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3. Political Opportunity Structures in Amsterdam and Berlin

In the previous chapters I have discussed this study's areas of interest. In particular, I explained what I understand social capital to be and that the primary focus of my research is on gaining insight into how it is used instead of merely mapping what it 'looks like'. In order to investigate the relationship between social capital and its mobilized form, I will concentrate on networks of voluntary organizations, and in particular on the networks of the Turkish ethnic communities in Amsterdam (the Netherlands) and Berlin (Germany). The reason for studying migrant communities and their voluntary associations relates, in the first place, to the roles that these organizations can play in the integration of immigrants into the host society (e.g Rijkschroeff and Duyvendak, 2004). West European countries are currently still trying to deal with large groups of immigrants who arrived during the second half of the last century, and the role of migrant organizations is often the topic of debate. Questions such as whether or not such associations should be financially supported by the government of the host society regularly set off heated discussions. Better insight into the workings of the community of migrants and their organizations would, therefore, be helpful when it comes to defining positions in these debates. My focus is on the Turkish communities in Berlin and Amsterdam in particular because their demographic compositions match up. Their migratory backgrounds are very similar, as are their occupational and educational levels. Moreover, both communities are about the same relative size in respect to the total population of the cities in which they reside (see also the Introduction). However, the circumstances that they encounter in their respective locations are considerably different. In other words, the voluntary organizations have to operate within different political opportunity structures. Comparing the same groups in different settings will shed light on what influence the political opportunity structure has on the social capital of the respective migrant communities and the way in which it is mobilized.

The first part of this chapter contains a short exploration of the concept of political opportunity structures. Thereafter, I describe these structures in Berlin and Amsterdam, and will show that circumstances in the two cities are quite different. I will conclude this chapter by once more addressing the research questions set out in the Introduction, and by formulating some hypotheses on the relationship between the political opportunity structure, social capital and mobilized social capital.

3.1 The influx of immigrants: same challenges, different responses

Germany and the Netherlands have a comparative history when it comes to the waves of migration that the countries have faced. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the two nations were both countries of (labor) immigration. In times of economic growth they faced an increasing demand for (unskilled) workers, and the laborers required were to be found abroad. As the economic crisis developed in the early 1970s, the welcome extended to these immigrants abruptly ended. Although no new workers entered their borders, both countries did face an increase in immigration as a result of family reunification: the laborers that had arrived over the two previous decades were entitled to bring their families to join them (1970s and 1980s). Furthermore, both Germany and the Netherlands played host to substantial groups of political refugees, including those who fled the Turkish regime after the military coup in 1980. In both countries – albeit at a different rate - there was a growing awareness of the fact that many of the migrants that had intended to stay for a restricted period of time were, in fact, no longer planning to leave. As it is put in Germany: "*Sie haben Arbeiter gefragt, aber Menschen sind gekommen*' [*they asked for workers, but people came*]. The presence of these immigrants demanded a reaction and suitable policies from the hosting governments. Both countries had to find ways to deal with the newcomers and learn how to somehow incorporate, integrate, or assimilate – depending on the ruling climate – them into their societies. And despite the similarities in the arrival of and demands for migrant workers, the ways in which the two countries welcomed and integrated them are structurally different. The migrants in Germany and the Netherlands faced almost polar opposite *political opportunity structure*s (POS).

3.2 Political opportunity structure; what is it, why is it important and what does it look like in the relevant cases?

From the 1970s onwards, the concept of political opportunity structures was developed by social movement scholars in relation to political conflict and political mobilization (e.g. Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1988, 1994; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995). In particular, scholars sought an explanation for the differences found between groups and places in terms of their level of conflict and political mobilization. At the time, the differences were predominantly explained within two streams of theory: rational choice and cultural determinism (Koopmans & Statham, 2000). These theories focus on the agency of the actors, while the (new) social movement scholars instead highlighted the influence of the political environment in which the actors had to act. The idea of these scholars was that the political structure largely influences the behavior and freedom of movement of the population. The general notion is that in configurations in

which individual actors are provided with easy access to political participation, and have ample opportunities to be heard through conventional channels of communication, the need to express political contention in terms of collective mobilization is dispelled. However, if these conventional channels are blocked, for example because minority groups are excluded from voting, the political configuration leaves the protesters with no option but collective mobilization. In cases where political configuration is completely closed and the insurgents are (near to) being oppressed, there will be no collective mobilization either. In summary, the relationship between the openness of the political structure and collective mobilization is supposed to be curvilinear (see Figure 3.1) (Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Meyer, 2004).



Figure 3.1 Relationship between the openness of political structure and collective mobilization

Whereas the tenor of the meaning of political opportunity structures in relation to political mobilization, as described above, is generally agreed upon, a more precise definition of POS is much less univocal. Sidney Tarrow is often quoted. He describes political opportunity structures as '*consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure*' (1994; p. 85). This formally correct, yet also broad, definition leaves ample room for maneuver. The number of definitions of POS is large and they are intrinsically diverse (cf. critical reviews by Tarrow, 1996; Bousetta, 2000; Meyer, 2004; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004). This mainly relates to the fact that the concept of POS is no longer only applied to the study of social movements and political conflict for which it was initially developed; it is now also used in other fields of research, such as the foundation of organizations (Morawska, 1996), Euroscepticism (Lees, 2008), and social capital (Maloney, Smith, & Stoker, 2000). Understandably, scholars adjusted their conceptions of POS and the accompanying operationalization to the objects under study. As Meyer (2004) remarked: '*many*

scholars avoid a large conceptual statement of opportunities and simply identify variables they judge to be relevant to the case at hand' (p.134).

The broad concept of POS can also be adjusted, or fine-tuned, to the circumstances of the area of work herein, namely that of migrant mobilization, ethnic political participation and the organizing process of migrant associations. For instance, Patrick Ireland (1994) defined POS in this field as "*the immigrant's legal situation, their social and political rights, citizenship and naturalization laws and broadly-defined integration policies as well as non-policies*" (in Bousetta, 2000). Parallel to for non-immigrant groups, a different degree of ethnic political mobilization and participation of migrants can be expected depending on the type of POS. According to the same logic that underlies Figure 3.1, an exclusive political opportunity structure provokes more political mobilization than an inclusive one does, while a POS that is too exclusive will also temper political action.

