Downloaded from UvA-DARE, the institutional repository of the University of Amsterdam (UvA)
http://dare.uva.nl/document/154506

File ID	154506
Filename	References

SOURCE (OR PART OF THE FOLLOWING SOURCE):

Type	Dissertation
Title	Incomplete cartels and antitrust policy : incidence and detection
Author	A.M. Bos
Faculty	Faculty of Economics and Business
Year	2009
Pages	189
ISBN	9789036101462

FULL BIBLIOGRAPHIC DETAILS:
http://dare.uva.nl/record/323110

Copyright

It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other then for strictly personal, individual use.

UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (http://dare.uva.nl)

References

[1] Abrantes-Metz, R.M., L.M. Froeb, J.F. Geweke and C.T. Taylor (2006), "A Variance Screen for Collusion," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 24(3), 467-486;

[2] Abreu, D. (1986), "Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 39(1), 191-225;

[3] Abreu, D. (1988), "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," *Econometrica*, 56, 383-396;

[4] Albaek, S., P. Mollgaard and P. Overgaard (1997), "Government Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case," *Journal of Industrial Economics*, 45, 429-443;

[5] Alexander, B. (1997), "Failed Cooperation in Heterogeneous Industries under the National Recovery Administration," *Journal of Economic History*, 57(2), 322-344;

[6] Asch, P. and J.J. Seneca (1975), "Characteristics of Collusive Firms," *Journal of Industrial Economics*, 23(3), 223-237;

[7] Athey, S. and K. Bagwell (2001), "Optimal Collusion with Private Information," *RAND Journal of Economics*, 32(3), 428-465;

[8] Aubert, C., P. Rey and W.E. Kovacic (2006), "The Impact of Leniency and Whistle-blowing Programs on Cartels," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 24(6), 1241-1266;

[9] Aumann, R. and J. Drèze (1974), "Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures," *International Journal of Game Theory*, 3, 217-237;

[10] Bain, J.S. (1956), "*Barriers to New Competition*," Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press;

[11] Bajari, P. (2001), "Comparing Competition and Collusion: A Numerical Approach," *Economic Theory*, 18, 187-205;

[12] Bajari, P. and G. Summers (2002), "Detecting Collusion in Procurement Auctions," *Antitrust Law Journal*, 70, 143-170;

[13] Bajari, P. and L. Ye (2003), "Deciding between Competition and Collusion," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 85, 971-989;

[14] Baker, J.B. (2003), "The Case for Antitrust Enforcement," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 17(4), 27-50;

[15] Baker, J.B. and T.F. Bresnahan (2007), "Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining Markets and Measuring Market Power," in: *Handbook in Antitrust Economics*, Buccirossi, P., ed., MIT Press, Cambridge, MA;

[16] Baldwin, L.H., R.C. Marshall and J-F. Richard (1997), "Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Auctions," *Journal of Political Economy*, 105, 657-699;

[17] Baumol, W.J., J.C., Panzar and R.D. Willig (1982), "*Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure*," New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich;

[18] Belleflamme, P. (2000), "Coalition Structures with Open Membership and Asymmetric Firms," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 30, 1-21;

[19] Benoit, J.P. and V. Krishna (1987), "Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and Quantities," *Review of Economic Studies*, 54, 23-36;

[20] Benson, L., M.L. Greenhut and G. Norman (1990), "On the Basing-Point System," *American Economic Review*, 80, 584-588;

[21] Bernheim, B.D. and M.D. Whinston (1990), "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," *RAND Journal of Economics*, 21, 1-26;

[22] Blair, R.D. and R.E. Romano (1989), "Proof of Nonparticipation in a Price Fixing Conspiracy," *Review of Industrial Organization*, 4, 101-117;

[23] Bloch, F. (1995), "Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies," *RAND Journal of Economics*, 26(3), 537-556;

[24] Bloch, F. (1996), "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 14, 90-123;

[25] Bloch, F. (2002), "Coalitions and Networks in Industrial Organization," *Manchester Studies*, 70(1), 36-55;

[26] Bloch, F. (2005), "Group and Network Formation in Industrial Organization: A Survey," in: *Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs and Coalitions*, Demange, G. and M. Wooders (eds.), Cambridge University Press;

[27] Bolotova, Y. (2006), "Cartel Overcharges: an Empirical Analysis," *Working paper*, University of Idaho;

