

# ON OLYMPIC BOYCOTTS

## Its Appropriateness as a Political Mean



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## ABSTRACT

This thesis offers an answer to the question whether an Olympic Boycott can be an appropriate mean, from a political point of view. The Olympic Charter prohibits political influence on the Olympic Movement. However, Olympic boycotts are mostly initiated by politicians and states who are not bound by the Olympic Charter. The historical Olympic boycott cases are scored on nine conditions of appropriateness. These conditions are derived from the requirements of International Law on general sanctions, by which politicians and states are bound, and from an extensive study on the effectiveness of economic sanctions.<sup>1</sup> This thesis shows that all historical cases of Olympic boycotts do not meet that standard for appropriateness sufficiently. When an Olympic boycott is applied, it are the athletes who pay the highest price of the sanction, and in many of the cases they are the only ones. For this disproportionate costs bearing to be justified, the cause of the boycott must be grave. For a sanction to be effective however, the goal must be modest. For that reason an Olympic boycott can hardly be an appropriate political tool since it is unable to meet the requirements of lawfulness and possible effectiveness on sanctions and at the same time justify the costs for a domestic group (athletes) who have no leverage in the political matter. Furthermore the leverage of an Olympic boycott is very limited due to the time frequency of the Olympic Games. The Olympics Games are celebrated every four years within sixteen days. It makes the leverage of using the Olympics bound by time and makes the selection of an Olympic boycott target arbitrarily. As soon as the Olympic are over, the leverage of the boycotter is gone. There is no possibility to threaten with more pain infliction in the future, as with economic sanctions, since there is no such future. This time limit applies to total boycotts but to ceremonial boycotts such as the non-attendance of politicians at an opening ceremony and associated meetings, as well. However the negative effect of an Olympic boycott on the athletes of the sender state will have a more long-lasting effect, in some cases even an indefinite effect. Based on the conditions of International Law and research on effectiveness of sanctions, this thesis shows that all historical Olympic boycotts were not appropriate political means. It is very unlikely that a possible future Olympic boycott can be an appropriate mean from a political point of view.

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<sup>1</sup> Hufbauer e.a. (2007) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered.

## PREFACE

This thesis marks the end of a four study period. In 2005, after about ten years working, I decided to start studying again, alongside my job in youth care. Now, four years later, I am about to get my Masters degree in Political Science-International Relations. I enjoyed the experience, the work and the knowledge I gained and never regretted my 2005 decision, although I really look forward to experience the notion of spare time again. On my thesis, the subject and the work, I look back with the same positive feelings. The subject of Olympic boycotts came to me during the debates of the possible Beijing boycott. Although I regularly watch the Olympics when they appear, I had no special interest in Olympism before I started this research. While researching Olympic boycotts I entered a world of great imagination. There is no other event as big as the Summer Olympics in the world and, more important, there is no other event in which so many nations of the world come together, while focussing on something else than (power)politics. The scale and organisation of the Olympics is simply amazing and offers a treasure on fascinating, moving, astonishing stories and events, not only bound to sports. I thoroughly enjoyed my stay at the Olympic Study Centre in Lausanne where I was granted the opportunity to research this information in their library and historical archives. I thank the IOC for this possibility, moreover I thank Regula Cardinaux for the smooth arrangements during my visit and the staff of the library and archives for their services. Needless to say, during my research and writing of my thesis I never got bored with the subject, nor had any regrets choosing it. I hope the reading of this thesis will give you some of the satisfaction and joy I had researching and writing it.

During the four years of study and especially the time of my thesis research, I have enjoyed much support, interest and help from family, friends and colleagues. Without forgetting others some people duly deserve to be mentioned here. First and foremost that is my husband Alex van der Heiden for his indescribable amount of love and support. Furthermore, I thank Jeannette Mak for her supervising work. Her thorough and high quality advice and feedback really improved this thesis. I thank Herbert Wolff for his feedback on my draft writings, and finally Kees Waagmeester for being the fastest and most personal helpdesk whenever I had troubles with my computer.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ANOC</b>	Association of National Olympic Committees
<b>DPRK</b>	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
<b>FRG</b>	Federal Republic of Germany
<b>GDR</b>	German Democratic Republic
<b>FIFA</b>	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
<b>IF</b>	International Federation
<b>ILC</b>	International Law Commission
<b>INGO</b>	International Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>IOC</b>	International Olympic Committee
<b>LAOOC</b>	Los Angeles Olympic Organising Committee
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>NOC</b>	National Olympic Committee
<b>OAU</b>	Organization of African Unity
<b>OCOG</b>	Organising Committee of the Olympic Games
<b>OGGI</b>	Olympic Games Global Impact
<b>OPHR</b>	Olympic Project for Human Rights
<b>PRC</b>	People's Republic of China
<b>ROCOC</b>	Republic of China national Olympic Committee
<b>SCSA</b>	Supreme Council for Sport in Africa
<b>SANOC</b>	South African National Olympic Committee
<b>SANROC</b>	South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee
<b>SLOOC</b>	Seoul Olympic Organising Committee
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations (International) Children's (Emergency) Fund
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>USOC</b>	United States Olympic Committee
<b>USSR</b>	Union of the Soviet Republics

## **1 – INTRODUCTION**

‘Why are athletes interfering in politics? Don’t they have a minister of Foreign Affairs?’

asked Avery Brundage, president of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1937 (Brundage quoted in Hazewinkel 2001:511). At the time, British and American sport organisations called for a boycott of the 1940 Tokyo Olympic Games after Japan had invaded China in July 1937 and employed an atrocious regime against the Chinese citizens. It was not the first time politics invaded the Olympics and it would not be the last time either. In spring 2008 several Non Governmental Organisations (NGO’s) make an appeal to politicians to boycott the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics in August that year. Reasons for the appeal are the oppression of dissidents in China, the violation of human rights by the Chinese authorities, the lack of free press and speech in China, the occupation of Tibet and the cooperation of China with the Darfur and Myanmar governments.

‘We are not calling for any sort of boycott by the athletes, they have been training for years. What we would like to see is as many as possible high profile public figures making a principled decision to stop at home - and watch it on TV’,

said Anne Holmes, director of the Free Tibet Campaign (The Guardian 2008:a). The Beijing Olympics had only just ended when the Georgian President Saakashvilli calls upon the United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU) to sanction Russia for invading the Georgian region Abkhazia, including a boycott of Russia’s 2014 winter Olympics (The Guardian 2008:b).

Pro-boycotters are convinced that a boycott is a powerful tool to force, in this case the Chinese, to change. In April 2008, China surprises the world when it openly cooperates with the UN-peace keeping force for Sudan. The New York Times ascribes this change in Chinese behaviour to the action of Mia Farrow and Steven Spielberg (among others) who are calling for a boycott of the ‘genocide Olympics’ (The New York Times 2007). Others state that a boycott will not have the intended effect. On the contrary, they argue that the Olympics itself provide the opportunity for change. In March 2008, Lord Moynihan, Chairman of the British Olympic Committee, states: ‘Ironically, the greatest challenge may come when the flame is extinguished on

August 24. Many human rights campaigners will wish that the Olympic Games were an annual event; and that the permanent site was Beijing' (Moynihan 2008).

Following the debates last summer I got interested in Olympic boycotts. Does a boycott have the desired effect or is a boycott (mis)using the Olympics for propagandistic purposes? Is a boycott a brave form of statecraft or is it a by-product of a conflict that is already fought out on other stages? Politicians and states are not a member of the Olympic movement and therefore not bound by its rules as laid down in the Olympic Charter. And it is the Olympic Charter that forbids political pressure to the Olympic Movement. However, an Olympic boycott is presented as a sanction, aimed to evoke a change by the target state. When applying (economic) sanctions politicians and states are bound by regulations and laws. I want to find out whether politicians and states who boycott (or have boycotted) Olympic Games do follow the requirements of international law. Does their conduct towards the Olympic Movement meet the standards of their conduct against another state? If so, that would make a political boycott of the Olympic Games appropriate from a political point of view.

The time frame of this thesis is too short to study whether and to what extent the historical Olympic boycotts achieved their intended effects. There is however research available on the effectiveness of economic sanctions, like the comprehensive 'Economic Sanctions Reconsidered' of Hufbauer e.a. (2007). I can therefore measure the boycotts against conditions of effectiveness of economic sanctions. If an Olympic boycott fails this test of possible effectiveness, it can not be an appropriate mean.

Although the IOC wants to separate sport and politics, Olympic history shows more than one boycott. The Olympics are frequently regarded as an opportunity for political leaders to make their views known. One reason might be that the Olympic Games offer quite a stage. There is no other event in the world that brings together so many states as the Olympic Games. The Olympic Movement is an international organisation with more member states than any other international organisation. Every four years most of them come together - athletes, fans and political leaders- for the celebration of the Olympic Summer Games.<sup>2</sup> Neither the boycott call of 1940 nor the boycott call of 2008 is an incident in Olympic history. The different Olympic boycotts have been separately recorded in descriptive case-studies (Hulme 1990, Wilson 1993, Caraccioli 2008) but I found no research comparing the different boycotts. This study does compare several boycotts and

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<sup>2</sup> In a two year alternating sequence from the Summer Games, every four years the Olympic Winter Games are held. This thesis focuses on the summer Games. Winter Olympics are seldom subject of a boycott; probably because the winter Games are less high profile since their number of participants (athletes as well as states) is substantially smaller.

explores whether a boycott is an appropriate political tool to use. The conditions of appropriateness are derived from the experiences with general sanctions and the requirements of international law on sanctions. I found some literature that views an Olympic boycott as a 'regular sanction' but on that subject there is no comparison study of multiple cases either.

The Olympics are still alive after more than a hundred years but so is political interference in the Olympics. In spring 2008 the torch-run of the Olympic flame causes riots and protests in several states. Meant to celebrate the Olympic spirit it instead becomes a heavily secured event. At the same time discussion arises whether the Beijing Games should be boycotted. In March 2008 European Parliament President Pöttering urges politicians to consider a political boycott of the Olympics (The Guardian 2008:c). Both Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama ask American President George W. Bush to boycott the opening ceremony, during their campaign to become the democratic presidential candidate (BBC News 2008:a). John Mc Cain, the Republican candidate for the presidential elections, states in April 2008 that he would boycott the opening ceremony if he was president of the United States (Phoenix Business Journal 2008). It shows that Olympic boycotts are not just an interesting subject to study, it is a relevant subject as well for politics today and in the future. Thus, I found my thesis subject. This study is a preliminary attempt to offer grounds for the debates on Olympic boycotts.

## **RESEARCH QUESTION**

My research question is:

Can an Olympic boycott be regarded as an appropriate political mean?

The sub questions to answer this question are:

- ❖ Do Olympic sanctions meet the requirements of international law on general sanctions?
- ❖ Do Olympic sanctions meet the requirements of possible effectiveness of general sanctions?

## **REFINING THE SUBJECT**

Olympic history shows several occasions, and several forms, of boycotts. The IOC can boycott a National Olympic Committee (NOC) as it did with the South African NOC from 1964 until the Barcelona Olympics of 1992. The IOC also boycotted NOC's of the states that were held accountable for the two World Wars. Most of the Olympic boycotts however are imposed by states, in this case NOC's, not attending the Games. The call for an Olympic boycott is mostly

made by the political leaders of states. Technically an Olympic Boycott is aimed at the IOC since they decide where the Games are held and who participates. However, the goal is to influence another state. That can be the state which is hosting the Games or any state that is also participating in the Games.

Broadly speaking there are three types of Olympic boycotts by states/NOC's. The first is a boycott where an NOC does not participate at all. Subsequently there will be no official representative of the state present at the opening ceremony. I call this a 'total boycott'. There have been total boycotts as protest to the politics of the hosting state, like the 1980 boycott of the Moscow Games, led by the Americans. There have also been total boycotts out of criticism of another competing state like the boycott of the 1956 Melbourne Games. This boycott was not aimed at Australia but at the Soviet Union (amongst others) for their use of violence in Hungary.

The second type of boycott is the absence of political leaders and high officials at the opening ceremony. The athletes participate in the Games but the state does not send its 'normal' representatives to the opening ceremony. There will be no diplomatic meetings which usually are conducted during and around the Games. I call this a 'ceremonial boycott'.

The third type of boycott is when athletes do participate but do not represent their nation. In 1980 several West European states gave their athletes the possibility to compete at the Moscow Olympics, but not as a representative of their state. So the French, British, Australian, Dutch and Spanish athletes walked under the Olympic Flag at the opening ceremony and at a medal ceremony the Olympic hymn was played instead of the national anthem. This was the result of long discussions among West European leaders to take a united stand on the boycott, which they failed to reach. In May 1980 eighteen West European Olympic Committees suggested that 'committees be permitted to refuse participation in opening Olympic ceremonies and to send teams without national flag, uniforms, or anthems' (Kanin 1981:137). I call this a 'representation boycott'. This form of boycott is often combined with the 'ceremonial boycott'.

This research focuses on the boycotts by state-actors. I describe the boycotts of the Olympic history that fall into the category 'total boycott' by more than one state-actor.

## **STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS**

Despite the wishes of the IOC to separate sport and politics, the two prove to be inseparable. In chapter 2 I will start off with the relation between sport and politics in general and in the international political world in particular. How are sport and athletes used to obtain political

aims? Can sport actually bring about peace or can it evoke a war? What is the role of sport in foreign aid and diplomatic relations? These questions are dealt with in chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes the Olympic movement. What kind of international organisation is it, how are the IOC and NOC's structured. What are the decision making procedures and what are the regulations of the movement. In what way do politics interfere in the Olympic Movement and why is that. Chapter 4 handles sanctions. What are sanctions and how did sanctions develop as a political mean. I will show what international law requires of sanctions. Furthermore the study on effectiveness of economic sanctions 'Economic Sanctions Reconsidered' of Hufbauer e.a. (2007) will be discussed. From this theoretical frame I will derive the nine conditions that could make an Olympic boycott an appropriate political mean to use. In chapter 5 I will show the methodology I have used to describe the cases. I will show how I obtained the data on the several occasions, and which setbacks and windfalls I experienced in that process. Then in Chapter 6 I describe six cases of a total Olympic boycott, along the set conditions. The cases are the Olympic Games of 1956 in Melbourne (two separate boycotts), 1976 in Montreal, 1980 in Moscow, 1984 in Los Angeles Olympics and 1988 in Seoul. Each case shows how politicians and other actors use the Olympics for their political aims. I will describe whether the boycott heats up already existing enmity or whether it cools a prior friendly relation. Are there other sanctions employed as well or is the Olympic boycott the only action taken? Furthermore I will show how the athletes in question react and what the reaction of the IOC is. Chapter 7 offers a short insight in the cases that did not lead to a total boycott but showed similar circumstances as those who did. These cases are the Olympic Games of 1936 in Berlin, 1968 in Mexico City, 1972 in Munich and in 2008 in Beijing. In Chapter 8 I will present my conclusions and answer the question whether an Olympic boycott can be an appropriate political tool to use. What are the scores on appropriateness of the six cases? Are there historical Olympic boycotts that have been appropriate from a political point of view, and if so, which ones? What are other findings of this study and what grounds are offered for future debates on Olympic (or sport) boycotts? In the Annex, chapter 9, you will find the sources for the case data and finally in chapter 10 the bibliography.

## 2 – SPORT AND POLITICS

### INTRODUCTION

‘Sport is one of the few cross-cultural universals found in all known cultures past or present, no matter how primitive’ (sociologist Günther Lüschen quoted in Wallace 1988:9). Sport is present in all societies and therefore sport is a subject of politics. Sport has become more popular in most societies ‘more so than ever now that television has multiplied a million fold the number of seats in the audience (Wallace 1988:4). Sport is a reflection of society ‘and therefore may also encompass some of the worst human traits, including violence, corruption, discrimination, excessive nationalism, human rights abuses, cheating and drug abuse’ (Beutler 2008:363). But sport also has many potential positive benefits. Sport is a ‘universal language’ that can bridge religious, racial, social and gender divides. Sport brings individuals and communities together and ‘provides a forum to learn skills such as discipline and leadership [...] and convey principles as tolerance, solidarity, cooperation and respect’ (ibid:365). Furthermore, sport plays an important role in improving public health. So reason enough for politicians to use sport a political mean.

At the domestic level politicians use sports to (among other things) keep young people off the streets in the inner cities or to enhance the general health of the population. Like the ‘Chill’ programme in Canada which allows inner city youth from the Lower Mainland to participate in a snowboarding programme. ‘Chill presents troubled youth an opportunity for success and increased self esteem through sport (Western Economic Diversification Canada 2005). In the United Kingdom ‘everyday sport’ is a campaign to encourage people to build physical activity in their daily life. The Department of Health has the promotion of physical activity as a key priority and funds the program to, among other things, ‘reduce the health and obesity time bomb facing the nation’. (Sportengland 2005). The Dutch government started a similar campaign in 2007 called “30 minutes exercise”<sup>3</sup> to encourage Dutchmen to move towards a healthier and more active lifestyle’ (MinVWS 2007). Sport provides citizens the chance to be successful regardless ones background, religion or race. Sport is therefore an important mean of leverage in a society. Argentinean football player Diego Maradonna grew up in the slums of Buenos Aires as one of eight children in a poor family. In 1982, at age 21, he was paid about 3 million British pounds to play for FC Barcelona, breaking the world record transfer fee of that time. (BBC News 2004:a). The tennis sisters Serena and Vanessa Williams (Americans of Nigerian descent) are born and raised in the

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<sup>3</sup> Dutch title ‘30 minuten bewegen’

Californian village Compton, associated with drugs, gangs and violence rather than with tennis, usually seen as an upper class white sport. Their father Richard Williams, who learned the game from books and video's trained his daughters to play tennis at the broken asphalt fields with no nets. (CNN 2008:a) They became top ranking tennis players and in 2008, financial magazine Forbes estimates that Serena and Venus respectively earned fourteen and thirteen million US dollars a year (Forbes 2008). Sport is not only a mean at the domestic political level but equally serves as such in the international political world. Sport can be used as a diplomatic or propagandist mean by politicians. Sport can serve as mean for development and is used in foreign aid programmes. In this chapter I will show how sport and international politics are intertwined.

### **SPORT: PEACEFUL OR WARLIKE?**

'Football equals war', allegedly the Dutch football player Rinus Michels made this statement to a journalist at the world cup 1974 (NRC). It became a well known saying in the Netherlands. It is clearly meant metaphorically, referring to the battle on the playing field between sportsmen. However in 1969 the 'Football War' broke out between Honduras and El Salvador. It was a real war fought out on the military battlefield between soldiers. It was named the Football War<sup>4</sup> since the war started soon after a series of football matches between the two states, deciding which nation could play the World Cup. The visits back and forth were accompanied with riots, protests and threats of the visiting players. 'Rioting during the second game led the two countries to break diplomatic relations. Two weeks later, the 100-hour Soccer War took place, resulting in about 2.000 casualties' (Drezner 2006). So can sport really bring about war? The organisational structure and the ceremonies and rituals organised on national lines, make international sport events a stage to demonstrate political power, nationalistic tensions and rivalries (Toohey&Veal 2007:87). Sport is not likely to be the only reason for a war to start. Sport can however enhance already existing tensions between states. In 1956, a few weeks before the opening of the Melbourne Olympic Games, the Soviet Union had beaten down a protest of Hungarians in Budapest. Both the Hungarians and the Russians are present at the Melbourne Olympics. At the opening ceremony 'as heartily as the Hungarian delegation is cheered by the public, the Russian delegation is booed' (Schaller 2004:128 - my translation from Dutch KEO). In the final of the water polo competition the Soviets and the Hungarians meet. 'The match denigrating into a confrontation of verbal and physical spite. With the Hungarians leading 4-0, the Soviets begin taunting them with shouts of

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<sup>4</sup> Or Soccer War.

'Fascists'. The referee suspends five players at one point for punching and kicking, and there is blood in the water when Valentin Prokopov, head butted Ervin Zador of Hungary, splitting his eyebrow' (Miller 2004:149). The referee stops the game early and grants the victory to the Hungarians, the Russians do not protest.

At the World Cup Bridge, the Bridge Association makes sure that existing tensions are not fought out on the bridge table, despite the fact that the sport is not very physical. With about sixty nations competing 'the problem of how to deal with the enmity between Israel and numerous other countries [is] solved by ensuring that nations which will not compete against Israel are drawn in separate qualifying pools, with the hope, fortunately always fulfilled, that two incompatible nations will not both qualify for the later stages' (Hill 1996:34).

Sport may look like a continuation of war, only by other means. 'Sir Arthur Gold, a British sport administrator and former Olympic athlete, who has experienced both sport and war, has wisely said, it is not difficult to decide which of the two one prefers'. 'Some sports people go so far as to argue that sport actually promotes peace' (Hill 1996:35), like the Olympic Movement which has the promotion of peace as one of its goals (IOC 2007:11). In 2007 football brings a ceasefire in the intrastate civil war in Ivory Coast, a country subject to violence between the Muslim north and the Christian south. The national team, 'the Elephants', is made up of players originating from the south as well as the northern part of the country. In 2007 they qualify to play for the World Cup, a first in Ivorian history. It opened the possibility of peace talks when protests are called off. 'We stopped so we can watch the Elephants at the nation's cup' a protester tells a journalist (BBC news 2006). So what the UN-mission UNOCI (UN 2004) could not achieve, football players could. International competition can positively influence public opinion according to Cartwright Young (1982:27,28). She states that during the Olympics 'embraces and kisses among representatives of politically hostile nations are not unusual, and it cannot hurt international understanding for almost a billion people through-out the world to be exposed to such symbols of friendship'. Not only athletes respect each other despite different nationalities, the true sport fans also admire the results of any athlete based on their efforts, respecting the sportsmanship and fair play. It makes it possible that American wrestlers get a standing ovation of the Iranian public in Teheran for their victory (Goldberg 2000:66), something not quite imaginable in a political arena.

In World War I, football does not bring a cease fire but serves as a pastime for both parties. In 1914 a two day Christmas truce is declared. The British and German soldier come out of the trenches near St. Yves and play a football match that the Germans win by 3-2 (Drezner 2006).

Sport is not the main and only reason for a war to start and neither can we expect sport to bring enduring peace. But the discussed examples show how sport can intensify or transform existing sentiments and feelings in a society. The close relation between sport and politics could be based on their shared competitive nature. An exception to that rule was found in the Pacific Islands, where a noncompetitive spirit prevails. A story is told of a European in one such peaceable culture who coached the local young men in footracing.

‘At the word ‘Go!’ all the runners sprang from their starting blocks, joined hands, ran like mad, and crossed the finish line together.

Most sport, however, is intensely competitive’ (Wallace 1988:9). Sport is about competition, who runs the fastest, who jumps the highest and who scores the most goals? The international system of states is also competitive according to realists; who has the most power, whose interest are prevailing, who wins the war? In the old days sport provides training for the ultimate competition between states: war. Teaching on his ideas of an ideal state Plato states on gymnastics that ‘only the warlike sort of them are to be practiced and to have prizes of victory; and those which are not military are to be given up’ (quoted in Wallace 1988:10). The link between sport and the army, and thus state security, has remained strong ever since. In 1874 the French army incorporated the sports club *Club Alpine French* since they were the only ones fit and adapted enough to defend the nation against Italian invasion in the mountain border area (Drouet 2005:67). In 1953 an American study finds the European children stronger than the American ones. The American youth seemed inclined ‘to become sports spectators rather than athletes’ (Hunt 2007:798). President Eisenhower is worried about the connection with the growing number of rejections by the military of potential soldiers due to their inadequate fitness levels. He starts to create a sports system of mass participation to promote public health and thereby the nations preparedness for war (idem). American president Kennedy states in 1960 that ‘the physical fitness of our citizens is a vital prerequisite to America’s realization of its full potential as a nation’. He worries about ‘the growing softness and increasing lack of physical fitness’ which in his view is

‘ “a dangerous menace to our security by a more physically robust Soviet population. To meet the challenge of this enemy will require determination and will and effort on the part of all Americans”, he declared. “Only if our citizens are physically fit will they be fully capable of such an effort” ’ (Hunt 2007:798-799).