A number of researchers have demonstrated the importance of the POS for the establishment, life and development of immigrant organizations and ethnic mobilization (Koopmans & Statham, 2000, 2001; Rijkschroeff & Duyvendak, 2004; Bloemraad, 2005; Vermeulen, 2006). To narrow down the wide-ranging concept of POS, Koopmans (2004) advocated that '*(c)itizenship and integration regimes act as a field-specific political opportunity structure that shapes migrant identities and their patterns of organization and political participation*' (p.452). Together with his colleague, Koopmans proposed a two-dimensional scale in which citizenship and integration regimes make up the two axes (Koopmans & Statham, 2000). The citizenship regimes refer to the degree to which full citizenship is accessible to the individual migrant; how easily can migrants be naturalized, do they have the same rights as natives, and are they regarded as part of the nation? This dimension ranges from the situation where there are no or very few opportunities for immigrants to become naturalized, to a society in which there is easy access to the new nationality. The integration policies, on the other hand, relate to the extent to which immigrants are recognized as a cultural group and are granted the accompanying rights; are migrants expected to fully adjust to the majority's culture or are they allowed to express their own background? How do the authorities respond to the ethnic and religious claims of these groups? Countries are fully exclusive when they do not allow for any expression of the cultural backgrounds of migrants and expect them to fully adjust to the dominant culture. On the other hand, they are inclusive when they stimulate this expression and tolerate different cultures living side by side.

Based on the extremes of the two dimensions, Koopmans and Statham formulated a typology that characterizes a nation's POS. They distinguished four ideal-typical conceptions of political opportunity structures: ethnic segregationism, ethnic assimilationism, civic pluralism (multiculturalism), and civic republicanism (universalism; see also Figure 3.2). The first two are based on the notion that only those with a shared ethnic background (that of the native majority) are entitled to political

rights, and it is difficult, or impossible, for newcomers to become naturalized. With *ethnic segregationism*, migrants are excluded from these political rights, but they are allowed to express their culture. This type of POS was common in the era of the guest worker programs. Governments provided workers with ample opportunities to experience their foreign culture, for example, they were often encouraged to speak their mother tongue and their children were taught in that language. However, because it was



Figure 3.2 Two-dimensional model for citizenship/ political opportunity structures (from Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy, 2005)

expected that these laborers would return to their homelands within the foreseeable future, they were, at the same time, excluded from the political community. Nevertheless, even after the end of these guest worker programs, this philosophy can still be encountered, for example in conservative regions in Germany and Switzerland (Koopmans & Statham, 2000).

Ethnic assimilationism means that migrants are excluded from possessing political rights until they have become naturalized. Naturalization within this framework is encouraged, as long as migrants demonstrate adherence to the culture of the dominant group. Within such an environment there is no room for the expression of any culture

other than the dominant one. In other words, in this configuration both individual and group rights are hard to obtain. Germany is considered to be a country with such an assimilationist political opportunity structure. The other two conceptions of POS are based on a civic-territorial principle of access to the political system. Within *civic pluralism* (also referred to as multiculturalism in Koopmans et al. (2005)) the assignation of political rights is based on a territorial principle, i.e. once migrants have lived for at least a certain amount of time in the host country they are allowed to vote, and naturalization is relatively easy. For instance, immigrants' children who are born in the host country can be granted citizenship rights because of this. The Netherlands is often given as an example of a country with this type of POS. Furthermore, migrants are allowed, and sometimes even encouraged, to express their own culture. Finally, *civic republicanism* (also labeled 'universalism', ibid.) grants political rights to everyone who is living in a particular country, but does not allow the expression of ethnic differences. The notion is that there are universal rights, such as equality, which apply to everybody. This means that, at the same time, there must be strict neutrality with regard to individuals' cultural affinities, and no one can be given preferential treatment, whether they belong to either the native or the immigrant population.

There are two important points to note with regard to this typology. Firstly, given that the typology is based on a 'conceptual space' and the circumstances to which it applies obviously change, it is important to realize that a country's position in this two-dimensional space can vary over time (Koopmans et al., 2005). A new political set-up, for example, can lead to new policies which give the political opportunity structure a twist. Furthermore, one will not encounter any type of POS in its 'pure' form. It is impossible for countries to maintain a strict multicultural system, because even the idea of cultural freedom has its limits when the violation of individual human rights comes into play (for example, in the case of female circumcision). Moreover, nor will a regime that favors assimilation be able to uphold a position that immigrants have to acculturate even in the private sphere. In other words, the four extremes reflect *extremes*, but they are only approximations of reality. Nevertheless, countries do have political opportunity structures that come close to, or are based on, these extremes, and they certainly differ enough from each other to be distinguishable (Koopmans & Statham, 2000).

3.2.1 The political opportunity structure as an 'atmosphere'

I follow Koopmans et al.'s proposition by regarding the POS with respect to migrant mobilization and organization as citizenship regimes and integration policies. Their model provides a straightforward typology that shows how different countries have different ways of treating the migrant population. The two axes serve as bases upon which separate cases can easily be compared. But even by 'narrowing-down' the broad concept of POS to the relevant factors of citizenship regimes and integration policies, the

operationalization of these elements, and the POS as a whole, remains intangible. Case-specific characteristics that are crucial in one example may be absent or at least irrelevant in another. In what follows, I will present descriptions of the political opportunity structures in Berlin (Germany) and Amsterdam (the Netherlands) in as ordered a way as possible. To that end, I have listed a number of characteristics that I find to be generally indicative of the relevant citizenship regimes and integration policies, which apply as much as possible to both cases. I will discuss the political opportunity structures on the basis of the separate characteristics formulated here, but it must be noted that the POS is eventually the sum thereof. The POS can be seen as an 'atmosphere' within which actors can operate, and which can be made concrete by reference to its characteristics. The implication of the notion of the POS as an 'atmosphere' is that this complicates (but does not prevent) its use as an explanatory factor. Because the concept has many facets, it is difficult to demonstrate a direct one-on-one relationship between (particular assets of) the POS and, in this case, social capital and its mobilization. It is the configuration of the POS, namely the 'climate' within which it operates, which stimulates or prohibits the specific development or use of social capital, and only in some instances is it possible to pinpoint exactly which element(s) of the POS was (were) the direct cause(s). I will now describe the political opportunity structures of the two cases at hand. Firstly, I will focus on the general typologies that are ascribed to Germany and the Netherlands, and will thereafter concentrate on Berlin and Amsterdam in detail. Finally, I present a comparison between the two case-studies regarding the influence of the POS on the utilization of social capital in Chapter 10.