[28] Bolotova, Y., J.M. Connor and D. Miller (2008), "The Impact of Collusion on Price Behavior: Empirical Results from Two Recent Cases," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 26(6), 1290-1307;

[29] Borenstein, S. and A. Shepard (1996), "Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets," *RAND Journal of Economics*, 27(3), 429-451;

[30] Bos, I. (2007), "Can we catch a Thief with an Economist?," *AENORM*, 57, 61-65;

[31] Bos, I. and J.E. Harrington (2008), "Endogeneous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms," Economics Working Paper Archive, 544, Johns Hopkins University;

[32] Bos, I. and M.P. Schinkel (2006), "On the Scope for the European Commission's 2006 Fining Guidelines under the Legal Maximum Fine," *Journal of Competition Law and Economics*, 2(4), 673-682;

[33] Bos, I. and M.P. Schinkel (2008), "Tracing the Base: A Topographic Test for Collusive Basing-Point Pricing," ACLE working paper, No. 2008-07;

[34] Bresnahan, T.F. (1987), "Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: The 1955 Price War," *Journal of Industrial Economics*, 35(4), 457-482;

[35] Brock, W.A. and J.A. Scheinkman (1985), "Price Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints," *Review of Economic Studies*, 52(3), 371-382;

[36] Brusco, S. and G. Lopomo (2002), "Collusion via Signaling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities," *Review of Economic Studies*, 69(2), 407-463;

[37] Cabou, C.G., D.D. Haddock and M.H. Thorne (1992), "An Analytic History of Delivered Price Litigation: Do Courts Properly Distinguish Rivalrous from Collusive Instances," *Economic Inquiry*, 30, 307-321;

[38] Canter, D. (2003), "*Mapping Murder: The Secrets of Geographical Profiling*," Virgin Publishing;

[39] Carlton, D.W. (1983), "A Reexamination of Delivered Pricing," *Journal of Law and Economics*, 26, 51-70;

[40] Castanias, R. and H. Johnson (1993), "Gas Wars: Retail Gasoline Price Fluctuations," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 75, 171-174;

[41] Chamberlin, E.H. (1933), "*The Theory of Monopolistic Competition*," Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press;

[42] Chang, M-H. (1991), "The Effects of Product Differentiation on Collusive Pricing," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 9(3), 453-469;

[43] Christie, W.G. and P.H. Schultz (1994), "Why do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes?," *Journal of Finance*, 49(5), 1813-1840;

[44] Christie, W.G., J.H. Harris and P.H. Schultz (1994), "Why Did NASDAQ Market Makers Stop Avoiding Odd-Eighth Quotes?," *Journal of Finance*, 49(5), 1841-1860;

[45] Clarke, I., O. Sandberg, B. Wiley and T.W. Hong (2001), "Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System," in: *Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies*, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin, 46-66;

[46] Clark, J.M. (1943), "Imperfect Competition Theory and Basing-Point Problems," *American Economic Review*, 33(2), 283-300;

[47] Clark, J.M. (1949), "The Law and Economics of Basing Points: Appraisal and Proposals," *American Economic Review*, 39(2), 430-447;

[48] Clay, K. and W. Troesken (2002), "Strategic Behavior and Market Structure in Whiskey Distilling; 1887-1895," *Journal of Economic History*, 62(4), 999-1023;

[49] Coase, R.H. (1991), "The Institutional Structure of Production, Nobel Memorial Lecture," in: Coase, R.H., *Essays on Economics and Economists*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago;

[50] Commons, J.R. (1924), "The Delivered Price Practice in the Steel Market," *American Economic Review*, 14, 505-519;

[51] Compte, O. (1998), "Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring," *Econometrica*, 66(3), 597-626;

[52] Compte, O., F. Jenny and P. Rey (2002), "Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion," *European Economic Review*, 46(1), 1-29;

[53] Connor, J.M. (2001), "*Global Price Fixing: Our Customers are the Enemy*," Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers;

[54] Connor, J.M. (2003), "Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement," *Working paper 03-12*, Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University;

[55] Cyert, R., P. Kumar and J. Williams (1995), "Impact of Organizational Structure on Oligopolistic Pricing," *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 26, 1-15;

[56] Cramton, P.C., and T.R. Palfrey (1990), "Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs," *International Economic Review*, 31(1), 17-47;

[57] D'Aspremont, C., A. Jacquemin, J.J. Gabszewicz and J.A. Weymark (1983), "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 16(1), 17-25;

