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2. Social Capital

Social capital is a popular concept in the social sciences, and has been studied by many scholars with different backgrounds and from different angles. The advantage of this diversity is that the limitations and possibilities of the concept have been highlighted, which allows for an evaluation of its usefulness, including for conscious applications in new research. Such critical appraisal is needed, because the multitude of studies of social capital is accompanied by many divergent definitions of and outlooks on it. In order to create some clarity about this, I will first demonstrate how social capital is generally defined. That is, I will discuss what scholars more or less agree upon as the main components thereof (i.e. networks, trust, and shared norms and values). Despite the fact that there is consensus on these basic elements, there is also confusion about the concept because, on a more detailed level, the interpretations diverge. The most important difference is that between those who regard social capital as an individual asset and those who consider it to be a characteristic of the collective. I will provide insight into the varying outlooks on the issue that can be found in the literature by presenting a typology which clearly distinguishes between collective and individual social capital. This typology also reveals how the various approaches relate to each other.

Moreover, the typology I will produce also includes the outlook on social capital that I will adhere to in this work. It will become clear that this view is the most appropriate in a study of voluntary associations and their mobilization, which is, after all, the aim here. In the previous chapter I discussed the relationship between voluntary organizations, civic communities and political participation. I will start this chapter by explaining how the concepts of civic community, civil society, and social capital are linked.

2.1 The relationship between a civil society, a civic community and social capital

The relationship between civic communities and social capital is so accepted today that these concepts are often used almost interchangeably. Furthermore, as Marsh (2002) pointed out, the notions of civic community and social capital are regularly – intentionally or otherwise – confused with that of civil society, even though this is inappropriate. A close examination of these concepts reveals how easily the confusion

arises. To begin with, a civil society[12] is the sphere which exists between the state, the market and the family (see Figure 2.1) (e.g. Lelieveldt, 1999; Warren, 1999; Dekker, 2002; M. Edwards, 2004), and which is shaped not by individual citizens, but by groups or organizations formed by them.



Figure 2.1 Representation of the civil society in relation to the state, the market, and the family (adapted from Fennema (2004) and Lelieveldt (1999))

The distinction between civil society and the state is based upon the constitutional right of association, which allows organizations to act autonomously (e.g. Dekker, 2002), without government interference. Organizations in a civil society do not act in pursuit of profit, which therefore distinguishes them from commercial enterprises. The associations within civil society are not based on familial relationships or friendships, and this distinguishes them from the private sphere. The fundamental principle that differentiates a civil society from the other three spheres is the principle of voluntariness (Newton, 2001); the associations shaping it are established voluntarily. No government institution, or indeed any other actor, has forced the foundation of these organizations. Furthermore, citizens are free to participate in civil society in general, or in any organization in particular. Membership is by no means a legal requirement. Instead, a person is free to join and leave an association, and is likewise free to join or not join in with any activities initiated by civil society. This is different to the 'obligatory' memberships of core institutions like the family, to which one belongs from birth, the state, which one simply cannot avoid, and the workplace, because almost everybody needs to work. The reason why individuals engage with these voluntary associations is that they can collaboratively produce common goods that they are not able to create

[12] Michael Edwards (2004) demonstrates that there are in fact three theoretical positions regarding the meaning of civil society in the literature. The first, analytical, model sees it as a structural given: civil society is a distinct part of society. This model is the most common notion and is also discussed herein. The second, normative, model regards 'civil society' as 'a society that is civil'. It refers to a society which is motivated by a different way of being and living in the world, in which citizens are free, there is tolerance, no discrimination, non-violence, trust and cooperation. The third model sees civil society as the public sphere: an arena for public deliberation, rational dialogue and the exercise of 'active citizenship' in pursuit of the common interest. Edwards suggests synthesizing these three models into one, as they are interrelated and each has different strengths and weaknesses.

individually. This applies to more politically related matters, such as interest representation, as well as to social goods, such as a soccer competition.

The conceptualization of civil society as the whole of voluntary organizations does not in itself entail a normative connotation. In my view, it merely describes the presence of citizen-initiated, formalized relationships in the shape of voluntary associations, and nothing more and nothing less. However, civil society is ascribed many roles, with Edwards and Foley (2001) describing three of these in relation to social capital. These roles are more or less generally accepted. Firstly, a civil society has both public and quasi-public functions; it provides educational activities, offers social or even financial support (for example, food banks) and supplies aid through a variety of schemes. It takes on tasks that actors in the governmental, commercial and familial spheres fail to address. Secondly, civil society has representative or contestatory functions. In other words, a civil society can voice the interests of its participants vis-à-vis the government, which can be pressed to act on matters of public interest. Other authors term this function as the mediating role of civil society (e.g. Olsen, 1972; Lelieveldt, 1999). The civil society as mediator not only represents its constituency against the government (i.e. bottom-up), but it also serves as a top-down intermediary by supporting the government in implementing policies. The third function of civil society that Edwards and Foley distinguish has already been discussed in the previous chapter: socialization. This major role, "if not *the* major role" (B. Edwards & Foley, 2001, emphasis in original), refers to the opportunities that voluntary organizations offer to their members to shape their 'habits of the hearts'. In such associations, members can develop individual and generalized social trust, shared norms and values, and civic skills.

This third role in particular reveals why the concepts of civil society and civic community are often used interchangeably: if one assumes that a civil society *by definition* fulfils the three functions referred to, this implies that the members of the organizations have indeed developed civic skills, and any community in which citizens are civically minded is, logically, a civic community. Yet, I would argue that although it is *likely* that a civil society adopts all three roles, and it is also *likely* that a civil society produces civic citizens, this is not a hard and fast rule. I regard civil society as a domain within the larger entity of a (democratic) society. Whether the former can indeed be equated with a civic community depends upon the internal structure of this civil society[13] (see also Roβteutscher, 2002). For example, a civil society in which the ruling norm is 'every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost' is less likely to produce public goods than one in which participants act upon a motto of 'I will do you a favor today, and you can return it tomorrow, or any other day'. A civil society in which citizens

[13] Edwards and Foley (2001) write that the definitional confusion surrounding the concept of civil society stems from variations across the 'many civil societies'. Chambers and Kymlicka (2002) have even devoted a book to the topic called *Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society*, which includes a contribution on Confucian and Islamic conceptions of civil society (by Madsen and Hanafi respectively).

do not trust anyone outside their own group will not be able to make a united stand against the government in times of oppression.

Moreover, if the voluntary organizations that make up civil society are each characterized by a strictly vertical balance of power, where the leaders decide and the members follow, this can hardly be seen as being a democratic and encouraging environment. So, to have a beneficial effect, voluntary organizations need to have a horizontal internal structure (Putnam, 1995; Stolle & Lewis, 2002). Members of voluntary associations have to find ways to achieve their common goals collectively, and in most cases will only succeed in doing so when they empathize with each other, create a sense of reciprocity, and learn 'the art of compromise' (Newton, 2001). Because of the inherently asymmetrical power relationships, it is difficult to experience trust and reciprocity in vertical structures. In contrast, the members in a horizontal structure are of equal standing, which facilitates the development of mutual trust and social understanding (Putnam, 1993). A horizontal structure embodies previous successes at collaboration (ibid.). This means that the fact that a horizontal structure exists at all reveals that, in the past, people must have worked together successfully. This encourages future cooperation. For example, if I see that my fellow PhD-students have formed a discussion group in which they talk about each other's work to everyone's satisfaction, I will be inclined to join in and actively participate. The presence of horizontal interactions also increases the potential costs of avoiding social obligations. If I play a dirty trick on one of my co-members at my volleyball club, I can expect - in a horizontally structured environment – that other members will hear about it, turn their backs on me, and may even exclude me from their team. As the costs of avoiding one's responsibilities increase, the number of those who do so decreases. Another beneficial effect of a horizontal internal structure is that it fosters robust norms of reciprocity. If another team at my club asks me to substitute one of their players in an important match, I will be more willing to do so if the same team has helped me with a similar favor in the past, or I trust that they will help me out in the future. In a vertical structure, the unequal power relationships hinder the asking and returning of favors on a voluntary basis. For example, within the mafia favors are often asked and done, but in those cases it usually concerns 'an offer you can't refuse', which is not voluntary at all. As Warren (2001) explains, vertical structures are characterized by relationships of dependence and '*under the condition of dependence, norms of reciprocity and trust are either superfluous or naïve*' (p.31). Furthermore, horizontal structures facilitate communication and the flow of information, not least about the reputation of other actors in the system. Again, if I know that the other team is reliable when it comes to returning favors, because other people I trust have told me so, I am more likely to trust its members as well and be more willing to help them out.

In summary, horizontally structured voluntary associations are more democratic and enable their members to learn how to collaborate. They thereby lead to the development of trust, foster norms of reciprocity, decrease the number of defectors to

social norms, and facilitate the flow of information among members. In other words, this type of organization actually contributes to the civicness of a community.