3.3 General typologies of POS in the Netherlands and Germany[20]

In the Netherlands, there is a political opportunity structure that can, generally, be characterized as 'civic plurist', 'multicultural' or 'inclusive' (respectively, Koopmans & Statham, 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Vermeulen & Berger, 2008). The public debate on integration has hardened since the beginning of this century, but this is not obvious in the country's policies (Koopmans, 2008). The strong conviction that there is a need for the 'preservation of migrants' cultures' has perhaps been diluted, but migrant groups are still offered ample opportunities, and are indeed encouraged, to express their cultural backgrounds (Ersanilli, 2009). Minority language teaching is no longer allowed, but female teachers are still permitted to wear headscarves. Moreover, the government explicitly advocates and welcomes non-natives working in public positions, and there are many forms of public media that are aimed at this group (Koopmans, 2008).

[20] I intend to provide a picture of the political opportunity structures in the two countries as they were around the time I performed my field work, i.e. 2005/2006. See also the paragraph 'points of attention'.

Scrutinizing the other axis (the individual rights) on the basis of the model presented above, it transpires that citizenship in the Netherlands is predominantly based on a territorial principle and naturalization is relatively easy. In 2003, the conditions that immigrants had to meet in order to be able to apply for naturalization were strengthened, and from that time onwards applicants cannot have a criminal record and must take a naturalization test. Nevertheless, the naturalization percentages among immigrants and their children are high. Overall, even though the POS in the Netherlands seems to be slowly sliding towards a more universalistic model, it '*remains much closer to the civic pluralist corner*' (Koopmans & Statham, 2000, p.28).

The POS in Germany, at least at the federal level, is described as 'ethno-cultural assimilationist' or 'exclusive' (ibid.), although in more recent years there has been a slow shift towards a more inclusive regime: '*Germany now moves (…) along a path somewhere between ethnic assimilationism and civic pluralism*' (Koopmans & Statham, 2000, p.25). However, even though Germany is moving and shifting, it still remains in the assimilationist corner. Firstly, Germany's naturalization policies are harsh (irrespective of the new legislation that was implemented in 2000). The individual right to become a German citizen is only granted under strict rules based on, for example, length of legal stay, renouncement of the nationality of birth, and the ability to live in the country without the need for social benefits. To some extent, Germany is currently facilitating the acquisition of the German nationality –especially for children born there to migrant parents – hence the changing position in the two-dimensional model. However, whether this new legislation actually makes naturalization easier and more attractive is questionable. In any case, the *Einbürgerungsquoten* (the number of people who are naturalized compared to the number of people who could apply) from the *Statistisches Bundesamt* (2009; the Central Statistic Office) indicate that, save for a small increase in 2006, the relative number of naturalizations nationwide has decreased since 2000. In practice, there are still too many hurdles to overcome on the road to German citizenship. Secondly, the assimilationist character of the POS in Germany is also seen with respect to group rights. For example, Germany regards itself as a Christian country, and religions other than Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism are not granted the same, privileges. Furthermore, no policies that are aimed at migrant groups in particular are pursued, and nor is the formation of migrant organizations encouraged. The 'foreigners' (*Ausländer*) are recognized as a separate group, but not many facilities are available to it. Indeed, a comparative study among youths in Germany, France and the Netherlands revealed that young Turks in Germany feel more discriminated against and excluded than their counterparts in the other two countries (Ersanilli, 2009).

It is generally acknowledged that Germany and the Netherlands represent different types of citizenship regimes and have different ways of dealing with the incorporation of migrants (in the next paragraph, I will expand on these classifications since some may regard the contrast between the two countries presented above as being too harsh).

However, in countries with a decentralized governmental system, these citizenship regimes are usually pursued on the national level, whereas other policies may not be. As Vermeulen (2006) and Koopmans (2004) articulated with respect to integration policies, it is necessary to take into account that the political opportunity structure is shaped at the national as well as at the local level of government. In the German case, for example, the policies on the federal and local levels are sometimes not in line. As I will explain later in more detail, it was long the case that at the federal level the prevailing view was one of non-integration, while at the local level some politicians were convinced of the benefits of a more integrative policy (Vermeulen, 2006; Berger, 2010). In the Netherlands, the two policy levels are not so contradictory, but the local government is responsible for 80% of the minority policies pursued (Buyse & Gricevich, 2001). With a national and international comparative study (Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands), Koopmans (2004) demonstrated that variations in the POS are present between cities *within* countries, and that the differences *between* countries are even more pronounced. These are empirical arguments as to why the local as well as the national and federal policy levels have to be taken into account in the determination of the POS.

Vermeulen and Berger (2008) have demonstrated that the POS in the specific cases of the cities of Amsterdam and Berlin are clearly distinct. These divergent political opportunity structures induced me and my colleagues to use these two cities as the basis of a comparative study of migrant organizations. Given the distinct political opportunity structures, one would also expect different reactions from the migrant populations in the two locations. Vermeulen (2006), for example, has proved that the immigrant organizing processes of the same group of migrants (i.e. Turks) differ in the two cities: because of the facilities that the Amsterdam POS had to offer, the Turkish community in that city has developed a more comprehensive organizational network[21] than the Turkish community in Berlin, where there was no policy of encouragement. A more detailed description of the political opportunity structures in the two cities will follow after I have addressed the issues which need to be taken into account when analyzing a POS.

3.4 Points of attention

The typologies of the POS in Amsterdam/the Netherlands and Berlin/Germany that I present herein are, in many ways, 'ideal typical' (some may even say they are caricatures). I certainly do not intend to present them as 'absolute' qualifications. First of all, even though the analyses of these systems are based upon rather objective measures, it is always possible that one POS has a different effect on different actors. I intend to

[21] I.e. the network of interlocking directorates.

present the political opportunity structures in the two cities in terms of how they are relevant for the Turkish populations and, in particular, their voluntary associations. Maloney et al.(2001) are right to argue that different associations in the same context may face or perceive different political opportunity structures, for example because a particular system may discriminate against certain types of organizations or specific groups. Berger (2010) demonstrates this in the case of Berlin, where Turks, Italians and *Aussiedler* each have a different status and thus have different opportunities, even though they are all immigrant communities.