[58] Davidson, C. and R. Deneckere (1990), "Excess Capacity and Collusion," *International Economic Review*, 31, 521-541;

[59] Deneckere, R.J. and C. Davidson (1985), "Incentives to form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," *RAND Journal of Economics*, 16(4), 473-486;

[60] Deneckere, R.J. and D. Kovenock (1992), "Price Leadership," *Review of Economic Studies*, 59(1), 143-162;

[61] DeRoos, N. (2001), "Collusion with a Competitive Fringe: An Application to Vitamine C," Manuscript, Yale University;

[62] Diamantoudi, E. (2005), "Stable Cartels Revisited," *Economic Theory*, 26, 907-921;

[63] Dick, A.R. (2004), "If Cartels Were Legal, When Would Firms Fix Prices?," in: *How Cartels Endure and How They Fail*, Grossman, P.Z. (ed.), Edward Elgar;

[64] Donsimoni, M.-P. (1985), "Stable Heterogeneous Cartels," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 3(4), 451-467;

[65] Donsimoni, M.-P., N.S. Economides and H.M. Polemarchakis (1986), "Stable Cartels," *International Economic Review*, 27(2), 317-327;

[66] Eaton, C. and M. Eswaran (1998), "Endogenous Cartel Formation," *Australian Economic Papers*, 37(1), 1-13;

[67] Eckbo, P.L. (1976), "*The Future of World Oil*," Cambridge, MA: Ballinger;

[68] Eckert, A. (2003), "Retail Price Cycles and the Presence of Small Firms," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 21, 151-170;

[69] Ellison, G. (1994), "Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee," *RAND Journal of Economics*, 25(1), 37-57;

[70] Escrihuela-Villar, M. (2003), "*Partial Cartels*," Doctoral Thesis, University of Alicante;

[71] Escrihuela-Villar, M. (2004), "Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability," Working Paper;

[72] Escriuhela-Villar, M. (2008a), "On endogenous cartel size under tacit collusion," *working paper*;

[73] Escriuhela-Villar, M. (2008b), "Partial coordination and mergers among quantity-setting firms," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 26(3), 803-810;

[74] Espinosa, M.P. (1992), "Delivered Pricing, FOB Pricing, and Collusion in Spatial Markets," *RAND Journal of Economics*, 23(1), 64-85;

[75] Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (1990), "Horizontal Mergers: an Equilibrium Analysis," *American Economic Review*, 80, 107-126;

[76] Farrell, J. and M. Rabin (1996), "Cheap Talk," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 10(3), 103-118;

[77] Federal Trade Commission, "Findings, Opinions and Orders in the Matter of Boise Cascade Corporation, et al.," *Federal Trade Commission Decisions*, January 1978, 91, 1-111;

[78] Feinstein, J.S., M.K. Block and F.C. Nold (1985), "Asymmetric Information and Collusive Behavior in Auction Markets," *American Economic Review*, 75(3), 441-460;

[79] Feldenkirchen, W. (1992), "Concentration in German Industry, 1870-1939," in: "*The Rise of Big Business, International Library of Critical Writings in Business History*," Supple, B.E., Edward Elgar;

[80] Fershtman, C. and A. Pakes (2000), "A Dynamic Game with Collusion and Price Wars," *RAND Journal of Economics*, 31(2), 207-236;

[81] Fraas, A.G. and D. Greer (1977), "Market Structure and Price Collusion: An Empirical Analysis," *Journal of Industrial Economics*, 26(1), 21-44;

[82] Friederiszick, H.W. and F.P. Maier-Rigaud (2007), "The Role of Economics in Cartel Detection in Europe," in: *The More Economic Approach in European Competition Law*, Schmidtchen, D., M. Albert and S. Voigt (eds.), Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck;

[83] Friederiszick, H.W. and F.P. Maier-Rigaud (2008), "Triggering Inspections *Ex Officio*: Moving Beyond a Passive EU Cartel Policy, *Journal of Competition Law and Economics*, 4(1), 89-113;

[84] Friedman, J.W. (1971), "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," *Review of Economic Studies*, 38(1), 1-12;

[85] Froeb, L.M. (1988), "Auctions and Antitrust," *Economic Analysis Group Discussion paper*, EAG 88-8, U.S. Department of Justice;

