

File ID 146373
Filename 8: Output benchmark

SOURCE (OR PART OF THE FOLLOWING SOURCE):

Type Dissertation
Title Benchmarking carrots and sticks : developing a model for the evaluation of work-based employment programs
Author J. Castonguay
Faculty Faculty of Law
Year 2009
Pages 388
ISBN 978 90 5629 575 2

FULL BIBLIOGRAPHIC DETAILS:

<http://dare.uva.nl/record/315571>

Copyright

It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use.

8. Output Benchmark

The output of a policy is the actual services it delivers to its participants. With respect to work-based employment programs, these products can be seen in terms of training provided and job search assistance received. In addition, the product of a policy can also be measured in term of number of benefit claimants it actually helped, no matter what the impact of this help was on their actual return to the labour market, or not. Receiving a sanction for non-compliance with the program can also be seen as an output of the policy. Hence, four indicators have been chosen in chapter 4 to represent the output of work-based employment programs. These are:

1. Training
2. Job search assistance
3. Coverage
4. Number of sanctions

8.1. Training component

In all the NDYP Options, a minimum of one day per week must be dedicated to training towards recognised certification (Hasluck and Green, 2007). This training can be done in-house or provided by an external provider. Furthermore, the participants are expected to continue their job search activities while on the Employment Option and this should be facilitated by the employers, such that free time can be taken to attend interviews (DWP, 2007, provider guidance). Concerning the ND25plus, one or two days a week is also reserved for training. Similar to the NDYP external providers can be contracted out to provide this training. Moreover, a training component can be added to the program by combining the Work Experience/Placement opportunity with another IAP which is focused on basic skills training.

In the Dutch Work First projects included in the Work First Benchmark 2006, significant is the fact that a quarter of the projects do not specifically require the participants to spend a specific amount of time on training and job search activities. This can be seen from table 7.3 which was presented in benchmark 11 on the number of hours per week required in the programs. No requirements besides work-activities means that training would be an integral part of the work-activities to be undertaken, in other words, on-the-job training. Nevertheless, table 7.3 showed that a third of the projects offered the standard package of three or four days of work and one day of training and activities related to job search, where two-thirds of these were of the “three days work, one day training and job

search training" kind, for a total of 32 hours per week. From the data available on the Work First projects in the Netherlands, little is known about the specific type of training which is given, and especially whether this training leads to recognised qualifications. But in general it is clear that training is less of a formal requirement in Work First projects in general than what is seen in the UK. The Dutch Work First programs should therefore score lower than the New Deal programs.

The Work for the Dole program does not contain any training component nor any activities related to learning skills needed for finding a job (OECD, 2000, p. 209). The Community Work Coordinators receive a small budget for covering the costs created by participants, such as tools and work-clothing. A small part of this budget may be allocated by the Community Work Coordinators to training, but this sum is minimal. As illustrated by Nevile and Nevile (2003, p.75), the federal guideline is that up to 12% of the Work Experience Fee can be spent on training, which amounts to A\$198 to A\$252 in total for each participant, depending on the area. In fact, according to surveys, 95% of the Community Work Coordinators would like to be able to give more training and job search assistance to their participants and 65% said that if it was not for the federal guideline they would spend more on training even if it meant they would have to pay for it themselves (Nevile and Nevile, 2003, p.76). Nonetheless, with regard to training, the Australian Working Together reform package implemented in 2002-2003 created a Training Credit available for those participating in the Work for the Dole (Budget 2001-2003). The value of this Training Credit is A\$ 500 to A\$ 800 depending on the area, (€ 305 to € 488) which is made available to them upon completion of the program (Nevile and Nevile, 2003, p.75). This training credit, while being a valuable addition to the possibilities within the Customised Assistance program (it must be used within a six months period), cannot be used during the Work for the Dole.

In Geneva, the legislation on the Temporary Job program clearly states that the participants should spend four full days in the job and that one day per week should be reserved for job search or training (Cantonal Unemployment Law, art. 40). Article 49 of the Regulation for Implementation of Cantonal Unemployment Law states that the participants must continue job search while in the program, conform to the directives given by the Agency. The precise way the one-day-a-week requirement for job search and training will be filled will therefore vary from participant to participant. The evaluation of the CEPP has however noted how the day allocated for job search and training is not truly used by the jobseekers, and that it is neither stimulated nor controlled by the case-managers (CEPP, 2002, p.37). They also noted that only a very small part

of the participants were taken part in training, that is to say 12 person in 2000 and 63 in 2001 (CEPP, 2002, p.38). A low score should thus clearly be given to this program.

Concerning training activities within the RMCAS, a one-time "Insertion Allowance" is available for each claimants for the purpose of either 1) vocational training, 2) creating an own business, or 3) active labour market programs. The amount of this allowance is between CHF 1000 and CHF 10 000 (~ € 640 to € 6400)³³. However, the legislation is very specific in that these activities must be related to a realistic and realisable plan (see article 29, RMCAS Law). Also, this allocation is not automatically handed out to all RMCAS claimants - thus cannot be seen as a voucher - but is only available to those who present a written demand accompanied with a clear description of the project and a detailed budget (RMCAS Law, art. 30). A special commission, nominated by the Canton of Geneva State Council, reviews the demands for the Insertion Allowance and its decision is binding for the Hospice Général who delivers the RMCAS (RMCAS Law, art. 31). Clearly, the precise amount of time spend by participants in the RMCAS in the activities funded by the Insertion Allowance will vary from case-to-case, and it is even so that not all claimants receive this allowance. In fact, the only available figures on the number of allocations which were disbursed refer to the years 1997 and 1998, in which only respectively 37 and 22 claimants received the allocation (Cuhna, 2002, p. 27). It should also been noted that this allocation is only given out once, such that if the "project" does not lead to finding a job, no other chances are given to start a second "project" (see also Cuhna, 2002, p. 35 on this issue). Thus although on paper it may seem that the RMCAS provides for a sensible amount of training, seeing the fact that all responsibilities are less in the hand of the claimants to prepare a realistic training project and seeing the lack of involvement from the Hospice Général in providing internal training activities, the program will receive a low score on this benchmark.

Within the Ontario Works program, the type of activities undertaken under the second heading of "other employment measures" varies from claimant to claimant. These services are grouped under two categories: 1) Employment-Support Activities and 2) Employment Placement and Support to Self-Employment (Provincial Auditor of Ontario, 1998 and 2002). The OW Directive #6.0 states that claimants will be required to participate in the activities that support the shortest route to employment, and that these requirements should reflect the claimant's experience, skills, circumstances as well as the local labour market (p.6). Since

³³ For exchange rate: see footnote 18.

claimants are required to perform job search as part of their activation conditions, job search support will be provided to the participants, either in the form of assistance in independent search or as part of a structured job search program (OW Dir. #6.0 p. 11). If not required to participate in Community Participation after some months in job search, other employment measures might be made mandatory, but only in cases where this will lead to a shorter route to employment than otherwise, thus rather restricted. Hence, basic education and job-specific skills training will only be given on the basis of referral for which a screening procedure will have shown the need for further training (p.12). Furthermore, the OW Directives #40.0 the more costly Employment Assistance programs, such as employment placement (direct job placement) and supports to self-employed, should be reserved for those who are *not likely to find employment without this help*. As can be seen, the training component of the Ontario Works program follows a typical “Work First” strategy where resources should be spent only when these can significantly increase the speed at which the claimant will be able to find a job. In this approach, any job is better than no job. No job implying receiving a benefit and taking part in often costly employment program, one can also translate this by saying that any job is better than costly training programs.