The structure and qualitative characteristics of a civil society thus determine whether it is a civic community or not. Putnam (1993) describes a civic community as one in which individuals cooperate to produce collective goods and actively participate in public affairs. It also has a flourishing associational life, with horizontal relationships of reciprocity and mutual trust. Putnam stated that civic communities produce social capital. Social capital, essentially, refers to a social structure which enables actors to achieve more than they would be able to do on their own. It is generally characterized by a network structure of social relationships that are based on trust and shared norms and values (van Deth, 2003). Following the socialization argument that is also discussed in the previous chapter and paragraph, horizontally structured voluntary organizations within a civic community, as a form of civil society, are the ideal environment within which to develop these networks, trust, and norms and values.

The conceptualization of social capital as the trichotomy of networks, trust, and norms and values is indeed generally accepted, but the way in which theorists put it in a larger framework and sequentially translate this into empirical measures varies considerably. For example, some translate the theoretical aspects quite literally into measurement instruments, while others have a looser approach and use more indirect measures to substantiate their theory. One important source of this divergence is the fact that scholars are aiming at different levels of analysis: the collective or the individual. Later in this chapter, and in order to shed light on the confusing and seemingly contradictory uses of the concept, I will use this distinction to classify into four categories the dominant schools of thought on the issue. Furthermore, with this classification, I will be able to reveal which view on the concept I am utilizing in the current research, and why this outlook is the most appropriate for the study of the mobilization of social capital. Before I elaborate on this typology, I will first turn to the origins and the general definition of social capital.

2.2 Defining social capital

The appearance of the concept of social capital as it is understood today can be traced back to L.J. Hanifan, who discussed it in his book on rural school communities which was published in 1920 (Borgatti, 1998). It was not until several decades later that Jane Jacobs (1961), in a study on urban planning, Ulf Hannerz (1969), in a study of ghetto life and poor neighborhoods, and Glenn Loury (1977), in a study of racial income differences, used the concept in their publications. Yet it took until the final quarter of the 20th century before its utilization became more widespread. Almost simultaneously,

Pierre Bourdieu in France and James Coleman in the US (re)introduced the notion in the 1980s (an earlier publication by Bourdieu (e.g. 1972) did not receive much attention because it was initially only published in French). The concept of social capital became even more popular after Putnam presented his studies on government performance in Italy (1993) and the decline of social capital in the United States (2000). Even though many scholars objected to Putnam's approach to the issue, he indisputably put it permanently on the map.

As the numerous publications on social capital prove, defining the concept is a hazardous undertaking. It could be said that there are almost as many definitions as there are researchers. Nan Lin (2001b, p.24), nevertheless, observed that all authors "share the understanding that social capital consists of resources embedded in social relations and social structure, which can be mobilized when an actor wishes to increase the likelihood of success in a purposive action". Portes (1998) came to a similar conclusion: 'the consensus is growing in the literature that social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures' (p.6). Lin and Portes thus emphasized the network component of social capital. Other authors put the emphasis on the need for social trust, reciprocity, and shared norms and values to supplement the element of social networks. Francis Fukuyama (1999), for instance, defined social capital as 'an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals'. In his view, trust and networks arise as a result of social capital, instead of being part of the concept. However, even though scholars stress other elements, in taking all of these views together it can be said that social capital is regarded as a three-pillared concept, consisting of social networks, trust, and norms and values (Schuller, 2001; van Deth, 2003; Patulny & Svendsen, 2007). It is difficult to (empirically) separate these three pillars, because the components are strongly interconnected: if people do not share the same norms and values, it is unlikely that they will trust each other and a social network without trusting relationships is very seldom and. (The mafia is often quoted as an example (the only example?) of social capital as a network without trust. I would, however, argue that a social structure of this kind is not, by definition, social capital because, amongst other things, the members of the network do not have a free choice about when or if to leave it). Nevertheless, because most theorists place emphasis on one of the three pillars, they also only operationalize this component, while inferring the presence of the others in some cases, or neglecting them completely in others.

2.3 Social capital in the current study: a general definition

I define social capital, in line with Lin (2001b), whose work I will discuss in more detail below, as a tool with which to gain an advantage through social relationships, made

possible by the resources that are involved in these relationships. Social capital is an asset that can help either a person or a collective: it allows X to achieve ends that he would otherwise not be able to (Fennema & Tillie, 2005). Here, X can refer to an individual as well as a collective (this specification will be shown to be important later on in this chapter.) I consider the network structure to be the most important pillar of social capital, because it is the element 'sine qua non'. As formulated by Lin, social capital is all about the 'resources embedded in the social structure'. The social structure that X has at his/its disposal has only surplus value, i.e. X can only gain an advantage from others when the other 'end' of the social relationship possesses goods or resources, particularly those that X does not have him/itself. In other words, there has to be a network with embedded resources before any actor can benefit at all from what the others possess. I do acknowledge that for X to actually exploit social relationships and their resources, it is necessary that these relationships have a basis of trust and that the same norms and values are being supported. If two actors do not trust each other, they will never allow the other to have access to their resources. Moreover, disagreement about social norms and values can cause problems, for example I would not lend my computer to someone I know does not care about other people's belongings. I will, therefore, focus primarily on the network component of social capital, but always with an eye on the other two elements.

Just like any other kind of capital, social capital is, by definition, a potential or latent characteristic. Someone who owns a large house that has doubled in value since the date of purchase is thought to possess significant financial capital. But it is not until this person sells the house that he will be able to turn this value into actual funds. Likewise, a business owner only profits from the human capital that he has at his disposal when his employees are actually working. In other words, capital is only of *real* value when it is mobilized, activated or used. This also applies to social capital. For example, it was only after I enlisted the help of my relations to find me an apartment after I suddenly became homeless, (and someone indeed offered me a place to stay), that I became aware that my family and friends could help me more than I had expected. This distinction between social capital and mobilized social capital is very important in the current study. The presence or absence of social capital has been studied many times, but there is a gap in the current literature when it comes to how it is used. This study takes up the challenge of filling this hiatus.

2.4 The measurement of social capital; some initial insights

The multitude of definitions of social capital is also reflected in the measurement of the concept. The measures set out in the literature are various, ranging from a question

about social trust, to an inventory of the presence of voluntary organizations, and to unemployment figures, to name just a few. Ideally, one would use a measure that encompasses all three elements of social capital, but such an instrument is still very rare (Paxton, 1999; van Deth, 2003; Sabatini, 2005; Lillbacka, 2006). Only a very few researchers have attempted to create such tools (Van Deth (2003) mentions studies by Anheier (2001) and Bothwell (1997)). By using data reduction techniques ((e.g. Paxton (1999), Smith (1999), and Narayan and Cassidy (2001)), others have endeavored to create a multiple-item measurement which includes all three pillars of social capital. The most common practice, however, is for researchers to focus on one component only. The OECD (2001) recorded that social capital is usually measured with the focus being on trust and levels of engagement *or* interaction in social or group activities. Schuller (2001) also observed that "*the most common measures of social capital look at participation in various forms of engagement, such as membership of voluntary organizations, churches or political parties,* or *at levels of expressed trust in other people"* (emphasis added). These two examples reveal that there is no consensus about how social capital should be measured, and researchers' preferences for any particular measure depend on which element they attach the most value to. Some think of social networks as being *the* essential ingredient (a view that I share), while others perceive trust to be the indispensable element for social capital.

The different theoretical conceptions, and the congruent empirical differences, have led to a great deal of misunderstanding. Researchers blame each other for not measuring social capital, while they are all, in fact, convinced that they are doing nothing but. These misconceptions – or the different ideas about how to study social capital - are first and foremost rooted in the fact that scholars are not aiming at the same level of analysis. While some are convinced that social capital refers to individual matters, others advocate that it is a group characteristic (van Deth, 2008). I do not think that it is necessary to single out one 'best method' from all of the different forms of understanding of the concept, but I do acknowledge the need for more transparency in the current 'social capital mish mash'. It is important that authors make clear what they mean by social capital, and upon which level they are focusing; the individual or collective. Last, but certainly not least, one's research methods must be consistent with one's definition and level of analysis. As I will show in the following paragraphs, the latter largely influences which measures are (considered) appropriate.

2.5 Individual vs. collective social capital

The root of most of the confusion about social capital lies in the fact that scholars differ in their conceptualization of it as an individual or a collective asset. "It is a category mistake to refer to an individual's social capital", stated Stolle and Rochon (1998; p.50).

Newton (2001) held the same absolute opinion: "If social capital is anything, it is a societal not an individual property, and should be studied as a social or collective phenomenon, not at the individual level as if it were a property of isolated citizens" (p.207). Other scholars take the opposite stance. For example, Snijders (1999) advocated that "we are talking about the resources of an individual" (p.29).

Only a few scholars strike a happy medium, stating that social capital is as much about collective as it is about individual goods. Paxton (1999) claims to be the first to acknowledge that social capital can be found at different levels of the social structure simultaneously. In her view, most researchers only regard social capital at the level they are focusing on to be the 'true' version of it. Paxton emphasized that the concept can be measured on both the individual and the collective level. She further theorized that social capital on the individual level is linked to social capital on the group level. Other scholars also point to this intertwinement of the two levels. For example, Lin (2001b) maintained that institutionalized social relationships with embedded resources benefit individuals within the collective as well as the collective as a whole. I agree with Paxton and Lin: individual and collective social capital are not necessarily mutually exclusive, yet nor is it necessary to always take individual and collective social capital into account simultaneously.