A second point concerning the contrasting qualifications of the political opportunity structures in Germany and the Netherlands relates to what is called the 'policy gap'. This notion refers to the situation where a certain policy is formulated, but practitioners eventually deviate from these guidelines. For example, the German authorities are often reproached for having a negative attitude towards migrants, for instance because there is little recognition of their needs and claims, yet low level bureaucrats may, in fact, try to develop positive relationships with these groups. The presence of a policy gap in either or both of the current case studies cannot be ruled out and, moreover, will not be investigated. The typology of the POS in Amsterdam and Berlin presented here is based on characteristics that are, as far as possible, official, objective and verifiable. As a result, the contrast between the two cases is possibly more pronounced than local practices are in fact. I do not regard this as a problem, because even if both practices converge, this will be within limits, and they will not turn out to be completely the same. Another reason why the qualifications provided here should not be adhered to too rigidly is that political opportunity structures change over time. This is particularly relevant in the current case: insight into and the outlook on immigration and integration have been high on the political agenda in recent decades, which has obviously had an impact on the POS. The empirical part of the study herein was performed in 2005 and 2006. At the start of the new millennium in particular, both Germany and the Netherlands and their political opportunity structures went through some considerable changes. In the Netherlands, it is clear that its POS has become more restrictive in the last decade, in particular after the formation of the new LPF party and the murder of its leader, Pim Fortuyn, in 2002. A *laissez-faire* attitude was replaced by a more demanding approach. In Germany, there has been movement in the opposite direction: the very strict regime that marked the POS in the 20th century has relaxed, including the implementation of a more lenient naturalization law which was passed in 2000. However, these 'shifts' in the two-dimensional sphere towards the other end of the spectrum, as suggested by Koopmans and Statham (2000, 2001), should not be exaggerated, especially not when comparing the two cases. Koopmans (2004) has already highlighted that the differences in local political opportunity structures *within* countries are much smaller than the differences *between* countries. He found that even the most liberal city in Germany was more conservative than the least liberal city in the Netherlands. Moreover, in a recent assessment of the political opportunity structures in twelve Western-European nations

in the years 1980, 1990, 2002 and 2007, Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibel (2009) laid bare the idea that the positions of Germany and the Netherlands in the two-dimensional space of the axes of 'individual equality' and 'cultural difference' are changing, but not in relation to each other. Both Germany and the Netherlands are shown to have increased individual equality and decreased the cultural differences between immigrant and native groups. However, Germany's position remains in the section that can be characterized as the most restrictive, while the position of the Netherlands is consolidated in the quadrant reflecting an open POS.



Figure 3.3. Positions of Germany (D) and the Netherlands (Netherlands) in the two-dimensional space of individual and group rights in 1980, 1990, 2002 and 2007 (from Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibel, 2009)

In summary, my point is that even though the characterization of Germany/Berlin as restrictive and the Netherlands/Amsterdam as integrative may be too strong, I do use it to emphasize the mutual differences between the two political opportunity structures. This should also be borne in mind with respect to the presentation of the POS in the two specific cities which follows[22].

[22] As well as my own observations, I base this on various publications by (in order of date of publication) Koopmans and Statham (2000, 2001), Buyse and Gricevich (2001), Hunger and Tränhardt (2001), Østergaard-Nielsen (2001), Penninx and Schrover (2001), Schwarz (2001), Rijkschroeff and Duyvendak

One final point should be noted when it comes to the subsequent descriptions of the political opportunity structures: I will attempt to present the state of affairs at the time that the empirical material was collected (2005-2006). As I did not always possess the data regarding those precise moments, but instead had access to that from earlier or later times, it is difficult to objectively determine the continued effect of policy measures taken in the past. I have, however, made assessments of what the most probable situation in 2005-2006 would have been. For example, the naturalization law that was implemented in 2000 indicates a more open POS, but at the same time, a number of respondents were not particularly appreciative of this legislation, from which one could deduce that the consequences thereof may not be as positive as had, perhaps, been expected. Furthermore, I have already referred to the naturalization figures provided by the Statistical Bureau, which indicate that the willingness on the part of immigrants and their descendants to become German citizens is also dwindling after the relaxation of the naturalization legislation.

In what follows, I will discuss the POS in Amsterdam and Berlin successively. The characteristics upon which these descriptions are based are summarized in Table 3.1. They include the general attitude that the respective authorities display towards migrants, the status of individual rights (for naturalization and voting), the status of integration policies, the treatment of ethnic organizations (for example, whether they receive funding), and the degree to which migrant associations have access to the political system.

3.5 The political opportunity structure in Amsterdam

As already referred to, the POS in Amsterdam is described as being 'civic pluralist'. Ever since the arrival of immigrants, the universal belief in the Netherlands in general, and in Amsterdam in particular, has been that the cultures and identities of the newcomers should be preserved. The famous phrase characterizing the political outlook was 'integration while retaining their own identity and culture'. From the beginning of the 1980s, there has been growing political awareness that the migrants that were brought in to covertemporary labor shortages were not going to leave the country, and in 1983 the national 'Minorities Policy' (Minderhedenbeleid) came into effect, and was the

(2004), Koopmans et al. (2005), Pfaff and Gill (2006), Vermeulen (2006), Yurdakul (2006), Vermeulen and Berger (2008), Berger (2010), Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibel (2009).

	Amsterdam	Berlin
general typology	civic pluralist (multicultural)	ethnic assimilationism (shifting towards more integration)
attitude regarding 'other'	cultural identities recognized: preservation of minority cultures after 2002: more demanding	little appreciation and tolerance of cultural diversity: pressure to assimilate and adjust
general discourse	"integration while retaining own identity and culture" Since 2000: emphasis on social-economic integration	long time: "Germany is not a country of immigration" since 2000/2004: more multicultural but still strict demands
status of integration policy	explicit integration policy 80% integration policy at local level	implicit policy integration policy is regional (Berlin is region)
attitude regarding migrant organizations	immigrant organizations helpful for emancipation, so stimulated	the right to establish migrant organization, but under strict state supervision; distrustful attitude Ausländerbeauftragte stimulating role
funding of migrant organizations	initially: every organization eligible for subsidies, except political and religious funding included in the minority policies later: mainly specific activities, often under condition of inter-organizational collaboration	subsidy not included in immigration policy only 'happy few' eligible organizations subsidies only for specific projects carried out by a selection of organizations
minority councils	national Turkish council IOT multi-ethnic migrant councils in several city districts status: consultative, little influence on policy making	no state initiated national council23 Ausländerbeiräte on city district level status: marginal and powerless
access to political system	interaction between civil servants and politicians and migrant organizations immigrant organizations included in policy making process	no access to political system, greater demand for politically active community immigrant organizations play marginal role, more room for recognized religious organizations (not Islam) Ausländerbeauftragte (city wide)
migrants in political positions	Turkish politicians in city and city district councils	few Turkish representatives, only in city council
accessibility of nationality	relatively easy, although increasingly strict more and more conditions	difficult and not very common since 2000 new law, facilitating in particular newborns
voting rights for migrants	at municipal level after 5 years of legal residence	no voting rights