Benchmark 15: Output - Training Component

	Benchmark
	Training
United Kingdom	
<i>NDYP Options</i>	5
<i>ND25+ IAP</i>	5
The Netherlands	3
<i>Work First</i>	
Australia	1
<i>Work for the Dole</i>	
Canada (Ontario)	2
<i>Ontario Works</i>	
Switzerland (Geneva)	
<i>Temporary Job</i>	2
<i>RMCAS</i>	2

Benchmark 15 summarises the finding above in ranking the programs according to the intensity and quality of their training component. Only in the New Deal program is there a clear requirement to provide training for at least one day per week to the participants, and where this training

component is not only on paper but is being implemented throughout the program. For this reason, both New Deal programs will receive the highest score. On the other side, it was clear from the design of the Work for the Dole program that it is not meant to provide any direct training to its participants, although surely some training is part of the work-activities. Nevertheless, because no formal training is part of the program, this program will receive the lowest score of 1. Because of the case-by-case nature of the training in both Swiss program, as well as the very small evidence training is actually being undertaken within the programs, both will also receive a score of 2. A score of 2 will also be given to the Ontario Works programs, since it is clear that training will only be provided if it can be proven that the participant needs this training. Because of evidence that this test is rather restrictive, such that only persons whose need of training is pressing, it cannot be considered that all participants will receive formal training as part of the program. At last, the most Work First programs offered some type of training as part of their program. However, the extent to which this training lead to recognised qualification is unknown. Also, the data available points towards a mix of training and job search activities as a counter-part to the work-activities, which could mean that job search would take-up the largest part of this component. Hence, the Work First programs also receive a score of 3 for this benchmark.

8.2. Supervision and Guidance

In numerous evaluations of work-based employment programs, the crucial role of the supervision and guidance of participants has been shown to have major impact on the results of the program (see Ochel, 2005, for a survey of evidence). Chapter 3 has indeed shown how intensive guidance can have many positive effects on the participants and therefore assist in leaving the program to join the labour market. In all countries, two different level of supervision are present in the program. First, the participants are followed by their case-manager at the public body which delivers the benefit. This level of supervision will first be discussed for each program. Second, the participants also receive supervision and guidance from the actual service provider who is responsible for the delivery of the program. This will be discussed afterwards. Also, where relevant, the number of hours which is reserved in the program for job search activities will be presented. These three elements, supervision from public body, supervision from program provider, and portion of the program dedicated to job search activities will thus make up this benchmark on the extent of the supervision and guidance of the participants in their return to the labour market.

In the United Kingdom, each participant of the NDYP and ND25plus will be assigned a New Deal Personal Adviser at the Jobcentre Plus, which will remain their first contact person throughout each stage of the program (Jobcentre Plus Provider Guidance, 2007, par. 27 and 59). This personal adviser is responsible for tracking the progress of the participant and is the contact person for the service provider of the Option or Intense Activity Period program in which the participant is taking part. Usually, there is contact between the ND participants and the ND Personal Adviser every two weeks, as this is a requirement for claiming Jobseekers Allowance (Jobcentreplus, 2007).

Since the Building on the New Deal strategy launched in 2004, more flexibility has been given to the options in the NDYP. Mainly, the options should not anymore be seen as exclusive choices for the participants but rather form a “menu” from which combinations can be made. The New Deal participants and the New Deal Personal Adviser then choose what the best combination of activities will be. As pointed out by Walter and Wiseman (2003), no clear criteria for allocating the individuals really ever existed. This means that the New Deal Personal Adviser, in the context of the NDYP, has very much influence on the content of the program for each of its jobseeker. The importance of the role of the New Deal Personal Adviser is also very large for the New Deal for 25 plus. In fact, Wilkinson (2003) has shown that ND Personal Advisors follow three models of delivery for the Intense Activity Period. In the modular approach, the New Deal Personal Adviser selects an appropriate package of activities from one or different provider to coherently be undertaken by the participant, while in the routeway and the combination approach, the New Deal Personal Adviser will agree with one service provider on the general direction of the IAP and will leave the choice of the specific activities to the service provider (Wilkinson, 2003). While the choice of the activity is therefore delegated by the personal adviser to the service provider, the actual supervision of the participant is still done by the New Deal Personal Adviser. It has indeed been shown by many studies that the relationship between the participant and its personal advisor is one of the most decisive in the success of the New Deal for Young People program (see Hasluck and Green, 2007, p.145).

In Australia, the introduction of the Active Participation Model in July 2003 had significant impact on the referral process of participants for the Work for the Dole program. Instead of being referred by Centrelink through a computerized referral system, referral to a Community Work Coordinator is done by the Job Network member who was providing services to the jobseeker in the three months preceding mandatory participation in Work for the Dole (Nevile and Nevile, 2003, p. 134).

However, according to the Australian Council of Social Services (2002, p. 61), the Job Network member is not responsible for the participant anymore once he/she enters the Work for the Dole program. The possible reason given by the ACOSS is that there would then be an incentive for the Job Network member to inappropriately refer its hard-to-place clients to the Work for the Dole program. Case-management at the governmental level is thus the sole responsibility of Centrelink. However, Centrelink only takes care of initial eligibility and tracks the activation efforts of the claimants in terms of job search or participation in employment programs (See OECD, 2001, p. 172-173). But the tracking of job search efforts directly by Centrelink is also dropped when the claimant is handed over to a Job Network member after 3 months of unemployment, and this tracking should then be performed by the Job Network member through an Activity Agreement (OECD, 2001, p.174). In addition, as illustrated by the Australian National Audit Office (2007, p. 29), the role of Centrelink within the Work for the Dole program is limited to approving the Preparing for Work Agreements which have been updated by the Community Work Coordinator responsible for the participant, and reviewing relevant information with respect to meeting the program's requirement, as provided by the CWC. Clearly, claimants fall in a monitoring black-hole when their Job Network members refer them to a Community Work Coordinators, and supervision and guidance by a government body is thus nearly inexistent in the program. This has also been observed by Nevile and Nevile (2003, p. 148).