[86] Froeb, L.M. and M. Shor (2005), "Auctions, Evidence, and Antitrust,", in: Harkrider, J. (ed.), "*The Use of Econometrics in Antitrust*," American Bar Association;

[87] Genesove, D. and W.P. Mullin (2001), "Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case," *American Economic Review*, 91(3), 379-398;

[88] Gilligan, T.W. (1992), "Imperfect Competition and Basing-Point Pricing: Evidence from the Softwood Plywood Industry," *American Economic Review*, 82, 1106-1119;

[89] Goppelsroeder, M., (2008), "Collusion and Entry: an Experimental Study," ACLE working paper, No. 2009-05;

[90] Goppelsroeder, M., M.P. Schinkel and J. Tuinstra (2008), "Corporate Leniency programs in the Cartel Lifecycle: 'Cleaning out the Closet'," *ACLE working paper*;

[91] Graham, D.A. and R.C. Marshall (1987), "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single Object Second Price and English Auctions," *Journal of Political Economy*, 86, 1217-1239;

[92] Graham, D.A., R.C. Marshall and J-F. Richard (1990), "Differential Payments within a Bidder Coalition and the Shapley Value," *American Economic Review*, 80(3), 493-510;

[93] Granitz, E. and B. Klein (1996), "Monopolization by 'Raising Rivals' Costs': The Standard Oil Case," *Journal of Law and Economics*, 39(1), 1-47;

[94] Green, E. and R.H. Porter (1984), "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," *Econometrica*, 52, 87-100;

[95] Greenhut, M.L. (1981), "Spatial Pricing in the USA, West Germany, and Japan," *Economica*, 48, 79-86;

[96] Greenhut, M.L. (1987), "Basing point system," in: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds.), *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics*, Vol. 1, Stockwell Press, New York;

[97] Griffin, J.M. (1989), "Previous Cartel Experience: Any Lessons for OPEC?," in: Lawrence R. Klein and J. Marquez (eds.), "*Economics in Theory and Practice: an Eclectic Approach*," Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 179-206;

[98] Grout, P. and S. Sonderegger (2005), "Predicting Cartels", *Economic Discussion Paper OFT 773*, OFT, London;

[99] Grunzel, J. (1902), "*Über kartelle*,", Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot;

[100] Gupta, B. (1997), "Collusion in the Indian Tea Industry in the Great Depression: an Analysis of Panel Data," *Explorations in Economic History*, 34, 155-173;

[101] Haddock, D.D. (1982), "Basing-Point Pricing: Competitive vs. Collusive theories," *American Economic Review*, 72, 289-307;

[102] Haddock, D.D. (1990), "On the Basing-Point System: Comment," *American Economic Review*, 80, 957-962;

[103] Halliday, J. and P. Seabright (2001), "Networks good, cartels bad: but how could anyone tell the difference?," in: *Fighting Cartels*, report of the Swedish competition authority;

[104] Harrington, J.E. (1989), "Collusion among asymmetric firms: The case of different discount factors," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 7(2), 289-307;

[105] Harrington, J.E. (1991), "The determination of price and output quotas in a heterogeneous cartel," *International Economic Review*, 32(4), 767-792;

[106] Harrington, J.E. (2004), "Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," *RAND Journal of Economics*, 35(4), 651-673;

[107] Harrington, J.E. (2005), "Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," *International Economic Review*, 46(1), 145-169;

[108] Harrington, J.E. (2006), "How do Cartels Operate?," *Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics*, 2(1), 1-105;

[109] Harrington, J.E. (2008), "Detecting Cartels," in: *Handbook in Antitrust Economics*, Buccirossi, P., ed., MIT Press, Cambridge, MA;

[110] Harrington, J.E. and J. Chen (2006), "Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 24, 1185-1212;

[111] Hart, S. and M. Kurz (1983), "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," *Econometrica*, 51(4), 1047-1064;

[112] Hay, G. and D. Kelly (1974), "An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies," *Journal of Law and Economics*, 17, 13-38;

[113] Hay, G.A. (1999), "Practices that Facilitate Cooperation: the Ethyl Case," in: J. Kwoka and L. White (eds.), *The Antitrust Revolution*, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, New York;

[114] Hinloopen, J. and A.R. Soetevent (2008), "Laboratory evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs," *RAND Journal of Economics*, 39(2), 607-616;

[115] Hotelling, H. (1929), "Stability in Competition," Economic Journal, 39(153), 41-57;