Nowadays sport still serve feelings of national pride and prestige abroad. At the Olympics and at other major sport matches you see royals and presidents at the stadium, cheering for their national team and publicly decorating them after victory. Governments use sport at the domestic level but there are also several examples of sport being used in international relations, as a diplomatic mean.

### SPORT IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY

The Russian newspaper *Pravda* stated in 1958:

‘An important factor in our foreign policy is the international relations of our sportsmen. A successful trip by the sportsmen of the USSR of the people’s democratic countries is an excellent vehicle of propaganda in capitalist countries. The success of our sportsmen abroad helps in the work of our foreign diplomatic missions and of our trade delegations’ (Espy 1979:4).

Here sport is used to showcase the Russian (communist) political system in general. Sport can also be used as an actual mean in diplomacy, like the ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ in 1971 when a ‘visit of a table-tennis delegation from the Unites States of America (USA) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) preceded and set the stage for the opening of long-severed diplomatic relations between the two countries’ (Espy 1979:3).

Japan and the Korea’s had a troubled relation since 1945, when the Japanese occupation of Korea ended. In the mid-nineties the *Fédération Internationale de Football Association* (FIFA) decides that the World Cup Football of 2002 should take place in Asia. Only two Asian countries make a bid: Japan en South Korea. The FIFA’s decision body is heavily divided over which state to choose. Unable to choose the FIFA proposes that Japan and South Korea should co-host the event. Eventually both states agree (The New York Times 1996). It leads to the re-establishing of diplomatic relations between Japan en South-Korea. By co-hosting this international event at which many international visitors travel towards and between their countries, their defence and security departments are forced to cooperate by sharing intelligence. It brings the states to sign an extraditing treaty, which is spectacular since Japan then only has an extradition treaty with the USA and no other country. Their military dialogue, which was suspended the year before as a result of a row over history textbooks used at Japanese schools, is resumed. With North-Korea the

suspended dialogue is re-opened and Japanese spouses living in North-Korea are granted visits home. (Cha 2002:111-112).

States can use sport to soften up existing relations. 'In early 1977 the United States, in an effort to normalize relations with Cuba, sent a basketball team composed of players from South Dakota, whose quality was considerably less than the best of the United States had to offer. Much to the delight of the Cubans, the United States team lost' (Espy 1979:4).

Governments can use their power by influencing international sport events, based on the nature of their relation with other states. In 1930 the United Kingdom refuses visa to Russian football players who were about to play the British team. The government judges their visit 'propagandist, not sporting, in tone and intent' (Polley 1998:4). In 1966 the United Kingdom faces a similar problem when they host the World Cup football. Totally unexpected, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK North-Korea, KEO) qualifies for the World Cup. Preceding the World Cup sixteen of the eighteen football federations of Africa, Asia and Oceania boycott the World Cup. The FIFA ruled that there was one place for those three continents available and most of the federations thought this was far too strict. The boycott means that only Australia and North Korea, the latter not being known for having a great football team, compete for that one place. Both Games are played in Phnom Penh and North Korea wins both matches. The British government does not recognise the DPRK and 'is afraid that admission to the UK might seem to imply recognition, particularly if the ceremonies at matches involve flags and national anthems'. Furthermore the exception for representatives of the DPRK can be seen as a precedent for other unrecognised nations, in particular by the German Democratic Republic (GDR East Germany, KEO). Finally the UK government is worried that admission of DPRK representatives will harm their relation with South-Korea (*idem*). Refusing visa like in 1930 is not a favourable reaction to this problem, since the FIFA might remove the championship away from the UK if she bans a duly qualified team. Eventually the DPRK representatives are granted visa to the UK. They play under the name of North-Korea instead of DPRK. There is a minimal use of national symbols and the formal presentations of the teams to government and royalty are restricted. The national flags and anthems are not displayed at matches, only at the opening game (which does not include North Korea) and at the final. No one expects North-Korea to play the final; indeed they are defeated in the quarterfinals by Portugal. The negotiations leading to this solution are made by representatives of the embassies, the British Foreign Office and the Korean Cultural Relations Department. 'The potential crisis is averted and government and sport prove that despite their

different agendas, they can work together' (ibid:5). When a major sport event is organised the athletes/teams that have qualified must be given the possibility to enter the state that is hosting the event. This usually is a formal requirement. For the Olympic Games an Olympic identity card can serve as a passport and the host city must promise that all athletes and officials can enter their nation. But not only athletes and coaches travel to the Olympics or a World Cup, also many fans do. This can be deemed a problem for the security services since not all fans can be investigated up front, nor are the fans accredited by the IOC or another international sport organisation. With all these people travelling to the event this can easily be an overload of the existing travel routes. This might bring states to, temporarily, lift barriers to flight routes or seaways to make access to the event possible, like in Japan and South Korea during the World Cup Football in 2002. In this way sport provides a way of opening or softening relations and cooperation between states. On the other hand politicians can use the same sport as a mean in severing or even ending relations between states. Governments can refuse visa to not only fans, but also to athletes and officials making it impossible to enter the competition. Governments boycott sport events and use them as a podium to give the world their opinion. And what a podium it is for politicians! One can wonder how many viewers a live broadcast of a meeting of the General Assembly of the UN would produce, but it is unlikely to outvote the 3.9 billion viewers of the Athens Olympics in 2004 (Jackson & Haigh 2008:350) or the 840 million viewers of the Beijing opening ceremony in China alone (Beijing 2008:a).

The Olympic Games have seen their share of politics and state-influence. There have been boycotts and refusals of supplying athletes with visas, which will be described in chapter 6 and 7.

### **SPORT AND CIVIL SOCIETY**

Sport is used by governments but also in civil society. Civilians use sport to influence the government or to show their government that the public has another view on international relations. In 1928 the Olympics are held in Amsterdam. The planned one million Dutch guilders funding of the government is outvoted by the Dutch Parliament. The Christian Anti Revolutionary Party regards the Olympics a heathen feast where men are honoured instead of God, and Sunday rest is not respected. The required money then is provided by civilians and companies donating money (Nationaalarchief 2004).

In 1963 South African sportsmen found the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) and ask for recognition from the IOC instead of the South African National Olympic

Committee (SANOC) that already exists. The SANROC does not become an official NOC but they are able to influence the IOC as well as state-leaders to boycott the Apartheid Regime in sports. They encourage governments to include sport in their sanctions against South Africa. In 1977 the Governments of the Commonwealth do this by signing the Gleneagles' Declaration, officially stating that they will discourage any sport competition with South Africa. Allegedly this agreement would not have seen the light without the SANROC campaign (Hill 1996:35).

In 1974 two Dutch comedians initiate a boycott campaign against Argentina, the host of the football World Cup that year. 'They could not prevent the Dutch team going to this, by dictator Videla ruled state, but their action did bring about a national debate on the subject' (NRC 2008). The Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs has to answer questions by members of the Parliament. The Minister states that the decision whether to compete has to be made by the Dutch Football Association and not the government. However the ambassador in Argentina is requested to follow normal protocol but to be reticent at festivities organised around the World Cup event (Parlement&Politiek 2009). Earlier in that year the World Cup Hockey is also played in Argentina. Then the Dutch team competing in Argentina does not lead to public nor state action, probably due to the difference in scale of both the sport and the event.

In 1986 the American media mogul Ted Turner organises the Good Will Games, meant as alternative for the Olympic Games, mainly for American and Russian athletes. As a reaction of the American boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, and the Soviet Boycott of the Los Angeles Games in 1984, Turner wants to 'take the politics out of superpower sports' (Senn 1999:209). Turner organises the Good Will Games in cooperation with Russian Sport Committee and the Russian broadcasting 'Gosteleradio'. The first Good Will Games are held in Moscow and 3000 participants from 80 countries compete. The Goodwill Games are organised five times, both winter and summer Games. In 2001 the Goodwill Games are organised for the last time, the boycott-era of the Olympic Games seems to be in the past. The fear that the Olympic Games will not survive political influences is diminished and with that the main reason for the existence of the Goodwill Games.

In 1998 during the football world cup in France, Iran and the USA play each other. While the governments of the USA and Iran had no diplomatic relations for twenty years, the players and supporters of both sides state that they were in France to play football and not politics.

‘Iranians and Americans, in full party mode, tied together the tips of their flags and danced the linked colours through the streets of Lyon as they headed for the soccer showdown’ (Botchford quoted in Delgado 2003: 299).

The footballers themselves also show real sportsmanship by exchanging flowers and gifts to each other before the start of the game, which the Iranians won 2-1 (The Guardian 2006).

### **SPORT AS A MEAN FOR DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE**

On the international level there is much agreement about the positive role of sport in the (re)building of (inter)national societies. Sport is even regarded a human right. It is included in several international treaties. Article 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘everyone has the right to rest and leisure’ (UN 1948). The UNESCO International Charter states in article 1 that ‘the right to physical education and sport is fundamental for everybody (UNESCO 1978).

Based on these rights and the faith in the positive power of sports the UN as well as INGO’s use sport as foreign aid, for example with rebuilding war-torn societies. In the post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina the ‘Open Fun Football Schools’ are started, bringing together children from different ethnic groups. Not limited to football the football school intends to develop confidence, skills and teamwork among the children.<sup>5</sup> The programme builds on a double agenda combining sport and politics, integrating communities and to promote grassroots youth football. They have been ‘strikingly successful not only in getting children from across frontlines to play together, but also in getting their families and communities to cheer for them, and their local football clubs and town leader to cooperate so that they can play’ (Gasser&Levinsen 2004: 468). In Liberia football is used by UNICEF and NGO’s to ‘provide an alternative career to the militia’ especially for children (Armstrong 2004: 485).

‘Right to Play’ is one of many NGO’s that uses sports as foreign aid. Born out of the Organising Committee of the Lillehammer winter Olympics, it regards sport and its heroes as a mean to ‘improve health, develop life skills and foster peace for children and communities in some of the most disadvantaged areas of the world’ (Right to Play 2003). Active in over 40 developing countries they gain much attention when, Olympic Champion speed skating, Joey Cheek donates his prize money of the 2006 winter Olympics to ‘Right to Play’. He says: ‘The Olympics is a very

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<sup>5</sup> The Open Fun Football Schools are now also active in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia and Georgia. The programme is funded by the United European Football Association (UEFA), the UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) and the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO).

selfish pursuit. I wake up every morning and I ask myself how can I focus all my energy on what I do so that I can be the best in the world? After years of this and after years of other people sacrificing so that I can be the best in the world, I feel that it is imperative to give something to someone who's less fortunate than myself' (ABC News 2006).

In 2001 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appoints a Special Advisor on Sport for Development and Peace, to encourage the (more systematically) use of sport along other means to reduce poverty, achieve universal education, promote gender equality and combat HIV/AIDS as well as use sport in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The use of sport is seen as a cost-effective mean in achieving the Millenium Development Goals set by the UN (Beutler 2008:359-360). In 2004 the Council of Europe and the European Parliament proclaim the European Year of Education through Sport. The UN follows by proclaiming the year 2005 the International Year of Sport and Physical Education (ibid:362). Sport is used as an instrument for mobilization as well by the UN (as by national and regional politicians) through appointing celebrity athletes as Goodwill Ambassadors and spokespersons to reach out to civil society and to mobilize and communicate essential messages. Again

‘the visit of a famous sportsperson to any country in the world generally creates greater media coverage and public support than that of any political figure’ (ibid:365).

‘Few enthusiasts of elite sport nowadays believe that it can be separated from politics, though there must be many who wish that it could. In fact they interlock at a number of different levels’ (Hill 1996:2). Politicians use sport as a mean to better the national and international society, sometimes initiated by civil society. Sport is a powerful tool in foreign aid and rebuilding societies. On the other hand state power is used by politicians to influence the international sports world. Sport and politics do indeed interlock at many levels. So perhaps not surprisingly the then IOC president Lord Killanin states in 1983: ‘Ninety-five percent of my problems as president of the IOC involved national and international politics’ (Killanin quoted in Senn 1999:x). However, the very fact that the Olympics survived many wars and major international crises, shows that sport also can exceed politics. The Olympics can only survive if there is enough international collaboration present. In the next chapter I will show how the Olympic Movement is organised and how Olympism and politics are interlocked.

### 3- OLYMPISM

‘Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles. The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity’ (IOC 2007:11).

Olympism in all its aspects is organised and carried out by the Olympic Movement. ‘The Olympic Movement is the concerted, organised, universal and permanent action, carried out under the supreme authority of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), of all individuals and entities who are inspired by the values of Olympism. It covers the five continents. It reaches its peak with the bringing together of the world’s athletes at the great sport festival, the Olympic Games’ (idem). Olympism is conceived by Pierre de Coubertin who revives the ancient Olympics to modern Olympics in 1894. He organises the Olympic Games of Athens in 1896. Since then the Olympic Games are held regularly and the Olympic Movement grows stronger and bigger. In August 2008, 204 National Olympic Committees sent 10,708 athletes to the Beijing Olympics (Beijing 2008:b).<sup>6</sup> Olympism is at the base of all Olympic activities. In this chapter I will show the different players and parts of Olympism like the Olympic Movement, the IOC, National Olympic Committee’s (NOC’s), the International Federations (IF’s), the Olympic Charter, the Olympic symbols and ceremonies and how they influence or are influenced by (international) politics.

#### THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT

‘The Olympic Movement encompasses organisations, athletes and other persons who agree to be guided by the Olympic Charter. The goal of the Olympic Movement is to contribute to building a peaceful and better world by educating youth through sport practised in accordance with Olympism and its values’ (IOC 2007:13). The three main pillars of the Olympic Movement are the IOC, the IF’s of various sports and the NOC’s. Furthermore the Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG), national associations, clubs and individuals (including not only athletes

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<sup>6</sup> There are currently 205 NOC’s. Brunei was expelled on the opening day of the Beijing Olympics so their two athletes could not compete. The Brunei’s NOC had failed, in spite of IOC effort, to register their athletes before the deadline. (Reuters 2008:a)

but also coaches, referees, technicians etc) are members of the Olympic Movement for 'their interest constitute a fundamental element of the Olympic Movement's actions' (IOC 2007:14).

The fundamental principles and rules of Olympism are codified in the Olympic Charter. The Charter is adopted by the IOC first in 1908, the latest updated version is in force since 7 July 2007 (ibid:1). The Charter serves three main purposes:

- ❖ it is a basic instrument of a constitutional nature, sets forth and recalls the fundamental principles and essential values of Olympism;
- ❖ it serves as statutes for the IOC;
- ❖ it defines the main reciprocal rights and obligations of the three main constituent of the Olympic Movement, namely the IOC, the IF's and the NOC's as well as the Organising Committees for the Olympic Games, all of which are required to comply with the Olympic Charter (ibid:9).

## **THE IOC**

The IOC is the authoritative body of the Olympic Movement. The mission of the IOC is 'to promote Olympism throughout the world and to lead the Olympic Movement' (ibid:14). This does not only constitute organising the Olympic Games but also, among other things:

- ❖ to encourage and support the promotion of ethics in sport as well as education of youth through sport and to dedicate its efforts to ensuring that, in sport, the spirit of fair play prevails and violence is banned;
- ❖ to cooperate with the competent public or private organisations and authorities in the endeavour to place sport at the service of humanity and thereby to promote peace;
- ❖ to encourage and support the promotion of women in sport at all levels and in all structures with a view to implementing the principle of equality of men and women;
- ❖ to oppose any political or commercial abuse of sport and athletes;
- ❖ to encourage and support development of sport for all;
- ❖ to encourage and support initiatives blending sport with culture and education;
- ❖ to encourage and support a responsible concern for environmental issues, to promote sustainable development in sport and to require that the Olympic Games are held accordingly (ibid:14-15).

The IOC currently has 110 members. The maximum number of members is 115 (IOC 2007:30). The IOC consists of:

- ❖ A majority of members (maximum 70) whose membership is not linked to any function or office. There is only one such member per country;
- ❖ a maximum of 15 members which are active athletes;
- ❖ a maximum of 15 members which are presidents or persons holding an executive or senior leadership position within IF's or other organisations recognised by the IOC;
- ❖ a maximum of 15 members which are presidents or persons holding an executive or senior leadership position within NOC's, or world or continental associations of NOC's (ibid:30).

The IOC describes itself as 'an international non-governmental not-for-profit organisation, of unlimited duration in the form of an association' (ibid:29)<sup>7</sup>. IOC membership is not evenly divided between states and members do not represent their state in the IOC but the other way around. They represent the IOC and Olympism in their country and region. This is one of the ways in which the IOC prevents herself from (too much) political dependency. The IOC is 'a self-electing, self-perpetuating body [...] in which membership is by invitation only' (Senn 1999:6). The IOC is seen as an elite non-democratic organisation by outsiders as well as IOC members themselves. 'In his memoirs, Killanin (former president IOC, KEO) wonders how liberals like himself and "above all, member of the Communist bloc countries" can tolerate "such a system" that openly defies "democratic principles" ' (idem). When de Coubertin founds the IOC he is adamant that members should not be dependent of any government. IOC membership was no paid position which meant that only rich and elite men are able to pay for their expenses as IOC-member and have time to devote to the IOC. 'Such individuals would not have readily thought in terms of democratic of participatory processes' (Toohey&Veal 2007:48). De Coubertin himself also is an aristocratic, wealthy man, and he does not hide his dislike of democratic processes. The first IOC has fourteen members which are all nominated by De Coubertin himself. He states that he 'needs elbow room at the start, for many conflicts are bound to rise'.

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<sup>7</sup> While technically sport competitions are between sport organisations one could argue that the IOC is a transnational organisation rather than an international organisation. 'Since the Olympic sport organisations are structured similarly to nation-states, the Olympic system itself manifests, traits and actions characteristic of international organisations' (Espy 1979:9).

As the best means of safeguarding liberty and serving democracy, it is not always best to abandon ourselves to popular will. Rather we must maintain, in the midst of the vast electoral ocean, strong islands that will ensure independence and stability' (De Coubertin quoted in Senn 1999:21).

The IOC never changed its fundamental rules and remains different from most international and transnational organisations. This shows in the non-representative nature of the IOC, which is subject to criticism. Requests for more representation, for example every NOC one chair at the IOC, are deemed to be unpractical. It would make the IOC even larger, and therefore more 'unwieldy than it is at present, so accelerating the tendency for power to be concentrated in a few hands' (Hill 1996:71). Sufficient representation is ensured by the NOC's and IF's associating. The Association of National Olympic Committee's (ANOC) has regional associations like the European Olympic Committees and the Association of Olympic Committees of Africa. These associations can bring the common interests at the IOC footlight. The same goes for the Associations of the IF's like the General Association of International Sports Federations. Another criticism is on the fact that members can be re-elected until they reach the age of seventy, making the IOC not the most dynamic organisation. Until 2001 the President could also be re-elected until he was seventy years of age. Now the President is elected for eight years and he can once be re-elected for another four years (IOC 2007:46). De Coubertin serves twenty-nine years as president, and Samaranch twenty-four years. Since 1894 there have only been eight presidents. Most IOC-members are West-European and so are seven of the eight Presidents. The IOC now 'makes an efforts to represent the various parts of the world' (Senn 1999:7).

The IOC meets only once or twice a year in a Session. Combined with their large number of members this makes the IOC not the most effective decision making body. Therefore an executive board is elected by the Session and constitutes of the President, four vice-presidents and ten other members. They are elected by a secret ballot of the IOC Session. Board members are elected for four years and can be re-elected once. Only the President has a paid position. The headquarters staff (some 200) and the Director General support the executive board. Additional to the Sessions, Olympic Congresses are organised by the IOC. Olympic Congresses, including IOC members, representatives of the international sport world and athletes serve as a consultative body for the IOC President. The IOC President can create commissions to advise him or the IOC Session and the executive board. Some commissions are permanent but the President can also install temporary commissions. Among the IOC commission are:

- ❖ The Ethics Commission: established in 1999 after the corruption scandal of the bidding process of the Salt Lake City Winter Games of 2002. The commission monitors the observance of the Code of Ethics and updates the ethical principles. She investigates complaints of breaching ethical principles and proposes sanctions if necessary. The Code of Ethics, enshrined in the Olympic Charter, offers rules for behaviour in seven areas among which 'relations with states'.
- ❖ The Olympic Programme Commission: advises the IOC which sport should be included in the Olympic Games.
- ❖ The Olympic Solidarity Commission. Olympic Solidarity contains the assistance of the IOC to the world wide spreading of Olympism. Their main task is to assist NOC's who are not able to take part in the Olympic Games without help. This assistance is financial but also sharing of knowledge or offering technical assistance. The Solidarity Commission furthermore 'urges governments and international organisation to include sport in official development assistance' (IOC 2007:19).

The IOC is subject to criticism on different subjects. Accusations of bribery of the IOC-members are made regularly, but become apparent in 1989. The Organising Committee of the 2002 Salt Lake City winter Olympics has paid IOC members to vote for their city at the election in 1995 (BBC News 1999). The head of the Organising Committee steps down and six IOC members are expelled by the IOC (The Guardian 2002). In 1991 the IOC adopts new guidelines for candidates bidding for the Games and for the IOC members. These are however guidelines and critics state that the IOC cannot enforce these regulations and that there still are many ways to favour IOC members without breaking the rules (Miller 2004:271). The immense increases in revenues make the stakes for bidding cities very high and therefore liable to bribery. The Beijing Games made a profit of at least 16 million US dollars according to the Chinese government (China Sports Review 2009). The IOC's liability lies in its securing financial independency with the income from television rights sales and sponsorships.

The commercialisation of the Olympic Games is also reason for criticism. The Games are about money, revenues and sponsorships more than about sport and athletes performances. Recently athletes and coaches protested when the IOC changed the swim final schedule for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Instead of the regular evening schedule they were shifted to the morning, at request of the American Broadcaster NBC, so they could broadcast the finals prime time in

America. There were many critics including the Australian Swim coach Thompson stating: 'the only thing that gets me cranky is that the IOC have made the decision for commercial reasons, not for the good of the sport' (USAToday 2006). However, there are 25 world records are broken in the Beijing Swim contest (Sina 2008). Already in 1932 the Olympic expenditure is reason for protest. The Los Angeles Games are held in the midst of the crisis years and demonstrators hold banners stating 'Groceries not Games' (Miller 2004:93). A, now permanent, opposition group is established on the same argument. The 'Bread not Circuses' organisation started in 1990 to oppose the bid of Toronto for the 1996 Olympics (CBC 1990). Now they provide a broader agenda for reform of the Olympic Movement. Other items on their agenda are:

- ❖ more public participation and democratic accountability;
- ❖ social equity – relating to housing/rents/homelessness, cultural equity and civil liberties;
- ❖ sexual equity and equal opportunities;
- ❖ environmental impacts;
- ❖ employment (Toohey&Veal 2007:73).

In 2003 the IOC creates the Olympic Games Global Impact (OGGI), an evaluative instrument (Olympic Review 2006). The OCGI must not only describe and evaluate the Games but also provide data on 150 indicators of the OGGI. The indicators are divided into three dimensions: environmental, social and economic and among them are many of the items of 'the Bread not Circuses' agenda (Toohey&Veal 2997:73-74). All indicators must be described over a period of eleven years, starting five years before until two years after the Olympics. The database which will come about from these reports can be used by researchers but also provides future bidders and organisers data which can make their expectations and preparations more evidence based.

## **NOC'S AND IF'S**

There are 205 NOC's recognised by the IOC. 'The mission of the NOC's is to develop, promote and protect the Olympic Movement in their respective countries, in accordance with the Olympic Charter' (IOC 2007:61). Each NOC is obliged to participate at the Olympic Games. The NOC has the exclusive authority to select the participants for the Olympic Games and the exclusive authority to select and designate the city which may apply to organise Olympic Games in their respective countries' (IOC 2007:61).

‘The NOC must preserve its autonomy and resist all pressures of any kind including but not limited to political, legal, religious or economic pressures which may prevent them from complying with the Olympic Charter’ (ibid:62).