In the Netherlands, case-managers within the municipality are responsible for the supervision of Social Assistance claimants. However, as already mentioned in benchmark 13 concerning the type of rewards to the participants, about a quarter of the project actually give a salary to their participants. Often, these participants are hired by a private provider for the duration of the program. The consequence of such a design is that the participants in these programs are not anymore claiming a Social Assistance benefit, which means that in almost all cases all monitoring and guidance will be discontinued by the municipality. For the 76% of the projects where eligibility to the benefit is maintained, the municipality will usually continue to give some case-management to its participants, although the intensity of this case-management might be diminished and partially handed-over to the service provider. The precise extent of the intensity of the case-management done by the municipality itself was not registered by the Work First Benchmark 2006. In the six cases studies undertaken by the Council for Work and Income (2008) is this variation in involvement from the municipality confirmed. The type of supervision by the municipality found in these case-studies can be summarized by the following (RWI, 2008):

- Alkmaar: Participants are hired by Sheltered-Workplace, they are not anymore part of the caseload thus there is no direct case-management from the municipality after the placement in the project (p.69)
- Alphen aan den Rijn: Participants are handed over to a Private Provider (not hired) who also takes over all case-management after the placement (p.77-78).
- Hoorn: One projects where participant are hired by Private Provided and where there is no role for the municipality (p.86), one project where the municipality remains more involved in case-management (p.86).
- Meppel: Participants are not claiming the benefit, municipal case-managers do not have direct contact with participants, but the municipality does have some contact with work-supervisors at the Sheltered-Workplace (p.95).
- Oss: Private provider hires the participant and the municipality is not involved in case-management (p.98).

In Ontario Works, the case-worker within the Delivery Agent remains the main the central contact-person for claimants throughout the entire period in which they receive a benefit. The OW Directive on Community Placement mentions that regardless of the delivery approach, the delivery agent should take an active role in promoting community involvement and the development of community placements (p.6). After an initial take-up interview with a case-worker, Ontario Works claimants must report any changes in circumstances every months, including change in income or participation in Employment Assistance, although this does not have to happen in person and can be done through handing in forms (see Lightman et. al., 2004, p.14). OW Directive #43.0 also mentions how participation requirements are updated every three months to review participation and Employment Assistance and a new Participation Agreement is completed. Buckanan and Klassen (2005, p.10) explain how similar to the Work for the Dole, the case-worker is not involved anymore with the participant, but the service provider is the one in charge for supervision and guidance. Clearly, the intensity of the case-management in the Ontario Works program is very low. It has indeed lengthily been discussed by Lightmand, Herd and Mitchell (2004a, 2004b, 2005) that the case-management within Ontario Works is very much oriented towards controlling fraud (making sure claimants have income under the threshold) and must less towards helping them find a job.

Similarly, the government bodies responsible for the Temporary Job programs and the RMCAS also only offer limited supervision and guidance to their participants. With respect to the Temporary Job

program, the Cantonal Measures Services within the Cantonal Employment Office which takes over the case-management of UI claimants who have exhausted their rights to UI. They will then offer them a Temporary Job, which they cannot refuse, nor choose (see art. 45 Regulation on the implementation of the Cantonal Unemployment Law). The evaluation of the Temporary Job program by the CEPP (Public Policy External Evaluation Commission) in 2002 highlighted the lack of supervision of participants as one of the major failure of the program (p. 1). The evaluation explained this partially by the unrealistically large caseload attributed to each case-manager, which averaged around 300 to 800 claimants (CEPP, 2002, p. 43). This lead to unsystematic and incomplete follow-up on each cases (CEPP, 2002, p.43). The failures in terms of supervisions were also made noticeable by the lack of proper recording in each claimant's files, which made it impossible to clearly follow the claimants' path within the benefit system.

Regarding the RMCAS, the case-manager at the Hospice Général is responsible for the supervision of the claimants. On average, each case-manager within the Hospice General had a caseload of 50 clients (Cunha, 2002, p. 61). Besides determining eligibility and disbursing benefits, the case-manager is responsible for finding a 'mutual obligation' placement for the claimant and taking care of the monitoring of the client while in its 'mutual obligation' placement (Cuhna, 2002, p.19). However, the type of assistance given by the case-manager varies greatly from one case-manager to the other, as their large degree of autonomy creates a poorly formalized work-methodology (Cuhna, 2002, p.41). Hence, while there seemed to be a directive that claimants should be met every six weeks, the implementation of this rule is very flexible and varies from weekly meetings with some claimants to meeting once or twice a year with other claimants (Cuhna, 2002, p. 43). Concerning job search assistance within the RMCAS, while the legislation requires claimants to perform job searches throughout their claim period, this has not been implemented by the Hospice Général since they are not responsible for job search assistance and other labour market policy. These responsibilities are given to the Cantonal Employment Office, and in principle, claimants must be registered at this office as a job seeker. However, it has been noted by Fluckiger and Vassiliev (2005, p. 10) that there is not contact between the Hospice Général and the Cantonal Employment Office and that no coordination between these two is taking place. It can be concluded from this that no job search component is truly being implemented in the RMCAS program.

A second level of supervision is present for the participants in work-based employment program. Indeed, in all programs in this benchmark

participants are also being supervised by the organisation where they perform their work-activities. An extensive supervision within the work-based activities could therefore explain, and maybe compensate, less extensive guidance from the government level responsible for the program. However, precise information on the type of supervision supplied by the implementing organisations is very scarce, due to the scattered nature of these organisations in each program. Indeed, in each program taking part in this benchmark, hundreds of service providers are involved in the direct contact with the participants. Nevertheless, in some programs, guidelines are available in which the minimum requirements are set concerning the supervision of participants.

In the Work for the Dole program, projects are funded on the basis of a maximum of 15 participants per supervisors (Nevile, J.W. (2003), p.5). In terms of quality of supervision, a survey and several interviews conducted by Nevile (2003, p.5) showed that Community Work Coordinators are highly committed to the success of the program for their participants. In fact, even though the program does not have the explicit aim that participants should find employment, this is an implicit aim of many Community Work Coordinators. This means that in practice, many supervisors go to great lengths in order to help their participants find a job, or solve some of their barriers to work. Nevile has therefore highlighted the quality of the supervision and guidance by the private provider to be one of the most crucial determinants of the results shown by the Work for the Dole.

In the RMCAS, in order to be accepted as a 'mutual obligation' placement, sufficient supervision of the claimant must be present within the organisation, and the participants must be treated similarly to the other regular employees or volunteers (Cunha, 2000, p.16). Nevertheless, as evaluated by Cunha (2000, p. 49), the quality and intensity of this supervision varies greatly in reality, even though this is part of the contract between the host organisation and the Hospice Général. In addition, Cunha reports evidence of some host organisations refusing to accept some participants because of the high level of supervision they would require (p. 49).

In the Netherlands, the variation in the type of supervision within the work activity will vary greatly as each municipality has freedom to set different requirements for their service providers, and that in some cases much freedom is given to the provider resulting in little information being available on an aggregate basis. A survey of Work First participants in which 75 participants took part showed that 64% of the respondents had the possibility to have individual meetings with a coach or case-manager

(RWI, 2008, p.37). This can be considered a rather high level of supervision within this benchmark. Nevertheless, 25% of the respondents indicated that their supervision only consisted of on-the-job supervision (RWI, 2008, p.37).

Within the New Deal program, supervision is provided by the Option or Intense Activity Period provider to participants. The Provider Guideline from Jobcentre Plus requires that NDYP Option providers assign a Personal Tutor to each participants, which will be responsible for setting a Learning and Development Plan with the participants and monitoring this plan at least every month (2007, par. 21). Within the ND25plus, Jobcentre Plus actually remains the most important supervisor for participants; leaving less guidance responsibilities to the provider (see Jobcentre Plus Provider Guidance, 2007, par. 28-39). The provider should nevertheless provide complementary supervision of its participants, and is responsible for revision and looking for refinements of the Action Plan which has been drawn between the New Deal Personal Advisor and the participant (Jobcentre Plus Provider Guidance, par. 35). However, the Provider Guidance document is clear to state that any changes to the Action Plan must however be approved by the ND personal advisor.