[116] Hviid, M. (1992), "Endogenous Cartel Formation with Private Information," *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 25(4), 972-982;

[117] Kandori, M. and H. Matsushima (1998), "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion," *Econometrica*, 66(3), 627-652;

[118] Karlson, S.H. (1990), "Competition and Cement Basing Points: F.O.B. Destination, Delivered from Where?," *Journal of Regional Science*, 30, 75-88;

[119] Kaysen, C. (1949), "Basing Point Pricing and Public Policy," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 63, 289-314;

[120] Kinghorn, J.R. and R. Nielsen (2004), "A Practice without Defenders: The Price Effects of Cartelization," in: *How Cartels Endure and How They Fail*, Grossman, P.Z. (ed.), Edward Elgar;

[121] Koskoff, D.E. (1981), "*The Diamond World*," New York: Harper & Row;

[122] Kühn, K.-U. and M. Motta (1999), "The Economics of Joint Dominance," Working paper, Florence: European University Institute;

[123] Lambson, V.E. (1987), "Optimal Penal Codes in Price-Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints," *Review of Economic Studies*, 54(3), 385-397;

[124] Lambson, V.E. (1994), "Some Results on Optimal Penal Codes in Asymmetric Bertrand Supergames," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 62, 444-468;

[125] Leibenstein, H. (1966), "Allocative Efficiency vs. X-Efficiency," *American Economic Review*, 56, 392-415;

[126] Levenstein, M.C. (1995), "Mass Production Conquers the Pool: Firm Organization and the Nature of Competition in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Economic History*, 55(3), 575-611;

[127] Levenstein, M.C. (1996), "Do Price Wars Facilitate Collusion? A Study of the Bromine Cartel before World War I," *Explorations in Economic History*, 33, 1107-1137;

[128] Levenstein, M.C., V.Y. Suslow and L. Oswald (2003), "International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of Effects and Policy Remedies," *William Davidson Working Paper*, 538;

[129] Levenstein, M.C. and V.Y. Suslow (2004), "Studies of Cartel Stability: A Comparison of Methodological Approaches," in: Grossman, P.Z. (ed.), *How Cartels Endure and How They Fail*, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 9-52;

[130] Levenstein, M.C. and V.Y. Suslow (2006), "What Determines Cartel Success?," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 44(1), 43-95;

[131] Levy, D.T. and J.D. Reitzes (1993), "Basing-Point Pricing and Incomplete Collusion," *Journal of Regional Science*, 33(1), 27-36;

[132] Liefmann, R. (1977), "*Cartels, Concerns and Trusts*," New York: Arno Press;

[133] Loescher, S.M. (1959), "*Imperfect Collusion in the Cement Industry*," Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press;

[134] Loescher, S.M. (1980), "Economic Collusion, Civil Conspiracy, and Treble Damage Deterrents: The Sherman Act Breakthrough with Southern Plywood," *Quarterly Review of Economics and Business*, 20, 6-35;

[135] Machlup, F. (1949), "*The Basing-point System*," Philadelphia, The Blakiston Company;

[136] MacKie-Mason, J.K. and R.S. Pindyck (1987), "Cartel Theory and Cartel Experience in International Mineral Markets," in: Gordon, Jakoby and Zimmerman (eds.), *Energy: Markets and Regulation*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 187-214;

[137] Mailath, G. and P. Zemsky (1991), "Collusion in Second-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 3, 467-486;

[138] Marengo, L.M. (1955), "The Basing Point Decisions and the Steel Industry," *American Economic Review*, 45(2), 509-522;

[139] Markham, J.W. (1951), "The Nature and Significance of Price Leadership," *American Economic Review*, 41(5), 891-905;

[140] Marshall, R.C., M.J. Meurer, J-F. Richard and W. Stromquist (1994), "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 7, 193-220;

[141] Marshall, R.C. and L.M. Marx (2007), "Bidder Collusion," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 133, 374-402;

[142] Martin, S. (1990), "Fringe Size and Cartel Stability," *European University Institute Working Paper 90/16*;

[143] Martin, S. (2002), "*Advanced Industrial Economics*," 2nd edition, Blackwell Publishing, UK;

[144] Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (1988), "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, 2: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles," *Econometrica*, 56(3), 571-599;

[145] McAfee, P. and J. MacMillan (1992), "Bidding Rings," *American Economic Review*, 82, 579-599;