So, although some researchers claim strongly to have a certain perspective on theoretical grounds, most of the time their preferences concern a different level of analysis instead of a theoretically inspired point of view (Barry Wellman in: Borgatti, 1998). The different approaches to social capital not only occur in theory, but also in practice. Stolle and Lewis (Stolle & Lewis, 2002) argued that any difference between individual and collective social capital is not necessarily conceptual or definitional, but lies in the choice of dependent variables. Some researchers focus solely on individuals and individual variables (e.g. Flap & Völker, 2004), while others concern themselves with the collective and only use corresponding measures (e.g. Knack & Keefer, 1997). In many cases, even empirical restrictions shape the outlook on the concept of social capital.

The typology that I will present now as a way of clarifying the ambiguities in the social capital literature is based upon this distinction between the individual and the collective. This distinction is embodied in two dimensions; what I call the 'providing' and the 'receiving' sides of social capital. The former refers to the 'location' where social capital is produced: in the group or from an individual. The latter refers to the entity which profits from the social capital under study. I will expand upon the two dimensions in more detail below. Following my line of thought, each theory about, or interpretation of, social capital can be classified as being either 'individual' or 'collective' on the two dimensions. This leads to the production of a 2x2 table containing four categories into which each notion of social capital can be classified (see Table 2.1). This table also reflects the fact that I approach social capital as being something which is provided by a single entity, while the collective profits from it. I will return to my classification at

length in my discussion of the four cells after I have introduced what I have labeled the providing and receiving sides of social capital.

2.6 The providing and receiving sides of social capital

The general distinction between individual and collective social capital provides clearer insight into the differences that exist in the literature, but it is not yet satisfactorily explained. Even the academics who appear to consider social capital on the same, either individual or collective, level can still use different operationalizations. Decoster (2000) remarked that 'in consideration of the data' it often occurs that social capital is measured on the individual level by one researcher as well as on the collective level by another. But there is also a more theoretical explanation for the confusion that sometimes arises. In my opinion, as well as the general distinction between the collective and the individual, social capital in fact has two sides: providing and receiving. With this distinction, I mean that on the one hand social capital has a 'source' or a place where it 'resides' (the providing side), and on the other it has an eventual effect on one or more actors (the receiving side). A distinction between individual and collective social capital can be made on both the 'providing and 'receiving' sides. Sequentially, the combination of the two levels on both facets of social capital results in a typology of four outlooks. This is represented in Table 2.1.

		Receiving side	
		Individual	Collective
Providing side	Individual	e.g. Bourdieu Burt Lin	e.g. this study
	Collective	e.g. Coleman	e.g. Putnam Fukuyama

Table 2.1 Typology of outlooks on social capital

Let us first consider the providing side of social capital, which concerns the 'location' thereof. Individual social capital in this circumstance does not mean that it can be found *within* the individual. This is by definition impossible, as the word social implies that it involves more than one person. Instead, it concerns the social capital *of* an individual. Individual social capital can be attributed to a particular actor, and can, therefore, be regarded as 'personal'. It refers to an individual's direct social environment. The three pillars of social capital, namely social networks, trust, and shared norms and values can

all be included in this view. However, in studies of the individual as a provider of social capital, the focus is generally on the network aspect thereof (e.g. Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001).

The collective can also be the provider of social capital. In that scenario the focus is on the general characteristics of the collective. Collective social capital cannot be ascribed to a single 'owner'. Unlike what is true for the individual as the provider of social capital, the studies which have the collective in this role are focused on what can be found *within* the collective, rather than concerning themselves with what ties one particular collective to another. The scholars who focus on collective social capital rarely use network measures, instead relying on measures of trust, which reside within the collective, or on the presence or absence of shared norms and values. However, this is not to say that it is not possible to use network measures on the collective level, as I will show later.

The counterpart of the providing aspect of social capital is the receiving side. A focus on this element reveals that researchers use different methods to highlight the concept. Those who regard the individual as the receiving party are concerned with individual indicators of the benefits of social capital. Studies are focused on whether a particular individual is better off when he/she has (more) social capital than someone who has none. Does someone who has a lot of social capital find a better job than someone who has very little? Is someone who is rich in terms of social capital in better health than someone who is poor in that sense?

Other scientists have directed their attention on the collective level to the receiving side of social capital. Here, the question is whether the collective –as a whole– is better off with more social capital or worse off with less. Studies have been conducted into whether: governments perform better when social capital is present; there is less unemployment when there is social capital; or minorities integrate better into society when social capital is present (Boix & Posner, 1998).

Having explained the meaning of the providing and receiving sides of social capital, and how they can be interpreted on the individual and collective levels, I can now turn again to Table 2.1. This table represents the four combinations that follow on from the combining of the two levels on the providing and receiving sides of social capital. Each category has its 'representative' in the scientific world, whose outlooks I will discuss to illustrate what each cell represents. This is necessary because even the classical social capital theorists are interpreted in different ways by a third party. James Coleman, for instance, is typified by some authors as theorizing about individual social capital (e.g. Portes, 1998; Morrow, 1999; Decoster, 2000; Pope, 2003; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004; van Oorschot, Arts, & Gelissen, 2006), while others classify him as being in the opposite 'collective camp' (e.g. Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Putnam, in: Borgatti, 1998; Dekker, 2000;

Field, 2003; van der Gaag & Snijders, 2004). This is probably the result of Coleman's unclear definitions, but it may also be due to the lack of clarity in the usual distinction between the individual and the collective. I think my typology can solve this problem.

Other authors have made comparable, but not completely similar, typologies of views of social capital. The classification that Borgatti (1999) mentioned comes close to my proposition. He came up with three combinations: individual ties to benefit the individual, group ties to benefit the individual, and group ties to benefit the group. This typology follows that of Borgatti, Jones and Everett (1998; later on Adler & Kwon, 2002 presented a similar account), and distinguishes between the type of actor (individual or group) and the type of focus (internal or external). An external focus refers to an approach which takes the relationships between the actor (be it an individual or a group) and other actors at the same level into account. An internal focus, on the other hand, denotes a method that takes an introspective view of what happens within the actor. As there is no smaller unit than an individual, this aspect is only possible at the group level. Borgatti et al.'s typology has two limitations. Firstly, it applies to only some of the social capital research that is being carried out, namely those studies that maintain a network approach, i.e. they only take the network aspect of social capital into account. My typology includes all social capital studies, including those that focus on the trust, or norms and values, components. Secondly and more importantly, the authors present a typology consisting of four categories, while they are only able to present theories to fit three of them. Borgatti (1999) fails to discuss individual ties that benefit the group, while in the1998 publication Borgatti et all reason that, presumably, no theory centers on the individual focus with an internal focus since '*the individual is normally seen as the indivisible atom of the sociological world*' (p.28). I think it is a serious shortcoming of their typology does not exhaust all logical possibilities. It indicates that their concept of 'type of focus' is not suitable for characterizing social capital literature. Using the typology I present here, I will show that I am able to present examples fitting each of my categories.

2.7 Four outlooks on social capital

I realize that introducing new terminology into a field that is already overflowing with vague and controversial, or even contradictory, concepts does not make things easier. However, I take the view that my distinction clarifies ambiguities, instead of adding to the confusion. As will become clear, this classification of studies can disentangle the various views of social capital. It demonstrates that the researchers who, at first sight, seem to be at odds with each other are, in fact, simply on a different wavelength; they are studying different aspects of the same broad phenomenon. My typology puts all of

these views in clear proportion to each other. More importantly, scrutinizing the four outlooks will reveal that three of them are less appropriate or not appropriate at all when it comes to meeting the aims of the current study. The classical theories of social capital by Putnam, Bourdieu, and Coleman, which are each representative of one of the categories, do not enable the mobilization of social capital by voluntary associations to be closely considered. The fourth outlook, i.e. my approach, has not yet received much attention in the literature, but I will demonstrate that there is a real reason to change this. I will now firstly address the two most clear-cut and common combinations: community – community and individual – individual. Next, I will consider the two other, more complicated, mixes. The position that I hold on to, the individual-collective, is discussed last.

2.7.1 Collective – collective

		Receiving side	
		Individual	Collective
Providing side	Individual	e.g. Bourdieu Burt Lin	e.g. this study
	Collective	e.g. Coleman	e.g. Putnam Fukuyama

The collective is the provider and the receiver of social capital; the collective profits from the collective. This view is by some seen as the conventional notion of social capital, especially in the field of political science. Poortinga (2006) stated that scholars who take the collective approach to social capital regard it as an ecological societal construct instead of as a characteristic of individuals. This is manifest in the way in which social capital is defined, as well as in the measures used in the empirical part of these studies, such as gauges of democracy and political rights, freedom of the press, and inverse measures like crime rates (Paldam, 2000).