The NOC may cooperate with governmental bodies to fulfil their mission and they should achieve harmonious relations. The NOC may decide to elect representatives of governments or public authorities as member of the NOC, but governments or public authorities can not designate members of an NOC (ibid:64). In practice the NOC’s are not totally independent of their governments. Most NOC’s receive funding from their governments. In the USA the American NOC (United States Olympic Committee (USOC)) is granted the control of American participation in all international sport events, not only the Olympic Games, by a congressional act in 1972, which dissolved the Athletic Union which used to administrate all non-Olympic sport events (Senn 1999:12). State independence of NOC’s is perfectly accepted in most western democratic states, where state influence is limited to other public organisations as well. But in a socialist state, government independence is just un-imaginable. In the world wide Olympic Movement various political systems and traditions have their influence on the NOC’s and the IOC. Even between western states there is a difference in how much state influence is allowed by the NOC. In 1980 the American president Carter gets the USOC to comply with his wish not to compete at the Moscow Olympics. While the British Prime-Minister Thatcher also promotes a boycott, the British NOC shows their independence by competing at the Moscow Games, albeit under the Olympic flag (idem). In July 2008 the IOC bars the Iraqi athletes enlisted to compete at the Beijing Olympics in August that year. The Iraqi sports minister has replaced members of the NOC with government appointees, which is a clear breach of the Olympic Charter (The Guardian 2008:d). When later that week the Iraqi government pledges to ensure the independency of their NOC and agrees to hold transparent and free elections for new NOC-members before November 2008, the ban is lifted. This means that two Iraqi athletes can compete in track and field. For the others, archery, weightlifting, judo and rowing it is too late since the deadline of selecting for those sports already passed (The Globe and Mail 2009).

The IOC recognises International Federations (IF’s) as part of the Olympic Movement. An IF is an ‘international non-governmental organisation administering one or several sports at world level and encompassing organisations administering such sports at national level (IOC 2007:57).

The IF's maintain independent and autonomous in the administration of the sport but must conform their practices, activities and statutes to the Olympic Charter. They have an important task with the adoption and implementation of the World Anti-Doping Code. Fifteen presidents of IF's have a seat in the IOC. The IF's have quite some influence in choosing the host city. They provide the evaluation commission, which investigates the bids and draws a shortlist for the IOC to choose from (see next paragraph), with their opinion on the technical aspects of venues for their respective sports. At the Olympic Games they are responsible for the technical control and direction of their sports (ibid:58).

The IOC, NOC's and IF's form the core of the Olympic Movement. The IOC owns the Olympic Games and has the sole power to decide which city hosts the Games as well as which sports are in the Olympic Programme en which are not. The balance of power between these three parties is under tension. The IF's want more voice in deciding which sports can enter the Olympic Programme. Inclusion 'makes a sport better known and more popular, and so increases its ability to raise funds' (Hill 1996:69,70). The IF's also want to share more of the financial revenues, produced by the Olympic Games. It is even said by some that the IOC is redundant and the Olympic Games could well be organised by the IF's and the NOC's. Others state that the IF's then would concentrate on their own world cups and the Games would cease to exist (idem).

### **RECOGNITION BY THE IOC**

The IOC is the body which decides who is part of the Olympic Movement and who is not. The Olympic Charter states 'the Olympic Games are 'competitions between athletes in individual or team events and not between countries' (IOC 2007:19). The individual athlete however must be selected by a NOC and the NOC's in their turn must be recognised by the IOC. The standard is that there is one NOC per country and the athlete competing 'in the Olympic Games must be a national of the country of the NOC which is entering such competitor' (ibid:81). These requirements and rules bring a political component in the Olympic Movement, with which the IOC struggles regularly. The Olympic Charter defines 'the expression "country" as 'an independent state recognised by the international community' (ibid:68). The name of the NOC 'must reflect the territorial extent and tradition of its country and shall be subject to the approval of the IOC Executive Board' (idem). Although clearly political these rules seem quite distinct. However, the number of NOC's outnumbers the United Nations members. Although the IOC states that they only recognise NOC's and not states, others say that 'ultimately, participation in

the Games became a public affirmation of international recognition' (Senn 1999:2). History shows controversial admissions of the IOC including the two Germanys, China and Taiwan and Palestine.

In 1950 the German Democratic Republic (GDR East-Germany), applies for a separate NOC recognition. At first they are provisionally recognised by the IOC in 1955, on the condition that they will compete as a single, joint German team with the West-Germans (Hill 1996:40). The Germans indeed do compete as a united, single team at the Olympics of 1956, 1960 and 1964 (both summer and winter Games). The cooperation is never without tension though, and tension intensifies when the Berlin Wall is build in 1961. In other international sport events in that period, such as the world championships hockey and skiing, the Americans and French deny the East German athletes visa so they can not compete. In 1966 the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) permits separate German teams to compete in the European Championships. The IOC follows suit, despite western states claiming that they will not provide visa for the East Germans. 'The IOC response was to point out that French, American and Canadian cities are bidding for the Games of 1968, and to threaten to reject them if their governments do not mend their behaviour' (ibid:41). The Games of 1968 are held in Grenoble (winter Games) and Mexico City (summer Games) and the East Germans are allowed entry in France on Olympic identity cards. In Grenoble and Mexico City the separate teams walk under the same banner, with the same anthem and emblems at the ceremonies. At the Munich Games of 1972 the East Germans make their first separate appearance at the Olympic Games. When recognising the East German NOC the IOC does not speak about the territory of the GDR but states that 'the East German Olympic Committee is fully affiliated for the geographical area of East Germany' (ibid:42). The separate Germanies are not recognised by the UN until 1973 (UN 2009).

In 1922 the Chinese NOC is recognised. In the Chinese war between communists and nationalist most of the nations' officials, among whom most NOC member, flee to the isle of Taiwan in 1951 (Hill 1996:44). The UN then recognises (the now) Taiwan as the 'real' China. The Soviet Union and its allies recognise the mainland, the People's Republic of China' (PRC), as the 'real' China. In 1952 both China's want to compete at the Helsinki Olympics. The Helsinki OCOG<sup>8</sup> voted 29 against 22 for allowing Chinese athletes of the PRC to compete without being member of an NOC, only for those events for which they were recognised by IF's (ibid:45). The Taiwanese boycott the Games for this reason. Only one Chinese athlete represents the PRC in

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<sup>8</sup> Then the Organizing Committee is in charge of the invitations.

Helsinki. In 1954 the IOC recognises the Olympic Committee of the Chinese Republic<sup>9</sup> based at Beijing beside the already existing Chinese Olympic Committee based in Taiwan. The Beijing Olympic Committee boycotts the next Olympic Games of Melbourne 1956. It withdraws itself from the Olympic Movement and all IF's after their demand of erasing the Chinese Olympic Committee (Taiwan) is not granted (Hill 1996:45). In 1959 the Taiwanese are told by the IOC that they must change their name since they are not administering sport in the mainland of China. In 1960 they compete at the Rome Olympic Games under the name Taiwan (Formosa), which is a condition for entering the Olympics. 'The team duly carries a name board 'Formosa' during the opening parade, but displays a placard 'under protest' (ibid:46). In 1971 Taiwan is no longer recognised as a state by the UN which recognises the government of Beijing to be the authority of the republic of China including Taiwan. In 1979 China rejoins the Olympic Movement, the Taiwanese NOC is not expelled but renamed 'Chinese Taipei' and still exists as such.

In 1992 the IOC grants athletes from the former Republic of Yugoslavia the right to compete at the Barcelona Olympics, despite the fact that boycotting the Yugoslav NOC is part of the UN-sanctions. They compete as individual Olympic athletes under the Olympic flag.

In 1993 the Palestinian NOC is recognised by the IOC, following the recognition of Israel by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) by which they are declared the legitimate representation of the Palestinians (BBC News 2007). The Palestinians' first Olympic appearance is at the 1996 Atlanta Games.

The Olympic Games are a competition between individual athletes, but for an individual athlete to be able to compete he must be a national of the NOC he is representing. This necessary citizenship of a political entity provokes controversies. 'Zola Budd, excluded from the Games as a South African, found a place – albeit with considerable controversy – as a British citizen. In contrast, Jonty Skinner, arguably the fastest swimmer of his time, could not participate in the Montreal Olympics because he would not renounce his South African citizenship' (Senn 1999:xv). The Dutch speed skater Bart Veldkamp does not agree with the Dutch system of qualifying. He is granted the Belgium nationality and competes for Belgium at the Nagano winter Olympics in 1998, winning them a bronze medal at the 5000 meter race.<sup>10</sup>

The fact that the individual athletes do represent a nation at the Games makes way for political sentiments during and around the celebration of the Games. To not fuel these

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<sup>9</sup> Since 1957 the Olympic Committee of the People's Democratic Republic of China

<sup>10</sup> New rules minimize the misuse of nationality changing. An athlete who has changed his nationality may only compete at the Olympics provided that at least three years have passed since he last represented his former country (IOC 2007:82).

nationalistic emotions the IOC does not provide a ranking table per country, but of the athletes winning medals. There are however many other symbols and ceremonies featuring nations at the Olympic Games. Those symbols and ceremonies have been subject to political demonstrations and actions on several occasions, as will be shown in the paragraph on Olympic ceremonies and symbols.

### **ELECTION OF HOST CITY**

The hosting of the Olympic Games is seen as a prestigious honour. Hosting the Olympic Games means a large amount of visitors, among whom many high profiles like presidents and royals. It also gives a city/country the opportunity to show itself to the world since the Olympic Games are broadcasted throughout the world. Before and during the Games jobs are generated and the hosting city shares the advertising and sponsor revenues with the IOC. Before a city can bid for the hosting of the Games it must fulfil several criteria and provide the 'evaluation commission'<sup>11</sup> with information on these criteria. The city must have political and public support in their country. There must be a detailed plan of finances including a back-up for when there is no profit or even a loss. The venues, accommodations, and transport opportunities must be dealt with as well as security (Toohey&Veal 2007:66). So when a city applies as a candidate it already invested, among other things, quite some money and effort. It makes the choosing of the host city of the Games one of the main real powers that the IOC holds. Every two years the IOC Session chooses the hosting city of the summer or winter Olympics seven years in advance. When the host city is chosen a contract is made between the IOC and the hosting city. The Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG) will be established, in which members of the IOC, the president of the NOC and representatives of the host city will take place. 'Each OCOG exist for perhaps only eight years: six or seven years of preparation and a year or two after the Games to clean up the books and make its final reports to the IOC and other appropriate institutions' (Senn 1999:14).

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<sup>11</sup> The commission consists of IOC members, representatives of NOC's, IF's the Athletes Commission and of the International Paralympic Committee. The commission evaluates all bidding candidates and provides a shortlist for the IOC to choose from. The members of the Commission are the only ones who may visit bidding cities at the time of evaluating. Other members of the IOC are forbidden to visit cities, sites and representatives of bidding cities. This measure was taken after the bribe-scandal of Salt Lake City in 1998/1999. It became clear that IOC members visited several bidding cities who tried to secure votes by lavishing IOC-members during those visits and/or sending them money and gifts. When the IOC-members can visit the cities of the shortlist those visits are bound to clear rules about the duration and number. (Hill 1996:72).

## CEREMONIES AND SYMBOLS

### The Olympic Flame

The Olympic Flame is first lit at the 1928 Olympics in Amsterdam. Since the Berlin Games in 1936, the Olympic Flame is lit at Olympia and by torch carried in a relay procession to the host city. During the opening ceremony the flame is brought into the stadium, where the Olympic Flame is lit. The Olympic Flame burns during the entire celebration and is distinguished during the closing ceremony. In 1948 the torch relay from Greece to London highlights border crossings where festivities are organised celebrating the new found peace in Europe. In 1988 the torch relay to Seoul zig zags from west to east to symbolize harmony between opposite poles (Olympic Museum 2007:7). Recent history shows torch relays which evoke not only positive reactions. In 1996 the torch relay to Atlanta changes its route after protest is announced if the torch would go through territories ruled by Native American tribes or territories that had adopted legislation discriminating against gays (Senn 1999:xi). In 2008 the torch relay to Beijing is subject of protests against China. The main topics are the lack of respect of human rights by the Chinese government and the situation in Tibet. In several places the relay has to be stopped by local police authorities, in Paris leading to the extinguishing of the flame. The IOC even discusses a prematurely ending of the torch relay (Timesonline 2008:a). In March 2009 the Executive Board of the IOC changed the rules for the torch relay, from the Olympics of 2016 onwards the torch relay will be held within the borders of the organising state (The Boston Globe 2009).<sup>12</sup>

It is not uncommon that the organising committee chooses a person with symbolic political value to light the flame during the opening ceremony. In the 1964 Tokyo Olympic the flame is lit by Yoshinori Sakai who was born on the day of the Hiroshima bombing. At the 2000 Olympics in Sydney the flame is lit by Cathy Freeman an athlete of Aboriginal descent (Schaller & Hennaux eds. 2004:161, 285). Alike is the use of a torn 'star spangled banner' by the Americans at the opening ceremony of the Salt Lake City winter Olympics in 2002. The flag is removed from the ruins of ground-zero after the 9-11 attacks. The flag is presented not by athletes alone, but by New York fire- and policemen as well (CNN 2002).

### The Olympic Oath and Creed

The Olympic oath for athletes is introduced at the 1920 Antwerp Olympics. The oath is recited at the opening ceremony, by one athlete representing all athletes. It states: 'In the name of all

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<sup>12</sup> Until 2016 the contracts are already made up but there are no plans for extensive international torch relays like the one in 2008.

competitors I promise that we shall take part in the Olympic Games, respecting and abiding by the rules which govern them, in the true spirit of sportsmanship, for the glory of sport and the honour of our teams' (Toohey&Veal 2007:64) There is a similar oath for the officials, like referees, participating in the Olympics. The Olympic creed is attributed to Pierre de Coubertin and states:

‘The most important thing in the Olympics is not to win but to take part, just as the most important thing in life is not the triumph but the struggle. The essential thing is not to have conquered but to have fought well’ (idem).

At the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics, two steeple chasers take this creed to heart. In the final, a substitute official miscounts the laps for the 3000-meter steeplechase and makes everyone run an additional lap. At the actual 3000 meter mark American Joe Mc Cluskey is second, but he is passed in the additional lap by England’s Tom Evenson. Evenson offers to trade the medals with Mc Cluskey but the latter says he is happy to have the bronze one (Ecker 1996:53).

### **Ceremonies and venues**

‘The Olympic Games shall be proclaimed open by the Head of State of the host country’ (IOC 2007:103) with a standard declamation. Only the IOC president and the President of the OCOG are allowed to deliver short speeches during the opening and closing ceremony. Besides those no speeches of any kind may be held by any representative of any government or other public authority, nor by any other politician, in any venue during the entire period of the Olympic Games, including all ceremonies (idem). In 1928 the Amsterdam Olympics are not declared open by Queen Wilhelmina but by her husband Prince Hendrik. The Queen is upset when the date of opening the Games is decided without her. At that date she is on holiday and she ‘is not to be ordered, not even by respectable, elderly lordships and earls’ (Nationaalarchief 2004, my translation from Dutch KEO). In 1932 the Olympics are held in Atlanta. Spending money at a sport event at the time of the Great Depression leads to protests. President of the USA Hoover refuses to open the Olympic Games, stating ‘It is a crazy thing, and it takes some gall to expect me to be a part of it’ (Time 1996).

During the Games ‘no kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas’ (IOC 2007:98). Also forbidden is any ‘publicity or propaganda, commercial or otherwise, to appear on persons, on sportswear, accessories or, more generally, on any article of clothing or equipment whatsoever worn or used

by the athletes or other participants in the Olympic Games (*idem*). In 1968 at the Mexico City Olympic Tommie Smith and John Carlos, the gold and bronze medal winners at the 200 meter run, use the medal ceremony to make a political statement about the treatment of black citizens in the USA. They come on stage wearing black socks and a black hand glove. They have a badge with the text 'project for human rights' on their shirt. When the anthem is played and the American flag was raised, they look down, instead of to the flag, and deliver the 'black power' salute. The two athletes are suspended and sent home by the IOC as well as the American NOC (Bass 2002).

The Olympic Games and ceremonies are, despite IOC rules forbidding it, subject to less of more subtle outings of nationalism. 'Many commentators point to the waving of national flags at the Games as an example of undesirable national passions' (Senn 1999:xiv). The Olympics in 1908 are the first with an opening ceremony of athletes entering the stadium as a nation group with the national flag. All the national flags are supposed to be flying at the stadium. The American and Swedish flag however are accidentally missing. The Swedish withdraw from the Games and go home, the Americans refuse to dip their flag to King George VI in the opening ceremony (Miller 2004:53). At the 1936 Olympics the Americans again do not dip their flag for Adolf Hitler. Since then the not dipping of the flag has become an American tradition, performed at all Olympics (US History 2008). In 1968 American hammer thrower Connoly is selected to carry the flag at the opening ceremony. When he announces that he will dip the flag he is replaced by fencer Janice Romary. He is not supposed to break the 60-year tradition and is told that if he did, he would break federal law<sup>13</sup> (Ecker 1996:102). At the 1912 Olympics in Stockholm Finland is part of the Russian Tsarist Empire and therefore the Finns compete under the Russian flag. At the opening ceremony the Finnish athletes short step when entering the stadium so there is a pronounced gap between the Russians and them. (Miller 2004:53). When British athletes enter the stadium at the Moscow 1980 opening ceremony, they walk under the Olympic flag, 'some westerners called this progress, but the Soviet hosts [...] called it a violation of sacred Olympic tradition' (Senn 1999:xiv).

The Olympic Games offer a stage for (political) opportunities as well, which people would not have without the Olympics. Until 1986 only amateur athletes can compete at the Olympics. This means the possibility to compete on an international stage for Afro-Americans before World War II. Black athletes are not allowed to sport professionally in the USA until 1946<sup>14</sup> and therefore were (forced) amateurs. 'For 45 years, sport was to offer Soviet citizens one of the few

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<sup>13</sup> 22 December 1042 a Federal Act was signed under the heading 'Respect for the Flag' which states 'the flag should not be dipped to any person or thing' (Ecker 1996:102).

<sup>14</sup> In 1946 Jackie Robinson was the first black athlete who was professionally contracted by baseball's Brooklyn Dodgers with whom he debuted in the major league in 1947 (Time 1999)

opportunities for foreign travel and the broadening of human experience' (Miller 2004:127) and this goes for many athletes coming from 'closed' countries.

### **The non-existing tradition of the first visitor**

In 1968 the Chechoslovak Ingenieur Mr. Martinka Miroslav writes to the Mexican OCOG. He is curious whether he can claim the position of 'the first visitor'. In his letter he states that 'there is a very long Olympic tradition according to which the first one applying as a visitor becomes an extraordinary guest at the Olympic Games and the OCOG will make all provisions to ensure his participation. This tradition has been strictly observed at all preceding Olympic Games organized in the history of world sports'. Since Mr. Miroslav send a telegram immediately after the ballot of the IOC Session in Baden-Baden in 1963, at which Mexico City was chosen the host for 1968, he assumes he was indeed the first to apply for visiting the Olympics, and now wants to know if he can count on the accompanying privileges. Miroslav will, after visiting the Mexico Olympics 'do his best to popularize Mexico in Chechoslovakia and Europe [...] which might appear to be very useful because people in Chechoslovakia do not know much of Mexico'. The OCOG contact the IOC after they found no information about the tradition of the first visitor in their protocols. The Secretary General of the IOC answers the OCOG and writes 'We have no information in this office whatsoever concerning the matter, we have asked the President of the IOC for his instructions. Today mr Brundage replied with: 'there is no tradition or precedent I know to cover the claim of Mr. Miroslav. If the Organising Committe wishes to be generous, thats its business' (IOC Archives:a). Whether the Mexican OCOG was generous is not known.

### **The Olympic Truce**

'During the Ancient Olympic Games a truce of up to three months was declared in regard to any hostilities taking place among the Greek states, to enable athletes to pass safely to and from Olympica' (Swaddling quoted in Toohey&Veal 2007:65). The two World Wars provide for a shift around. Instead of the Olympics stopping wars, the wars are stopping the Olympics. The Olympic Games of 1916, 1940 and 1944 are cancelled.

In 1992 the UN Security Council includes, for the first time, sport as a recognised element within the sanction policy in Resolution 757 of 1992 stating that all states must 'take the necessary steps to prevent the participation in sporting event on their territory of persons or groups representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)' (Security Council

1992:15)<sup>15</sup>. In 1992 the IOC negotiates with the UN to ensure that the athletes of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia can compete in the 1992 Barcelona Olympics as individual Olympic athletes. The next year 'a resolution<sup>16</sup> on the observance of the Olympic Truce during the Olympic Games is adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly' (Kidané 1998:5). Since then the UN General Assembly draws a resolution on the Olympic Truce one year prior to the celebration of the Olympics. Since 1995 it is custom that the hosting state of the Olympics introduces the draft resolution to the General Assembly. The Olympic Truce is a symbol in favour of peace but it is not a binding or enforceable resolution. However, despite being symbolic, in 2001 the Truce Resolution does not come about easily. The Americans are supposed to draft the Resolution for the winter Olympics to be held in Salt Lake City in 2002. 'The US Defence Department is opposed to using the word 'truce' [...] to ensure that the text of the resolution will not create an obstacle to military operations' after 9-11 (ibid:6). It takes three months of negotiating on the wording of the text before the USA presents the draft resolution. The Secretary of State, the National Security Adviser and the Defence Secretary have to approve the text (idem). It has the word 'truce' in it but the 'truce' is defined narrower in this resolution than in others. A usual phrase in previous Olympic Resolutions is that the UN 'urges Member States to observe, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, the Olympic Truce, individually and collectively during the Games [...]' (UN 2007). In the 2002 version the UN 'requests member states to observe, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, the Olympic Truce [...] by ensuring the safe passage and participation of athletes at the Games' (UN 2002).

### **POLITICS AT THE OLYMPICS**

The most brutal invasion of politics at the Olympic Games is without a doubt the terrorist attack by Palestinians at the 1972 Olympics in Munich. During the celebration of the Games they enter the Olympic village and take the Israeli wrestling team hostage. The Games are halted. The terrorists demand access to world press, transportation out of Germany and the release of Palestine prisoners in Israel. After a day, at the airport where transportation would take place, in a shoot out all the Israeli hostages are killed along with five of the terrorists (there are eleven Israeli deaths in total) (Senn 1999:151,152). After debate the IOC decides that the Games will continue after a day

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<sup>15</sup> Sport was also included in resolutions on South Africa in the ninety-sixties. Those resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly and not the Security Council and therefore not binding but recommended.

<sup>16</sup> The resolution is entitled 'Building a peaceful and better world through sport and the Olympic Ideal'.

of mourning and a memorial service. IOC president Brundage speaks the now famous words 'the Games must go on'. Individual athletes are free to withdraw if they wish to. The Israeli team goes home, and so does the Egyptian, Algerian and the team of the Philippines. Individual athletes of the Netherlands and Norway leave the Games (Toohey&Veal 2007:107).

Politics are part of and present at the Olympic Games, wanted or unwanted. The celebration of the Summer Olympics is 'the world's biggest peace-time event' (ibid:1). That fact alone is reason enough for the Olympic Games to serve as a political stage as well as a sportive one. 'Independently of the elaborate Olympic ritual, merely the visibility of the Games makes them an attractive target for political and social causes' (Senn 1999:xi). The importance of nation states in the Olympic Movement makes the Movement and the Olympic Games liable for political influences. The IOC can sanction not only athletes or IOC members who breach the Olympic Charter, but can also sanction NOC's, IF's, host cities, OCOG's or candidate cities. A NOC can be suspended and its recognition can be withdrawn. The IOC can withdraw the right of a host city or an OCOG, to organise the Olympic Games. (IOC 2007:51). The IOC did sanction both the South African National Olympic Committee (SANOC) and the NOC of Rhodesia. They are both suspended for administrating the apartheid regimes of their countries in the Olympic teams as well. Racism is a clear violation of the Olympic Charter and was in these cases clearly present at the compilation of the Olympic teams, an activity over which the IOC has authority. Considering the high stakes and interest for NOC's and the countries they are representing, the sanctions that the IOC can apply offer quite some power to them. Except for the South African and Rhodesian case however, the IOC threatened to use sanctions against host cities, candidate cities or (boycotting) NOC's a few times, but seldom imposed them. For Wallace this is proof that the IOC needs governments more than governments need the IOC and the Olympics (Wallace 1988:26).