[146] McAfee, P. (1994), "Endogenous Availability, Cartels, and Merger in an Equilibrium Price Dispersion," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 62, 24-47;

[147] McAnney, J.W. (1991), "The Justice Department's Crusade against Price-Fixing: Initiative or Reaction?," *Antitrust Bulletin*, 521-542;

[148] McCutcheon, B. (1997), "Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?," *Journal of Political Economy*, 105, 330-350;

[149] Motta, M. and M. Polo (2003), "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 21(3), 347-379;

[150] Motta, M. (2004), "*Competition Policy: Theory and Practice*," Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;

[151] Neumann, M. (2001), "*Competition Policy: History, Theory and Practice*," Cheltenham: Edward Elgar;

[152] Newmark, C.M. (1988), "Does Horizontal Price Fixing Raise Price? A Look at the Bakers of Washington Case," *Journal of Law and Economics*, 31(2), 469-484;

[153] Noel, M.D. (2007), "Edgeworth Price Cycles: Evidence from the Toronto Retail Gasoline Market," *Journal of Industrial Economics*, 55(1), 69-92;

[154] Perry, M. and R. Porter (1985), "Oligopoly and the Incentives for Horizontal Merger," *American Economic Review*, 75, 219-227;

[155] Pesendorfer, M. (2000), "A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions," *Review of Economic Studies*, 67, 381-411;

[156] Pindyck, R.S. (1979), "The Cartelization of World Commodity Markets," *American Economic Review*, 69(2), 154-158;

[157] Pindyck, R.S. and D.L. Rubinfeld (2001), "*Microeconomics*," fifth edition, New Jersey: Prentice Hall;

[158] Piotrowski, R. (1933), "*Cartels and Trusts: their origin and historical development from the economic and legal aspects*," Porcupine Press: Philadelphia;

[159] Porter, R.H. (1983), "A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886," *Bell Journal of Economics*, 14, 301-314;

[160] Porter, R.H. (2005), "Detecting Collusion," *Review of Industrial Organization*, 26(2), 147-167;

[161] Porter, R.H. and J.D. Zona (1993), "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," *Journal of Political Economy*, 101, 79-99;

[162] Porter, R.H. and J.D. Zona (1999), "Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding," *RAND Journal of Economics*, 30(2), 263-288;

[163] Posada, P. (2001), "Leadership Cartels in Industries with Differentiated Products," *Warwick Economic Research Papers*, No. 590;

[164] Posner, R.A. (1970), "A Statistical Study of Antitrust Law Enforcement," *Journal of Law and Economics*, 13, 365-419;

[165] Prokop, J. (1999), "Process of Dominant-Cartel Formation," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 17(2), 241-257;

[166] Ray, D. and R. Vohra (1999), "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 26, 286-336;

[167] Rey, P. (2007), "On the Use of Economic Analysis for Cartel Detection," in: *European Competition Law Annual 2006: Enforcement of the Prohibition of Cartels*, C.-D. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (eds.), Oxford: Hart;

[168] Ross, T.W. (1992), "Cartel Stability and Product Differentiation," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 10, 1-13;

[169] Rossmo, D.K. (1999), "*Geographic Profiling*," CRC Press, Baton Rouge, FL;

[170] Rotemberg, J.J. and G. Saloner (1986), "A supergame-theoretic model of price wars during booms," *American Economic Review*, 76(3), 390-407;

[171] Rothschild, R. (1992), "On the Sustainability of Collusion in Differentiated Duopolies," *Economics Letters*, 40, 33-37;

[172] Rothschild, R. (1999), "Cartel Stability when Costs are Heterogeneous," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 17(5), 717-734;

[173] Salant, S.W. (1976), "Exhaustible Resources and Industrial Structure: A Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market," *Journal of Political Economy*, 84(5), 1079-1094;

[174] Salant, S.W., S. Switzer and R.J. Reynolds (1983), "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 98(2), 185-199;

[175] Salop, S.C. (1979), "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," *Bell Journal of Economics*, 10(1), 141-156;

[176] Salop, S.C. and D.T. Scheffman (1983), "Raising Rivals' Costs," *American Economic Review*, 73(2), 267-271;

[177] Salop, S.C. and D.T. Scheffman (1987), "Cost-Raising Strategies," *Journal of Industrial Economics*, 36(1), 19-34;

[178] Scherer, F.M. (1980), "*Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance*," 2nd edition, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston;