The political scientist Robert Putnam is the outstanding example of a scholar who theorizes and practices on the collective level. Putnam does not deny the existence or importance of individual social capital. Indeed, while he recognized that social capital has "*both an individual and a collective aspect*" (Putnam, 2000; p.20), he simply concentrates on the 'collective good', whereas others focus on the 'private good' (Putnam in: Borgatti, 1998). He regards the two uses of social capital as complementary, not competitive. His focus on the collective level is clear from his definition of social capital: "*features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions*" (Putnam, 1993). The explicit reference to *society* reveals Putnam's focus on the collective level. He is concerned with the (beneficial) effects that social capital can have on communities as a whole. The first major study in which he applied this idea was a study of government performance in the Italian regions (Putnam, 1993), in which he revealed that areas with more social capital had better performing governing institutions. Using several general measures, like the relative number of voluntary associations and levels of newspaper

readership, he inferred the amount of social capital present in a specific region. As these were aggregate measures, they concerned the collective as a whole and did not refer to individuals. The dependent variable in the study, governmental performance, was also measured on the collective level with an index that included responsiveness and the provision of public services, such as waste management and libraries.

Another study of social capital by Putnam is his work on its decline in the US (Putnam, 2000) with the telling title, *Bowling alone*. Driven by a growing personal unease with a changing social climate in the US, Putnam began to conduct an extensive study of the sources of and possible solutions for this discontent. First, he found that the American people had become less politically involved and more distrustful of their government and each other. At the same time, he observed that people were less socially connected, less involved in voluntary organizations and, in general terms, were less 'civic'. In other words, Putnam saw – in his view – an alarming decline in social capital in the US.

Putnam also took a collective-collective approach in this study. At first sight, it may have seemed to involve individuals' 'lifestyles', but he in fact only used aggregate, average and collective measures to make his case. He presented the *mean* number of memberships of social and civic organizations, the *mean* number of times people did voluntary work, and the percentage of people who thought that 'most people can be trusted' (Putnam, 2000, p.291). As these measures are aggregated over the population, they are no longer individual gauges. This automatically implies that any conclusions cannot be based on individuals either.

Putnam's *definition* of social capital includes all three pillars thereof: trust, norms, and networks. However, he only partially succeeded in converting the theoretical components into appropriate *measures*. His measures of trust (the commonly used GSS and WVS questions[14]) and norms and values (a variety of 'political culture' variables (Adam & Rončević, 2003)) may do the trick, even though these are open to criticism (e.g. Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000). However, the way Putnam operationalizes networks is, in my view, wide of the mark. Variables such as number of memberships, the number of organizations, the number of hours for which a respondent volunteers, etc. are perhaps *relevant* for the network component of social capital, but no more than that. Furthermore, this is only relevant if one assumes that voluntary organizations do, indeed, produce personal networks for their members (an assumption which Putnam does not put to the test) and citizens who do not belong to voluntary organizations do not have a social network. Moreover, the essence of a network is that it reveals who is connected to whom on any kind of criterion. The simple recording of the

[14] This question goes: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Answer options are: 'most people can be trusted' and 'can't be too careful'. (World Values Survey, 2005)

presence, or absence, of organizations, or the number of memberships that a person holds is by no means a reflection of this essence. If only Putnam had studied the connections between organizations, or the number of friends each respondent had, he would have nailed the concept of networks. Networks can be measured very clearly, and Putnam missed an opportunity to do so in his study. As I will show, other investigators of social capital did focus on the network component thereof in a more appropriate manner.

Francis Fukuyama is another well-known author on the subject of social capital, who, according to Claridge (2007), '*practically equated social capital with trust*' in his earlier publications (Fukuyama, 1995). However, in later work, Fukuyama defines social capital as '*shared norms or values that promote social cooperation, instantiated in actual relationships*' (Fukuyama, 2001; 2002, quote: p.27). This reveals an emphasis on norms and values and not on trust, even though he continued to pay attention to this element. Fukuyama himself explicitly stated that he views social capital as an individual asset (Fukuyama, 2002): "*Social capital is not a public good, it is a private good*" (p. 29-30). It is, therefore, perhaps surprising that in almost all reviewing articles Fukuyama is regarded as theorizing about collective social capital (e.g. Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Borgatti et al., 1998; Paxton, 1999; Poortinga, 2006). If Fukuyama's research is placed in the light of the typology presented here, the apparent paradox can be explained. Fukuyama concerned himself with macro sociological phenomena, such as economic development and the chances for democracy. Thus, the receiving side is the collective. When considering the providing aspect of social capital, he used aggregate measures of trust and other gauges which referred to the collective (e.g. nation states) as a whole (Fukuyama, 1995). In other words, by using aggregate measures, Fukuyama automatically shifted the focus from the individual to the collective.

Fukuyama and Putnam used measures of trust as their indicators of the degree of social capital. In general terms, the trouble with using trust in this way is that it easily becomes detached from the other two components. One of the most common measures – especially concerning collective social capital – is the question in the World Values Survey (WVS): "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Measuring trust in this way, as a separate entity, detaches it from the networks in which it is embedded and which are crucial for social capital. It is my view that levels of trust are only interesting *in relation to* social connections. Putting it bluntly, whether I feel I can trust the rest of the world has no effect on my relationship with my neighbor, who I would like to ask to water my plants when I am away from home, but it *is* important that I can trust him/her to be helpful. I, therefore, prefer a method of measuring social capital that incorporates social structure.

This collective – collective outlook on social capital is not suitable for studying how it is used, or, in this particular case, how voluntary organizations mobilize their community. The main problem with this approach is that the focus is always on the whole, which implies that one never sees what is going on in the inside. At most, one is able to comment upon the final *result* of the mobilization, for example about what percentage of the population was involved in it, but not upon the *process* and who mobilized whom. This is also related to the types of measures that are applied in this area of research, which consider the cultural aspects of social capital (trust and norms and values) more than the structural elements (the network).

It may seem that a focus on the collective prevents the use of practical network measures, although this is not necessarily the case. It is certainly possible to describe a network on the aggregated level by using what is called a socio-centric network approach . The disadvantage, however, is that one really needs to have the data on the complete network (i.e. information about the presence or absence of ties between each pair of actors) to be able to reach sound conclusions. I assume that this is an important reason why social capital researchers using this collective-collective perspective do not focus on the network aspect. In contrast, in research into individual social capital, the focus is predominantly on social networks, with only peripheral attention being paid to norms and values and trust.

2.7.2 Individual – individual

		Receiving side	
		Individual	Collective
Providing side	Individual	e.g. Bourdieu Burt Lin	e.g. this study
	Collective	e.g. Coleman	e.g. Putnam Fukuyama

The providing and receiving sides of social capital are individual; the individual profits from the assets of another individual ('I have friends with cars and I am the one who can and will borrow them'). Many social capital studies are aimed at this purely individual level, starting with the works by Bourdieu, who was one of the first scholars to introduce the concept, and by doing so initiated a vast amount of literature. Bourdieu mainly took a theoretical approach to social capital, while the famous scholars, Nan Lin and Ronald Burt, commenced a more empirical line of research in later years.

Pierre Bourdieu, one of the ancestors of social capital, regarded it as an individual asset. This leftist French sociologist used the concept in combination with the notions of cultural capital and economic capital. His aim was to explain social hierarchy. According to Bourdieu, one's societal position depends upon one's 'wealth' in these three domains. He defined social capital as "*the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, membership in a group*" (Bourdieu, 1986; p.248). This means that in Bourdieu's view, the richness of an

individual's social capital firstly depends on the number of social connections he/she has to other individuals. The more people one knows, the bigger the chance that one has more resources at one's disposal. Secondly, an individual's social capital depends on the amount and the quality of the resources that the relationships possess. If each 'other' has many resources (money, knowledge etc.) this means that the individual has more social capital at his disposal than if each 'other' has none.

Bourdieu's theory is illustrative of the focus on social networks that is present in the theories of scholars that I classified in this individual-individual category. The other two pillars of social capital, norms and values and trust, are, although important, secondary. Bourdieu regards networks of relationships as the result of an unremitting, but not necessarily conscious, social investment strategy that turns social relationships into social obligations. The "durable obligations subjectively felt" (Bourdieu, 1986; p.249) include feelings of gratitude, respect, friendship, etc., which might be regarded as the trust and norms and values' components of social capital. In Bourdieu's view, however, these are merely prerequisites to profiting from social capital. The actual volume thereof depends upon the size of the individual's social network and the volume of the resources embedded therein.

As for his work on social capital, Bourdieu is more of a theorist than an empiricist (Adam & Rončević, 2003; Claridge, 2007). His broad, yet precise, theory contrasts with the rather modest indicator that he mentioned in his extensive study of taste and distinction (Bourdieu, 1984 [2002]). Bourdieu presented no more than one indicator of social capital, viz. membership of golf clubs (Bourdieu, 1984 [2002]; p.219; Field, 2003; p.14). This is surprising given the fact that he did specify how the volume of one's social capital can be established (size of network and corresponding resources). In my view, Bourdieu's indicator by no means does justice to his own theory or to social capital theory in general, particularly not in the tradition of individual social capital. Other researchers, amongst whom are Ronald Burt (e.g.2000) and Nan Lin (e.g. 2001b), do, however, provide more solid empirical foundations for their social capital theory.