The Olympic Games are used as a political podium on several occasions, and the boycotts and threats of boycotts that took place in Olympic history prove that. The multi-state boycotts, and the cases in which a boycott was threatened but did not materialize are described in chapter 6 and 7. First chapter 4 provides the theoretical framework for the conditions of appropriateness to which the boycott cases will be measured.

## 4- SANCTIONS

### INTRODUCTION

The Olympic Games are a sportive competition between individuals who enter this competition through the NOC of the state of which they have citizenship. According to the Olympic Charter, the applicable law to Olympics and the Olympic Movement, the NOC must be autonomous and resist all political pressure. So for the IOC, which strives to oppose all political abuse of sport and athletes (IOC 2007:15), it is very straightforward: an Olympic boycott is against the Charter, it is illegitimate and can therefore never be appropriate. Most of the multiparty Olympic boycotts have been initiated by governments, leading to NOC's boycotting. In 1980 president Carter starts the boycott campaign, not the American athletes and alike, the 1984 boycott is not initiated by Soviet athletes but by the Kremlin. A government is not a member of the Olympic Movement and therefore not bound by the Olympic Charter. International law does not demand of states that their national athletes compete at the Olympics or any international sport event. So a government itself does not violate any laws by initiating and enforcing an Olympic boycott, although it forces their NOC to violate the Olympic Charter. I want to find out whether the choice of an Olympic boycott does however meet the standards for other sanctions, like economic sanctions, that are bound by international law. Do governments follow the requirements of international law when they, so to speak, sanction the Olympic Movement, as they would when they sanction another state? If so, that might mean that from the perspective of a sovereign government, an Olympic boycott could be an appropriate political tool, despite all its adversaries. Another requirement for that appropriateness is whether the sanction has any chance of being effective. If an Olympic boycott is only costly for the Olympic movement, the organising city and the athletes, without having the intended effect or at least a good change at that, how can that measure be appropriate? In this chapter I will show the development of sanctions as a political mean and explore which laws and norms are applicable to those sanctions. Furthermore, I will summarize the extensive study on the effectiveness of economic sanctions of Hufbauer e.a. (2007). From this theoretical frame I will draw the requirements for appropriateness of an Olympic boycott. In Chapter 6 the Olympic boycotts will be measured by these requirements.

## DEFINITIONS

An international sanction is 'a penalty threatened or imposed as a declared consequence of the target's failure to observe international standards or international obligations' (Doxey 1996:9). The International Law Commission of the UN (ILC) includes international law in its definition and describes international sanctions as 'consequences of an (internationally) wrongful act, unfavourable to the offender, provided for or admitted under international law' (Picchio quoted by ILC 1991:9). Sanctions or countermeasures are the umbrella term for a variety of measures that states may take.<sup>17</sup> The main condition for legality of any of those measures is the target's wrongful act or failure to observe international standards and obligations. Non-violent sanctions can range from retortion to comprehensive economic sanctions. Retortions are unpleasant measures that are not unlawful by itself and therefore always permitted. Retortion measures can be cancelling official visits, breaking off diplomatic ties or the ending of aid. Retaliation or reprisal measures are measures that in itself are unlawful because they break international law or breach treaties between the states. These measures become lawful by the unlawful behaviour of the target state, which indicates that their lawfulness ends as soon as the target state fulfils its obligations. Economic sanctions are seen as the most severe non-violent actions (Doxey 1996:14,15). Hufbauer e.a. (2007) define economic sanctions as 'the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary<sup>18</sup> trade or financial relations, by which the sender state explicitly or implicitly seeks to change the target state's political behaviour' (2007:3). The three basic means to do so are limiting exports to the target state, restricting imports from the target states and impeding the flow of finance, including freezing or seizing target-country assets within the sender's control (ibid:44,45). The cessation of import or export is called an embargo. A boycott occurs when both import and export are interrupted. I will use the term sanction for the umbrella definition and specify when needed in 'economic sanction', 'diplomatic sanction' or 'smart sanction' for example. When quoting I will, obviously, use the term of the writer. When necessary I will specify to which term out of this section that refers. While the logic of both import and export interruption is not applicable to Olympic boycotts, I will use this term, since non-participation at Olympic Games is commonly referred to by the term boycott.

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<sup>17</sup> The terms sanctions and countermeasures are used to describe the overall term of different measures. The UN distinguishes sanctions as a measure taken by an international body and countermeasures as measures taken by one state to another.

<sup>18</sup> "Customary" does not mean 'contractual'; it simply means levels of trade and financial activity that would probably have occurred in the absence of sanctions' (Hufbauer e.a. 2007:3)

## DEVELOPMENT OF SANCTIONS: PRACTICE AND LAW

Like the origins of modern Olympic Games, the origins of economic sanctions can be found in Ancient Greece. In 432 BC the *Megarian Decree*, proposed by Pericles, is adopted by the Athens Assembly. The degree bans all trade between the Megarians and the Athens. There is general agreement that the decree played a major role in the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Chan & Cooper Drury 2000:1). Since then, economic sanctions have regularly been imposed by states, unilaterally and multilaterally. Most research, like the 2007 study of Hufbauer, Schott, Elliot and Oegg handles sanctions from the beginning of the 20th century and onward.

### Interbellum

After World War I, the debate about the use of economic sanctions is intensified within the League of Nations. Until then most sanctions 'foreshadowed or accompanied warfare' (Hufbauer e.a. 2007:10). American president Woodrow Wilson is convinced that economic sanctions can be an alternative for war.

'A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted but it brings a pressure upon the nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist',

he states in 1919 (Wilson quoted in Padover 1942:108). The League of Nations, established that same year, aims to avoid war and constrain conduct that might develop in war. Member states are called to solve their disputes in any other way than using armed force and this is enshrined in the covenant. Several multilateral treaties are signed, among which the Locarno Treaties in 1925 and the Kellogg Briand Pact in 1928. These treaties also oblige signed parties to settle their eventual dispute peaceful but none of them addresses specifics about sanctions or reprisals (Yousif Elagab 1988:26,27). However, already in 1934, the Institute of International Law, a private organisation of lawyers who promotes international law as a mean to obtain international peace, draws up a resolution in which they recommend to set conditions for reprisals. These conditions are, among others, that only the aggrieved state has the right to reprisal. The reprisal itself has to be proportionate to the injury suffered, the effects must be limited to the target state and everything possible must be done to respect the rights of individuals of the state. The reprisals should not go against humanitarian law and should be stopped immediately when satisfactory result is reached

(Yousif Elagab 1988:31,32, my translation from French KEO). Economic sanctions are seen as a political tool of influence, useful when doing nothing is unwanted, only applying diplomatic pressure is too little and military intervention is too blunt. Economic sanctions are thus used as a substitute for military invention. However 'the objectives sought with the use of sanctions retained a distinctly martial flavour' (Hufbauer e.a. 2007:10).

By 1939 four of the six permanent members of the League of Nations Council are engaged in acts of aggression and subsequently excluded from the League of Nations and its council.<sup>19</sup> Sanctions issued against them do not have influential power that was expected of them and by the time World War II breaks out, the League of Nations seems a powerless institution.

After World War II, sanctions are more and more used to obtain other foreign policy goals such as the improvement of human rights in the target state or the settlements of expropriate claims. But still, sanctions are also used for military objectives, like the withdrawal of troops or the discourage of military adventures of the target state.

## Cold War

After World War II, the United Nations are established, replacing the League of Nations. The UN Charter, adopted in 1947 takes a stronger stand on aggression. When the covenant of 1919 states that aggression was the last resort, the UN Charter states aggression is prohibited, unless under very specific circumstances. Article 2.4 of the Charter states

'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations' (UN 1945).

With the drafting of the Charter, there is debate whether 'force' is meant to embrace economic coercion or not. Brazil suggests that the text of article 2.4 is more explicitly defined, namely 'all members should refrain [...] from the threat or use of force or use of *economic measures* in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organisation' (Yousif Elagab 1988:198). The text of the Charter is not restricted and therefore does not automatically impose any constraints on economic coercion (idem:201). Countermeasures are permitted against states that threaten international peace and security. It is not allowed to coerce a state to 'subordinate the normal

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<sup>19</sup> The permanent member of the Council were: France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan and the USSR. Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, Italy invaded Abbesynia in 1933, Germany withdrew itself in 1936 prior to their occupation of the Ruhr and the USSR invaded Finland in 1939.

exercise of a state's sovereign rights.' Any state is free to choose its own political, economic, social and cultural system (UN 1965). Whether a State is guilty of threatening the international peace and security is decided by the Security Council. Under Article 41 of the Charter, 'the Security Council may call upon Member States to apply measures, not involving the use of armed force, in order to maintain or restore international peace and security'. Such measures are commonly referred to as sanctions.

'This legal basis is recalled in order to underline that the purpose of sanctions is to modify the behaviour of a party that is threatening international peace and security, and not to punish or otherwise exact retribution' (UN 1995:par. 66).

Mandatory sanctions<sup>20</sup> are issued only twice by the Security Council until 1990. The veto-right of the permanent members of the Security Council prevents the USA, the Soviet Union and its allies to become the subject of sanctions.

Despite this low number on sanctions on the account of the UN, Hufbauer e.a. (2007) count 111 sanctions issued between World War II and the end of the Cold War. Most of these sanctions, 72, are issued by the USA against seven initiated by the Soviet Union. It is no coincidence that the USA, by far, leads the sanctioners list during the period that they were the hegemonic power. The goal of economic sanctions is not solely the influencing of the target state's (political) behaviour. Economic sanctions are also imposed to demonstrate resolve. 'This is particularly true for the United States, which frequently has deployed sanctions to assert its leadership in world affairs. US presidents seemingly feel compelled to dramatize their opposition to foreign misdeeds, even when the likelihood of changing the target country's behaviour is remote' (Hufbauer e.a. 2007:5). This also serves a domestic goal. Beside showing the target state, you also show your own citizens (and voters!) that you are not only willing but also able to act, without asking them to sign up for the army. Already in 1935, when the League of Nations issues sanctions against Italy, this point is raised by David Lloyd George, then a leader of the British political opposition. He remarks about the sanctions that 'they came too late to save Abyssinia from subjugation by Italy, but they are just in the nick of time to save the British Government' (Rowland quoted in Hufbauer e.a. 2007:6).

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<sup>20</sup> A Resolution of the Security Council is binding for all member states of the UN. If there is no Resolution adopted the Security Council can 'only' recommend to member states that they sanction the target state, since the Security Council might agree on the breach of international peace of security, but might not agree on the sanctions. Like in 1979 when the hostage crises in Tehran was declared to be a breach of the international peace by the Security Council, but the USSR vetoed any mandatory sanctions (Doxey 1996:1)

### The 1990's

After the ending of the Cold War, there is a huge increase in multilateral sanctions in which the United Nations play a more active role. This is mostly due to the more compliant policies of the Soviet Union, under the reign of Michael Gorbachev. Soon after the end of the Cold War this leads to the first major comprehensive sanction under UN authority, namely the sanctions against Iraq. This particular sanction however becomes heavily debated for its unwanted side-effects and consequences. The premise of President Wilson, that a boycotted state would not be able to resist the pressure of an economic sanction proves to be nothing like a general law. Sanctions often do not bring about the intended change in the target state's behaviour. Target states prove to be able to produce formerly imported products themselves or they can rely on powerful allies. This means that the pressure that is applied with the sanction can (easily) be diminished by the target (Hufbauer e.a. 2007:8). Furthermore it appears that targeted regimes can use sanctions to enhance their position. Instead of increasing public discontent against the ruling elite, the sanctions produce a 'rally around the flag' and can enhance resolve to resist against foreign coercion (Chan & Cooper Drury 2000:7). The foreign interferal can provide the perfect scapegoat for the targeted regime. Moreover, the premise of President Wilson that economic sanctions are a 'deadly remedy' does prove to be true. A consequence of comprehensive economic sanctions is the suffering of the civilian population of the target state. The rational argument behind sanctions is the so called 'pain-gain-formula', assuming that pain is avoided and gain is aspired. But gains and pains or costs and benefits are weighed and measured differently. It appears that, targeted (authoritarian) regimes do not all accord the same value to the sanctity and quality of human life as the sanctioning states (Tostensen&Bull 2002:375-376). Comprehensive economic sanctions are aimed to target the government of a state, but in practice they often target the wrong parties like the children, the poor and the elderly (Weiss eds. 1997:5). It is clearly inconsistent if, by sanctioning a state that breaches human rights of its population, the sanctioner also breaches the rights of that population. The concern about this is growing, particularly on the sanctions that have these unwanted side-effects but show no results on the intended effect of the sanction.

'When political gain is evident, civilian pain seems tolerable and justifiable [...] when political gain is less apparent, [...] civilian pain is less tolerable and justifiable (ibid:233).

Despite its disadvantages sanctions are still seen as a useful mean in multilateral action against states or political authorities that violate basic norms of international relations, including

#### *4-SANCTIONS*

humanitarian emergencies in civil wars (Weiss eds. 1997:3). The UN, partly due to influence by INGO's like the International Committee of the Red Cross, results from research and recommendations from round-table-conferences like the Interlaken Process, starts to change their sanction regime. The charter gives the Security Council all freedom to decide not only when sanctions should be deployed, but also to the design of the sanctions. It appears that the design could be a lot smarter. The International Law Commission (ILC) of the UN makes up requirements for sanctions in 2001 (which include all the recommendations already made in 1934 (!) by the Institute of International Law). Among them are the following:

- ❖ Sanctions are only prohibited against a state which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act.
  - ❖ Sanctions shall be terminated as soon as the target state fulfils its obligations.
  - ❖ Sanctions are bound by humanitarian law.
  - ❖ A target state is warned by the state imposing the sanction; the target state gets the opportunity to fulfil its obligations.
  - ❖ Before sanctions are taken negotiation is offered.
  - ❖ Sanctions are prohibited if the dispute is pending before a court or tribunal which has the authority to make binding decisions on the matter.
  - ❖ Any state other than an injured state is entitled to take sanctions if it is included in a group of states which obligations are breached by the target state or if the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole.
- (International Law Commission 2001: 126-135).

The Security Council draws up requirements for sanctions in 2006.

Their requirements involve the design, the implementation, the evaluation and follow-up of sanctions. Recommendations for sanctions are (among others):

- ❖ Thoroughly pre-asses sanctions: be clear what behaviour the sanctions seek to change, define the responsible actors, asses the possible humanitarian, political and economical impacts of the sanction.
- ❖ Clearly define the scope of the sanctions, as well as the conditions and criteria for their easing or lifting (Security Council 2006: 4-15).

### SMART SANCTIONS

A smart sanction is a targeted sanction. 'Targeting is intended to focus coercive pressure on those responsible for wrongdoing, while minimizing unintended negative impacts. Targeting means applying pressure on decision making elites and the companies or entities they control. Targeting can also mean selectively sanctioning specific products or activities that are vital to the conduct of an objectionable policy and that have value to responsible decision makers' (Cortright and Lopez 2000:2).

The three mainstream smart sanctions, designed to target the elites in power, are arms embargoes, travel sanctions and financial sanctions. The first two being more selective, an arms embargo is defined to military equipment in itself and travel sanctions can be imposed on certain individuals. Financial sanctions, like suspension of loans and aid and/or denying access to international capital markets, are meant to influence the regime in power, but those measures will have an effect on the general economic situation in the target state, and thus on its civilians. Smart sanctions do not prevent that civilians get hurt. 'Even when sanctions are carefully targeted against decision-making elites, ordinary people may still feel the pinch. Political leaders often redirect the pain of sanctions onto the most vulnerable, or against political opponents' (ibid:4). Therefore the sanctioner seeks to find trade restrictions on commodities from which the revenues are disproportionately beneficial to the regime, like for instance oil and diamonds. In that case the humanitarian impact of the sanction can only appear after the sanction is imposed on the government and that will make it more difficult for that government to blame these consequences on the sender target (Lektzian 2003:15).

In 1995 the UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali offered recommendations on sanctions in his 'Supplement of the Agenda for Peace'. Among the recommendations were:

- ❖ When sanctions are imposed, delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups is ensured.
- ❖ The costs of the sanction should be borne equitably by all member states and not exclusively by the few who have the misfortune to be neighbours or major economic partners of the target country. The Security Council will assist states that suffer collateral damage, unless they support the target state.

(UN 1995:par. 72-75).

Smart sanctions are clearly an improvement of the blunt comprehensive economic sanctions. But UN Secretary General Kofi Anan still warns in 1998 that 'the international community should be under no illusion [...] humanitarian and human rights policy goals cannot easily be reconciled with those of a sanctions regime' (UN 1998: par.64).

#### **OLYMPIC BOYCOTTS: SMART OR ECONOMIC SANCTION?**

Doxey (1997), Mack & Kahn (2000) and Cortright & Lopez (2002) place sport boycotts in the category of smart sanctions, like diplomatic and cultural sanctions. The ILC considers sports boycotts as retaliation measures, unpleasant but lawful measures. Like an economic boycott is not about economics so a sports boycott is not about sport. The goal of a sanction, including Olympic boycotts is the change of political behaviour. A smart sanction however aims at the government or elite in power to apply the wanted change. Several Olympic boycotts were not aimed at the hosting state, but at other competing states. Those boycotts placed the burden at another, namely the organising state. Also when Olympic boycotts are aimed at the organising state, the regime of that state is not the only one that faces the consequences. Consequences of the boycott are felt by athletes, sponsors, suppliers of housing and materials, TV-stations covering the Olympics and so on. An Olympic boycott therefore does not fit the standard of a targeted thus smart sanction.

An Olympic boycott will have economic effects, especially for the organizing city/state. Less competing athletes and fewer visitors will lead to less spending on tickets and souvenirs as well as less spending on hotels, restaurants and other tourist attraction in the host city/state. Less states competing will lead to less TV-coverage and therefore to less advertisement revenues. These consequences are not on the scale of import and/or export embargoes but do represent considerable financial/economical consequences, regarding the 16 million dollars profit of the Beijing Olympics for example. The organizing of the Olympics takes several years. There has never been an Olympic boycott which was announced at or soon after the election of a hosting state. So the latter announcement of a boycott can be seen as a breach of the 'customary expected participation' like the customary trade in Hufbauer e.a.'s definition of economic sanctions (see definitions page 35). This thus leads to considerable financial consequences for the organising city/state since the planning and the budget is based on the probable participation that would have occurred in absence of an Olympic boycott.

For these reasons, I argue that an Olympic boycott is not a smart sanction but is not a hardcore economic sanction either. It is somewhere in the middle of the two. As stated in the

previous paragraph there is not much research available on the effectiveness of smart sanctions. I will therefore apply the conditions of economic sanctions but also include available theoretical implications of smart sanctions theory on the Olympic boycotts.

From the requirements of international laws and norms on sanctions, as discussed above, I will apply the following two on the Olympic boycotts:

- ❖ The boycott is announced to the target state with a clear statement on its obligations and in time for the target state to fulfil these obligations.
- ❖ The boycott is not about a dispute pending at an international court or tribunal.

### EFFECTIVENES OF SANCTIONS

'Economic Sanctions Reconsidered', the 2007 study of Hufbauer e.a examines 174 economic sanctions between the years 1915 and 2000. They do not ask whether but when sanctions are effective. They examine the record of economic sanctions in achieving their foreign policy goals. They search for factors, political and economic, that improve the chances of a positive contribution to the desired policy outcome. By doing so they have identified circumstances in which economic sanctions are most likely to contribute to attaining foreign policy goals (Hufbauer e.a. 2007:2)<sup>21</sup>. They find the following conditions for such effective sanctions<sup>22</sup>:

- ❖ The foreign policy goal is relatively modest.
- ❖ The target state and the sender states are otherwise friendly related and are trading partners.
- ❖ The target state is not an autocratic state (preferably a democratic state).
- ❖ If the sender wants to avoid military escalation, it is best to employ the sanction with maximum impact rather than gradually building up the pressure.
- ❖ Carefully match your own domestic costs as a sender: too much will lessen public support, too little will lessen the impact of the sanctions signal to the target.

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<sup>21</sup> Hufbauer e.a. (2007) score the effect of sanctions on a scale of 1-16 points. A score that equals or exceed 9 points is characterized as effective. The points are scored on two variables: 1-'the foreign policy succes' divided in 'failed outcome', 'unclear but possibly positive outcome', 'positive outcome, meaning the sender's goals were partly realized' and 'succesfull outcome, in the sense that the sender's goals were largely or entirely realized'. 2- 'Sanctions contribution' divided in 'negative contribution', 'little or no contribution', 'substantial contribution' and 'decisive contribution'. Both variabels score from 1-4 points and are multiplied for the total score.

'A score of 9 means that sanctions made a substantial contribution to the sender's goals and that the goals were in part realized; a score of 16 means that sanctions made a decisive contribution to a succesfull outcome.' (Hufbauer e.a. 2007: 49-50).

<sup>22</sup> Effectiveness is scored when the sanction played a significant role on the foreign policy goal. A sanction with a score below 9 can be very succesfull on showing resolve at home. Also a score of 8 can mean that a sanction was a succesfull component of a broader approach to obtain the foreign policy role.

- ❖ If a modest goal is wanted a sanction as a single weapon is more effective. When a high policy goal, like regime change is wanted, a combination of measure is more effective.
- ❖ The target state is significantly smaller than the sender state.  
(Hufbauer e.a. 2007:160-178).

As stated above an Olympic boycott does not have all the features of an economic sanction. I can use most findings for application on Olympic boycotts to see if they match the requirements for effectiveness, although some of them need to be specified to the Olympic boycotts. The findings are worked out in the following section which leads to the conditions for effectiveness. There is one finding I cannot use for the Olympic boycotts. The inapplicable condition is 'if the sender wants to avoid military escalation the sanction should be applied with maximum force rather than with gradually building pressure. In Hufbauer e.a. (2007) words it then is more effective 'to slam the hammer than to turn the screw' (ibid:168). The ultimate threat of an Olympic boycott is the boycott itself. The not competing of the sender state (and its allies) is the price to be paid when the target state does not change its behaviour. So in an Olympic boycott the avoiding of military escalation is not relevant.

### **Modesty of the goal**

A modest goal is one that does not threaten the government in power in the target state or its military capabilities. Among modest policy goals are expropriation disputes or releasing (few) political prisoners. A modest goal can be reached with an economic sanction as a stand alone mean, contrary to more demanding goals, like regime change, impairing military potential or disrupting military adventures, where sanctions usually are part of a broader approach. When the goal is modest, which does not mean that it is trivial, there will be less incentive for allies of the target to step in (ibid:66). With a modest goal the success rate of sanctions is 51%, for regime change and democratization it is 31% and for disruption of military impairment it is 21% (ibid:159). I focus on the foreign policy goals that a government states towards another state when they threaten with or impose an Olympic boycott. This is not always very clear, since technically the Olympic Movement or the IOC is boycotted. My research is about the appropriateness of the Olympic boycott as a political tool, so I will distil the foreign policy goal and use that in the analysis. For example, when a collective of African states threatened to boycott the 1968 Mexico City Olympics, their actual demand was towards the IOC. They wanted South-Africa to be

removed as participant of the Olympic Games. The foreign policy goal in this case is however that they want a regime change in South Africa, namely the ending of the Apartheid Regime. For this condition, I can therefore use the same scale as Hufbauer e.a. (2007) for the policy goal ranging from: modest policy changes (like freeing of prisoners/hostages, human rights cases and religious persecution cases), to regime change and democratization, disruption of military adventures, military impairment (like preventing the target state to obtain or produce weapons of mass destruction or nuclear weapons) and other major policy changes (like the surrender of territory or other security related policies, such as harbouring terrorists<sup>23</sup>) (Hufbauer e.a. 2007:52-52).

