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Type	Dissertation
Title	Incomplete cartels and antitrust policy : incidence and detection
Author	A.M. Bos
Faculty	Faculty of Economics and Business
Year	2009
Pages	189
ISBN	9789036101462

FULL BIBLIOGRAPHIC DETAILS:
http://dare.uva.nl/record/323110

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