Nan Lin defines social capital as the "*resources embedded in a social structure that are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions*" (Lin, 2001b; p.40). The social structure he refers to is not that of a society, community or any other large entity, but rather the social network of individuals. This is clear from the empirical research that Lin has undertaken. For example, one of his studies on social capital –although he did not name it as such at the time – is about occupational status and job attainment. Lin and Dumin (Lin & Dumin, 1986) revealed that someone's occupational status, as well as his/her social resources (read: social capital), facilitate access to prestigious occupations. The amount of social capital an individual had was assessed by (the diversity of) the occupational status of his friends, relatives and acquaintances. In other words, all relevant variables were measured on the individual level. The work of Lin (and Dumin)

is particularly interesting since it involves not only social capital itself, but also the way it is used. It is also worth noting that Lin did not operationalize the trust and norms and values elements of social capital; his sole focus was on the social network and the embedded resources. Although I do not take the individual-individual approach to social capital, I do adopt many of Lin's ideas. As I will show in the discussion of my individual-collective outlook, they are also of use in that perspective.

Burt is another important representative of the individual-individual viewpoint (e.g. 2000). Just like Lin, Burt holds a network driven view of social capital and neglects the trust and norms and values components. But where Lin emphasized the *cultural* aspects of the network (i.e. which characteristics can be ascribed to the actors in the network, such as specific resources), Burt stressed the *structural* features (i.e. what the network looks like). Burt started with the idea that social capital refers to a social structure which can advantage certain individuals or groups in pursuing their goals: "*better connected people enjoy higher returns*" (Burt, 2000; p. 348). The question is then: what does 'better connected' mean? In Burt's view, weak connections between individuals add to their social capital. He argued that particularly those who function as a link between several (two or more) groups of people are thought to possess a greater amount of social capital than those who are only part of one, tightly knit, group. For example, consider the case of a woman named Jessica. She takes part in a book club that she started with her colleagues at the lawyers' office where she works, and she also has a seat on the district council. Assuming that none of her colleagues know any of her fellow councilors, this puts Jessica in a powerful position. First of all, she knows many people who themselves probably possess a diverse range of resources. Furthermore, she has access to the information residing in both groups. This gives her an advantage over the others who only hear about what is happening in their own circle. More importantly, Jessica is the one who can decide what information that she acquires from one group is transferred to the other, and what is not. Such a bridging position between two tightly-knit groups is termed a 'structural hole' by Burt (1992). According to Burt, people 'involved in' a structural hole are 'better' connected and thus have more social capital at their disposal than those who have network closure (i.e. are in a group in which everyone is connected to everybody else)[15].

Burt and Lin measured social capital by means of social networks. As in Bourdieu's theory, the role of trust and norms and values is not nullified as such, but these elements are instead regarded as mediators between the actor and the resources in the network.

[15] Interestingly, Coleman holds the opposite view on closure. In Coleman's opinion, networks that are characterized by 'closure' (i.e. everyone in the network is connected) are rich in terms of social capital (Coleman, 1988, 1990). This is because in 'closed' networks each individual has easy access to all of the information residing therein. More importantly, network closure facilitates sanctions that make it less risky for people in the network to trust one another (Burt, 2000).

In other words, trusting relationships facilitate access to the resources in the network (e.g. Völker, 2000). These resources refer to the (im) material support that the actors in the network have to offer. Relationships of trust with acquaintances who can provide these resources increase the opportunity of access thereto and the use thereof. For example, I prefer teaching statistics to a good friend instead of to someone to whom I entertain less friendly feelings. Two colleagues who cannot stand each other will not help each other out, even if they could. The emphasis on the type and content of a relationship is generally present in the work of researchers such as Lin and Flap, and less so in Burt's approach. In general, research in the 'Burt-tradition' focuses on network location instead of network content (Lin, 2001a). In this tradition, networks are analyzed for the presence or absence of bridges (i.e. single connections between groups, like Jessica), and on the strength of ties and the position of certain individuals in a network (central or not). This can provide important information about an individual's social capital, but I nevertheless believe that it is important to also take the qualitative characteristics of a network into account, especially when it comes to social capital, which is all about the resources that can or cannot be used.

Moreover, this individual – individual outlook on social capital must be set aside if one wants to study its use by voluntary organizations, which is the purpose of the current study. It must be said that voluntary associations do play a role in many social capital studies within this perspective, because they often focus on organizational memberships. The numbers of memberships, the types of organizations, or the degree of activity that people display within organizations are all examples of indicators of social capital in this approach. People with more memberships, or a more diverse range of memberships (e.g. being a member of a choir and a bridge society), as well as those who are more actively involved in organizations, are regarded as having more social capital since they get to know and interact with more people (e.g. Wollebaek & Selle, 2002). The point is, however, that in this way, voluntary associations are treated as facilitators of the production of the social capital of their members, and not as separate actors which have social capital themselves. But even if organizations were to be treated as the individual actors, this individual-individual approach would not be able to shed light on the mobilization of the collective of associations, i.e. the community. The mobilization of the community is a collective return of social capital. In other words, the receiving side is the collective. Within the individual-individual approach, attention is given only to what the individual can achieve for him/herself.

2.7.3 Collective – individual

		Receiving side	
		Individual	Collective
Providing side	Individual	e.g. Bourdieu Burt Lin	e.g. this study
	Collective	e.g. Coleman	e.g. Putnam Fukuyama

The collective is the provider of social capital; the receiving aspect is on the individual level and the individual profits from the collective. An example of how social capital on the collective level can benefit individuals is a small village in which the ruling norm is that one does not take someone else's property without permission. Even a visitor from abroad, who may not adhere to this particular norm, would be able to leave his bike unlocked in the street without it being stolen. Research that fits into this category concentrates on trust and norms and values instead of on networks. An example of such a measure is a statement like "People in this neighborhood do not share the same values.", to which a negative answer would indicate a higher degree of social capital (Sampson & Raudenbush, 1997).

A theorist who, in my opinion, can be categorized in this collective-individual category is James Coleman. As I mentioned earlier, there is a great deal of ambiguity about how to interpret Coleman's ideas about social capital, namely whether he regards it a collective or an individual phenomenon. I suspect that this is due to the way in which Coleman has formulated his theory (his phraseology), referring to the individual and the collective in one statement. Coleman viewed social capital "*as an attribute of the social structure in which a person is embedded,* [and it] *is not the private property of any of the persons who benefit from it*" (1990, p.315). Judging by this account, with its explicit reference to social capital not being private property, it is clear why many view Coleman as a 'collective' theorist (e.g. Dekker, 2000; van der Gaag & Snijders, 2004). Yet, Coleman also stated that social capital "*facilitate[s] certain actions of actors within the structure*" (1988, p.98) and "*social capital is an important resource for individuals*" (1990, p.317). This has, obviously, led others to interpret Coleman's vision as meaning that social capital is an individual asset (e.g. Morrow, 1999; Decoster, 2000; Stolle & Lewis, 2002; Pope, 2003). Considering his - seemingly contradictory - statements, there is a case for both interpretations. However, using the typology presented here clearly demonstrates that it is not a contradiction. The first statement makes clear that the collective provides the social capital, while the second highlights that the individual profits from it. Yet another quote from Coleman's underlines this:

> *"[... A]n organization that was initiated for one purpose is available for appropriation for other purposes, constituting important social capital for the individual members, who have available to them the organizational resources for effective opposition." (1988, p.108)*

Coleman does not explicitly distinguish the three, commonly accepted, pillars of social capital (the networks, norms and values and trust). Instead, he discusses three of what he calls 'forms of social capital': information channels, obligations and expectations, and social norms. These can be related to the three pillars, but they refer to slightly different things. According to Coleman, what these three forms of social capital have in common is that they are comprised of aspects of social structures and they facilitate the actions of actors therein (Coleman, 1988; p.98). He does not, however, explicitly discuss social networks. The information channels refer to the potential for information that is inherent in social relationships (p.104). More social capital in this sense means more information, and the more information one has, the more powerful one is. The 'information channels' are comparable to the resources embedded in a social structure as formulated by Nan Lin (see previous paragraph). The second form of social capital, obligations and expectations, refers to mutual favors that people can do for each other. If A does something for B (i.e. fulfils an obligation), A can expect B to return the favor in some way in the future. According to Coleman, if this is to happen, one necessary precondition is that the social structure which A and B are in is characterized by trustworthiness (one of the three generally acknowledged elements of social capital). If people do not trust that obligations will be repaid, they will be unwilling to do something for someone else. Furthermore, the exchange of favors is not limited to one-to-one relationships. Groups (collectives) can also have a system of obligations and expectations which are no longer person-bound, but are generally available for anyone. If A does B a favor, this favor can also be 'returned' by C. The third form of social capital that Coleman described – norms – has a collective character. The ruling of norms, i.e. the existence and effectuation thereof with appropriate penalties for defectors, is typically something that takes place at the collective level. The norm that Coleman regarded as the most important is that one should not act out of self but of public interest. This helps communities to overcome public goods' problems. At the same time, individuals are helped by the norms that rule a community. For instance, norms that inhibit theft make life easier for most people (albeit not the thieves) because it means that they can leave their bikes unlocked in the street (as in the example at the beginning of this paragraph).