*Condition for appropriateness Olympic boycott: the goal is modest.*

### **Prior relation of the sender and target**

When the target state and sender state are, prior to the sanction, positively related and they trade with each other the sanction is more likely to be effective. This condition has a clear economic logic and a non-economic logic. The economic logic is that prior trade between the states means that an economic sanction will produce substantial pressure. Furthermore it means that there are costs involved for the sender state as well. This seemingly contradicting interest strengthens the chance of effectiveness. The sanctioning state shows that it is serious about the goal of the sanction. This point is further worked out at the cost-matching condition (see page 46,47) The non economic point is that it is easier to influence friends than it is to influence enemies. Besides economic ties, there are diplomatic and cultural ties. Any sanction will put a strain on all those ties and therefore heighten the costs of non-compliance. It obviously also heightens the costs for the sender. A sanction towards a befriended state is likely to be successful when there is a very specific target by which the sender shows it is interested in changing that specific issue rather than the over all relationship between the states.

When the prior relation between the sender and target is antagonistic there is a success rate of 19% of sanctions, against 46% of success when prior relations are cordial. When the policy goal is modest there is a slightly higher percentage of success when the prior relation was neutral. The disruption of military adventures does not succeed in any case where prior relations were antagonistic (Hufbauer e.a.2007:164). When the sender state and the target state are otherwise

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<sup>23</sup> Prior to 9-11-2001 terrorist attack sanctions aiming to change the behaviour of states sponsoring terrorism was deemed to be a modest policy goal (Hufbauer e.a. 2007:52).

cordial related, there will be less chance of other allies stepping in to support the target state. Support of other states would decrease the chance of effectiveness of the sanction.

I will score this variable not only on prior political and trade relations but also on sports relation. Did the target and sender state have prior relations in sports exchanges?

*Condition for appropriateness Olympic boycott: The sender and target state had prior cordial relations (diplomatic, trading and sports).*

### **The target is not an autocratic state**

When scored on regime type of the target state, 46% of the successful sanctions are aimed at a democratic state. 34% of the successes are sanctions against anocratic states and with autocratic states the success rate drops to 28%. As Hufbauer e.a. (2007) state 'it is hard to bully a bully' (ibid:166). An authoritarian regime is less likely to be impressed by sanctions, and is more likely to arrange a 'rally around the flag' by which the regime increases their domestic support. They can blame the negative consequences of the sanction to the sender state and create more internal cohesion against the 'enemy'. This point is also raised by scholars of the Public Choice Theory and/or smart sanctions (Weiss eds. 1997, Chan & Cooper Drury 2000, Kaempfer & Lowenberg 2000). They state that in case of an authoritarian regime, a sanction can only be effective when the sanction enhances the domestic pressure of opposition within the target state. There has to be an organized opposition already existing however. In absence of such group a sanction can only strengthen the regime in power. (Kaempfer & Lowenberg 2000:182). Wallenstein calls this 'the double grip' of a sanction. Not only applying international but also domestic pressure is 'a condition that has improved the sanction's success rate in the past' (Wallenstein quoted in Chan & Cooper Drury 2000:14). The presence of (several) domestic interest groups is the reason that a democracy is more likely to react to sanctions. Domestic interest groups will influence the government; if not immediate they can do so at the next elections.

*Condition for appropriateness Olympic boycott: target state is a non-autocratic state.*

### **Domestic costs of the sender state**

The sender state needs to match the costs, imposed on her domestic constituencies (and of allies in case of a multilateral sanction), to the expected benefits. The benefits and costs are not only economic but also political. If the sender state bears no costs to the sanction, the sanction is unlikely to have much impact. The wanted foreign policy change must have value to both sides.

But if the domestic costs of the sender are too high, public support for the sanction policy will easily diminish. The results of the Hufbauer e.a. study show that when the sender aspires to impair the military abilities of the target, it must be willing to bear higher, that is significant costs (welfare loss to sender). For modest policy changes however the domestic public is willing to bear little cost but is not willing to suffer a loss. The domestic costs of a sanction should not be concentrated on a particular domestic group, since then the sanctions can have a retroactive negative effect on one group by hindering their current and future competition position. (Hufbauer e.a. 2007:177). The most obvious domestic interest group in case of an Olympic boycott are the athletes who would compete at the Olympics. There also will be costs for others, like suppliers of clothing or equipment for the athletes and sponsors of the athletes or of TV-coverage of the Olympics. Are the costs only concentrated on these domestic groups? Are the costs matched carefully, for example by compensating the costs of the affected group(s)? Besides the issue of effectiveness there is also a more moral side to this point. Buckley jr. (1980) argues about the Moscow boycott: 'If we feel free to ask the farmers to make contingent sacrifices, and also the manufacturers and technicians and workers who produce refined computers designed to go to Russia, then we can ask United States athletes to forgo the competition in Moscow' (Buckley jr 1980:245). Applied to the Olympic boycotts this would mean that when offers are asked from soldiers and businessmen, you can also ask them of athletes.

*Condition for appropriateness Olympic boycott: the domestic costs are not concentrated on one particular domestic group and are carefully matched. (Exception: when goal is military impairment: higher domestic is needed).*

### **Single weapon or comprehensive sanction**

Hufbauer e.a. (2007) concludes that when the aspired goal is modest a single weapon sanction is more effective. When a high policy goal, like regime change is wanted, a combination of measure is more effective. Hufbauer e.a. states that their conclusions on this variable are misleading, due to the methodology used. Successful sanctions are those where the economic sanction made a positive contribution to the policy outcome. But in cases where multiple sanctions are applied, those often include covert and/or military measures. Those measures, required for the higher policy goals, wipe out the contribution of the economic sanction to the policy goal. With the cases where the more demanding measures were applied, it are those measures that contributed to the wanted policy outcome. Those measures are always precluded by economic sanctions. That is

however not necessarily a tactical move based on predicted effectiveness. It is simply a requirement of international law. The findings show 'that companion measures are used most frequently in episodes involving regime change and high policy goals, but the effect on outcomes is marginal or negative, except in the case of military impairment, where most successful cases also involve military force or threats to use force' (Hufbauer e.a. 2007:176). As stated before, the threat with military force is not used with Olympic boycotts, and there is not much differentiation on the scores of the other goals. However the other way around the findings are applicable. Hufbauer e.a. (2007) find that when disruption of military adventures is the goal there is no case where a single sanction was effective and as stated there is a significant increase in success with a combination of sanctions when the goal is military impairment. That would mean that when an Olympic boycott is aimed to disrupt military adventures or military impairment and it is a stand alone sanction, there is not much chance that the sanction will be effective. When an Olympic boycott is part of a broader sanction regime the sequence of the sanctions is interesting. Is the Olympic boycott the first step of the 'screw turning' or is the Olympic boycott a logic consequence of the already existing sanction regime? If it is a standalone weapon the next question is whether the goal is disruption of military adventures or not.

*Condition for appropriateness Olympic boycotts: When the boycott is a standalone weapon, the goal is not disruption of military adventures.*

### **Target is smaller than sender**

A sanction is more likely to be effective when the target is substantially smaller than the sender. This seems an obvious point but it says something about the leverage the sender state has. When the target state is larger then the sender state success is only possible if the goal of the sanction means more to the sender then to the target, i.e. the sanction might be more about showing resolve and action at home than abroad. In the successful sanctions with a foreign policy goal, the sender state is larger than the target in more than 90% of the cases. (Hufbauer e.a.2007: 75-87 (appendix 3A)). This implies that a larger size in sports is needed for a sender state of a sports boycott to make that boycott effective. I therefore will see whether the sender state is bigger in Olympic success than the target state, besides their difference in size on an economic scale.

*Condition for appropriateness Olympic boycott: The target state's is significantly smaller than the sender, economically and Olympically.*

### **Multilateral or not?**

When applied multilateral the size of the sender state (or group) obviously grows and is more likely to exceed the size of the target. However, a multilateral sanction is not more effective by definition, especially when applying economic sanctions. When aiming for a multilateral approach that involves consultation and debate with the presumed allies of the sanctioning state. If that does not happen quick and decisive, it will weaken the signal function of the sanction. A multilateral sanction does enhance the political and economical pressure to the target but, due to the required agreement on the content of the sanction, the chance is that the scope of the sanction will be diluted. The more states involved, the more domestic interest calculation needs to be done. Then there is the risk that allies do not participate at all, when they are asked to do so, or only show lukewarm enthusiasm, which will give the target regime ammunition to defend its position, since even allies of the sender question the sanction. Furthermore, scholars of economic and non-economic sanctions agree that a sanction is more effective when the target and sender are positively related. Kaempfer & Lowenberg (2000:184) state that especially smart (signalling) sanctions should be imposed by culturally similar countries. They must by definition, involve a relatively small number of sanctioners – i.e. they must be less multilateral in nature- because cultural traits are not that universally shared. The symbolism of the sanction is easily diluted by multilateralism. Here the Olympic boycott distinguishes itself from economic sanctions. With an Olympic boycott, or the threat of it, the consequence for not obtaining the policy goal, is that the sending state will not compete. The more states are included in the boycott, the more leverage it will have, since both the economic and the symbolic and political effects will become larger. For that reason I only study Olympic boycotts by more than one state. I do think that the speed with which such a coalition is formed is a condition for effectiveness. The longer it takes for the initiator to form a coalition, the less powerful the boycott will be.

*Condition for appropriateness Olympic boycott: coalition of the willing is established quick and decisive.*

### **DISCLAIMERS ON EFFECTIVENESS SANCTIONS**

Hufbauer e.a. (2007:139) state that it is hard to design (economic) sanctions that have the power and accuracy of a cruise missile. According to them it is even harder for smart sanctions to be effective. 'Effective implementation of smart sanctions requires a tremendous amount of detailed knowledge about the country, persons, and groups targeted'. To obtain this knowledge can be

difficult. Even when funds can be identified, secrecy and speed are critical in preventing targets from move assets to numbered accounts. In many instances, members of the sending coalition lack the administrative resources to monitor and enforce laser sharp measures. 'Smart sanctions may satisfy the need in sender states to 'do something', they may slake humanitarian concerns, and they may serve to unify fraying coalitions and isolate a rogue regime. But they are not a magic bullet for achieving foreign policy goals. They might work better as a signalling device than as a coercive measure' (ibid:139,141). The advantage of smart sanctions is in the fact that they avoid unwanted negative effects of the sanction. The condition of specific targeting does enhance the effectiveness of smart sanctions, but is still a moral and ethical choice made by the sanctioner. Applying more blunt force could bring about the same increase in effectiveness. There is not much scientific proof on the effectiveness of smart sanctions yet, let alone a comparison with the effectiveness of comprehensive economic sanctions. Tostensen & Bull (2002) ask whether that is possible; a smart sanction is supposed to be targeted, tailor made to that specific situation, so how can you derive general conclusions of those sanctions?

In 2008 Hafner-Burton published her result to the effect of 'naming and shaming'. This refers to the practice of publicly criticising a regime without imposing further sanctions, so it might be the cheapest way to try to influence the policy of a certain regime. Mostly the object of shame is the lack of respect of human rights of the regime, a modest goal according to Hufbauer e.a. (2007). Hafner-Burton (2008) finds that naming and shaming is not just cheap talk. Its effect is however not always the intended. For some regimes the spotlight they are placed under is an incentive to better their behaviour, but it can also drive a regime to become more oppressive. Sometimes regimes change what is easy and visible but remain harsh and oppressive in other areas. Another finding of Hafner-Burton is that NGO's, the media or the UN 'shine the spotlight selectively. Some countries guilty of horrible abuses never draw much publicity, while other responsible for lesser abuses draw much attention' (Hafner Burton 2008:694). In 2000 for example, the eleven countries receiving the worst score for political terror were Afghanistan, Algeria, China, Colombia, Congo-Kinshasa, Iraq, North Korea, Republic of the Congo, Russia, Sierra Leone and Sudan. The Amnesty International top ten of naming and shaming only included three of them: China, Russia and Sierra Leone. Besides those three the spotlight was frequently set on Chile, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States, despite the fact that their ranking on the repression scale was lower (idem:697).

## CONDITIONS FOR OLYMPIC BOYCOTTS

Based on the research of effectiveness of economic sanctions, the theory on smart sanctions and the conditions for sanctions imposed by international law I find the following variables to score the appropriateness of Olympic boycotts.

On the goal and the timing:

1. The goal is modest.
2. The boycott is announced to the target state with a clear statement on its obligations and in time for the target state to fulfil these obligations.

On the relation between sender & target state and the regime of the target state:

3. The target state has a non autocratic regime.
4. There is a prior cordial relation between sender and target state.
5. The target state is significantly smaller than the sender state.
6. Coalition of the willing is established quick and decisive.

On the domestic costs of the sender state:

7. Domestic costs are matched and not concentrated on a particular interest group.

On other measures:

8. The boycott is not about a dispute pending at an international court or tribunal.
9. When the boycott is a standalone weapon the goal is not the disruption of military adventures.

In chapter 5 I will describe the methodology used and how these 9 variables are operationalised.

In chapter 6 the Olympic boycott cases will be described and measured along these conditions.

## 5- METHODOLOGY

### INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a report on a qualitative research of case studies. The different boycotts cases are described by the same variables. Those variables are linked to existing relevant theory. This ensures the congruence of the study and allows me to draw conclusions. This congruence also makes it possible to link the gathered data to these existing theories.

### SOURCES

I want to find out whether the Olympic boycotts meet the standard of other sanctions like economic sanctions, to see whether an Olympic boycott could be an appropriate measure from the political point of view. To make up the conditions for appropriateness of an Olympic boycott I used the following sources:

- ❖ 'Economic Sanctions RECONSIDERED' by Hufbauer, Schott, Elliot and Oegg (2007). This is the most cited study on economic sanctions which provides clear conditions for a sanction to be effective, i.e. for the sanction to contribute to the aspired policy outcome.
- ❖ Available literature on economic sanctions and smart sanctions, most descriptive of nature. There is not much quantitative research on sanctions available, besides the study of Hufbauer e.a. (2007).
- ❖ International Law for the requirements and norms on sanctions.

To describe the Olympic boycotts along the made up requirements I have used available literature and research on Olympic boycotts, as well as on the Olympic Movement, Olympic Games and other related issues. Most of this literature is descriptive with a historical approach. I was granted the opportunity to visit the IOC study centre in Lausanne where I could access the historical archives on the Olympic Games. This provided me with a treasure of information which I could not have found elsewhere and which makes this study much more interesting and relevant. All information I needed was available to use, only the personal correspondence of former IOC president Samaranch is still under embargo. When I wanted to prepare for the archive research I found that there is little literature available on how to use a historical archive effectively. Thankfully I did not need those preparations, since the staff of the IOC library and archive was

very helpful. They provided me with well-organized lists on the relevant subjects and brought me all materials I asked for.

I used literature and archive sources available in the English, French and Dutch language. The latter two I translated into English.

## **OPERATIONALISATION OF THE CONDITIONS**

I here will specify for every condition how it is operationalised and where and how I found my data.

### **1. The goal is modest.**

I use the operationalisation of Hufbauer e.a. (2007) in their study *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. A modest goal is a change of the target state's policies in a relatively modest and limited way, without threatening the government in power or its military capabilities. Examples are human rights and religious persecution cases, releasing of prisoners.

Non-modest goals (in crescendo order):

- ❖ change the target regime (destabilize current regime);
- ❖ disrupt a military adventure;
- ❖ impair the military potential of the target (prevent the target to develop or acquire weapons);

Other changes of the target-state's policy and/or behaviour in a major way are also considered non-modest goals (Hufbauer e.a. 1007: 52-52/159).

### **2. The boycott is announced to the target state with a clear statement on its obligations and in time for the target state to fulfil these obligations.**

The information about the timing of the boycott will be weighed in each case based on the other available information of that case.

### **3. The target state has a non autocratic regime.**

I use the data of the Polity IV Index on regime authority. The Polity project, under the direction of the Centre for Systemic Peace and the George Mason University, examines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions. This perspective

envisions a spectrum of governing authority that spans from 'fully institutionalized autocracies through mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes (termed "anocracies") to fully institutionalized democracies'. The 'Polity Score' captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The recommended three part categorization is that of:

- ❖ autocracies (score -10 to -6);
- ❖ anocracies (score -5 to +5);
- ❖ democracies (score +6 to +10).

The Polity scheme consists of six component measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. It also records changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority. The Polity data includes information only on the institutions of the central government and on political groups acting, or reacting, within the scope of that authority (Systemic Peace 2009). Their data sources cover the years from 1946 and onwards, thereby covering all my cases. Other data sources like the ones of the CIA or the Economist start in the 1960.

#### **4. There is a prior cordial relation between sender and target state.**

The data for this variable was the hardest to get. The number of cases I study is not that big (six in total) but the number of states involved in those cases is (for example over 26 in the 1976 Montreal boycott and over 60 states in the 1980 Moscow boycott). So to keep the data surveyable, I will use the data of the initiator of the boycott and compare that to the data of the target state. When there is no clear coalition, but there are more states applying the boycott, I will provide the data for all states. Another difficulty is that the cases cover a period from 1956 to 1988. I found no comprehensive data base on any of the conditions that provides the data of this whole period with one 'mouse-click'.

- ❖ The existence of diplomatic relations is scored positive when the two states exchange diplomatic representation (embassy/consulate). It was hard to find this data. I searched the website of embassies and departments of foreign affairs in the hope to find a historical overview in which the required information was listed. That was not always the case, besides not all websites of Foreign Affairs Departments are available in English. I tried to email the French, British and New Zealand Departments of Foreign Affairs via their

website. Only New Zealand offered an email option on their website<sup>24</sup> and within days I received a personal answer to my questions with extensive information and additional sources.

- ❖ The existence of trade relations. I encountered the same problem as stated above. I, perhaps naively, expected that there would be overviews on trade relations available at the World Trade Organisation or the International Monetary Fund. There I found data to be available on more recent years, but not for all the years I was searching for. My sources are the same as with the existence of diplomatic relations, added with the Departments of Economics and Trade of the relevant states and other websites.
- ❖ The existence of sport relations. I wanted to find out whether nations had sport exchange beyond the normal international competitions and world cups organised by the different IF's. Exchanges such as the ping-pong diplomacy between the USA and China for example. This data proved to be very hard to obtain as well. Only when an article was written on two of the countries I could find this information. On sport exchange between 'enemy states' such research is available. However Olympic boycotts can also be between states that on other subjects have a neutral or cordial relation. The sports exchange between two friendly states hardly is an interesting subject for articles or books, so it appears, I could not find them. Since the Olympic participation already implies that the states concerned are active in multiple international sport competitions of the IF', I excluded this part of the condition. The amount of time it would take me to find any data would not be in proportion with the amount of data I would be able to gather.

So the condition of cordial relation is based on the score of trade and diplomatic exchange. I have established the following scores:

- ❖ Cordial relation when there trade and diplomatic exchange.
- ❖ Neutral relation when there is trade or diplomatic exchange.
- ❖ Antagonistic relation when there is neither trade nor diplomatic exchange.

##### **5. The target state is significantly smaller than the sender state.**

I score this condition on economic size and on Olympic size (medal count). Since Olympic Games are usually held half way in the year, I will use the date of the year before the Olympic Games,

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<sup>24</sup> The French site did offer an email function but my sent email was returned.

thereby representing the score of a whole year for all cases.

- ❖ Hufbauer e.a (2007) use the Gross National Product (value of goods and services produced by the nationals of a certain state GNP) for their data on size difference between states. I use the Gross Domestic Product (GDP, value of goods and services produced within a certain state) because this data is more widely available. However, this data is not available for the Soviet Union before 1989. On the cases involving the Soviet Union (Melbourne, Moscow and Los Angeles) I will use the GNP data for those states provided by the Hufbauer e.a. (2007) study. In my study this data is comparable with the GDP data. The difference between the two scores is too insignificant to alter the score in the broad category bigger-smaller. Since the Soviet Union by then is a closed and communist state, the difference between the GNP and GDP data will be even smaller than in other states. The GDP data is only easy available from the year 1960 and onwards. I could not find the data for the year 1955 (preluding the 1956 Melbourne case) so there I used the data of the year 1960.
- ❖ Olympic size: the amount of medals (and ranking) of the relevant states at the Olympic Games previous to the boycotted Games.

In the end I found the data I needed for the conditions 4 and 5 after extensive and time consuming internet and library searches. The various websites and other sources I used are listed in the annex and bibliography. I find the following websites worth mentioning because of their usefulness and convenience.

- ❖ [www.earthtrends.org](http://www.earthtrends.org). Website of the World Resource Institute. Offers data and country profiles on environmental, economical and social trends.
- ❖ [www.nationmaster.com](http://www.nationmaster.com). A central data resource based on data of the CIA world factbook, UN and OECD statistics on many subjects such as among which economics, religion, immigration, military and democracy.
- ❖ [www.countryrisk.com](http://www.countryrisk.com). A guide to internet country analysis resources. Over 85 sites are introduced (by subject) and reviewed on their usefulness.
- ❖ [www.theodora.com](http://www.theodora.com). Online versions of the CIA world factbook from 1989 and onwards.

## **6. Coalition of the willing is established quick and decisive.**

The information about the time it takes to form a coalition will be weighed on each separate case.

**7. Domestic costs are matched and not concentrated on a particular interest group.**

I consider domestic costs to be matched when there is some form of compensation offered to the domestic groups bearing the costs. I consider the costs not concentrated on a particular interest group when other sanctions are also applied, like for example import and/or export embargoes.

**8. The boycott is not about a dispute pending at an international court or tribunal.**

Overview of cases on the websites of :

- ❖ International Court of Justice
- ❖ The Permanent Court of Arbitration.

The International Criminal Court is established in 1989 and is therefore not relevant in this study. There have been no Olympic Boycotts where both target and sender states all belonged to the same region or continent. Therefore regional courts and tribunals, like the European Court of Human Rights, are not relevant for this study.

**9. When the boycott is a standalone weapon the goal is not disruption of military adventures.**

The data of Hufbauer e.a. (2007) is used to see whether there were other sanctions applies along the Olympic boycott. The goal of the boycott is also scored the same way as Hufbauer e.a. score them, see operationalisation variable 1.

The sources of the data of the cases are listed in the Annex, chapter 9.

**CONCLUSION**

When a boycott scores a 'yes' on five or more conditions the boycott is considered to be appropriate from a political point of view.

## **6-OLYMPIC BOYCOTTS**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The first Olympic boycott occurred already in the 420 BC. Sparta, at that time the most powerful of the Greek states, broke the Olympic truce. They fail to pay the fine resulting from this breach and are barred from the religious rites and the athletic Games at Olympia (Hoberman 1986:5-6). Since 1896 the modern Olympic Games also face political interference, excessive nationalism, a terrorist attack, (threats of) boycotts and the IOC expels two NOC's from competing at the Olympic Games. In this chapter I will describe the five multi-NOC boycotts, Melbourne 1 and 2, Montreal, Moscow, Los Angeles and Seoul, along the conditions of appropriateness.

### **CASE 1: MELBOURNE 1 (1956)**

#### **INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN 1956**

The East-West relations are more relaxed after the death of Stalin in 1953. His successor Khrushchev announces the policy of 'peaceful coexistence'. The USA and the Soviet Union focus on the 'non-aligned' states. Egypt shows, with the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1952, that they are indeed a force to be reckoned with. The allied forces end their occupation of East Germany in 1953 and in 1955 the latter becomes a sovereign state. The Soviet Union and eight Eastern European states sign the Warsaw pact in 1954.

#### **INTRODUCTION TO THE MELBOURNE OLYMPICS**

At their Session in 1949 the IOC chooses Melbourne to host the 1956 Olympic Games, over Mexico City, Buenos Aires and six American cities. It will be the first time that the Games take place in the southern hemisphere. This leads to criticism, the Games are held from 22 November until 8 December when it is spring in Melbourne. For many northern hemisphere athletes that is not 'in season' and they have to alter their training schedules. Due to the long quarantine requirements for horses the equestrian sports are organised in Stockholm (Sweden). The equestrian events take place in the European summer, five months before the Melbourne Olympics. By then there is no boycott threat whatsoever and athletes of the latter boycotting state do compete at the equestrian events.