At last, the Ontario Works Directives which guide almost all aspect of the delivery of the program and the implementation of the Act does not set any requirements in term of supervision of participants in Community Placement. While as mentioned above supervision of the participants is usually handed down to the program provider by the Ontario Works caseworker, there is no information publicly available on the actual guidance and supervision received by the participants. This lack of information in both official program documentations, such as Ontario Works legislation and directives, as well as from research reports and academic papers from Lightman, Mitchell and Heard will thus be interpreted here as a sign that very little supervision in terms of assistance towards finding work and removing barriers to work.

As can be seen, the depth of information which is available on the direct supervision of participants by service providers implementing the work-activity is very superficial. One explanation for this is that contracts between the providers of the work-based activities will vary greatly even within single projects. Furthermore, these contracts are not often made available publicly. Nevertheless, evidence from official guidelines and evaluation reports on both the level of supervision from the government as well as supervision from the service provider give enough information to make a qualitative comparisons of the programs benchmarked. This can be found in Benchmark 20.

One remarking finding from this section has been that most programs do not clearly build a time-period in their programs for Job search activities. Most of the time, this is either included as part of the time allocated for training (see the previous benchmark) or assumed to take place in the participant's own time. This is noteworthy since most programs take-up a large part of the working week. Nevertheless, it can be understood from all programs that case-managers are meant to verify job search efforts while the claimant is taking part of the program, and that they will continue proposing vacancies to the claimants as part of the regular job search assistance they provide to most claimants. Nevertheless, due to lack of clear data, this indicator will not be added to the calculation of this benchmark. Benchmark 20 shows the scores for the two sub-indicators, and for the overall score for this indicator.

Benchmark 20: Output – Supervision and Guidance

	Benchmark	SUB-INDICATORS	
	Supervision and Guidance	Intensity of supervision Government body	Intensity of supervision Delivering agency/provider
United Kingdom			
<i>NDYP Options</i>	5	5	5
<i>ND25+ IAP</i>	4	4	4
The Netherlands	3	2	4
<i>Work First</i>			
Australia	3	1	5
<i>Work for the Dole</i>			
Canada (Ontario)	1.5	2	1
<i>Ontario Works</i>			
Switzerland			
<i>Temporary Job</i>	1.5	2	1
<i>RMCAS</i>	2	2	2

With respect to supervision and guidance, both New Deal combine high levels of supervision from the New Deal personal adviser and the supervisor within the different work-activities, with the NDYP scoring highest on both elements and ND25plus scoring a 4. This lower score of the ND25plus is attributable to the delegation by the Personal Adviser of the choice of the activities to be undertaken to the service provider, while at the same time service provider only provide complementary

supervision for the participants since the personal advisor remains the main supervisor for the participant. Both the Dutch and the Australian program combine low levels of case-management by the public body with higher level of supervision from the service provider, although Australia does this in a more contrasting manner than the Netherlands. Both these programs therefore score on average a 3. At last, because of the very low level of supervision in both elements, the Ontario Works program and both Swiss programs receive the lowest score. Even though some case management is present from the public body, this is very limited. In the case of the Ontario Works program and the Temporary Job program, no evidence of supervision within the work-activities lead to the conclusion that these are nearly inexistent.

8.3. Coverage

As an indication of the extent to which this program will be able to achieve the more general objective of reducing caseloads, the number of yearly participants in each program as a percentage of all claimants will be compared. This will allow comparing the relative size of each program, putting other indicators of output and impact into a more realistic context. The larger the coverage of the program, the bigger its impact will be on unemployment benefit claimants. As a result, the score for the output benchmark will be larger when a program has a large coverage rate. In order to make this indicator comparable, the total number of participants within one year will be measured, as some programs vary in lengths. Data is however not often provided in these terms, so some calculations will be necessary with some programs in order to obtain comparable figures. As with the rest of the benchmark, the data will refer to the year 2006.

In the United Kingdom in the year 2006, 182,490 persons started a spell on the NDYP and 94,950 persons started a spell on the ND25plus (DWP Tabulation Tool, 2008). It should be noted that these figures relates to start of spells in the program, and not the number of individuals who started the program. Indeed, if participants do not exit to work while taking part in either one of the program, they will exit the program for a while and then become eligible for a second spell in the program. Figures from the Department of Work en Pensions relating to "individuals" will only take into account their first start in the program, and not their subsequent spells. Using this figure would thus lead to underestimating the actual number of person who started the program in 2006. In terms of individual starts in the program, the numbers are 163,220 for the NDYP

and 91,790 for the ND25+ (DWP Tabulation Tool, 2008). From this we can conclude that about 10.6% of the NDYP spells start and 3.3% of the ND25plus spells start were actually second or subsequent spells for some individuals. This “revolving door” issue will further be discussed in the impact-benchmark. These figures on starts on the New Deal programs were only given as an indication since this doesn’t give direct information on the number of person taking part in the work-based activities of the programs. Both the Gateway as well as the Follow-Through are included in these figures and should not be, as these are not part of what is defined here as work-based employment programs. Table 8.1 and 8.2 show the average number of participants each month in the various Options or IAP between May 2006 and May 2007 for each benefit.

Table 8.1 The NDYP participants per Option, Monthly Average May 2006- May 2007.

Option	Participants Monthly	In % of all Options
Employment Option	1,235	7 %
Environmental Task Force	2,821	15 %
Voluntary Sector option	5,502	29 %
Full-time education and training	9,248	49 %

Source: Department for Work and Pensions Tabulation Tool, 2008.

Table 8.2 Number of participants per IAP, monthly average May 2006 to May 2007.

IAP Activity	Participants Monthly	In % of all IAP
Subsidized Employment	440	3 %
BET/BS	2,070	16 %
Self Employment	1,241	10 %
Education and training opportunity	390	3 %
Work Experience / Placement	5,245	40 %
IAP Training	3,581	28 %

Source: Department of Work and Pensions, Tabulation Tool, 2008.

From the beginning of the New Deal for Young people, it was clear that the Employment Option would be the most effective at returning the participants to the labour market, and hence a larger proportion of participants should take part in this Option. It was initially planned that

the proportions of those going to the option would be as such: 40% to the Employment Option, 25 % to the Full-time education and training, 25% to the Environmental Taskforce, and 10% to the Voluntary Sector option (Philpott, 1999). However, already in January 1999 the proportions were instead: 22% Employment Option, 50% Full-time education and training, 13% Environmental Taskforce and 15% Voluntary Sector option (Philpott, 1999). The most obvious explanation for the much lower level of participation in the Employment Option and much higher level in the Full-time Education and training option, as explained by Philpott (1999), to be the fact that most participants of the NDYP did not meet the basic criteria set by employers. This implied that most participants did not have the required level of qualification for the jobs and thus went to acquire these qualifications in the Full-time Education and Training option. In addition, for the year between May 2006 and May 2007, the non-work based option (full-time education/training) of the NDYP increased in proportion, while the regular labour market work-based Options decreased (Department for Work and Pension, Tabulation Tool, 2008). Also, the proportion of those on the Environmental Task Force and the Voluntary Sector option stayed rather stable over that period of one year (Department for Work and Pensions, Tabulation Tool, 2008).