Furthermore, Coleman (1990) has admitted that the importance of 'a more artificial set of arrangements' (Field, 2003) [i.e. voluntary organizations] would encourage norms and trustworthiness, especially since the family, as the foremost generator of social capital according to him, has been devalued as the cornerstone of society. Yet, his operationalizations do not include any measure that refers to voluntary organizations at all, nor does he discuss voluntary organizations extensively on a theoretical level.

The collective-individual nature of Coleman's theory is expressed most clearly in the 'norms' and 'obligations and expectations' elements of social capital. With respect to the former, the social capital (norm) resides in the collective as people need to agree on particular norms to profit from it. If each individual adheres to his/her own norms,

which deviate from those of the rest of the collective, this person will not benefit. At the same time, the 'norms' element also reveals that social capital can be easily abused: it is tempting for people to reap the benefits of the collective social capital without ever investing in it (free-riding). In most cases, especially with reference to these norms, free-riding is rather easy. One can live in a democracy, and enjoy the freedom that is part of this form of constitution, without endorsing democratic norms. In a trusting community, where people leave their homes unlocked, burglars seize their chance. Since departing from these norms does not usually involve a direct confrontation between two actors (whether the actors is a collective or an individual) it is relatively easy to do. This is different in the case of the other two forms of social capital that Coleman described. The exchange of obligations and expectations and information is not conducted anonymously, and so departing therefrom is more easily sanctioned. Furthermore, the 'obligations and expectations' element of Coleman's theory reflects his collective-individual outlook. The habits of reciprocity are usually also held by the entire collective, of which an individual is a part, while the individual can reap the rewards.

Channels of information are usually of a more individual nature, as the exchange of a piece of information mainly takes place between two individuals. I could ask my (informed) friends where to find a good dentist, how to cook a complicated meal, or what the latest insights in social psychology are. However, especially in the current age of the Internet, the provision of information by an (anonymous) Internet-community is very common. One can collect a lot of data about almost anything, and some of it is often even provided by experts in the field (for example on encyclopedic websites such as Wikipedia.org). In this case, the supply of information is no longer attached to an individual's personal relationships (which would imply individual social capital), but stems from the collective.

When it comes to the empirical support that Coleman presented for his study, he revealed some ambiguities regarding his level of analysis. Coleman (1988) set out the concept of social capital as an explanatory factor in the creation of human capital, which he described as '*the skills and capabilities that make [persons] able to act in new ways*' (1990, p.304). In the empirical part of his research, this came down to an investigation of the effect of social capital on the school dropout rates of second-year students. Instead of operationalizing his three forms of the concept, Coleman presented several indirect measures with which to capture the sophomores' social capital. In particular, he determined the social capital inside and outside the family, with indicators representing the physical presence of the parents, the number of siblings, and the extent to which the parents were embedded in a social structure (measured by the number of times a family moved and the type of school the children attend). With this approach, Coleman defined two sources of social capital: the family and the community. Apart from it being odd that a scientist presents a theory with more or less clear concepts which he subsequently does not even attempt to translate into manageable measures (1988, p.110), and despite

the fact that he uses indicators that are questionable and inaccurate, Coleman's introduction of his measurements adds more ambiguity with respect to his outlook on social capital than was already the case based on his theory. He ultimately uses both collective and individual indicators of social capital. However, since I believe that Coleman's theoretical work is stronger than his empirical research, this does not alter my classification of him as being in the collective-individual category.

Apart from the practical hurdles that this outlook on social capital presents, as evidenced by Coleman's weak empirical foundation, I also abandon this approach on theoretical grounds. This relates to the reason why I regarded the individual-individual approach to be inappropriate for the current study: the beneficiary of the social capital is the individual, instead of the collective. It follows that the fourth outlook on social capital, the individual-collective, fits the aims of my work best.

2.7.4 Individual – collective

		Receiving side	
		Individual	Collective
Providing side	Individual	e.g. Bourdieu Burt Lin	e.g. this study
	Collective	e.g. Coleman	e.g. Putnam Fukuyama

The providing side of social capital is on the individual level, the receiving side is on the collective level.
This category is the least common view of social capital, bearing in mind that, to my knowledge, no research has been conducted which fits into it. This does not, however, mean that it is impossible to think of or carry out such a study. Indeed, I want to argue that the research I will present in this book should be classified as an individual-collective study of social capital. In particular, when voluntary associations are the object of investigation, as is the case here, this approach is most fruitful, and enables the researcher to explore social capital from different angles. I will demonstrate that a single organization can have advantages for the community it is a part of, as well as that a single board member can bring advantages to the organization he/she is a member of. Before then, I will briefly address the issue of the definition of social capital in this category.

In order to define social capital, I do not need to adjust the generally accepted three pillars of social networks, trust, and norms and values, as, for example, Coleman has done, although I do emphasize the former more than the latter two. In my view, the social capital of an organization consists of the resources that are embedded in its social structure. It is clear that this definition is similar to Lin's: 'access to and the use of resources embedded in a social structure'. The fact that I adopt Lin's definition is only logical, since both the category in which I placed Lin's theory, and the category in which the current view of social capital is situated, regard the providing side as being on the individual level.

In general, it is not hard to imagine how the social capital of an individual actor can benefit the collective. For example, there was a plot of grass in my neighborhood that had been completely neglected by the municipality. The fences around it were rusty, the goal posts were gone and there was only sand and rubbish where there used to be grass. Consequently, very few children played there. One eleven-year-old boy was unhappy about this and started a petition to get the plot renovated. Along with his friends, i.e. his social capital, he went door-to-door and eventually got enough signatures from local residents to convince the city's administrators to take action. A couple of months later, the area had been restored to its former glory. The boy had not only arranged better facilities for himself, but also for all of the other children in the neighborhood. In abstract terms, this implies that the providing side of this social capital is on the individual level, while the receiving side was the community.

The individual actor whose social capital benefits the collective need not be an individual person. Larger entities, such as a company, a municipality or a voluntary organization, can also be taken as individual actors, depending on the aims of the particular research. As this study is about voluntary organizations, I will explain this in more detail in reference to them.

To assume that voluntary organizations have an intermediary role between their members and the state, as discussed in the previous chapter and at the beginning of this one, involves the assumption that these organizations function as separate actors (and for that matter, it also involves the assumption that the state is a single entity). At the same time, an organization itself cannot, of course, act. It is a 'corporate actor' (Lelieveldt, 1999) which is represented by individuals. These individuals are the ones who act as if they are the organization. The question is then one of who these individuals are.

An individual who represents an organization needs to have a relationship with it. This implies that this person has a position within the association (for example, as a member, director, or a board member) and acts according to the role that is ascribed to it, i.e. the norms and expectations that others have about this position (Lelieveldt, 1999). In any study of organizations as actors, the researcher decides which role or behavior he/she regards as being a manifestation of representing the association. According to Lelieveldt (1999), an individual acts as a representative of his/her organization when he/she has contact with individuals and organizations outside his/her own. Each organization can have several representative individuals, which makes the "acting organization a many-headed monster" (p. 58). The most logical choice is to regard the executives as the representatives of the organization; they represent and have the best overview of it. Due to the formalized structure of voluntary organizations, especially when they are officially registered, it is easy to determine who their executives are. In most cases, the board members are the executives, particularly when the organization is

only run by volunteers. In more professional associations there may be paid employees, for example a general manager, who are the effective representatives thereof. In summary, voluntary organizations can be regarded as separate actors when the behavior of their representatives (which are, in most cases, the board members) is regarded as being the expression of the actions of the organizations themselves.

Expanding on the example of the boy who employed his social capital for the benefit of the community, one can think of situations in which a single organization can have a collective profit from its social capital. The current study focuses on ethnic communities in Western democracies. A single ethnic organization may employ its social capital, for example, to organize a pressure group into convincing the local government to meet the specific wishes of this particular group. If this organization succeeds, with the help of connected associations, in these attempts it is not only the organization itself and its members that profit, but also all of the other people who belong to this ethnic community. In other words, when regarded in this way, the receiving side of the social capital is the collective.

Moreover, a focus on voluntary organizations in the individual-collective outlook involves a peculiarity. The outlook can be interpreted as have I just explained: the organization, as an individual actor, provides the social capital that can benefit the collective. But one could also think of the board members, who are regarded as the representatives of the organizations, as the individuals who can bring their personal, individual social capital to the benefit of the organization and its members as a whole (the collective). For instance, a youth club wants to organize a weekly tournament for underprivileged children. The treasurer's best friend happens to be the assessor of a soccer club. In that example, the personal network of the treasurer – or in other words his social capital –is used in the service of the organization and, perhaps, eventually for the collective.