Table 3.1 Overview of political opportunity structure indicators in Amsterdam and Berlin in 2005/2006

[23] In November 2006 (after the period of data collection) the Minister of the Interior did set up an Islam Conference. See also page 17.

embodiment of the aforementioned motto. The city of Amsterdam adopted the national policy, and in later years municipal and national policy changes came into effect more or less simultaneously, although not in all respects. For example, in the 1990s, the national Minorities Policy was replaced by a policy of diversity that no longer focused on the emancipation and support of different minority groups and abandoned the notion of arrangement along ethnic lines. Instead, this policy was aimed at stimulating the social-economic positions of deprived people, whether they be natives or immigrants. In practice, however, the local governments retained their focus on specific groups, even though this approach contradicted the general "tough on integration" discourse of national policies at the time (Poppelaars & Scholten, 2008). The local governments were able to do this because about 80% of the country's policies on integration are pursued at the local level.

The changes in national and local policies were the result of a general hardening of the public attitude towards the presence and integration of immigrants. The rise of a new right-wing political party, the LPF, which took a clear stance on integration and immigration issues, and the murder of its leader (Pim Fortuyn), have accelerated the transition from a more pampering to a more demanding atmosphere. On the other hand, the actual consequences of this new climate are relatively limited at the current time: Koopmans et al. (2009) showed that the overall score of an extensive set of indicators of individual equality and cultural recognition has decreased very little.

The Minorities Policy that was valid for two decades included a prominent position in favor of the establishment and support of migrant organizations. The multicultural ideal implied that it was necessary to provide group specific services and that these were best delivered through migrant associations. In line with the former political arrangement of pillarization (Verzuiling), which meant that groups with different philosophies on life (Catholics, Protestants, socialists and 'liberals') should each provide their own services, such as newspapers, hospitals, schools and organizations, it was argued that this approach would help migrants to form their own 'pillar'. They were encouraged to set up organizations under which to unite, and more importantly to make available contacts who the government could address. In the old system of pillarization, the communication between the pillars took place at the elite level, i.e. between the organizations' leaders, so if newcomers were able to organize themselves, they would also be more approachable. The local government provided subsidies to stimulate the establishment of ethnic associations. In the 1980s and 1990s, every organization was, in principle, eligible for grants, except for political and religious associations because of the separation of the Church and State. However, since large groups of the migrant population were Muslims, and organized themselves along Islamic lines, the Dutch government felt compelled to somehow include religious associations in its policies. These organizations were therefore encouraged to establish social-cultural counterparts which could be financed as secular organizations. In general, the Muslim population has ample opportunities for religious expression, precisely because of the system of

pillarization. The right to a private education, for example, allows the establishment of Islamic schools, as long as they meet the criterion of providing a good education as formulated by the Ministry of Education. Indeed, they even receive financial support from the national government.

The subsidies granted under the *Minorities policy* were mainly fundamental and structural in nature. In more recent years, however, the policy has changed and associations do not often receive the latter type of funding anymore. Instead, only specific activities are financed, on condition that organizations collaborate with those formed by other ethnic groups.

Another way in which the Dutch government tried to keep in contact with immigrant groups was, and is, through migrant councils. In the case of the Turkish community, the *Inspraak Orgaan Turken,* in which different Turkish federations united and collaborated on a number of issues, was established at the national level in 1984. A year later, the Amsterdam government created a local Turkish council, the TDM, in which Turkish organizations of various denominations were brought together. The intention was that because of the different backgrounds of the participating associations, the government would acquire as much information as possible about the Turkish community, which would, in turn, feel represented. Alas, it was precisely the great diversity, or actually the many differences of opinion, between the assembled organizations that made the TDM fall apart: the tension between the participants often became so great that it was not possible to reach agreement. In 2003, the TDM was dissolved[24]. During the interviews I held in 2005, some respondents said that they were setting up a new Turkish council in Amsterdam (Inspraakorgaan Turken Amsterdam, ITA), but although they did receive a small amount of funding in 2006[25], this body has not become a major player.

In some city districts, the local government installed migrant councils in which immigrant organizations of different ethnic backgrounds could confer about relevant topics. However, participation is not open to every interested party: it is the city district that decides whether organizations are able to take part. In the Bos en Lommer area of the city, for example, only the organizations that receive subsidies from the city district are approved. The migrant councils in these districts are principally intended to provide (un)asked-for advice to the city districts, and they have very little influence on the development of policy, although research has shown that the impact of the TDM and the IOT in the nineties was greater than that of any individual Turkish organization (Raamnota, 1989). A study by Poppelaars (2007), on the other hand, revealed that local government officials often engage in close contact with migrant organizations because, amongst other things, this facilitates the implementation of (new) policies upon which

[24] Source: Gemeenteblad 2003 afd. 3A nr. 155/410

[25] Source: Evaluatie van de Bijzondere Subsidieverordening Integratie en Participatie (2007). Dienst Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, Gemeente Amsterdam

these bodies can provide advice about how mere proposals can be transformed into workable projects (Poppelaars & Scholten, 2008).

The final element of the POS in Amsterdam that is relevant for the functioning of migrant organizations is whether they have any representatives active in local politics. Meyer and Minkoff (2004) demonstrated that the number of black politicians in the US Congress was negatively related to the number of civil rights and black protest and advocacy organizations that are formed each year. The authors hypothesized that black congressional representation is assessed by social movement leaders as a sign of the openness of the normal political structure, implying that conventional ways of influencing politics and policies are more attractive than non-conventional protest activities. This would underline the general curvilinear relationship between the openness of a political structure and the existence of collective mobilization. In the current cases, it would mean that the presence of Turkish politicians at the city district and municipal levels would decrease the need for urgent community mobilization. Table 3.2 sets out the number of Turkish representatives elected in the 2002 and 2006 local elections in Amsterdam. The percentages of the representatives in the councils clearly correspond to the percentage of Turkish inhabitants in the city in the years 2002 and 2006 (respectively 5% and 5.2%).