The actual number of participant in the Options or IAP on a yearly basis is not directly available from the Tabulation Tool. Since participants spend more than one month in the program, a simple multiplication of the numbers would not lead to the correct number. Complications are also brought in by the fact that participants may also leave the Options before termination, so that assuming that participants all spend 26 weeks in the Option or 13 weeks in the IAP would also lead to overestimations. Nevertheless, with the use of other data provided by the Tabulation Tool, an approximate yearly number of Option and IAP participants can be derived, namely in withdrawing those who exit the program before the Options/IAP in the year 2006 from those who started a spell in that year. Doing this gives an approximation of 56,680 participants in the NDYP Options and 36,590 participants in the ND25plus in the year 2006. Using the ratios calculated above for each Options and IAP, the number of participants can be given for each of the work-based Options (Employment Option, Environmental Task Force and Voluntary Sector) as well as in the work-based IAP (Subs. Employment, Work Experience/Placement, and Self Employment). These are: Employment Option, 3,968; ETF: 8,502; VS: 16437; and for the ND25plus: Subs. Employment, 1,098; Self Employment: 3,659; and Work Experience/Placement: 14636.

In terms of coverage, the total number of Jobseekers Allowance claimants in the year 2006 is also not directly provided by the Department of Work and Pension. What is provided is a total number of claimants, which is found to be on average 689,425 for the year from May 2006 to 2007. This number refers to the income-based Jobseekers Allowance, as the contribution-based benefit could be seen as a separate benefit type to which the New Deal is not targeted. This will make better comparisons with the other programs where a clear distinction between Social Assistance and Unemployment Insurance is made. Coverage rates will therefore be calculated using yearly participation figures as presented in the previous paragraph, as a percent of this yearly average number of claimant. This calculation would be the most reliable estimate that can be made with the data provided by the DWP and will also be comparable to coverage rates in the other programs in this benchmark, although measured on a monthly basis and not a yearly basis. As a result, the coverage rate for the New Deal work-based programs is: NDYP Employment Option, 0.6%; the NDYP Environmental Task Force and Voluntary Sector option, 3.6 %; and the ND25plus work-activities IAP 2.8%. Clearly, the work-based portions of the New Deal programs are very small, totalling together around 7%, much smaller than any other program in this benchmark. One explanation for this is that while the New Deal is a large program, most claimants leave within the first phase of the program, the Gateway, which is not work-based and therefore not included in this benchmark. Even within the second phase of the program, not all choices of activities within this program can be considered to be work-based, which contribute to diminish even more the total number of participants to be measured in the coverage rate. It should be added that since the data on the total number of JSA claimants refers to a yearly average, a similar situation arises to that of the Ontario Works program (see below), where the true total number of person who went through the program might be underestimated. In the case that many claimants would stay very shortly in the benefit, the coverage numbers would be overestimated. This would mean that an even smaller number of claimants would take part in work activities as part of all of those who went through the benefit in a year.

The total number of participants in the 49 Dutch Work First project which took part in the Benchmark in 2006 was close to 9,000 (three projects did not provide a figure for this indicator) (Work First Benchmark Database 2006). The variation in the size of each project was large, with as little participants as 5 over the course of the year, and as many as 750. Nevertheless, one-third of the projects counted between 100 and 200 participants (Work First Benchmark Database 2009). Most projects seem thus rather small, which is confirmed when the size of the projects

compared to the size of the whole claimant population within each municipality. As shown in table 8.3, the number of participants over the year 2006 was less than 10% of the total number of benefit claimants in a large majority of the municipalities. Coverage was greater than 20% only in 17% of the projects. It should be mentioned at this point that these relatively low participation levels in Work First projects does not mean that most claimants are not receiving any employment assistance. As discussed by Sol et. al., 2006, most municipalities also offer other employment programs to those who do not take part in the projects.

Table 8.3 : Relative size of the projects

Relative Size	Frequency in the 49 projects
Less than 10% of total number of SA claimants	58%
Between 10-20 % of total number of SA claimants	25%
More than 20% of total number of SA claimants	17%

Source: Work First Benchmark Database, 2006.

In Australia, in the year running through June 2005 to June 2006, 446,087 person were claiming Newstart Allowance (aged 21 and above), and 77,380 claimed Youth Allowance (other) (aged under 21 and looking for work) (DEWR, 2006). Out of these claimants, a total of 87,118 participated in the Work for the dole program (DEWR, 2006). This is thus equal to about 17% of all unemployment assistance claimants in that year, a considerable proportion. Data from the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2006c) shows that more than a third of the Work for the Dole participants are young unemployed people aged less than 25 years old, a target group similar to the participants in the NDYP in the UK. Moreover, a majority of the participants have been unemployed for more than two years (DEWR, 2006c). Strikingly, only a quarter of the participants in the program are taking part at the time which the program is actually designed to take place at, that is to say, between the 6th and the 12th month of unemployment (DEWR, 2006c).

Data on number of claimants and number of total person supported by the Ontario Works benefits are provided quarterly by the Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services in the Ontario Social Assistance Quarterly Statistical Reports. In 2006, the average caseload claiming an Ontario Works benefit was 199,822. Similarly to the situation seen earlier in the United Kingdom, this number does not however reflect

the total number of claimants within one year. Some claimants might have left within one year period, which would mean that an average number would underestimate the total number of person who took claimed the benefit in that year. Nevertheless, as will be shown in the impact benchmark, exit rates out of the benefit are very small for the first year of claim, meaning that this underestimation might be smaller than expected. Unfortunately, the ministry does not provide more detailed data on the caseload. With regard to the work-based employment program, no official provincial data is available on the number of participants in the Community Placement program. Nevertheless, a study of employment program by Buchanan and Klassen in 2005 provides some indications on the break-down of the caseload between the different activities of Employment Assistance in Ontario Works. Their study however relates to the City of Toronto and not the province as a whole. Yet, Toronto is the largest city of Canada and accounts for about 35% of both the caseload as well as the total number of beneficiaries of Social Assistance in the Province of Ontario (City of Toronto, 2008). Buchanan and Klassen (2005, p. 29) illustrate that in 2003, 31,583 claimants took part in Community Placement. The authors confirm how Community Placement was by far the largest employment program in the city in 2003. Furthermore, in that year, the caseload for the city was on average every month 66,494 (City of Toronto Economic Indicators). The same problem of underestimation is found here with this figure, since it does not reflect the total number of person who claimed a benefit in that year. Nevertheless, seeing the very small number of exits within one year (20% of all claimants, irrespective of the length of their claim, see chapter 9), this number of total claimant will still be used, although with caution. Accordingly, about 47.5% of the caseload was participating in Community Placement in the City of Toronto in the year 2003.