This twofold interpretation of the individual-collective outlook on social capital poses the question of how social capital, as theoretically defined, is operationalized. First of all, this is done herein with an emphasis on the network component, and not so much on the trust and norms and values elements. That is not to say that these aspects are not important; trust in particular is inextricably bound up with a social network structure (Fennema & Tillie, 2005). The fact that there is a network (i.e. social connections) already implies trust, as "it takes at least two to trust" (ibid. 2005, p.229). Social trust is embedded in social relationships, just as shared norms and values are, but the network component is the 'sine qua non'.

But even when one takes the network element of social capital as the main focus, the question remains: what does the social network of an organization look like? Is it the sum of the networks of the personal acquaintances of each of the board members, even if these acquaintances are not even related to any voluntary association? Or does the

organizational network consist only of the connections that these board members maintain with other organizations? Each method has its merits, and one has to choose one of them based on theoretical and practical considerations. In what follows, I will expand on what kind of networks I regard as representing the social capital of migrant communities.

2.8 Assessing organizational networks

There are many ways to determine an organizational network. It is important at this point to realize that the social network of an organization is not the same as the organizational network. The former describes only a single central organization and the contacts thereof. This is visually represented in Figure 2.2. A network of this kind is called an ego-network: the central organization (point) is the 'ego', and the surrounding points (organizations) are termed the 'alters'[16]. Based on an ego-network, one can perform an ego-centric network analysis.



Figure 2.2 An ego-network: the central point is 'ego', the surrounding points are 'alters'. Each point represents an organization, and each line a connection between two organizations.

An organizational network consists of a multitude of ego-networks. The ego-network of each organization in the network is mapped and, at the points at which the ego-networks overlap, they are connected. For example, the ego-network of a women's organization contains, amongst others, a sports club, and the ego-network of this sports club contains a youth association that is not in the ego-network of the women's organization. In this way, a large organizational network can be configured. The analyses of a whole network are described as 'socio-centric', but since this network consists of

[16] In this example, the alters are not connected, but in reality this often will be the case. When alters are connected, it is said that there is network 'closure'. Whether or not there is closure in an ego-network influences the value of the alters for ego. Depending on one's view, closure is an advantage (Coleman, 1990) or a disadvantage (Burt, 2000). Also see note 15 in this chapter.

the separate ego-networks one can also carry out an ego-centric analysis by selecting a single ego-network.

The question now remains as to what the basis of the connections between the organizations is. When are organizations connected? Is it when they are located at the same address, or when they are participating in joint initiatives? The current study uses two approaches to map the social capital of voluntary organizations: the network of interlocking directorates and the contact network.

A common method with which to reconstruct an organizational network is the use of information about dual board memberships, i.e. a network of interlocking directorates (e.g. Mizruchi, 1996). These are networks that are formed by people who are part of more than one organizational board at a time. For example, the chairman of a pigeon fanciers' association, who is also the treasurer of a yacht club, provides the link between these two organizations. Information about board memberships can often be collected from official archives, such as those held by the Chamber of Commerce and similar agencies.

Following the logic of the interlocking directorates that exist in the financial sector, the networks of interlocking directorates between voluntary organizations are regarded as expressions of trust between them. Fennema (1982) argued that at times when the market as a whole fails to create an atmosphere of trust between banks and the industry for large-scale loans, the former establish interlocking directorates with the companies to whom they lend money (i.e. board members of the banks take a seat on the boards of these companies) to at least give the idea that the bank can keep an eye on what is happening to the funds. Even though, in practice, the ability of these 'watch dogs' to control the spending of the company is limited, the link nevertheless increases the creation of trust because of the ease with which information can flow throughout the network (1999). It is thought that a similar process occurs in a network of interlocking directorates between voluntary organizations. Accordingly, such networks provide important information about the social capital of voluntary organizations. I will refer to this type of network as a 'formal network' because of the official character thereof.

The network of interlocking directorates as a reflection of the social capital of organizations has several shortcomings. The most important criticism is that it is unclear whether the official links between organizations are actually used in everyday life. Are these links merely a formality, or do they reflect an intensive interaction between organizations? Research into voluntary associations which uses the networks of interlocking directorates[17] for operationalization purposes is scarce, and that which

[17] Much research has been performed on the (use of) networks of interlocking directorates of industrial corporations, banks etc. (e.g. Rolfe, 1967; Pennings, 1980; Mizruchi, 1996; Peng, Au, & Wang, 2001; Heemskerk, 2007).

does exist does not shed any light on this point (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Vermeulen, 2006; Berger, 2010); the use of the networks and the embedded resources are assumed, but never tested. In connection with this criticism, the question arises as to whether organizations have other contacts in everyday life that (also) provide resources that are actually used, and should thus be included in a exploration of their social capital. In other words, a particular voluntary organization, for example a music society, may have one formal connection to another organization because its secretary is the chairman of a chess club, but in everyday life it collaborates with at least fifteen other musically involved societies. In fact, the connection to the chess club may not even be addressed at all because of the divergent activities of the two organizations, while the connections with the other music societies are used intensively because of joint projects and shows. Although I assume that many organizations have everyday contacts that are used more than formal contacts, this is not to say that this applies to every association. It may also work the other way around: the everyday contacts may be superficial, and if an organization really needs the support of others (i.e. it needs to address its social capital) it turns only to those organizations to which it is formally connected. In other words, it is worth taking not only the formal, but also the informal connections into account when studying the social capital of voluntary organizations. This is what I call the contact network. I regard the network of interlocking directorates and the contact network as complementary; together they shape the social capital of the individual organizations and that of the community.

This work uses the social capital of Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin as its case studies, and Chapters 5 and 6 contain descriptions of the social capital of these respective communities. The ultimate aim of this study is to understand how social capital is mobilized. In the current study this entails an examination of how information is forwarded throughout a community. It will show how individual actors (single organizations) operate to inform the community. How this process in captured, is explained in Chapter 7. In Chapters 8 and 9 I will provide the empirical findings about the mobilized social capital in the two cities. However, before I turn in the next chapter to the main explanatory factor (political opportunity structures), there is one final feature of social capital and social capital theory that needs to be addressed: the distinction between bonding, bridging and linking social capital.

2.9 Bonding and bridging social capital

As stated above, the four outlooks on social capital need not be regarded as being mutually exclusive, but rather as complementary. Generally, which approach to social capital is the most appropriate depends upon the research's aims, preferences, and the

possibilities offered by the available data. Some researchers will, for whatever reason, always cling on to only one of these outlooks, while others may vary their positions over time. But the different views of social capital also have things in common. As well as a consensus that the three central elements of the concept are social networks, trust, and norms and values, there is a second point upon which theorists agree, irrespective of their point of view, namely the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital.

2.9.1 The introduction of bonding and bridging social capital in the scientific literature

After the jubilant mood caused by Putnam's 1990s reintroduction of the concept of social capital had died down a little, there was a growing body of public opinion that it also has a less beneficial side. Portes and Landolt published generally recognized criticisms of the subject under the revealing title of "The Downside of Social Capital" (Portes & Landolt, 1996). These authors (1996) pointed out that a negative side effect of social capital is that it can lead to the exclusion of outsiders, excessive claims on group members, restrictions of individual freedoms, and downward leveling norms (Portes & Landolt, 1996; Portes, 1998).

Other comments, expressed in more positive terms, were that social capital is not a one-size-fits-all concept as it was presented initially. This does not necessarily have to mean that social capital has a *negative* impact, but it did sometimes turn out to have a *less positive* effect than expected. Researchers found that some groups which, at first sight, had considerable amounts of social capital, sometimes still lagged behind compared to others with the same amount. For example, members of communities that are characterized by extreme social control, benefit from unconditional support, while their opportunities to do something other than what is expected of them are blocked rather than increased (on the negative outcomes of social capital, see also Castiglione, 2008). The idea was then that the two types of social capital had to be distinguished. One type is better suited to 'getting you by', the other to getting you 'ahead' (de Souza Briggs, 1998).

Within this framework, Gittell and Vidal (1998) presented bonding and bridging social capital[18]. The former is defined by them as "*the type* [of social capital] *that brings closer together people who already know each other*" (p.15). Putnam termed this type of social capital as 'exclusive' because it is '*inward looking and tends to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups*' (Putnam, 2000, p. 22). Groups are homogeneous when based on specific characteristics, such as socio-demographic and socio-economic

[18] Remarkably, Gittell and Vidal (1998) referred to Putnam (1996) as the one who came up with this classification first, whereas Putnam (2000), for his part, referred to Gittell and Vidal as the originators! Later authors usually agree with Putnam.

features (e.g. M. Leonard, 2004; Kim, Subramanian, & Kawachi, 2006). Bonding social capital is further characterized by multi-functional ties and great trust (R. Leonard & Onyx, 2003). It can be found within families, within ethnic communities, and between close friends and neighbors etc. (e.g. Woolcock, 2001). It is this form of social capital that has a predominantly supportive function, helping people to get by. For example, Sampson and Raudenbush (1997) found that homogenous neighborhoods (i.e. with more bonding social capital) had more effective social capital, leading to reduced crime levels. In their study of the implications of social capital for economic development policy, Woolcock and Narayan (2000) argued that bonding social capital serves as an effective way of protection, risk management and solidarity for poor village groups. However, in order to help the poor to develop economically, bridging social capital is necessary.