Year		Amsterdam	Berlin
2002	City council	4 (8.9%)	-
2002	City districts	16 (5.0%)	-
2006	City council	3 (6.6%)	6 (4.0%)
2006	City districts	22 (6.8%)	-

Table 3.2 Number of Turkish representatives in Amsterdam and Berlin (percentage of total; from Vermeulen and Berger, 2008)

With respect to the citizenship regime as it relates to the individual rights of newcomers (the second of the two axes in Koopmans et al.'s model; see Figure 3.1 on p. 67), the accessibility of nationality and the right to vote are crucial indicators. In the Netherlands, both of these elements are national measures that also apply in Amsterdam. The Netherlands used to be known as a country in which it was relatively easy to be naturalized. However, as the political climate has hardened in more recent years, the demand for naturalization has increased. Currently, the main requirements that foreigners who want to become Dutch have to meet are[26]: at least five years of legal residence in the Netherlands, no criminal record, passing the *inburgeringsexamen* (civic integration examination) which tests speaking, reading, writing and understanding of Dutch, and whether a candidate is '*ingeburgerd*', i.e. has knowledge of the ruling customs

[26] As noted in the brochure of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Netherlands (2007): *Hoe kunt u Nederlander worden? (How to become Dutch)* Retrieved in March 2009 from www.ind.nl.

in the country. The final demand is the willingness to renounce one's former nationality, although the candidate is not obliged to do so if the country of origin does not permit this, or if it would lead to a demonstrable loss of rights that would financially damage the candidate (such as loss of an inheritance). The introduction of the civic integration examination in 2007 in particular caused a great deal of concern, and is a stumbling block for many candidates. At the same time, this test is a clear sign that the citizenship regime in the Netherlands has become stricter.

A migrant's right to vote was introduced in the Netherlands in 1986, which made the country one of the first in Europe to include this group in the electoral process. Since then, immigrants who have legally resided in the Netherlands for five years or more are permitted to vote in elections at the local level, i.e. municipal, and in the case of Amsterdam also at the city district level. They also have the right to stand in local elections.

Overall, the political opportunity structure in Amsterdam is characterized by a government that is sympathetic towards migrant organizations and provides them with ample financial and political opportunities, even though the official regime has recently become stricter. Given this favorable attitude, it is expected that the voluntary associations in Amsterdam will have substantial amounts of social capital, i.e. the contact network in Amsterdam is large and there are many ties between actors. This should become clear particularly in comparison to the social capital of organizations in Berlin, which operate within a much harsher political opportunity structure.

3.6 The political opportunity structure in Berlin

The political opportunity structure in Berlin has a considerably different configuration compared to the one in Amsterdam. First of all, the attitude of the German government towards newcomers at the national level is very different to the Dutch approach. The POS in Germany is generally described as ethnic assimilationism: immigrants are allowed to practice their own culture, but they are excluded from the political system. This obviously means that people living in Germany who do not have German nationality are not allowed to vote at any level[27]. Secondly, it is difficult to obtain German nationality, although the requirements that have to be fulfilled have been relaxed since the start of the century. Until 2000, German nationality was based on the principle of *ius sanguinis*: only for people who have German 'blood' (*sanguis*), i.e. have German ancestors. This implied that the guest workers who arrived in the 1960s from Italy, Turkey and other countries, would never be able to legally become German, and would never be allowed to participate conventionally in the political process. In 2000,

[27] The only exception is that EU-citizens without German nationality are allowed to vote at the local level.

however, the legislation concerning naturalization was adapted, mainly regarding the rights of second and subsequent generations of immigrants. Those who want to become naturalized must: have been living in Germany for at least 8 years, have no criminal record, pass a language test, cannot be reliant on social benefits, be willing to give up their former nationality. The new legislation only allows children born in Germany after 2000 to non-German parents who have lived in the country for 8 or more years to have dual citizenship. When they are aged between 18 and 23, these children have to decide whether they want to keep the German or the other nationality, since dual citizenship is not possible for German adults. Despite this liberalization of the naturalization laws, many have protested against the refusal of dual citizenship. One of the slogans used was '*Doppelpass für die Doppelrealität*' (double nationality for the double reality), referring to the fact that many migrants were not able or willing to give up their original nationality, but did want to become German citizens. This is also visible in the fact that the predicted growth of naturalization figures has failed to occur (see above). All in all, naturalization in Germany is still relatively difficult and uncommon, particularly when compared to other EU countries (Koopmans, 2004).

The legal hurdles that apply to naturalization are congruent with the general approach to immigrants in Germany. There is very little appreciation and tolerance of cultural diversity and the pressure to assimilate and adjust to the dominant culture is significant. The general idea in the first few decades after the first influx of migration was that the new arrivals had two choices: 'integration or departure'. For a long time, the German approach was based on the idea that '*Germany is not a country of immigration*' (a well-known phrase in the Helmut Kohl era, 1982-1998), despite the fact that it had for years been one of the most important destinations worldwide for migrants (Immerfall, 2008). It was around the turn of the millennium that the government became convinced of the fact that Germany had to deal with the large groups of immigrants who had arrived in recent decades and who were clearly staying and watching their children grow-up. The reluctance of the German government to change is directly related to the fact that the issue of integration has not been a separate policy domain for many years. The policies that were pursued were always part of other more encompassing policy areas, and generally concerned restrictive measures against the growth of the immigrant population. It was only in 2005 that a more encompassing law was implemented. The initiative for the law was taken by the, at the time, left-wing coalition between the social-democrat party, the SPD, and the green party, *Die Grüne*. The new legislation was the result of a process that had started years before. In 2000, Prime Minister Gerhard Schröder (SPD) wanted to welcome highly skilled computer professionals into the country, and to that end he launched a Green Card Program. This was taken as a starting point for a debate on the position of Germany as a country of immigration. An impartial committee was established by the Minister of Internal Affairs, and was charged with developing solutions and recommendations regarding more encompassing regulation of immigration and integration. At the same time, parties in

congress produced their own draft bills (Goethe Institut, 2009). The result of many years of deliberation and navigation between the demands of parties which wanted to stimulate the influx of highly skilled workers and those which wanted a strict limitation on immigration in general, was a compromise that was reached in 2004. The Immigration and Integration Act was accepted and implemented from the 1st January 2005[28]. This meant that for the first time in German history political account was taken of the fact that the country was dealing with immigrants and integration issues. In some respects, the act entailed a relaxation of the law, since it included major improvements to the legal positions of migrants, in particular refugees[29]. On the other hand, it also encompassed other, relatively strict, demands, for example, requiring foreign residents who receive unemployment benefits or '*who ha[ve] not yet managed to integrate into the economic, cultural and social life of the Federal Republic of Germany without state help*'[30] to take integration courses. In other words, even though the new legislation suggested some improvements in the position of immigrants, it also involved some tightening of the law. Ultimately, the legislation remained more exclusive than inclusive.