In view of the large proportion of all provincial claimants in the city, an extrapolation of this percentage to the rest of the claimants in the province would lead to an approximation of the number of participants in Community Placement to be around 94,915. This is clearly only a second-best quantitative indicator but this does give an idea of the size of the program compared to the other program in this benchmark. The coverage rate of the Ontario Works programs is in this view very large as compared to the other programs, at 47.5 %. Even if taking into account a possible overestimation of the coverage of this program, the difference with other programs benchmarked so far is thus large that in terms of ranking this benchmark would remain unchanged.

The Canton of Geneva had a population of 445,306 in 2006 (OCSTAT, T-01-2-1-3-1-01). Compared to the close to 13 million in the Province of

Ontario (with 2.5 million in the City of Toronto alone), the close to 20 million in Australia and the almost 59 million in Great Britain, the population from which participants are drawn for the Temporary Job and the RMCAS is rather small. It is thus to be expected that these programs will have much less participants than the programs in Ontario, Great Britain and Australia. In 2004, there were 15,569 person claiming unemployment insurance benefits in the Canton of Geneva (OCSTAT, T-03-3-2-1). The unemployment rate was 7.1% for the Canton, while it was 3.9% in Switzerland as a whole (OCSTAT, T-03-3-2-1). Of those claiming unemployment benefits, 3706 person reached the end of their entitlement without having found a job while claiming the insurance benefit (OCSTAT, T-13-3-03). However, not all those who reached the end of their entitlement benefit either took part in a Temporary Job, or claimed RMCAS. In fact, in 2004, 1,978 individuals were in a Temporary Job and 810 individuals were claiming RMCAS (OCSTAT, T-13-3-03). These two programs are thus by far the smallest ones in this benchmark, although the Dutch Work First projects are even much smaller when taken individually.

Concerning the Temporary Job, the design of the program means that all those claiming the benefit are also performing work-based activities. All 1,978 claimants can thus be included in the benchmark of the number of participants in the work-activities. The complete number of RMCAS claimants cannot be seen as all performing a work activity. Indeed, as already discussed earlier in the Input and Process benchmarks, the obligation to take part in a 'mutual obligation' activity is only an obligation "in principle". As discussed in Benchmark 14, this has meant that case-managers interpret this obligation quite flexibly, such that some claimants will be exempted (perhaps only temporarily) from taking part in the work-based activities. Evaluations from Cunha (2002) and Fluckliker and Vasiliev (2005) have nevertheless identified that a large proportion of the claimants are participating in a work-based activity. The most recent figure relates to 1999 and 2000, in which respectively 81% and 78% of the claimants were participating in a 'mutual-obligation' activity (Cunha, 2002, p. 62). Assuming that still around 80% of the participants is taking part in the 'mutual obligation' activity is realistic since a more recent evaluation by Fluckliker and Vasiliev (200X, p.X) confirms that the number of available place exceed the number of participants, thus excludes the possibility that some claimants would not be able to participate due to a lack of places. This would thus mean that in 2003, 648 RMCAS claimants were participating in a work-based activity.

Although the absolute number of participants in the two Swiss work-based employment programs was easy to gather, the calculation of the coverage rate presents some difficulties. The question here is which claimant population should be used as a denominator. By using only the benefit attached to the Temporary Job and the RMCAS benefits as total claimant population, very high coverage rates can be observed as a result of the particular design of both these programs. But this would not lead to a comparable coverage rate to the other programs since these other coverage rates are related to a much larger claimant population, namely all unemployed. It would thus be more appropriate to compare the number of participants in the Temporary Job program and the RMCAS to the total number of those who reached the end of their unemployment insurance claim, which can be seen as the pool of claimant from which both programs will find their participants. This will result in more comparable coverage rates within this benchmark. Hence, the coverage rate for the Temporary Job program is 53.3%, and that of the RMCAS is 17.5 %.

Benchmark 17 summarizes these findings on the approximate size of the programs. As already mentioned, some of these figures were not directly available from the official statistics provided by the respective ministries or department.

Benchmark 17: Output - Coverage

	Benchmark
	Number of participants in work-activities
United Kingdom <i>NDYP and ND25+</i>	1
The Netherlands <i>Work First</i>	1
Australia <i>Work for the Dole</i>	3
Canada (Ontario) <i>Ontario Works</i>	5
Switzerland <i>Temporary Job</i>	5
<i>RMCAS</i>	3

Nevertheless, these estimates show that there is a large variation in the size of the projects in the benchmark relative to the number of claimants for their relevant unemployment benefit. Both the Ontario Works and the Temporary Jobs programs have the largest coverage rates, with around half of the benefit claimants taking part in the program. On the other side, both the Work First programs as well as the New Deal programs are very small, with less than 10 percent of claimants being reached for a large majority in the Netherlands, and all New Deal work-based programs altogether. As a result, Ontario Works and Temporary Jobs will receive both a 5, and the Dutch Work First programs and the New Deal programs will receive a 1. In between are found the Work for the Dole and the RMCAS, who both reach about one fifth of all possible participants, and hence score a 3.

8.4. Quantities of sanctions used

The different types of sanction legislation with respect to each work-based employment program have been discussed in the Input Benchmark, in Benchmark 7. Thereafter, Benchmark 14 in the Process Benchmark discussed how sanctions were being implemented in each program, with regard to the level of formality and flexibility in the procedures. Now, this section will compare the number of sanctions that are being used in each program. As discussed in chapter 4, this indicator on the number of sanctions used within each program cannot directly be used as an indicator of performance of the program as no clear assumption can be made between the number of sanctions used and the results of the programs in terms of return to work. Nevertheless, these sanctions are a product of the input and the design within the policy chain of work-based employment programs, and should thus be included in this chapter. Unfortunately, as the section on each program will show, data on the number of sanctions used in the work-based programs to be benchmarked is often not made public, or available only in a very aggregate manner.

Only a few reports and articles have been written about the use of the sanction in the New Deal program. One reason for this might be that within the official statistics provided by the Department of Work and Pension Tabulation Tool, the sanctions only available for all JSA claimants in general, and not for New Deal participants in specific. Nevertheless, it a recent survey on sanctions by Peters and Joyce show that between April and June 2004, only 1,375 sanctions had been imposed on the 46,756 participants in all three phases of the NDYP and 430 sanctions imposed on the 36,141 ND25plus participants. These figures thus show that only

2.9% of the NDYP participants and 1.2% of the ND25plus participants had received a sanction in this period. This however refers to the whole of the program, including the Gateway period and the Follow-Through, which are not included in this benchmark. Separate figures regarding the NDYP Options have nevertheless been made available by Bivand (2002) for the first quarter of 2002. His figures are quite higher than the more recent figures from Peters and Joyce (2006), as he showed that over 3,000 sanctions had been reported during that quarter, which represents close to 16% of all Options participants. It should be noted that these sanctions either referred to refusing to take part in the Options or to leaving the program before completion, either voluntarily or through misconduct.

The results from Bivand (2002) with respect to sanctions within each option are presented in table 8.4. Interestingly, there are significant differences in the number of sanctions given out in each of the options of the program. The fact that the largest amount of sanctions is found within the Environmental Task Force has been also noted by Bonjour et. al. (2001). The researchers have found out that most of the sanctions in the Options are experience mainly by poorly educated and less motivated young men who take part in the Environmental Task Force. This was also mentioned by Walter and Wiseman (2003), who show that about 13% of all options participants were sanctioned in 2000, out of which 27% were in the Environmental Task Force option. One of the explanations for this has been brought by Bodganor (2004), who explains that in the event a participant does not willingly choose an appropriate option, the ETF option is most often the option which is then chosen by the New Deal Personal Advisor (Bodganor, 2004). This would imply a larger proportion of “uncooperative” participants in the Environment Task Force than in the other Option.