Gittell and Vidal defined bridging social capital as "*the type that brings together people or groups who previously did not know each other*" (p.15). Putnam described it as linking "*substantial sectors of the community and span[ning] underlying social cleavages*" (1996, p.665). He also added that bridging social capital is inclusive and contains outward looking networks (2000, p.22). The degree of trust in the networks that come under the bridging social capital definition is lower than in bonding networks (R. Leonard & Onyx, 2003), but bridging social capital is obviously also characterized by a minimum degree of trust. A main feature of the actors involved in bridging social capital is that they are dissimilar in terms of key characteristics (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). For example, they belong to a different religious background, they live in different countries, or their jobs have different statuses. One can think of more distant friends, associates, and colleagues and other acquaintances (Woolcock, 2001). With the idea that social capital allows X to achieve ends that he would otherwise not be able to (Fennema & Tillie, 2005), it becomes clear why it is bridging social capital in particular that gets people ahead. If my contacts are just like me, they probably dispose of the same resources that I do. The friends that have the same university degree as I do are at the same stage of life and are on about the same step of their career ladder. If I want to get a new, preferably better, job, these friends are unlikely to have a position available. But if my friends are *not* like me, they can provide me with other resources that I do not have myself. They may work in a different line of business or be older than I am and are, therefore, already in a managerial position, for example. If I want to find a new job, these are the friends that can probably help me to get ahead.

The potentially negative consequences of social capital, first commented on by Portes and Landolt (1996), mainly concerned the bonding form thereof. The (too) close connections involved in bonding social capital can imply heavy social norms. Related collective sanctions can have a restrictive effect on the individuals of a particular community, hindering instead of furthering the positions of the actors involved. Patulny

and Svendsen (2007), however, advocated not seeing bonding social capital as 'bad' and bridging social capital as 'good', but rather pointed to the need to be aware that both kinds can have beneficial as well as detrimental effects. The ideal is to find a perfect mix of the two forms. For that matter, bonding and bridging social capital are often not strictly separable. Some situations represent bonding and bridging social capital at the same time. The black church, in which people of the same race and religion (bonding), but of a different social class (bridging), are brought together is an example of the kind of social capital that Putnam proposed (Putnam, 2000; p.23).

In summarizing the situation, the difference between bonding and bridging social capital is, de facto, based on two characteristics: tie strength and similarity of actors. The latter refers to the socio-demographic and socio-economic features of the people involved. Actors are 'similar' if they are members of the same family, belong to the same ethnic group, or have the same social status. 'Dissimilar' actors differ in terms of these characteristics. Bonding social capital is related to the ties between 'similar' actors and bridging social capital to the ties between 'dissimilar' actors. The strength of the tie between two actors is also connected to the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital. Granovetter (1973) reported that there are three degrees of tie strength: 'weak', 'strong', or 'absent'. With his famous sentence 'the strength of weak ties' Granovetter advocated that weak ties, which lead to dissimilar others (i.e. bridging social capital), have more diverse resources to offer than strong ties do to similar others (i.e. bonding social capital). However, later empirical research has shown that this classification is not particularly strict. Leonard and Onyx (2003) reported that close, multifunctional ties were present as much in bonding as in bridging connections. Apparently, the most fundamental characteristic of bridging social capital is that it concerns 'dissimilar' ties more than it is about tie strength. I, therefore, assume that what makes one type of social capital bridging and the other bonding depends, most of all, on the similarity of the actors. Tie strength is a secondary feature that probably is correlated with, but not decisive for, the similarity of actors.

Some authors, including Fennema and Tillie (2008), advocate that bonding and bridging social capital should not be determined in terms of the characteristics of the actors, as I do, but rather in terms of the network structure. They regard bonding and bridging social capital in terms of the strength of ties (weak or strong) and the degree of network closure (the extent to which the alters of an actor are connected to each other or not). Bonding social capital involves strong ties and high network closure, whereas bridging social capital involves weak ties and low network closure. However, as Granovetter (1973) had already written, the stronger the link between two actors, the more similar they are. This implies that even though Fennema and Tillie claim not to take information about the actors into account, they inevitably do so, even if it is indirectly. Moreover, I am, amongst other things, interested in the connection between migrant communities and society at large. In order to be able to consider this link, I need to take the characteristics of the actors explicitly into account. Therefore, I will not use

this structural approach to bonding and bridging social capital, but will instead continue to focus on the characteristics of the actors involved. The distinction between bonding and bridging social capital in this study will be based upon two characteristics: the ethnicity and the type of organization.

2.9.2 Ethnic bonding and bridging social capital

Bonding social capital with respect to ethnicity refers to the ties an organization maintains with other organizations *within* the community. Bridging social capital, on the other hand, concerns the ties of members of the community to actors *outside* it. For example, when Turkish organizations have ties to other Turkish organizations, this reflects bonding social capital. When an association has ties to non-Turkish organizations (e.g. Moroccan or German ones), it has bridging social capital. Whether an organization has more bonding or bridging social capital with respect to ethnicity can indicate to what extent it is focused on its own group, or instead seeks to interact with society at large.

I expect to find relatively few ethnic bridges in the network of interlocking directorates, but quite a number in the contact network. This is because I assume that establishing formal relationships between organizations involves a greater degree of trust, which is generally the case between organizations of the same ethnicity. Informal connections, on the other hand, can be more casual and, therefore, less trust-based. Furthermore, I expect that associations will collaborate with those organizations that are in their physical neighborhood and that the ethnicity of these neighbors does not play an important role in the decision about whether or not to work together.

2.9.3 Bonding and bridging social capital over organizational type

Bonding social capital that is based on organizational type refers to the contacts that an organization has with other organizations with similar key objectives. In this respect, bridging social capital refers to the ties that an organization has to those of a different nature. So, if a soccer club is only connected to other similar clubs, this organization has bonding social capital. Even though this enables the club to fulfill its main aim, which is probably taking part in a competition, it does not provide the organization with other material[19] resources, apart from more of those that it already has itself (players, pitches etc.). This is different for a soccer club that also maintains contacts with other kinds of associations, i.e. that has bridging social capital regarding the type of organization. For

[19] I am leaving aside here the immaterial resources that an organization may be able to offer, such as helping out with filling in forms and doing the bookkeeping, as they are not directly linked to the type of organization.

example, the club wants to celebrate its 50th anniversary with a musical event. If it also maintains contacts with a music society, it can try to organize something with it instead of hiring an expensive commercial orchestra. Zmerli and Newton (2007) found that many organizations tend to have mainly bonding social capital, which '*restricts the networking capacity of associations, and the ability to function as agents of social integration, insofar as they are mainly in contact with groups that have the same main activity as their own*' (p.171).

2.10 Linking social capital

Woolcock (2001) reasoned that as well as a distinction between bonding and bridging social capital, yet another refinement is needed. He introduced the concept of 'linking' social capital. Linking social capital is defined as "*norms of respect and networks of trusting relationships between people who are interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalized power or authority gradients in society*" (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004, p. 655). Some seem to interpret linking social capital as being connections to individuals in a better position (e.g. Kim et al., 2006), but I regard it as the relationships between actors and formal institutions beyond the community (following Woolcock, 2001; Patulny & Svendsen, 2007). Based upon a number of studies (Lipsky, 1980; Narayan, 2000; Krishna, 2002), Szreter and Woolcock asserted that the links which connect the powerless to the powerful are extremely important for the welfare of the former, especially in poor communities (and as long as the powerful do not exploit these connections). In this context, Putnam (2004) found that in Italy the frequency of the contact between citizens and politicians was negatively correlated with social trust and economic growth because of the exploitative nature of the relationships.

In the current study, the linking social capital of voluntary organizations is relevant. Social capital theory ascribes an important role to the interaction of organizations with governmental bodies because this leads to the development of political trust on the part of the board, which can transfer this to its members. Of course, linking social capital does not occur in a network of interlocking directorates. In their professional capacity, civil servants do not take up a place on the board of any voluntary organization. If they did, these organizations would no longer belong to the realm of civil society. The contact network, on the other hand, can include ties between organizations and the government. When organizations apply for funding, help to implement local government policies, or co-organize events with civil servants, they encounter governmental bodies. This indicates that these organizations have linking social capital. It will be interesting to find out to what degree organizations incorporate their contacts with governmental institutions in the mobilization of the community. I expect this to depend on the attitudes of the organizations vis-à-vis the authorities; that is, whether they regard the

government as a reliable partner (which probably depends on whether they are financially supported). But I expect it to be even more dependent on the treatment of the associations by the authorities; an open, accepting and encouraging environment is more likely to lead to positive relationships between organizations and authorities than a closed, exclusive and less sympathetic one.

This brings me to the next chapter, in which I will discuss the 'environments' that the subjects of this study encounter. I focus on the voluntary organizations in the Turkish communities in two European capitals, Amsterdam and Berlin. The relevant environments relate to the political opportunity structures in which these associations operate. In the next chapter, I will first discuss the concept of political opportunity structures on a theoretical level. Thereafter, I will describe what they are like in the two cities under study, which will reveal that they differ considerably.