[179] Scherer, F.M. and D. Ross (1990), "*Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance*," 3rd ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company;

[180] Schinkel, M.P. (2008), "Forensic Economics in Competition Law Enforcement," *Journal of Competition Law and Economics*, 4(1), 1-30;

[181] Schinkel, M.P. and J. Tuinstra (2006), "Imperfect competition law enforcement," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 24(6), 1267-1297;

[182] Schinkel, M.P., J. Tuinstra and J. Rüggeberg (2008), "Illinois Walls: How Barring Indirect Purchaser Suits Facilitates Collusion," *RAND Journal of Economics*, 39(3), 683-698;

[183] Schumpeter, J. (1912), "*Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung*," Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot;

[184] Selten, R. (1973), "A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, where 4 are Few and 6 are Many," *International Journal of Game Theory*, 2(3), 141-201;

[185] Shaffer, S. (1995), "Stable Cartels with a Cournot Fringe," *Southern Economic Journal*, 61(3), 744-754;

[186] Shenoy, P. (1979), "On Coalition Formation: A Game Theoretic Approach," *International Journal of Game Theory*, 8, 133-164;

[187] Slade, M.E. (1990), "Cheating on Collusive Agreements," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 8, 519-543;

[188] Smith, A. (1994), "*The Wealth of Nations*," Edwin Cannan (ed.), New York: The Modern Library;

[189] Smith, V.L. (2008), "*Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms*," Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;

[190] Smithies, A. (1941), "Monopolistic Price Policy in a Spatial Market," *Econometrica*, 9(1), 63-73;

[191] Smithies, A. (1942), "Aspects of the Basing-Point System," *American Economic Review*, 32, 705-726;

[192] Soper, J.B., G. Norman, M.L. Greenhut and B.L. Benson (1991), "Basing Point Pricing and Product Concentration," *Economic Journal*, 101, 539-556;

[193] Spar, D.L. (1994), "*The Cooperative Edge: The Internal Politics of International Cartels*," Ithaca: Cornell University Press;

[194] Staiger, R.W. and F.A. Wolak (1992), "Collusive Pricing with Capacity Constraints in the Presence of Demand Uncertainty," *RAND Journal of Economics*, 23(2), 203-220;

[195] Stigler, G.J. (1949), "A Theory of Delivered Price Systems," *American Economic Review*, 39, 477-489;

[196] Stigler, G.J. (1950), "Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger," *American Economic Review*, 40(2), 23-34;

[197] Stigler, G.J. (1964), "A Theory of Oligopoly," *Journal of Political Economy*, 72(1), 44-61;

[198] Stigler, G.J. (1983), "*The Organization of Industry*," Chicago: University of Chicago Press;

[199] Stocking, G.W. and M.W. Watkins (1948), "*Cartels or Competition?: The Economics of International Controls by Business and Government*," New York: The Twentieth Century Fund;

[200] Thisse, J-F and X. Vives (1988), "On the Strategic Choice of Spatial Price Policy," *American Economic Review*, 78, 122-137;

[201] Thisse, J-F and X. Vives (1992), "Basing-Point Pricing: Competition versus Collusion," *Journal of Industrial Economics*, 40, pp. 249-260.

[202] Thoron, S. (1998), "Formation of a Coalition-Proof Stable Cartel," *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 31(1), 63-76;

[203] Tirole, J. (1988), "*The Theory of Industrial Organization*," MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts;

[204] Van Cayseele, P. and D. Furth (1996a), "Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly with Buyouts or First Refusal Contracts," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 16, 153-180;

[205] Van Cayseele, P. and D. Furth (1996b), "von Stackelberg's equilibria for Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with buyouts," *Journal of Economic Studies*, 23, 96-109;

[206] Van Cayseele, P. and D. Furth (2001), "Two is Not Too Many for Monopoly," *Journal of Economics*, 74(3), 231-258;

[207] Vasconcelos, H. (2005), "Tacit Collusion, Cost Asymmetries, and Mergers," *RAND Journal of Economics*, 36, 39-62;

[208] Wang, Z. (2005), "Edgeworth Price Cycle and Oligopoly Coordination: Trial Evidence from Australia," *Northeastern University Working Paper*;

[209] Whinston, M.D. (2006), "*Lectures on Antitrust Economics*," MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts;

[210] Yi, S.S. (1997), "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 20, 201-237.