Table 8.4: Sanctions for the NDYP Options, 1st quarter 2002

Number of participants in Options	19,714
Number of sanctions	3,125
Sanctioned as % of Options participants	15.9%
<i>Per Options as % of total number of sanctions*</i>	
<i>Employment Option</i>	5.0%
<i>Full-Time Education and Training</i>	9.1%
<i>Voluntary Sector option</i>	18.6%
<i>Environmental Task Force</i>	31.8%

Notes: * Does not add up to 100% since sanction can also be during the Gateway or the Follow-Through period.

Source: Bivand, 2002, p. 16.

Sanctions within the Options can be either related to failing to start with the program, or leaving during the program due to voluntarily quitting or to misconduct. Bivand (2002, p. 17) has also shown the division of these sanctions in these two type of sanctions. For the Environmental Task Force, 52% of the sanctions related to refusal to start the program, compared to 44% and 48% for the Employment Option and the Voluntary Sector option respectively. According to Bivand, this clearly highlights a certain hierarchy in the willingness of the participants in joining these options, with the ETF being clearly the less interesting options of all.


Finally, Saunders et. al. (2001) concluded in their research that those who experience a third sanction (lasting up to 26 weeks) was small, and that those affected by this third sanction actually quickly obtained a job such that only a minority of participants did truly not have a source of income for a long period of time due to this sanction. Concerning the ND25plus, Wilkinson (2003) shows that only 2.6% of the participants have ever been sanctioned, and that the most of them only received a two-week sanction since less than 0.1% of all ND25plus participants have been sanctioned on more than two occasions. These figures are close to the more recent figures from Peters and Joyce (2006), who as mentioned above showed that 1.2% of the ND25plus participants (in all 3 phases of the program) were sanctioned between April and June 2004. Unfortunately, no sanction data is available on the level of the different Intense Activity Period programs.

The available data on the number of sanctions which are imposed on the (potential) participants of the Dutch Work First projects is very scarce. This is explained partially by the high degree of decentralisation of the social assistance scheme, in which the municipalities have control upon almost all design and implementation issues. Such a level of decentralisation has been implemented for reasons of efficiency since the municipalities were thought to be the best judges for the needs of the local population in terms of labour market policy. However, in order not to weight down the municipalities with time and resource consuming reporting for the national level, only limited reporting is required by the ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. Certainly, making numerous requests to the municipality for reporting would most probably end up in a large loss of efficiency, undermining the efficiency gains from the decentralisation of the scheme. The reports from the municipality are thus aggregated to all the services provided and thus do not report separate figures on the Work First projects. As a result, most municipalities will only monitor their social assistance scheme as a whole, and not separately for each service or project. This unavailability of detailed monitoring of the results of Work First projects has been brought

forwards not only by Sol et. al. (2007) in their rapport on the Work First Benchmark, but also by the two more in depth case-studies performed by the Council for Work and Income (RWI, 2008) as well as by SEOR (2006).

Consequently, the number of sanction which was laid upon Work First participants was unknown to the majority of the project leaders which took part in the Work First Benchmark 2006. Nevertheless, 20 projects did monitor separately the number of sanctions for the Work First participants. The ratio of the number of participants who received a sanction to the total number of participant in the project is shown in Graph 8.1 in the form of a histogram. This number of sanctions only includes those who were sanctioned while participating in the program. In other words, not granting a benefit due to refusal to participate in Work First in the first place is not counted in the ratio. This is mostly because this type of data was even more difficult to gather by the municipality since most of these claimants did not even enter the official claimant's statistics.

Graph 8.1: Histogram of the ratio of participants sanctioned to the total number of participants in the project (n = 20)




As can be seen, on average 24% of the participants in those 20 projects received a sanction at some point. This is rather high and should be interpreted with caution. First, the histogram shows that more than half of the projects for which there is data actually had a sanction ratio of less than 20% and that the average was increased by a few outliers above the

30% line. In fact, five projects had a sanction ratio between 0 and 10%, which actually equals to one fourth of the projects for which data is know. Nevertheless, these ratios can be considered high. The question then remains whether the 20 projects who did monitor the number of sanctions were the projects who were the most focused on using sanctions, and therefore put more attention at monitoring these and using these. On closer examination of the sanctioning rules of these 20 projects it becomes apparent that slightly more than half of the projects who collected data on sanctions also had harsher sanctions in the form of a complete withdrawal of the benefit. Also, what can be seen from the data is that many of the outliers in the graph above are projects who had a small number of total participants, where a large proportion of sanctions in the program is quickly attained by giving out a few sanctions. In general, these outliers also did only reduce the benefit level, and not completely withdraw the benefits. All in all, this thus leads to the conclusion that there would be an upward bias in the sanction figures of those 20 projects due to their increased focus on sanctions and issues of scale in very small projects (less than 10 participants).

In Australia, the survey on sanctions conducted by Heardly et. al. (2005) demonstrated how the use of sanctions had significantly increased from 1997 onwards with the increase in activation conditions and the introduction of the Job Network by the coalition government. Nevertheless, a number of changes in the sanctioning procedures have reduced the total number of sanctions imposed on NSA and YA claimants.

Graph 8.2 shows the evolution of sanctions for all benefit claimants between 1996 and 2006. Data concerning the number of sanctions per different type of reasons within the two types of sanctions are provided by Centrelink since 2004. Two of these reasons can be directly linked to participation in the Work for the Dole program, being a failure to attend an interview concerning the requirement to participate in Work for the Dole and failure to attend a Work for the Dole project. While the failure to attend the Work for the Dole interview consists of an administrative sanction, the failure to participate in the project is considered an activity-test failure. In the year 2005-2006, 8836 sanctions were imposed for failing to attend a WfD-interview, and 11,550 sanctions were imposed for failing to participate in a WfD-project (Centrelink, Quarterly Breach Data 2006a, 2006b, 2006c and 2005). Seeing that in that year, 87 118 claimants participated in the Work for the dole program, these sanctions represented 10.1% and 13.3% of all participants respectively.

Graph 8.2: The evolution of sanctions in Australia – Activity and Administrative Breach per year.



Sources: Heardy et. al., 2005, p. 14 for 1996-2003 and Centrelink, Quarterly Breach Data for 2004-2006. Data for 2003-2004 unavailable and break-up of data for 1998-1999 unavailable.