The city-state of Berlin has always adopted relatively progressive integration policies compared to the federal approach. The policy in Berlin was able to deviate from the federal course because such policies in Germany are mainly formulated at the regional level. Berlin is a city-state and thus can formulate her own integration policy. The fact that Berlin's policies were more progressive is attributed to both the role of the *Ausländerbeauftragte* (Commissioner for Foreigners), which was established by the Senate of Berlin in the early 1980s, and in particular to Barbara John, who filled this position. By the time John gave up the role, the political climate regarding migrants in Germany, and Berlin in particular, had become much more multicultural than it had been at the time of her inauguration.

The *Ausländerbeauftragte* has an ambivalent status in Berlin politics. On the one hand, it is the intermediary between politicians and migrants and, as such, has a crucial position; one of its most important tasks is to articulate the interests of migrants. On the other hand, the *Ausländerbeauftragte* has only a limited budget and no formal power. CDU-politician Barbara John (Christian Democrats) was the *Ausländerbeauftragte* for twenty years and is held by many as being personally responsible for the progressive integration course that Berlin took. Despite the restrictive policy measures of the federal CDU government (her own party) and the precarious position of the *Ausländerbeauftragte* in the political arena, John promoted the integration of migrants by stimulating naturalization (Berlin had higher naturalization figures than any other

[28] By 2007, the legislation already knew several adjustments, which shows how much the initial law was the result of endless compromises.
[29] www.zuwanderung.de of the Federal Ministry of the Interior
[30] As stated on the website of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees: www.integration-in-deutschland.de

city in Germany) and actively reaching out to migrant groups and their organizations. In practice, this meant that (only) a select group of organizations received funding from the *Ausländerbeauftragte*. The *Ausländerbeauftragte* had access to the (Turkish) community through these strategically chosen bodies, and because it was the main access point to the political system for these migrant organizations, their support legitimized the role and position of the *Ausländerbeauftragte* itself. Other than through the *Ausländerbeauftragte*, migrant organizations have little financial support available to them; subsidies are not included in immigration policy. Sometimes, the *Land Berlin* or the city districts (through the *Stadtteilmanagement* (city district management)) provide small amounts of money, but the lion's share of funds are provided by the *Ausländerbeauftragte*. Furthermore, the subsidies are only handed out for particular projects carried out by the organizations, and not for the organizations themselves. In 2003, Günter Piening (from the green party Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) took over the position of the *Ausländerbeauftragte*[31]. The name of the role has also been changed into the *Integrationsbeauftragte,* which emphasizes the foreignness of the immigrant population much less, and instead focuses much more on the integrative aims of the Commissioner.

Save for the *Ausländerbeauftragte*, who is actively reaching out to at least some of the migrant communities, the attitude of the government towards immigrant organizations in Berlin is generally typified as relatively 'hostile' (Gesemann, 2001; Vermeulen, 2006). Migrants have the right to establish associations, but they are under the strict surveillance of the state. This means that their activities are regularly tracked by the *Verfassungsschutz* and board relationships are scrutinized. This also results in some organizations being banned, such as the religious Milli Görüş movement. Islamic organizations in general are, to a large degree, ignored by the (local) authorities: there is hardly any official contact between them and politicians and they do not receive any financial support. It was only in November 2006 that the Minister of the Interior initiated the *Islamkonferenz* (Islam Conference), which is intended to collaboratively further the integration of the Muslim population and lead to a 'German Islam'[32]. Half of the participants are fifteen (German) regional and federal politicians, while the other half consists of representatives of Muslim organizations (five) and ten '*nicht-organisierte*' Muslims, practicing or otherwise, who are active in the public debate, are not related to any organization, and may take a critical stance towards Islam. The *Islamkonferenz* is not without controversy: even after the first meeting critics cast doubt

[31] How much Barbara John and the office of *Ausländerbeauftragte* were entwined can be seen from the stream of criticism that came straight after the appointment of Piening and still continues six years later (Köhler, 2004; Geithe, 2009). Moreover, during the interviews that I held in 2005, it was John who was referred to in particular.

[32] On the website of the Islamkonferenz it says: "*Ziel (...) eine bessere religions- und gesellschaftspolitische Integration der muslimischen Bevölkerung und ein gutes Miteinander aller Menschen in Deutschland, gleich welchen Glaubens*." www.deutsch-islam-konferenz.de

on the participant organizations (the conservative Muslim communities would only join the *Konferenz* to gain official recognition[33], but have no intention of integrating into German society) and the outcomes (because of internal differences there would never be any consensus on a course of action).

Migrant organizations in Berlin do not have many opportunities to relate to governmental institutions, and there is no federal migrant council as there is in the Netherlands. On the local level, there are '*Ausländerbeiräte*' (migrant councils) in several city districts, but their status is marginal and they are powerless. The city district officials decide which organizations are permitted to participate in the councils, which leads to the exclusion of the more conservative associations. Migrant organizations are not included at all in the policy making process and very little in the implementation of policy. At the city district level, the Quartiersmanagement organizations (meant to solve social inequality problems in Berlin[34]) collaborate, to a greater or lesser degree, with local associations on specific projects, but this partnership does not have a structural basis.

In general, migrant organizations have limited access to the political system. Not only are they rarely included in the political process, but there are also relatively few migrant, in this case Turkish, politicians. In Table 3.2 above it can be seen that only the city council has a small percentage of Turkish politicians. The figure of 4% is slightly less than the average of 5.5% of Turkish inhabitants in Berlin in 2006. It is argued that the demand for a politically active community is high due to the limited amount of political access (see also Figure 3.1 at the beginning of this chapter), but whether this is indeed the case will be considered later in this book.