Besides the two multi-NOC boycotts, the People's Republic of China (PRC) boycotts the Melbourne Olympics. They will not compete when Nationalist China (Taiwan) is competing. The NOC of Nationalist China does take part. When they arrive at the Olympic Village the flag of the People's Republic of China is mistakenly used, to welcome them. One of the team members climbs the flagpole and withdraws the flag, accompanied by cheers of the public that had gathered (Espy 1979:54).

There are 72 NOC's competing in Melbourne. Despite the situation in Hungary prior to the Games (see next paragraph) the Hungarian athletes make it to Melbourne. Forty-five of the Hungarian athletes decide not to travel back to Hungary afterwards. They are granted asylum in the West (Kanin 1981:65, Ecker 1996:80 & Senn 1999:108).

### GOAL AND TIMING BOYCOTT

Just a month before the opening of the Melbourne Olympics, on October 23 and 24, the Russian army crushes the Hungarian Revolt. Reports say 2.500 unarmed Hungarian civilians are killed by the Soviet troops (Britannica). The Russian intervention is condemned by most nations. In Western Europe the Soviet action leads to fear that the peaceful coexistence policy announced by Khrushchev is just words. In the Netherlands five political parties want the government to sever diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Citizens hold violent demonstrations throughout the country and dock workers in the Rotterdam harbour refuse to load Soviet ships. The CIA views the Dutch reaction as extreme (CIA 1956). A few days later the Israeli army occupies the Gaza strip and Sinai Desert, with help of France and Great Britain, thereby fuelling the Suez crisis (see next case). Still, on 6 November IOC president Brundage does not fear the infringement of those conflicts to the Games. On that day he writes to IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer 'international political developments have certainly added to our troubles<sup>25</sup> but probably will not interfere with the Games. We are lucky these wars did not start a few months earlier' (IOC archive:b).

However the next day, 7 November, the Dutch NOC decides unanimously to withdraw their team from the Olympic Games. In their cable message to the IOC of that day, they state 'regret inform you todays special general meeting NOC decided withdraw Netherlands team account soviet Russian participation Games after recent developments Hungary (stop) our conviction fundamental bases lacking for our participation celebration Olympic festival (stop)

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<sup>25</sup> Those troubles were the concerns of the IOC on the lack of speed of the Australians in their preparations of the Games (Ecker 1996:79/Senn 1999:107).

decision most difficult view splendid efforts organising committee' (IOC archive:c). The Dutch NOC does not threaten with a boycott upon demands, they *just* state that they will not participate. They do not ask the IOC to suspend the Soviet Union from participation nor make any other demand. The Dutch also do not actively encourage or enforce other NOC's to follow suit. Two NOC's do however, the Spanish and the Swiss. Espy (1979:54) interprets the Spanish actual reasons to be financial. 'The Hungarian affair had simply afforded them a good excuse' and they stated officially that it was 'not fitting for Spanish athletes to engage in sports of Olympic character while the liberty of peoples [sic] is being trampled on'. The Swiss boycott is 'a severe blow to the IOC, since their headquarters are in Switzerland' (ibid:55). The then IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer is Swiss and he does not hide his shame about his countries stance. In his view the 'shameful withdrawal' is mainly to blame on the German part of Switzerland. On 8 November he writes to Brundage 'the Swiss situation as regard to its participation to the Games or not is very embarrassing. On this subject there is a great division between the Swiss German sport leaders (who are against the participation) and the French part of this country who is in favour' (IOC archive:b). Also after the Games when he repeats this when writing to the president of the Melbourne OCOG:

'in this country (Switzerland, KEO) the controversies are not as yet finished as regard to the withdrawal of our athletes from the Games. More and more the public opinion begins to understand that they made a mistake, especially in the German part of this country. In our part the spirit is better and was always in favour of the participation' (IOC archive:d).

The IOC urges the boycotting NOC's to reconsider. The Netherlands and Spain do not. The Dutch NOC officially withdraws by letter of 8 November stating

'We regret very much to inform you that the Netherlands Olympic Committee decided unanimously to withdraw their team from the Games at Melbourne. One of the main reasons that we took this decision is due to the fact that we went through the same situation as Hungary now in 1944, when the Germans left Holland to make a new appearance after the battle of Arnhem, more cruel as ever before. The Olympic ideals are still living in Holland, we can assure you, but at the moment there is a lack of cheerful sporty feelings necessary for a team to participate at the feast of

Olympic Games [...] If it had been possible to enforce our participation this would have implied a violation of our Olympic ideals and our national pride and feeling of humanity' (IOC archives:c).

Brundage, who is presiding his first Olympic Games, is disappointed and tries to keep politics out of the Games, following his predecessor de Coubertin. On 9 November, he writes to Mayer 'if countries are going to abstain from the Olympic Games because they do not like what some of the other countries are doing, we might as well give up, since there will always be some country that is misbehaving. It is much better, I think, to try to preserve the little nucleus of international cooperation and good will that we have developed, in the hope that it will spread its influence' (IOC archive:b). He repeated his argument in public by stating:

'Every civilized person recoils in horror at the savage slaughter in Hungary, but that is no reason for destroying the nucleus of international cooperation. The Olympic Games are contests between individuals and not between nations. In an imperfect world, if participation in sports is to be stopped every time the politicians violate the laws of humanity, there will never be any international contests. Is it not better to try to expand the sportsmanship of the athletic field into other areas?' (Brundage quoted in Senn 1999:107).

The Swiss do reconsider. However, by the time they decide to participate after all, it is too late to arrange transportation. On 14 November, IOC Chancellor Mayer cables the OCOG that it is 'impossible getting plane for Swiss team whose participation is cancelled for that only reason am most upset (stop)' (IOC archive:e).<sup>26</sup>

When announcing their boycotts the Dutch, Spanish and Swiss NOC's do not make a demand to the IOC or to another state. They (minus the Swiss eventually) do not compete because the Soviet Union had invaded Hungary, but they never officially ask the IOC to suspend the Soviet Union. Certainly they want the Soviet Union to withdraw from Hungary but they do not demand this of the Soviet Union in order to make their Olympic participation possible. The goal of the boycott is *only* to make a statement and to show resolve, but is not aimed to influence

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<sup>26</sup> Perhaps even more frustrating since it was due to the Swiss government, upon pressure of Otto Mayer, that Hungarian athletes could travel to Melbourne. On 30 October 1956 Mayer informs Brundage that 'To-day he (Swiss minister of Foreign affairs) telephoned me saying that the Swiss Political Department accepts our initiative and that he is ready to act in the name of the IOC. Therefore the Swiss Legation has been informed in Budapest and is intervening to-day at the Hungarian Government. If we are going to be successful I don't know, but in any case all the European Press to-day is congratulating the IOC for its action (IOC archive:b).

another government or the IOC. One of the reasons for the lacking of a clear stated goal can be the time left until the Games. The invasion of the Soviet Union only took place four weeks before the opening. At that time, a lot of athletes already are in Australia to adapt to the temperature and do their last training. The final decision to boycott the Games is made around 8 November, leaving only two weeks until the opening of the Olympics. Any demand that would have been made would be unrealistic seen that short amount of time. So on the condition 'a clear statement is made in time' the score is 'no'. There is no clear statement and there was very little time to have met demands, if they would have been made.

**PRIOR RELATIONS & REGIME TYPE TARGET STATE**

The target state Soviet Union represents an autocratic regime in 1956, with a score of -7 on the Polity IV index (Melbourne 1:a).

The Netherlands have an embassy in Moscow and the Soviets have one in The Hague. Spain and the Soviet Union have no diplomatic relations until 1977. There is trade between the Netherlands and the Soviet Union and there are cultural and scientific exchanges. Overall the relation is determined by the east-west divide of the Cold War, in which the Netherlands are on the opposing side of the Soviets. The Spanish, despite the lack of diplomatic relations, do trade with the Soviets. The Spanish relation with the Soviet Union therefore is neutral. The Netherlands do have both diplomatic and trade relation with the Soviet Union. With regard to the decrease in this relation due to their alliance with the USA and other Western Powers, I view their relation neutral as well (Melbourne 1:b).

**Table 1- Melbourne 1-state size**

	Soviet Union	Netherlands	Spain
<b>GDP</b>	247	12,8	12
(ranking)	(--)	(13)	(14)
<b>Olympic medals</b>	71	5	1
(ranking)	(2)	(29)	(34)

(Grey column=target; white column = sender. GDP = billion \$, N.B.: Soviet Union is in GNP billion \$) (Melbourne 1:c)

There is no GDP data available of the Soviet Union in 1960 or before, therefore I use the GNP data for the Soviet Union in 1960, provided by Hufbauer et al. (2007).

The boycotting NOC's are not actively seeking companions. Perhaps the lack of time played a role on this point. There is no quick and decisive coalition of boycotting states. It seems that the boycotting states acted apart rather than as a collective.

#### **DOMESTIC COSTS SENDER STATE(S)**

The costs are highest for the athletes. Some of the Dutch athletes already are in Melbourne and are totally surprised by the announcement that they could not compete. There are no other domestic groups that are forced to take part in sanctions. There are no trade-sanctions for example, so the costs were born by one specific group. The Dutch athletes did get a Melbourne Award of the president of the Dutch NOC Erica Terpstra along with the apologies of her and of Claas van den Houten who was the secretary-general of the NOC in 1956. But this ceremony takes place in the year 2006, fifty years after the boycott. Even after all this time the athletes are very emotional about the sudden withdrawal in 1956 (Nu 2006). I found no information that either the Swiss or the Spanish athletes are compensated for the costs they bore. There are no other measures taken against the Soviet Union so the athletes were the only group bearing the costs.

#### **OTHER MEASURES**

There are no other sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union for their action in Hungary. That makes the Olympic boycott of the Netherlands and Spain a single weapon. Since there was no goal stated by the sender states there is no score on condition 9, like there is none at condition 1.

The Soviet invasion of Hungary is not pending at the International Court of Justice nor at the Permanent Arbitration Court (Melbourne 1:d).

Table 2- Melbourne 1-total case score

	YES	NO
1. Goal is modest	NS	NS
2. Boycott announced in time with clarity on obligations target		X
3. Target is non-autocratic		X
4. There is prior cordial relation between sender and target		X
5. Target is smaller than sender		X
6. Coalition is established quick and decisive		X
7. Domestic costs are matched and not imposed on particular group		X
8. Boycott dispute is not pending at tribunal or court	X	
9. When standalone weapon goal is not disruption of military adventures.	NS	NS

(NS= No Score)

## REACTION IOC

Immediately after the announcements of the boycotts, the IOC chancellor Otto Mayer takes a clear stand. Already on 9 November he suggests to Brundage in a letter that 'the following proposition must be submitted to the Executive Board: that all NOC's which have withdrawn for political reasons should be blamed officially by the I.O.C. If we do not do anything of the kind, politics will be mixed up more and more in our affairs. We must be strong and not be afraid to take such a decision. The countries which up to now have withdrawn informing us that this was for political reasons are: Holland, Spain, and, if such a decision is taken, Switzerland, while Egypt was clever enough to give us other reasons, a month ago<sup>27</sup>' (IOC archive:b). The day after the opening Mayer writes to Brundage 'I read that the opening ceremony was good. I am most happy that all athletes have the good Olympic spirit. That will be the best lesson to give to all those who don't know what Olympism mean' (idem). Brundage changes his mind on the punishing of boycotting NOC's. On 3 December 1956, two days before the closing ceremony he writes to Mayer

<sup>27</sup> See next case: Melbourne 2.

‘the Games have been a tremendous success, and the teams that stayed at home must find themselves in a ridiculous position with the Hungarians competing. My first thought was that they should be censured severely, but perhaps it is better to ignore them completely. They could see that the Games got along very well without them, and they probably consider themselves foolish enough, even without reprimands from the I.O.C.’ (IOC archive:b).

The IOC Session in Melbourne unanimously adopts a Resolution in which they condemn the boycotts. ‘On the eve of the opening of the Melbourne Games the International Olympic Committee at its first Session learned officially from its President, Mr. Avery Brundage, that a small number of nations had withdrawn from the Games for reasons other than sport. The International Olympic Committee, an organization concerned solely with sport, expresses its sorrow and regret at these withdrawals, considering that they are not in keeping with the Olympic ideal’ (IOC Session 1956:4-5). The Chancellor is instructed to send copies to all NOC’s which had withdrawn their teams. The Dutch do not agree that their boycott was contrary to the Olympic Ideal. They state in a letter of 23 April 1957 that ‘they were actually prompted by the Olympic ideal when taking this decision. After all the Olympic Games were created to bring about a better mutual understanding between the youth of all the different nations. The Soviet Union’s participation made this aim unattainable’. The Dutch feel that the blame of not complying with the Olympic ideal is undeserved and they request the text of the resolution to be altered or that the Netherlands are removed from the list of the boycotting nations. The chancellor replies that the IOC Session did not blame anyone but (only) had shown their regret (IOC archive:c). This seems to be enough to close the books on this subject.

## CASE 2: MELBOURNE 2 (1956)

### GOAL AND TIMING BOYCOTT

On 29 October 1956, France and the United Kingdom side with Israel in what becomes the Suez crisis. The French and British seize military control over the Suez-canal after Israel occupies the Gaza strip and the Sinai desert. The Suez-canal was nationalised by Egypt in 1952 by Gamal Nasser who seized power after a revolt in the same year. Egypt already has withdrawn themselves of the Melbourne Olympic Games before the Suez-crisis, for financial reasons. After the occupation of the Suez-canal they lodge protest demanding that the nations guilty of cowardly aggression against Egypt should be expelled by the IOC (Espy 1979:55). The Egyptian government also suggests in the media that the Olympics are a 'British party' according to Brundage's letter to the Egyptian NOC (undated, KEO).

'From a newspaper [...] I note that the Government of Egypt has decided not to participate in the Games of the 16th Olympiad at Melbourne under the assumption that these Games are a British enterprise. As you know this is an erroneous assumption. The Games are entirely under the international control of the IOC and the International Amateur Sport Federations in which Egypt has just as much voice as any other country.[...] The fundamental basis of the Olympic movement is that it is non-political and non-commercial, and it would only be an injustice to the Egyptian amateur athletes who have trained faithfully for four years with the idea of participating in these Games and lead to adverse criticism of your country if the Government, through a misunderstanding, decides to forbid the Egyptian Olympic Committee from taking part' (IOC archive:f).

On 7 November Egypt asks the IOC to expel the states who act with aggression on Egypt. The IOC answers that this demand is purely political and therefore the IOC does not comply with it (*idem*). In solidarity with Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq withdraw from the Games. Lebanon states that their withdrawal has two reasons. First, Egypt is their ally and second, there are travel difficulties as a result of the Suez crisis. The Lebanese NOC is afraid that the athletes, once they arrive in Melbourne, will not get the opportunity to travel home again. Brundage does not believe the sincerity of the latter argument and states that the non-participation of Lebanon was partly 'to

protest against the Australian attitude in the English-French-Egypt conflict (IOC archive:g, my translation from French KEO).

Egypt explicitly asks the IOC to expel France, the United Kingdom and Israel from participating at the Melbourne Olympics. The underlying demand is the withdrawal of France, the United Kingdom and Israel out of the Suez-canal, the Gaza strip and Sinai desert. This goal concerns the disrupting of military adventures and is not a modest goal. The explicit demand is made on 7 November which is two weeks prior to the opening ceremony. Even if the parties would want to comply with the demands of Egypt, two weeks would probably not be enough to withdraw the troops and for the Egyptian athletes to travel to Melbourne. So the demands were not made in time with the opportunity for the target state to comply with the demands. Besides Egypt already had withdrawn themselves before the Suez-crisis even started, it seems that they seized the opportunity of the Olympic spotlight. I wonder what would have happened when France, the United Kingdom and Israel had complied with the demands. Would that have made Egypt participate even if they did not intend to do so before they made their demands?

#### **PRIOR RELATIONS & REGIME TYPE TARGET STATE**

The target states were the United Kingdom, France and Israel. They all represented a non-autocratic regime. All three states score the highest score possible, a +10 on the Polity IV index (Melbourne 2:a).

The main two actors in this case are Egypt as the initial sender state and Israel as the initial target state. Those two states have no diplomatic relations in 1956 nor do they trade with each other, Egypt does not recognise the state Israel (nor do Lebanon and Iraq). It is not until 1977 that Egyptian Prime Minister Sadat's visit to Israel precludes further contacts. The UK has a diplomatic relation with Lebanon as well as with Iraq. I could not find information on relations between France and the sender states. Based on the score of the main actors Egypt and Israel the score for prior relationship is antagonistic thus not cordial (Melbourne 2:b).

**Table 3- Melbourne 2- State size**

	UK	France	Israel	Egypt	Lebanon	Iraq
<b>GDP</b>	72.273,34	63.343,31	2.887	4.144,24	NDA <sup>28</sup>	1.683,91
(ranking)	(2)	(3)	(33)	(27)		(40)
<b>Olympic Medals</b>	11	18	NM	1	2	NC
(ranking)	(18)	(7)		(41)	(32)	

(Grey column = target, white column = sender, GDP= billion \$) (NDA= No Data Available, NM= No Medal, NC= Not Competing) (Melbourne 2:c)

The initiator state Egypt is larger than the initial target state Israel, both economically and Olympically. However the difference, especially in Olympic medals, is slight. When all the states are considered there is no chance, no matter what Lebanon would score on GDP, that they outweigh the coalition of Israel, France and the UK. The score on the condition 'target is smaller than sender' therefore is negative.

The Egyptian NOC does not very actively seek companions. The lack of time probably played a role on this point. There is no quick and decisive coalition of boycotting states. It seems that the boycott of the two allies appeared more spontaneous than orchestrated by Egypt.

#### **DOMESTIC COSTS SENDER STATE(S)**

There are no trade nor diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel so there is no leverage for a sanction on these areas. This obviously means that for example business men do not have the opportunity to trade and bear costs. However for them it is not a decrease in possibilities, the no-trade situation exists for a significant period of time before 1956. For the athletes there is a sudden decrease in their possibilities. On that account they are the sole cost bearing domestic group (also in Iraq and Lebanon). A compensation of the athletes' costs is not mentioned.

#### **OTHER MEASURES**

When Nasser nationalized the Suez-canal in 1952 the French and British immediately denounce the action of Egypt and call for the internationalisation of the canal. They also impose sanctions on Egypt, together with the USA. They freeze Egyptian assets in the United Kingdom. They withdraw all the western pilots in order to show that the Egyptians can not run the canal

<sup>28</sup> The first available data on Lebanese GDP I could find was that of 1988. The time-gap is too broad to use this data.

themselves. The replaced Egyptian, Russian and Yugoslav pilots however managed quite capable (Espy 1979:48). On 31 October 1956 the French and British bombard Egyptian targets. The Soviet Union calls for a cease-fire and then finds the USA on their side.<sup>29</sup> The UN also steps in. The Security Council convenes on 31 October 1956 but can not decide on a resolution, due to the vetoes of France and the United Kingdom. The matter is referred to the General Assembly. In a special emergency session from 1-10 November 1956 they call for a ceasefire and establish the first UN Emergency Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities (UN 1956). These are sanctions imposed on the sender state of the Olympic boycott.

There are also sanctions imposed on the Olympic target states Israel, the United Kingdom and France. These sanctions are imposed by the United States and Saudi Arabia. The three sender states have no diplomatic nor trade relation, therefore no leverage for a sanction. The Olympic boycott is a stand alone weapon. The goal of this standalone weapon is the disruption of military adventures (Melbourne 2:d).

The occupations of the Suez Canal, the Gaza strip and of the Sinai desert are not pending at the International Court of Justice nor at the Permanent Arbitration Court, nor at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) (Melbourne 2:e).

**Table 4- Melbourne 2- total case score**

	YES	NO
1. Goal is modest		X
2. Boycott announced in time with clarity on obligations target		X
3. Target is non-autocratic	X	
4. There is prior cordial relation between sender and target		X
5. Target is smaller than sender		X
6. Coalition is established quick and decisive		X
7. Domestic costs are matched and not imposed on particular group		X
8. Boycott dispute is not pending at tribunal or court	X	
9. When standalone weapon goal is not disruption of military adventures.		X

<sup>29</sup> Despite the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 between the USA, France and Great Britain, in which the three states guaranteed the arab-israeli borders set with the armistice agreements in 1949. They would act upon violations of this agreement, if necessary with force, with or without the UN (Espy 1979:48).

## **REACTION IOC**

See reaction IOC on case Melbourne 1.

## **REVIEW ON THE MELBOURNE OLYMPICS**

Despite the (political) problems at the start of the Olympics, the Melbourne Games are a success. Not only considering athletic results, also in promoting peace and harmony in the international world. The two Germans compete as a single, united team, bearing a black, red and yellow striped flag overlapped with the Olympic rings and playing the 'Ode to Joy' of Beethoven instead of the two anthems (Ecker 1996:80). At the closing ceremony the athletes march into the stadium with their national teams as usual. Then they mix up and march 'as a single cavalcade, with no regard to order or country, mingling in the spirit of international friendship' (Espy 1979:58). The Soviet officials do not appreciate all that intermingling. They ask to have a separate Olympic village like they did at the 1952 Helsinki Olympics. The Australians do not offer that possibility. The Soviet athletes though seem to like the regular Olympic village. In the Soviet press complaints are made about 'the western powers having introduced 'Mata Haris' into the Village in Melbourne with the intention of leading the Soviet competitors astray and interfering with their training' (Senn 1999:109). However the only proven case of a male athlete focussing on a woman is the American hammer thrower Harold Connolly. He falls in love with the Czechoslovakian discus thrower Olga Fikotova at the Games, and in 1957 they get married. In their case the romance did not distract them too much, they both became Olympic champions in Melbourne (idem:109).

## CASE 3: MONTREAL (1976)

### INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN 1976

In June 1976 the South African rulers beat down a student protest in Soweto, at that day killing 23 unarmed mostly minor students, leading to more demonstrations and the killing of hundreds of civilians (BBC News 2002). There are several (para)military coups, prior to 1976, like in Cambodia (Red Khmer) and Chile (Videla). In Spain the military dictatorship of Franco ends with his death in November 1975, after which Juan Carlos is crowned king of a democratic Spain.

### INTRODUCTION TO THE MONTREAL OLYMPICS

In 1970, in Amsterdam, the IOC Session chooses the Canadian city Montreal to host the 1976 Olympics, over Los Angeles and Moscow. The Olympics are to be held from 17 July until 1 August. Before IOC President Killanin, presiding his first Olympics, opened the Games, he has dealt with not only a major boycott. Another political problem is served on his plate, by the organising state notably. The issue is whether the NOC of the mainland China or the NOC of the nationalist China (Taiwan) should represent China. Although in the end both NOC's boycott the Olympics since they both disagree with the found solution, this is not a multi-NOC boycott. The both NOC's are the opposing parties on the subject and they do not act together in their boycott threats and demands. Besides the initiator of the boycott is the Canadian government, demanding the dismissal of Taiwan. The Canadian OCOG and NOC do not agree. The government and Chinese NOC do not form a multi NOC coalition, therefore. Despite not meeting the requirements for a multi NOC boycott, I will however elaborate on the China-Taiwan issue since it was a major political problem for the IOC and Killanin, to which the actual multi-state boycott was added.