The very “soft” sanctioning regime found in the RMCAS in the canton of Geneva was discussed in the process benchmark earlier. It was made clear that sanctions were not often being used by case-managers, since they interpreted the obligation to participate in a ‘mutual obligation’ activity rather flexibly. Indeed, the reason of exits for RMCAS claimants was shown by Cunha et. al. (2002, p. 74) and it can be seen that only 0.5% of the claimants left the benefit because they refused to participate in a mutual obligation activity. Since no sanctioning mechanisms have been implemented for leaving the work-based activity voluntarily or through misconduct, no sanctions are registered for this type of sanctions. Furthermore, concerning the Temporary Job program, it has already been discussed how the sanctioning mechanisms of this program is rather different due to its design as an employment program in which the participants are hired by the Cantonal Employment Office. This means that refusing to participate in the work-based activities means that a person will not be eligible for the benefit in the first place, and refusing a placement will result in not being eligible anymore for the program. No data are available in the evaluations of the program concerning these sanctions. Moreover, sanctions during the program have already been said to fall under the realm of employment protection legislation, and not through social security sanctioning mechanisms. Fluckliker and Valiliev (2003, p. 77) have shown how 10% of the Temporary Job participants

actually leave their Temporary Job before the end of the program, although a large part of these do so because they have found a regular job. It would be wrong to count these cases of voluntary leaving the program as counting towards the number of sanctions being imposed on claimants. Unfortunately, no data is available on the number of participants which have left the program to claim Social Assistance, or who have been fired by their current Temporary Job placement.

Similarly, no data on sanctions is available from the Ontario Works program. Although Lightman, Mitchell and Herd (2005; 2004a; 2004b; 2003; and Herd and Mitchell, 2002) have lengthily discussed how the procedures for verifying continued eligibility have led to a harsh sanctioning procedure, they have not presented any statistics on the occurrence of sanctions. This is clearly due to the fact that data on sanctions are not made publicly available by the Ministry of Community and Social Services, or by the biggest Delivery Agents such as the Toronto Social Service department. This is very unfortunate since the sanctions of Ontario Works has been found to be rather harsh in terms both of level and procedure within this international benchmark, and it would be most interesting to see how the program compares in its total use of sanctions with the other programs.

This section highlighted one of the main problems encountered in benchmarking, which is the lack of available data on some important indicators. Table 8.5 on the next page shows the data that was available for the programs in the benchmark.

Concerning the monitoring of the number of sanctions by the government, one interesting conclusion can be made here. As was discussed in Benchmark 14, the UK and Australia had the most formal sanctioning procedures, with clear guidelines linking specific types of breaches with specific types of sanctions. Their level of flexibility was also small, especially in the case of the UK. It is therefore not surprising that these two countries are also the two countries with the most information available on the number and types of sanctions given. Apparently, by making sanctioning procedures straightforward, it becomes also much easier to monitor their use. The lack of a formal sanctioning procedure can also be coupled by a lack of monitoring not only because the latter then becomes much more difficult, but also because simply less attention has been given to sanctions within the program. Hence, this lack of focus on sanctions can clearly be seen in both Swiss programs, where informal procedures also resulted from a desire to maintain the social function of the program, which can also be seen from an apparent low level of sanction, and in any case a poor

monitoring of the use of sanctions. However, in Canada, this cannot be said to be the case, as sanctions are a major element within the program. Political motives and difficulties of monitoring the system can both be better explanations for the lack of data on sanctions.

Table 8.5: Number of Sanctions

Country	Failure to start work-based activities	Leaving voluntarily or through misconduct
United Kingdom		
-NDYP Options	E0: 2.2% VS: 9.1% ETF: 16.5%	E0: 2.8% VS: 9.5% ETF: 15.3%
-ND25+ IAP	n/a (1.2% all phases/all sanctions)	n/a (1.2% all phases/all sanctions)
The Netherlands	n/a	5 projects: 0-10% 8 projects: 10-20% 4 projects: 20-50% 3 projects: > 50 % → average: 24% 29 projects: n/a
Australia	10.1%	13.3%
Canada	n/a	n/a
Switzerland		
-Temporary Jobs	n/a	10% leave before end (to job?)
-RMCAS	0.5 %	n/a

On the other side, the high level of flexibility in the Dutch sanctioning procedure has meant that each municipality is free to set up its own monitoring system for sanctions within its Work First program. This also poses problem in terms of data analysis, since it is likely that some selection bias is present in the data which is collected. As discussed earlier, it might be so that the projects that do collect data on sanctions are also projects that put a great emphasis on sanctions as an instrument within their program. This would mean that the data which is available overestimates the average number of sanction used within Work First programs.

This chapter will not provide a ranking of these sanctions rates since a clear hypothesis on the influence of sanctions cannot be made.

Nevertheless, the interaction between sanction levels, sanction procedure, number of sanction used and impacts of the program will be part of the conclusions of this benchmark. This will thus be discussed in chapter 11, where all indicators of the benchmark will be aggregated and comparisons will be made on the effectiveness and efficiency of the programs in the benchmark.

8.5. Radar charts and overall performance level

The output benchmark only comprises of three indicators, resulting in a different shape to the radar chart than in the previous benchmark. Nevertheless, the triangles created by linking each score can still be compared with respect to its overall size and the extent to which it is skewed towards one or any other indicator. As a result, one can see that the New Deal programs have the largest scores on two indicators out of three, making these the largest shape of the benchmark. Also, their orientation towards training and supervision/guidance makes them more similar to the chart for the Work First programs of the Netherlands, even though the scores are smaller. On the other side, Ontario Works and the two Geneva programs are more oriented towards coverage for their high score. At last, it can be seen that the Work for the Dole program is made up of only very small score, a situation similar to the RMCAS program.

Figure 8.1 Output UK - NDYP *




Figure 8.2 Output UK - ND25plus *




Figure 8.3 Output Netherlands – Work First *




Figure 8.4 Output Australia – Work for the Dole *




Figure 8.5 Output Canada – Ontario Works *




Figure 8.6 Output Switzerland – Temporary Jobs






Figure 8.7 Output Switzerland – RMCAS *



* Legend for the indicator labels in figure 8.1 to 8.7 (see also section 4.3)

Label	Indicator	Sub-indicators
Training	Training	- Hours per week - Formality and transferability
Supervision / Guidance	Job search assistance	- Intensity supervision - Hours per week job search in program
Coverage	Coverage	- Number of participants per year in % of total yearly caseload

Figure 8.8 Surface Measure of Performance - Output



Note: UK NDYP: United Kingdom New Deal for Young People, UK ND25+: United Kingdom New Deal for 25 plus, NL WF: Work First programs in the Netherlands, AUS WfD: Australia Work for the Dole, CAN OW: Ontario Works in Canada, CH TJ: Temporary Jobs in Geneva Switzerland, CH RMCAS: Cantonal minimum social assistance revenue program in Geneva Switzerland.

All in all, figure 8.8 shows that the best performance in terms of output is found in the New Deal programs, despite their relatively small coverage rate. On the other side, the lowest level of output is found in the Work for the Dole, Work First programs and the RMCAS. In the Netherlands, this is caused by very low coverage combined with average scores on training as well as supervision and guidance. In the Work for the Dole, very low levels of training are the reason for the low overall performance level, since both coverage rates and supervision and guidance are average.

All score are rather low without special focus in the RMCAS program, explaining why it is slightly better with respect to the SMOP measure. At last, the same scores were given to the Ontario Works programs and the Temporary Jobs program, which put a great emphasis on coverage, and only achieve rather low scores with respect to training and supervision/guidance. The implication for these differences in relation to the rest of the benchmark will be discussed in more detail in chapter 11.