The political opportunity structure in Berlin thus distinguishes itself from the one in Amsterdam by being harsher as migrants and their descendants in the former city have less cultural and group rights than in the latter. If contact networks are influenced by the POS in a similar way to how networks of interlocking directorates are affected, one would expect to find a less extensive contact network in Berlin than in Amsterdam. However, an alternative scenario is that because there are fewer financial resources, and because of the negative climate concerning migrants and their organizations, associations have a tendency to flock together. In that case, the contact network in Berlin would be larger and the actors there would have more social capital. In what follows, I

[33] This refers to the recognition of a religion as a *Körperschaft des öffentliches Rechts* (corporation of public law). When a religion is officially and legally recognized, which can only be achieved by a decision of a court, it has the right to: raise taxes, receive endowments, be granted pastoral care in public institutions, receive social welfare supported by the state and religious instruction in state schools (Jonker, 2000). Currently, only the Lutheran and Catholic Churches and the Jewish community have the *Körperschaftsstatus*. Several Islamic organizations have attempted to gain, but have been denied, this status.

[34] Also see page note 59 on page 146, and page 153.

will theorize a little more on what scenarios can be expected when it comes to the relationships between the POS, social capital and its mobilization.

3.7 Political opportunity structure – social capital – mobilized social capital

The relevance of the POS on the immigrant organizing process in Amsterdam and Berlin has been demonstrated by Vermeulen (2006). He revealed that the political opportunity structures in the two cities are determinative of the number of migrant organizations and the interconnections between them, expressed as interlocking directorates. The inclusive POS in Amsterdam, with the availability of subsidies, facilitated the foundation of organizations. Furthermore, the fact that government officials encouraged Islamic groups to also set up non-religious bodies increased the number of interlocks between them, since in many cases the board members of the new organizations were also on the boards of existing ones. The hostile attitude of the German government, as expressed in the lack of easily accessible funds and a strict surveillance policy, has led migrants to establish fewer organizations, and those that have been formed refrained from making any interconnections. The POS had no clear effect on the *types* of organizations that were established in the two cities, which can be seen from the fact that, in that respect, the two communities evolved in a similar manner.

The current study is concerned with the social capital of migrant organizations (translated into the network of interlocking directorates and the contact network) and the way in which they mobilize it. This process of mobilization cannot be regarded separately from the context in which it exists. The course of the mobilization is determined by the shape of the social capital itself as well as by the larger structure (context), namely the political opportunity structure that sets the institutional boundaries within which the organizations have room to navigate. The theoretical relationships between the context, social capital and mobilized social capital are depicted in Figure 3.4.



Figure 3.4 Theoretical relationships between POS, social capital and mobilized social capital

3.7.1 Relationship I

Relationship I, which lies between the POS and social capital, has been tested by Vermeulen and his colleagues in terms of the network of interlocking directorates, and was proved to be positive: a stimulating POS leads to more a more extensive and better connected network of shared board memberships. However, the influence of the POS on the other element of what I define as social capital, i.e. the contact network, remains to be examined. This may be either absent, positive or negative, and need not be the same as the relationship between the context and the network of interlocking directorates. A positive relationship could be seen in the fact that the associations that are included in a dialogue with the government (for example through subsidies, migrant councils and the like) have a more extensive circle of acquainted organizations than those who are excluded. If this is indeed the case, and as a result of the city's inclusive POS, this would be confirmed by the organizations in Amsterdam having more social capital than those in Berlin, where there is an exclusive POS. But if the organizations that are included in this dialogue refrain from making contact with other organizations, perhaps because they do not need them because they draw their resources from the government, this would mark a negative relationship between the POS and the contact network. In this scenario, a more exclusive context stimulates the mutual bonds between organizations, resulting in a more extensive contact network. In a more inclusive POS, however, the need to stick together may be less pressing, thus leading to a more confined contact network. This would imply that the actors in Berlin have more social capital than those in Amsterdam and that the former have more ethnic bonding social capital.

3.7.2 Relationships II and III

The process of mobilizing one's social capital can depend on several factors. The most important aspect is the shape of the social capital at hand. In other words, if, for example, an organization has more social capital this means that it could potentially mobilize more organizations than is the case if it has little. If this is the case, it would imply that Relationship II is positive. On the other hand, the opposite may also be true: associations that have many contacts may be more selective in their choices of which other organizations to mobilize, while those that have only a few contacts may be inclined to utilize them all. In that case, the relationship between social capital and its mobilized form is negative. Given what is already known about the networks of interlocking directorates in the two cities, it seems that the community in Amsterdam contains more social capital than the one in Berlin. Assuming that the contact networks resemble these formal networks, a positive relationship between social capital and mobilized social capital would imply that the mobilization in Amsterdam will be more extensive, whereas the opposite scenario would lead to a more comprehensive mobilization in Berlin. However, it first remains to be seen whether the organizations in Berlin do indeed have less social capital.

Furthermore, as the mobilization of a network takes place within a wider context, the political opportunity structure that could affect the shape of the social capital may be an influence on the mobilization process as well, albeit directly (Relationship III) or indirectly . A positive effect of an open POS would be when migrant councils set up by the government stimulate the connections between the participants in such a way that they turn to each other during the mobilization process. This would mean that the actors who are members of any of the migrant councils would address their fellow members. A negative influence of the POS would be that an open structure provides so much room for the organizations that they become pacified: they may not feel the need to mobilize any other organization because they assume that the government will take care of things. From this perspective, the actors may instead address governmental organizations or officials during the mobilization. If this is the case, this should be visible in Amsterdam.

In a closed POS, where associations are left to their own devices, it is to be expected that organizations are used to taking care of business themselves and, because of this, have developed a way of mobilizing many of the community's associations. This would manifest itself when a significant proportion of (ethnic bonding) social capital is mobilized in the Turkish community in Berlin.

Based on the literature on social movements discussed at the beginning of this chapter, one would expect to find a closed POS having a stimulating effect on the mobilization process (because organizations cannot expect anything from the government, they have to take care of things themselves), and an open POS having a

pacifying influence. This would mean that mobilization will proceed more vigorously in Berlin than in Amsterdam.

3.8 To the empirical parts

In the next two sections of this book (Chapters 4-6 and Chapters 7-9) I will present the empirical results of my fieldwork. I will first explain how I gathered the information on the contact networks (Chapter 4), and then in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively, I draw a picture of the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin and their social capital. The second empirical part of this work is the true spearhead of this study because it concerns the data on how the two communities mobilize their social capital. In Chapter 7, I explain what I regard as mobilization and how I have tested it by means of an experiment. The two chapters which follow contain the results and the interpretation thereof. The comparison of the two cases can be found in the final part of the book (Chapter 10).