Before their election Montreal duly fulfils all requirements for an eligible bid. One of these requirements is that all teams from all NOC's recognized by the IOC must be given free entry. On 29 September 1969 the Canadian Minister of External Affairs writes to the IOC 'I would like to assure you that all parties representing the NOC's and International Sport Federations recognized by the IOC will be free to enter Canada pursuant to the normal regulations' (IOC archive:h). At that time the NOC representing China is the Republic of China National Olympic Committee (ROCOC) which resided on the Island of Taiwan. On 12 May 1970 the Canadian Government recognise the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing, as the sole legal government of China and withdraw their recognition of the Nationalist Chinese Government

residing on the isle of Taiwan<sup>30</sup>. It is not until 28 May 1976(!) that the Canadian Government officially states that they will not grant entry to athletes and other representatives of the Republic of China. The IOC wants the Canadians to uphold their promises made when bidding for the Games and they refer to the fine example of Olympic behaviour of the Austrians. They were granted the organising of the 1976 winter Olympics as late as 1973, after the chosen city Denver was not able to organise them due to public protests<sup>31</sup>. Although Austria only recognise the PRC, already at the time of the application, the Taiwanese team competes under the name and flag of the Republic of China in Innsbruck, since they are the IOC recognized NOC (IOC archive:h). In June 1976 Canada proposes that the Taiwanese can compete if their flag, name and anthem has no reference of China in it. But the Taiwanese argue that they are the legal government of China so they reject this proposal. The OCOG of Montreal does not agree with their government's stance so they go on and send out their invitations as scheduled including to the ROCOC. The ROCOC Olympic athletes therefore travel to the USA, where they await the outcome of the dispute between the IOC and the Canadian government. On 1 July 1976 the IOC issues a statement to all IOC members, NOC's and IF's. 'The IOC has pointed out that the steps proposed by the Canadian Government are in direct conflict with the fundamental principles that no discrimination is allowed against any country or person on the grounds of race, religion or political affiliation [...] Recognition of a National Olympic Committee by the IOC does not imply political recognition.' Furthermore the IOC points out that

'the Olympic Games are a sports field and not a political arena. They were conceived with a view to assembling the youth of the world and not to differentiate between the regimes. Even in 1936 when there was threatened interference by the German Government, the Government respected the rules of the IOC, after the strongest representation was made' (IOC archive:i).

However, a fortnight later on 16 July 1976, one day before the opening of the Montreal Olympics, the IOC makes the following statement to the press.

'Due to the shortage of time and the fact that the athletes of the world are already assembled in Montreal, the IOC cannot take the action it would

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<sup>30</sup> The UN recognises the PRC as the sole representative of China in 1971.

<sup>31</sup> After being chosen by the IOC in 1970, to host the winter Olympics of 1976, a referendum was held in 1972 among the citizens. They voted against the Olympics due to concern over finances and the environmental impact of the Games. Denver then rejected the IOC's offer and the Games were awarded to Innsbruck in Austria (Jefferson Lenskyj 2000:111)

have preferred or considered more appropriate. The IOC therefore, with great reluctance and under protest, has passed a resolution in which the rule requiring each contingent in the opening ceremony to be preceded by a shield bearing the name of the country of area was waived in relation to the ROC Olympic Committee and that if they desire to compete in the Montreal Games they must take part in all events and ceremonies under the name 'Taiwan', using their flag and anthem (IOC archive:h).

The American NOC does compete despite an earlier threat to boycott when the ROCOC could not participate (Wilson 1993:14). Now they could albeit only under the name Taiwan. The Taiwanese themselves do not agree and go home. The NOC of Paraguay wants to join them in solidarity but is asked by the Taiwanese to stay since they could help the cause of the Republic of China more with their presence and participation (idem).

The fact that Canada recognises the PRC in 1970 implies that preparations for this recognition are already ongoing in 1969 when Montreal applied for hosting the Games. They should have informed the IOC then or at least as soon as possible after their recognition. Now there was no time left to replace the Games to another city. The general assumption is that Canada issued this only in May 1976, because it was a condition of the PRC on a major corn deal between the PRC and Canada in that year. In the end the PRC does not compete either, since their demand, the inclusion of the Taiwanese in the NOC of the PRC is not met.

The Taiwan-China case gets citizens involved as well. Many write petitions and letters to the IOC, on a personal title or as an organised group. Surprisingly not only the Chinese Students in Canada agree with the Canadian Governments standpoint, but so do the Taiwanese Residents in Montreal. The latter state on 7 July 1976 that 'Taiwan should not use any Chinese flag or name because Taiwan never was part of China and should be properly separate' (idem). After the IOC's final decision many display their dissatisfaction. The IOC has given in and has set an unwanted precedent for future Games; what will now stop Moscow to refuse Israeli athletes in to the 1980 Olympics, Israel being not recognised by the Soviet Union? The IOC should have been willing to move the Games from Montreal. The IOC has succumbed to Canada but worse has succumbed to communist China (IOC archive:j).

While Canada takes a strong stance on Taiwan concerning the Olympic participation the Canadians do maintain relations with Taiwan, at least a business relation. The athletic shoes used

by the Canadian team are sold to the public as well. 'On the underside of the tongue of many of Hanover's Ponies is a label that reads:

'Official Shoe of the Canadian Olympic Team. The inside of the heel is stamped, 'Made in Taiwan'' (Dewar 1984:149).

When Killanin is fully absorbed by the Chinese-Taiwan issue, the Council of Minister of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) meets in Port Louis in Mauritius from 24 June – 3 July 1976. They adopt a Resolution on sporting links with South Africa in which they condemn the fascist regime of South Africa and the massacre of the their brothers and sisters in Soweto, Johannesburg, Pretoria and elsewhere in South Africa. They also condemn New Zealand who 'condones these atrocities by entertaining South African fascist in sports'. New Zealand played a rugby tour with and in South Africa. With the Resolution the OAU

'appeals to the IOC to bar New Zealand from participating in the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal and calls upon all member states of the OAU to reconsider their participation in the 1976 Olympic Games if New Zealand participates' (IOC archive:k).

The first suggestion of a boycott over the New Zealand Rugby question is made by the Tanzanian government official at the UN conference on apartheid in May 1976 in Havana. The actual threat of the boycott of African NOC's is made only 48 hours before the opening of the Olympics, when many of the African athletes are already present in the Olympic village. The IOC protests and states that they have no authority over rugby since it is not an Olympic sport. The New Zealand Rugby Federation is not affiliated with the New Zealand NOC, therefore the IOC has no 'jurisdiction' in this matter (Espy 1979:158). Furthermore it is not New Zealand that practices apartheid and therefore there is no reason to expel New Zealand, like South Africa is expelled. The IOC does not suspend New Zealand. All African NOC's withdraw from the Montreal Olympics and send their athletes packing and travelling home.

Again the public gets involved in the discussion. The Committee for Fairness in Sport, a South African government sponsored pressure group, draws up a petition that is send in by also many Canadian citizens. It states

'I vote against expelling any country from the IOC or the Olympics on any political ground. Sports should be run by sportsmen – not politicians. The international Olympic Committee decided that competing against South Africa's mixed team would make you supporters of apartheid (in

1968 red.), but Russia, Uganda and a host of others with odious politics are welcomed with open arms. Does that mean that by competing against Russia you are supporting communism and anti-Semitism – or by maintaining sport ties with Uganda do you endorse genocide? Certainly not! Send in because [...] it may help to get black and white athletes from South Africa back into world sport, even better still, it may help to save the Olympics' (IOC archive:l).

### **GOAL AND TIMING BOYCOTT**

The boycotting NOC's ask the IOC to expel New Zealand only 48 hours before the opening of the Olympic Games. While quite late that would not have been impossible to expel a NOC that late. After all the decision of the Taiwanese-China team also was made a day prior to the opening ceremony. The underlying goal is not aimed at the South African government to end apartheid but to New Zealand. They want to stop New Zealand from undertaking a rugby tour in and with South Africa. This is a modest and specified goal. However the goal is not to prevent something from happening since the rugby tour already had ended at the time of the boycott. The boycott was a punishment instead of an incentive to change behaviour. So the goal of preventing a rugby tour by New Zealand is, very obviously, not made in time, although it does not lack clarity. The AOU is criticized for this poor timing. There is also critic on the content of the boycott. Espy (1979) states that the choice of New Zealand and rugby as targets is 'blatantly arbitrary'. There were twenty-six other states that continued to have sport relations with South Africa. In fact, in the midst of the controversy, a United States gymnastics tour of South Africa was planned (Espy 1979:158).

### **PRIOR RELATIONS & REGIME TYPE TARGET STATE**

The target state is New Zealand. New Zealand represents a democratic regime with a +10 score on the Polity IV Index in 1976 (Montreal:a)

In 2009 New Zealand has no embassy in Tanzania, but is accredited to Tanzania by their Embassy in Pretoria (South Africa). In light of the high-profile visits of government leaders in the

early ninety-seventies it is likely that this accreditation already was established in 1975.<sup>32</sup> The Tanzanian President Nyere visits New Zealand in the early ninety-seventies, and against the background of the Olympic boycott, the New Zealand's Foreign Minister visits Tanzania in 1976 (Montreal:b).

New Zealand and Tanzania trade with each other in 1975. New Zealand offers support and training to Tanzania in their dairy plant industry (idem).

**Table 5- Montreal-state size**

	<b>New Zealand</b>	<b>Tanzania</b>	<b>OAU</b>
<b>GDP</b> (ranking)	13.709,72 (39)	2.580 (--)	27.778,93 (Nigeria) (29)
<b>Olympic Medals</b> (ranking)	3 (23)	0 (-)	18 (Kenya alone: 9 medals ranked (18))

(Grey column = target, white column = sender, GDP= billion \$) (Montreal: c)

While Tanzania alone is not larger than New Zealand, both in economic as in Olympic size, obviously the combined states are. The first ranked African state in 1975 is South Africa (no.24) but they are not part of the boycotting states. Nigeria is the next state (see table) and on itself already outweighs New Zealand in the GDP comparison.

The boycott is first announced by Tanzania but is made official and effective through the Organization of African Unity. Through this international organisation a coalition is established within a week, which is clearly quick and decisive, seen the number of states involved.

#### **DOMESTIC COSTS SENDER STATE(S)**

There are no sanctions from African states issued against New Zealand over their rugby tour, nor is New Zealand target of any other sanction. Therefore the athletes, and other persons related to the Olympics, are the only domestic group bearing the costs. There is no reference of any compensation of these costs.

<sup>32</sup> The New Zealands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade's records on Tanzania go back to 1999.

**OTHER MEASURES**

There are no sanctions targeted to New Zealand at the time of the Montreal Olympics. There are sanctions, by the UN against South Africa. In 1960, after the killing of 69 black South Africans by the Sharpeville Police, the Security Council adopts a resolution (S/4300) in which it condemns the violence and calls upon South Africa to end the Apartheid.<sup>33</sup> In November 1962 the General Assembly adopts a non-binding resolution which calls upon members 'separately or collectively, in conformity with the charter to break diplomatic relations with South Africa, to close ports for vessels, to boycott South African trade and to suspend landing rights for South African aircraft. In a resolution of December 1968 of the UN General Assembly the states are requested to 'suspend cultural, educational, sporting and other exchanges' with the South African Regime. However this is after the Montreal Games, and the resolution is not mandatory. It is not until 1977 that the arms embargo is declared mandatory, by the UN Security Council, and that sport is included specifically in the Gleneagles agreement of the Commonwealth States. Since there are no other measures and/or sanctions taken against New Zealand, the Olympic boycott is a stand alone weapon and the goal is not the disruption of military adventures (Montreal:d).

There is no dispute involving New Zealand pending at the International Court of Justice nor at the Permanent Arbitration Court (Montreal:e).

**Table-6 – Montreal-total case score**

	YES	NO
1. Goal is modest	X	
2. Boycott announced in time with clarity on obligations target		X
3. Target is non-autocratic	X	
4. There is prior cordial relation between sender and target	X	
5. Target is smaller than sender	X	
6. Coalition is established quick and decisive	X	
7. Domestic costs are matched and not imposed on particular group		X
8. Boycott dispute is not pending at tribunal or court	X	
9. When standalone weapon goal is not disruption of military adventures.	X	

<sup>33</sup> France and the United Kingdom abstain from voting.

## **REACTION IOC**

On 16 August 1976 Killanin writes to all NOC's, showing his concern over the mixing of politics and Olympics.

'Ever since 1896 there have been politics in the Olympic Games, but never on the scale of Montreal. This has arisen on the one side because of an increased nationalism and on the other because of increased interest by governments in sport. The latter is advantageous when it leads to development in sport but not when it results in political dictation' (IOC archive:k).

Furthermore he asks all the boycotting NOC's to state their reasons in consideration of the Olympic rule that forbids political influence in the Olympics. Killanin also asks the IF's if they have any experience with political boycotts and if so, whether they impose sanctions on boycotting nations. The results of this questionnaire are to be discussed in the tripartite meeting of the IOC, NOC's and IF's in Barcelona later that year. After this meeting, on 7 November 1976 the IOC issues a statement in which they condemn the withdrawal of individual competitors and teams from international sport events for purely political reasons. 'Any such behaviour in the Olympic Games is in complete contradiction to the fundamental principles and rules and cannot be tolerated. The strongest action will be taken against all offenders who render themselves liable to suspension from all Olympic activities' (IOC archive:m). There is no specification on what the strongest action implies.

## **REVIEW ON THE MONTREAL OLYMPICS**

There are several events cancelled because of the boycott which made 441 athletes depart the Olympics. Over 100.000 tickets are reimbursed. Still there are 3.25 million tickets sold and the Games are praised for their efficient and good transportation, venues and entertainment events (Miller 2004:207). This despite the fact that total costs of 1.6 billion US dollars exceeds the in 1969 estimated cost of 120 million US dollars, excessively (Toohey&Veal 2007:89). The political problems set aside, the actual celebration of the Olympics progresses in peace. The only political hick ups are protests of Ukrainian immigrants against the inclusion of the Ukrainian athletes in the Soviet team. They wave Ukrainian flags, chant political slogans and burn a Soviet flag (Toohey&Veal 2007:108). After the Munich terrorists attack the security is intensively organised

in both 1976 Games. At the winter Games in Innsbruck the police outnumber the athletes by 2 to 1. In Montreal 16.000 security officials are on duty. They ensure a peaceful and incident free Olympics until the closing ceremony, when a streaker appears on the field; clearly wearing no identity-card(Senn1999:172).

## CASE 4: MOSCOW (1980)

### INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN 1980

In November 1978 presidents Begin and Sadat sign the Camp David Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt. In Iran the Shah is banned after the Revolution in February 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini establishes an Islamic Republic in Iran.

### INTRODUCTION TO THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS

In 1974 the IOC Session chooses Moscow to host the 1980 Olympic Games. The only other candidate is Los Angeles. The 1980 winter Olympics will be held in the USA (Lake Placid) and Killanin states that 'the selection of these two countries, combined with the fact that in 1984 Sarajevo and Los Angeles will be hosting the Games, indicates that the Olympics do surpass all political and ideological barriers' (Killanin quoted in Ecker 1996:123). The first mention of a possible boycott comes in spring 1978(!) from American president Carter. He uses the boycott threat to show his disapproval of human rights' violations in the Soviet Union. Soviet dissidents are trialled and sentenced to lengthy terms in prison and labour camps, presumably to deny the dissidents the opportunity to contact western visitor at the Olympics (Kanin 1981:116). 'When the prominent, Western-backed dissidents are cleared of charges through court proceedings, the boycott talk subsided' (Shinnik 1982:15). On 27 December 1979 the Soviet Union invades Afghanistan, according to the Soviets on invitation of the Kabul government. To the international community it is an 'act of aggression'. The fact that Afghanistan is a non-aligned state adds to the importance of the invasion. The UN General Assembly adopts a Resolution on 14 January 1980, in which it calls for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan but does not specifically mention the Soviet Union in it (UN 1980).

Carter addresses his nation about the situation in both Iran<sup>34</sup> and Afghanistan on 4 January 1980. He there says he considers a boycott of the Moscow Olympics although he prefers an American team to participate (Kanin 1981:118). In his diary Carter wrote (On 2 January) that 'only if many nations act in concert would I consider it [a boycott] to be a good idea' (Carter 1982:474). When the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) makes clear that according to them 'the best way to fight Soviet aggression is to beat them at the playing fields', Carter informs

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<sup>34</sup> On 4 November 1979 fifty-two members of the American Embassy staff in Teheran (Iran) is taken hostage. The hostage will eventually last 444 days (BBC News 2004:b).

about his possibilities to enforce a boycott, already by 17 January (Kanin 1981:118). His staff informs him that

‘although you are the Honorary President of the USOC, you have no legal authority over it. Indeed, the rules of the IOC state that NOC’s ‘must be autonomous and must resist all pressures of any kind whatsoever, whether of a political, religious, or economic nature’.[...] You do not have any legal authority to prevent American athletes or spectators from attending the Olympic Games in Moscow, unless you invoke the International Economic Emergency Control Act. To do this, you would have to declare a national emergency (as you did because of the events in Iran) arising out of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and then forbid any transaction between American travellers to the Soviet Union and any person or entity in the Soviet Union. If the USOC withdraws from the Olympics, no individual American athlete would be recognized as a participant under IOC rules’ (IOC archive:n).

Carter realises that he needs the USOC on his side and invites their president Kane en secretary-general Miller to meet with him and Secretary of State Vance at the White House. After this meeting on 18 January, the USOC states ‘if our Governments advocates a boycott, our athletes, under Olympic rules, must decide whether or not they wish to comply.[.....] If the President of the United States advocates a boycott, we will immediately poll prospective members of the U.S. team to ascertain their feelings about such an action. [.....] Based on the collective view of the athletes the USOC executive board will then make a decision on whether or not to enter athletes in the Games’ (Hulme jr.1990:23). Two days later, on 20 January, Carter officially makes the boycott threat: unless the Soviets withdraw their troop before 20 February 1980, the USA will boycott the Moscow Olympic Games. The American Attorney General informs Carter on the juridical strains on the presidential boycott announcement, seen that the president has no power in the USOC. ‘If you determine that you want your plan to have a compulsory effect, some legal mechanism beyond a simple Executive Order will be necessary’. Two congressional enactments, amending the Amateur Sports Act, are presented to be the most effective, but it is recommended that

‘you keep this congressional option in reserve, for use if you decide that a voluntary program will not work. ‘Other [non-congressional] options are the declaring of a national emergency to which prohibition of

transactions with Russians can follow, or the revocation of the passports of American athletes. [...] This option is drastic and accompanied by very significant legal, practical and policy problems and therefore rendered undesirable' (IOC archive:n).

On 25 and 26 January the USOC meets in Colorado Springs. There Kane and Miller bring Carter's proposal, to ask the IOC to move, postpone or cancel the Olympics, to the executive board of the USOC. The Executive Board votes unanimously to do so, despite previous announcements of members to vote against a boycott. Cople, head of the athletics union's wrestling division has informed the IOC on 18 January that he would not vote for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics.

'I am for the embargoes and everything else to make the Russians mad, but a boycott of us athletes is just the thing to make the Russians happy. If we don't send our athletes, it won't hurt the Russians. If we really want to make them mad we should move the Olympics, or if that cannot be done, we should send the athletes and have an American spectator boycott (IOC archive:o).

However, seen the unanimous vote he clearly changed his mind.

On 2 February Carter, represented by his council Cutler, officially demands Killanin to postpone or cancel the Games (Hill 1996:121,122). On 9 February USOC President Kane proposes the same to the IOC Session, which is in Session at the Winter Games in Lake Placid. Secretary of State Vance addresses the Session.<sup>35</sup> There is a Soviet team competing at the winter Olympics as well as there are Soviet nationals present at the IOC Session. Killanin opens the Session and states that the political problems of the world are not the responsibility of sporting bodies. Then he gives the floor to Vance who makes an 'improperly political speech' (Miller 2004:219). He lashes out to the Soviet Union

'in the view of my government it would be a violation of this fundamental Olympic principle (Olympic Truce KEO) to conduct or attend Olympic Games in a nation which is currently engaging in an oppressive war and has refused to comply with the world community's demand to halt its aggression. This is not a question of whether a national team should be barred from competing on political grounds. It is whether

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<sup>35</sup> To the dismay of Killanin, since it is custom that the head of state both addresses the IOC Session and opens the Olympic Games. Carter sent Vance to do both the tasks.

the Games should be held in a country which is itself committing a serious breach of the international peace [...] It is impossible to separate this decision from its political consequences. To hold the Olympics mantle to any nation that is warring on another is to lend the Olympic mantle to that nation's actions' (Vance quoted in Miller 1992:85).

He ends by saying: 'Responsibility for this matter should not be shifted to the athletes. That would only force them to carry a burden which properly belongs to the leader of the Olympic Movement. None of us wants our athletes to suffer, but neither should we let them be exposed' (idem). The speech of Vance has the opposite effect on the IOC members who are furious over this breach of protocol by Vance. All members vote unanimously that the Moscow Olympics will proceed as scheduled. The Moscow OCOG carries out all the requirements of their agreement so relocating the Games would both be illegal as well is impossible. Killanin also reminds the Americans that the Olympic had continued, including an American team, when America was occupying both Vietnam and Korea (Miller 2004:219). Killanin expresses his hope that all those interested in the Games of 1980, and of the future, would not allow events to be dictated by politics that are outside the control of the IOC (Miller 1992: 86). The latter IOC president Samaranch remembers that many IOC members expressed their support for Moscow like 'General Holst-Sorenson from Denmark, serving with the NATO air force [...] subsequently having difficulties at home on account of this. The same with Wajid Ali from right-wing Pakistan. People for whom it was not easy to make such views public, but who wanted them to be recorded' (Samaranch quoted in Miller 1992:86).

So ten days before his deadline, Carter has no support from the IOC and also the USOC has not decided yet. Carter sends out over a hundred letters to foreign leaders asking them to join the boycott, but most allies employ a 'wait and see' policy rather than deciding already in February 1980 (Hulme 1990:43). Besides not all ally governments are willing to exert pressure on their NOC's (Hill 1996:124). Carter, clearly adamant on a boycott anyhow, asks his Justice Department

'whether the activities of the IOC or the USOC might raise antitrust concerns of relevance to extant circumstances' (IOC archive:p).

The Justice Department advises Carter on 15 February that

'on the basis of the information presently available to us and the origin and operation of the IOC we believe that serious consideration of the

application of antitrust laws to the activities of existence of the IOC is unwarranted’  
(IOC archive:p).

On 20 February the White House issues a press statement.

‘A month has now expired and Soviet forces have not even begun to withdraw from Afghanistan. The President has therefore advised the United States Olympic Committee that his decision remains unchanged and that we should not send a team to Moscow [...] and asked it to take prompt action to formalize its acceptance of his decision’ (idem).

In the same press statement the White House claims that ‘on 14 February President Kane of the USOC issued a statement saying the USOC would of course accept any decision the President makes as to whether a team should be sent to Moscow’ (IOC idem). But Secretary-General Miller of the USOC publicly states that the USOC will make their final decision on 11-13 April. Also Kane criticizes Carter for saying that a boycott now was ‘irrevocable’ and for implying that the USOC is just ‘a rubber stamp’. Allegedly Kane reaction to Carter’s statement is: ‘Nothing is irrevocable but stupidity and death’ (Hulme 1990:25).

On 21 March American athletes are received by Carter for a dinner at the White House. Carter ‘informs the athletes that they will not go to the Olympics due to the seriousness of the Afghan situation’ (IOC archive:q). The athletes are not convinced that easily, however. One day later they, backed by the Athletes Advisory Council, state that they ‘agree with the president that the US must assume leadership in convincing the rest of the world to make the 1980 Olympic Games an instrument of protest’. However, they suggest participation under limitations like only a flag bearer takes part in the opening ceremony, athletes will not leave training facilities nor the Olympic village, athletes will not participate in any victory ceremony and will leave the country as soon as they are finished competing. (IOC archive:p). The White House answers on 4 April that they are convinced that

‘*only* complete absence of the Americans will show the Soviet people and the rest of the world the extent of US disapproval of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and clearly demonstrate that the US will not let our athletes be employed as pawns for Soviet propaganda’ (IOC archive:p, emphasis added KEO).

The proposal of the athletes (matching the way allies will be participating in Moscow) is deemed to be ineffective.

‘Not only do these ‘punishments’ not match the crime, Soviet officials could easily conceal them from the Soviet public since they have complete control of the Soviet mass media. But they cannot conceal the complete absence of a U.S. team’ (IOC archive:p).

On 7 April the President is informed by his staff that there might be ways to convince the USOC’s House of Delegates that will meet and vote on the boycott on 11-13 April. ‘We can win the House of delegates vote this weekend if we develop and announce a program (1) to honour the 1980 Olympic athletes who will be giving up their chance to compete in the Moscow Games and (2) to help the USOC stave off the financial disaster it faces’ (IOC archive:p). Before the delegates meet they all receive a letter or a telegram from Carter urging them to support the boycott (Hulme 1990:26). Furthermore Carter sends a delegation including Vice-president Mondale to address the House of Delegates. Mondale gives a speech and states that

‘Hitler in 1936 had used the Games as a means of globally ratifying his policies and of legitimizing his regime. The failure to boycott then was implied to be one causative element in the events precipitating World War II. [...] Today the US must refrain from conferring similar benefits of legitimacy and acceptance upon a Soviet regime engaged in blatant aggression. History holds its breath; for what is at stake is no less than the future of the civilized world’ (Mondale quoted in Hulme 1990:26).

The house of delegates of the USOC voted, according to a complex, weighted system, 1.607 to 797, with 2 abstentions, not to send a team to Moscow’ (ibid:27).

With the IOC deadline of admission on 24 May 1980 there is time left to discuss the boycott, despite the USOC vote. American athletes and one member of the Executive Board, led by rower Anita de Frantz take the USOC to court. They allege that the USOC, by preventing American athletes from competing in the Summer Olympics, exceeds its statutory powers and abridges the constitutional rights of the defendants (IOC archive:r). The case is dismissed and Anita, who is the spokesperson in the press, receives a lot of hate mail accusing her of unpatriotic behaviour and is a subject of FBI investigation for the same reason (Sports Illustrated 1988). She is decorated an Olympic Order in 1980 and is and IOC member since 1986.

In, perhaps a desperate attempt to save the Olympic Games, Killanin proposes a postponement of the Games of a year to Soviet president Brezhnev, but gets no positive reaction. Even if Brezhnev had said yes, one might wonder whether the IOC would have agreed to hold the

Games in a non-Olympic year. Carter informs Killanin in May 1980 that 'if the IOC decides on a one-year postponement without changing the site, the US will go along but still reserve its freedom to renew the boycott if the Soviets have not corrected the situation in Afghanistan' (IOC archive:p).

On 24 May 1980 it is clear that 63 NOC's will not compete at the Moscow Olympics. 81 NOC's do accept their invitation. Sixteen of them compete under the Olympic flag instead of their national flag. Of the 81 NOC's competing there are 13 NOC's that by competing, defy their governments support of the boycott, like Great Britain, Spain, Australia, Italy and the Netherlands (see also paragraph coalition page 88,89).

Just like the Hungarians in 1956, in Moscow the Afghan team is present. The Afghans are adamant in their disapproval of boycott which they regard as 'conspiracies hatched by the US administration and CIA in close collusion with the Chinese hegemonistic leadership' [...]

'It is not only directed against our country's independence, territorial integrity and national sovereignty as well as peace and tranquillity of the region but also aimed at marring the peaceful atmosphere for sportsmen and athletes, these harbingers of peace and international understanding, up to the point of physically eliminating them' (IOC archive:s, letter of Afghan NOC to chairman of IOC).

The last notion refers to the killing of the Afghan hockey team on 24 April 1980. The Afghan hockey team left Afghanistan to play a friendly pre-Olympic match against the Soviet Union. The team was ambushed at Baghlan and 18 of the 22 hockey players were killed along with their Indian coach. The Afghan NOC was convinced that the bandits were hired by the US imperialists and stated that

'this bastardly act of terrorism committed against our sportsmen is directly connected with the notorious Jimmy Carter's policy of boycotting the Moscow Olympic Games en it is only he to be blamed for' (idem).

Amidst all the heated boycott discussions the team of Rhodesia makes it back to the Olympic family, now representing Zimbabwe. They become the first ever Olympic champion in female hockey. Six teams had qualified for the premiere of female hockey, but five of them did not compete due to the boycott, leaving only the Soviet team in the hockey competition. The

Czechoslovakian, Austrian, Indian, Polish and Zimbabwean team are invited and the team of Zimbabwe wins the one medal for Zimbabwe, a golden one (Schaller&Hennaux eds. 2004:215).

If the employers of the IOC post room thought they had been busy in 1976 they could think again. In 1980 thousands of letters and petitions are sent to the IOC by the public from all over the world. Petitions to move or cancel the Games, people opposing the boycott and people supporting the boycott (IOC archive:t,u).

### **GOAL AND TIMING BOYCOTT**

The goal of the USA initiated boycott is clear, they want the Soviets to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. This requirement is stated officially on 20 January, after several weeks of talking about the boycott. This is exactly six months before the opening of the Olympic Games. A period of six months is in time for the target to act on the requirements. However the deadline is not the opening of the Olympics but 20 February. Hulme (1988) states 'that the White House never sought to use the threat of a boycott as a means of forcing the actual withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The desire was to punish, rather than to manipulate'. The timing and the nature of Carter's boycott deadline reveal this. There are between 85.000 and 100.000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Hulme (1988) claims that even if the Soviets wanted to they could never moved those troops out of Afghanistan in a few weeks (Hulme 1988: 47,48). Kanin states that the White House would have considered American presence at the Olympics following a Soviet withdrawal between 20 February and 24 May, but the State Department insisted on the 20 February deadline (Kanin 1981:120,121). The Soviets show no intention to withdraw their troops on 20 February and thereby show that they do not intend to comply with the requirements of the White House. The early deadline and the fact that already in January Carter is advised on how to make the boycott compulsory, imply that Carter did not expect a positive reaction of the Soviet side. Already on 12 February the White House staff states that 'over the next few months we will be directly challenging the IOC's authority over sports by planning for alternate Games' (IOC archive:p), which also shows no hope for a positive outcome. However one could hardly imagine the USA still boycotting the Games when the Soviets would have withdrawn their troops on any date between 20 February and the beginning of May. So despite the deadline set by the USA, I argue that the goal is made in time for the target to change its behaviour, considering that it was six months before the opening of the Games and considering that the Soviets could have made a move to withdraw even if total withdrawal would not have been possible before the set deadline.

**PRIOR RELATIONS & REGIME TYPE TARGET STATE**

The target state, the Soviet Union, represents an autocratic regime in 1980. They score -7 on the Polity IV index (Moscow:a).

The Soviet Union and the USA have full diplomatic relations by the exchange of ambassadors. Since Khrushchev came to power in 1953 the relation between the USA and the Soviet Union became more relaxed. A period of 'peaceful coexistence' or 'détente' is realised, to which the ending of the Vietnam War and the signing of the Helsinki Accords, both in 1975, attribute. A few months before the invasion of Afghanistan both parties sign the second SALT agreement<sup>36</sup> on nuclear arms. There is no full antagonistic relation in this period but neither is it cordial. That becomes clear after the invasion in Afghanistan; immediately the relations are severed again. The fact that economic sanctions are applied after the invasion in Afghanistan proves that there is an economical relation, which seems fragile. (Moscow:b).

**Table 7- Moscow-state size**

	Soviet Union	USA
<b>GNP</b>	1.375	2.418
(Ranking)	(--)	(--)
<b>Olympic medals</b>	125	94
(ranking)	(1)	(3)

(Grey column=target; white column = sender.

N.B.: GNP billion \$) (Moscow:c)

The GNP size difference is significant with almost a 1:2 ratio. The Soviet Union is smaller than the USA. The Soviet Union is however bigger on the Olympic scale. At the 1976 Olympics in Montreal the Soviet Union ended first and the USA third in the medal rank. The second place was for the German Democratic Republic with 90 medals (but score higher than the USA's 94 since the GDR won more gold medals). Japan finishes on the fourth place with 39 medals. The first three places do not differ that much seen the gap there is to place four and further. Therefore the Olympic difference is not significant and does not alter the score of the Soviet Union being the significantly smaller state of the two.

<sup>36</sup> Strategic Arms Limitations Talks.

In January 1980 Carter starts to ask allies to join the USA in the Olympic Boycott. In the end there are over sixty NOC's joining the American initiated boycott, leaving no doubt about the fact that there was a coalition. But did this coalition come about quick and decisive? I argue not, especially not considering the pace with which Carter is acting. He makes 20 February the deadline. By that date only the White House has decided on the boycott. The USOC as well as all allies have not made up their mind yet. The West European Allies of the USA are divided, but none is as adamant as Carter himself. One of the closest friends of the USA, Great Britain endorses the boycott. That is, Prime Minister Thatcher strongly supports Carter but also promises not to force anything on their athletes. Allegedly the British Minister of Sport Howell stated

‘in this country Magna Carta Rules, not Jimmy Carter’,

when US government officials campaigned for the boycott in the UK (Hill 1996:122). West Germany also supports the boycott but will not pressure their NOC by travel restrictions or financial measures. Other European governments, like Denmark and France for example, state their disapproval of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan but also state that only the NOC is in the position to accept or turn down the invitation to the Moscow Olympics. Although the European Parliament votes for supporting the boycott on 15 February 1980, the Foreign Ministers are unable to make a joint statement. The European Association of NOC's also convenes. Some NOC's, among whom the British, Spanish, French and Italian, state that they will attend the Games regardless their governments decision. In May 1980 eighteen West European NOC's meet in Rome and propose that NOC's can participate in Moscow without attending ceremonies and by sending teams without national flags, uniforms or anthems (Kanin 1981:135-137). Outside Europe many NOC's find governmental influence less problematic. African, Asian and Latin-American governments and NOC's react differently. Kenya joins the USA because they oppose the Soviet Union for their influence in the horn of Africa, while Nigeria condemns the Soviet Invasion but also refuses an Olympic boycott. In Uganda a pro-Moscow regime seizes power with a military coup so they do go to Moscow. Carter sends American boxer Muhammad Ali to Africa to gain support for the boycott in five African states. This has the opposite effect. The presidents of Tanzania and Nigeria are insulted that Carter sends a boxer instead of a diplomat or a high-level politician and refuse to meet with him (Kanin: 1981:143; Hulme 1990:46). Furthermore, Ali is not briefed very well by the White House. In Africa, Ali is confronted with the refusal of the USA to join in the African led boycotts against South-Africa. Ali seems unaware of this history which makes him candidly state that he would not have made this trip if he knew that upfront (Kanin

1981:142-143, Hulme 1990:46). In Latin-America as well as Asia some NOC's join the boycott, while others do not. Kanin (1981), Hulme (1990) and Hill (1996) describe the foreign reactions and formation of the coalition extensively.

### **DOMESTIC COSTS SENDER STATE(S)**

The athletes pay the price of not competing at the Olympics. The White House does compensate this by organising alternative Games and offering financial incentives to the USOC. The athletes are received at the White House for dinner with the president where they are welcomed as heroes, and receive a congressional medal. In his speech Carter expresses his sympathy for the athletes and praises them.

'You have endured pain, exhaustion and personal sacrifice through years of intense training' and now have 'their changes dashed by a brutal act of aggression and a threat to world peace. [...] I commend you for your excellence in competition, for your courage, for your demonstrated love of your country, and for your enhancement of freedom.[...] It is no exaggeration to say that you have done more to uphold the Olympic ideal than any other group of athletes in our history. Yet the meaning of your action goes beyond even that. Future generations will know what you did – not just from the record books but from the history books. They will know that in the year 1980, you did more than any other group of people, large or small, anywhere on earth, to hold high the banner of liberty and peace. That is a great achievement. I salute you for it. The American people salute you for it' (IOC archive:q).

Besides the compensating of costs there are also other domestic groups paying a price due to other, economic sanctions (see next paragraph).

### **OTHER MEASURES**

Already in January 1980 the White House starts to impose other sanctions to the Soviet Union. Carter embargoes the grain export from the USA to the USSR to the point where the USA still meets its obligation of the contract, stating 'he is not seeking to starve the Soviet Union into submission' (The Financial Times 1980). Cultural and scientific exchanges are deferred. The opening of consular facilities in Kiev and New York are cancelled and the services of Aeroflot are

restricted. Licences of high-technology exports are suspended and the USSR fishing rights in the US 200-mile zone are minimized in 1980 and later on stopped. The import of Soviet ammonia is restricted as is the export to the USSR of phosphates. In March an embargo is announced on all Olympic equipment to Moscow except medical supplies (Moscow:d).

There is no dispute involving the Russian occupation of Afghanistan pending neither at the International Court of Justice nor at the Permanent Arbitration Court (Moscow:e).

**Table 8- Moscow total case score**

	YES	NO
1. Goal is modest		X
2. Boycott announced in time with clarity on obligations target	X	
3. Target is non-autocratic		X
4. There is prior cordial relation between sender and target		X
5. Target is smaller than sender	X	
6. Coalition is established quick and decisive		X
7. Domestic costs are matched and not imposed on particular group	X	
8. Boycott dispute is not pending at tribunal or court	X	
9. When standalone weapon goal is not disruption of military adventures.		X

### REACTION IOC

Unsurprisingly the IOC is not amused with the adamant boycott-campaign of Carter. Adding to the frustration is the fact that the White House offends all Olympic rules by pressuring their NOC to comply with a government decision and by delivering a highly political speech at the IOC Session in Lake Placid. Killanin laments about the White House:

‘If they understand other matters as well as they understand sport, God help us all’ (Hulme 1988T:71-72).

The White House may not have understood sport but an internal memorandum shows that the White House did discover the potential of sport. On 30 June Carter is informed that

‘the boycott effort highlighted the significance of sports in all nations of the world and suggests that we can more effectively use sports programs to strengthen our foreign aid and foreign policy objectives. Our nation has the unique ability to participate in sports programs throughout the world because we have such a large number of black and Hispanic athletes and coaches’ (IOC archive:p).

‘The Executive Board asks the sixty-six Olympic Committees which stayed away to explain why they had done so. However, it seems that the enquiries were not very energetically pursued and that some quite feeble excuses were allowed to pass’ (Hill 1996:129). This despite the 1977 declaration of the IOC that

‘in the future, Olympic committees that withdrew from the Games for unexplainable reasons would be subjected to a five-year suspension’ (Senn 1999:174).

The Americans expect a harsher reaction seen the briefing Carter gets from his staff before a meeting with Killanin in May 1980. ‘Killanin says that at the IOC meetings during the last week of May, the Soviets and perhaps others may attempt to censure or suspend the USOC because it accepted the government’s recommendation to boycott. He is very much opposed to any such move and believes it will not pass. At the meeting you may want to say that future US support of the IOC would be seriously affected by any such step’ (IOC archive:p) The Ethiopian Olympic Committee argues to reconsider the site of Los Angeles for the 1984 Games, but does not find support within the IOC.

## **REVIEW ON THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS**

The Soviets win the most medals at the Olympics and the East Germans take the second place. However, while the Games do continue Killanin says they were ‘fundamentally sad since there were too many absent faces and too many doubts and scruples on the part of those who were there’ (Miller 2004:222).

The boycott does not bring an end to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. However Carter, in retrospect in 1983, feels the boycott did work stating

‘The fact that the troops are still in Afghanistan indicates that we generated enough international reaction to make their takeover more difficult. The boycott damaged their international standing. It could be argued that without it, they would have also sent troops to Poland’ (Toohey 1984:163)

There are only a few that, by then, still admire President Carter ‘for having the guts to spoil their [Soviet KEO] party’, like American Sport journalist Howard Cosell (quoted in Senn 1999:187). Most commentators (Hill 1996, Senn 1999, Miller 2004) argue the boycott was ineffective and agree with Killanin that Carter was very insensitive to the Olympic Movement and all its members. Hill (1996:126) states, that Carters worst exhibition of insensitivity is the fact that in 1982 he is ‘photographed jogging in an Olympic tracksuit, which had been designed for the sole use of Olympic athletes in the US team’.

Due to the sixteen NOC’s competing under the Olympic flag there is a medal ceremony without any national hymns or flags, a first in Olympic history. The three medal-winners of the 4000 meter individual cycle pursuit are Swiss, French and Danish and are honoured under Olympic banners (Senn 1999:184).

## CASE 5 – LOS ANGELES (1984)

### INTRODUCTION TO THE LOS ANGELES OLYMPICS

The Olympic Games of 1984 are awarded to Los Angeles in 1976. Los Angeles is the only candidate, after Teheran withdrew from the bid. Los Angeles organises the Games without financial support from the US government. Director of the Los Angeles Olympic Organising Committee (LAOOC) Peter Ueberroth, sets up the first private enterprise to organise the Olympics. The LAOOC end the Games with a surplus of 223 million US dollars, due to, among other things, lucrative sponsor deals. It leads to discussions about unwanted commercialisation of the Olympics, for example the selling of 1 kilometre laps of the torch run for \$ 3.000. The Greek are appalled by this commercial violation of the purity of the flame and refuse to let the flame be kindled in Olympia. The money raised with this particular part of sponsorship will go to youth charity and while that wins over the IOC the Greek still object. Two Swiss students, working in Greece on an Olympic project then smuggle the flame to Lausanne. Their action is filmed to show that they lit the flame according to tradition. After the Greek are threatened to have to walk in their alphabetically place in the opening ceremony, instead of the usual first place, the Greek eventually give their permission for the 'normal' flame ceremony at Olympia (Hill 1996:145,146).

In September 1981 the USA invites the Rugby team of South Africa to play three Games on US soil. The South Africans get their visa to enter the USA, despite the IOC advising the Reagan Government to reconsider issuing the visa. African nations immediately threaten with repercussions in 1984. It leads to fears of a boycott from the Soviet Union since they are allies of most African countries (Wilson 1993:64) However after the IOC Session in Baden-Baden in 1981 the African nations lift the boycott threat.

The fear of a Soviet boycott does become a reality. In the summer of 1982 the Soviet sports minister Pavlov announces that the lack of security can be reason for the Soviet Olympic team to withdraw from the Olympics. After the death of Brezhnev the sports minister is replaced by Gramov, who is against a boycott. The Soviets continue to prepare for participation and sign contracts for television broadcasting and ticket sales, with the LAOOC, which indeed indicates their intention to participate (ibid:65). The cooperation between the Soviets and the Americans does not go smoothly though. The USA increases the number of staff at the immigration service because they expect a number of Soviet defections. The Soviets and other Eastern European NOC's are offended by this as they are with the questionnaire Soviet officials, like coaches and technical

staff, had to fill out in order to obtain a visa. Membership of the Communist party is placed in the same category as having committed a heinous crime, drug addiction or having a contagious disease (Toohey 1984:165). Then on 1 September 1983 Soviet jet fighters shoot down a civilian flight of Korean Air Lines. The Boeing 747 from New York to Seoul flies over the Sakhalin Peninsula, a sensitive security area of the Soviet Union. The Boeing fails to acknowledge repeated warnings by the Soviet Air Force and is therefore shot down. All the 269 passengers, 81 of them American citizens, and crew aboard die (Wilson 1993:66). American President Reagan calls the attack 'the Korean Massacre' and asks the UN Security Council for sanctions but the Soviet Union veto's a resolution (Reagan 1983). In the USA a civilian protest group 'Ban the Soviets' is established. They focus both on getting the Soviets to withdraw voluntarily and on encouraging the IOC to ban the Soviets. They allow anyone of school age or older to sign their petition 'since there were also children killed in the Soviet massacre of flight 007' (IOC archive:w). They also lobby to state and national politicians and they brief LA police officials on Soviet spying and terrorism techniques (idem). Two weeks after the shoot down the Californian State Legislature, the home state of the coalition unanimously adopts a resolution calling upon President Reagan and Congress to ban Soviet athletes to compete in the 1984 Olympics (Wilson 1993:66). Reaction from Olympic and other government officials is immediate. USOC President Miller is highly critical of the Legislature's action stating, 'everyone has been invited to Los Angeles and to renege on this at this time would be very, very dangerous to the survival of the Olympics and the Olympic Movement' (Toohey 1984:163). Americans wear t-shirts with the text 'Kill a Commie' and banners with the same text are hung in public spaces. It makes the Soviets worry even more about the safety of their athletes and staff (Miller 1992:89). The Ban the Soviet coalition draw a resolution with which they ask 'selected legislators in all American states' to focus on, among other things,

'the likelihood of Soviets inspired and orchestrated terrorism; theft of United States high technology, prevention of Soviet Olympic cheating abuses, undercharging the Soviets for Olympic broadcast rights and the prevention of Soviet spying and subversion by 5000 KGB agents and operatives disguised as Olympic visitors' (IOC archive:w).

In January 1984 Soviet officials meet with the Executive Board in Los Angeles. The Soviets have four concerns about attending the Olympics. The costs of staying in the Olympic Village are too high for the Soviet athletes and officials. Therefore, and for security reasons, they want to house their athletes on a Soviet ship, so they need permission to dock that ship in the LA harbour.

Furthermore they want permission for Aeroflot to take the Soviets to America and the recognition of Olympic Identity Cards instead of visas, according to Olympic protocol (Hill 1996:149). A few weeks later Soviet NOC president Gramov announces that the decision whether or not to participate will not be taken until 24 April (*idem*). One member of the Soviet delegation can not enter the USA because his visum is denied. Yermiskhin, the man in question, is deemed an active member of the KGB (Soviet State Security Department, KEO) by the US Government and is therefore denied entrance. Yermiskhin is later appointed as the Soviet Olympic attaché to the Los Angeles Olympics, and he is named as such in the contract between the Soviet NOC and the LAOOC. The Soviet attaché should take residence in Los Angeles no later than 1 March, according to this contract. On that day, the State Department again refuses to issue a visa for Yermiskhin (Hill 1996:150,151).

On 4 April there is a meeting at the IOC headquarters in Lausanne between the Soviet NOC and the LAOOC. After the meeting the Soviets state that they will attend the Games provided that the Olympic Charter is respected. The problem is that the demands of the Soviets considering visas, travel and housing arrangements are in the hands of the US government and not the LAOOC. On 11 April Gramov issues a statement and asks the IOC to convene an extraordinary meeting of the Executive Board to discuss the situation. The situation Gramov is referring to is

‘the large-scale campaign against the Soviet Union’s participation in the Olympic Games that has been mounted in the USA [...] enjoying the support of US official services [...]. Open threats of physical victimization and provocative actions are made to sportsmen and officials of the USSR and other socialist countries. Slanderous allegations are being made that the participation of a Soviet delegation in the Olympic Games would presumably threaten U.S. security. Besides the fear of safety of the Soviet participants the US government does not wish to grant the Soviet entry into the US upon their Olympic Identity Card, but wants them to obtain normal visa’s (IOC archive:x).

On 5 May Gramov publicly invites the president of the Association of National Olympic Committee’s (ANOC) to discuss the poor performance of the LAOOC with him. Samaranch at that time is about to meet with US President Reagan on 8 May, after the opening of the torch relay. Samaranch wants to ask Reagan to show even firmer support to the Olympics than he already had done, but just before they meet, the Soviet Union officially state that they will not participate in

Los Angeles (Hill 1996:152). Samaranch replies to the Soviet NOC with the orally and written reassurances that the Olympic Charter will be respected and that all NOC's are welcome in Los Angeles. On 10 May the Soviet NOC issues a press statement explaining their decision of non-participation because

‘the chauvinistic sentiments and [...] anti-Soviet hysteria are being whipped up in the country [...] aiming to create unbearable conditions for the stay of the soviet delegation and performances by soviet athletes’ (IOC archive:x).

Samaranch makes a public statement on 11 May in which he regrets not only the decision of the Soviet NOC but also the fact that they decided this ‘without warning and without having made new requests to the IOC or the LAOOC since their meeting on 24 April. Samaranch publicly state that he was ready to travel to Moscow to speak with Chernenko any moment (idem). On 18 May Gramov visits the Commission of the Olympic Movement of the IOC where he repeats the unanimous decision of the Soviet NOC not to participate. Besides the already mentioned examples Gramov recalls the many refusals of visa to Soviet journalists and the fact that a soviet exchange student is not able to travel back to the Soviet Union, he is removed from the plane to Moscow despite his protest and still remains at the Soviet embassy. According to Gramov this makes many parents of athletes wonder whether it is safe for their children to travel to the USA. Gramov also reminds the IOC that the Soviets non-participation is for security reasons only. They do not issue other sanctions, for example on Olympic equipment, like the American did in 1980 (IOC archive:v). The IOC Commission deplores the Soviet decision,

‘it deprives the athletes of the possibility of meeting and competing in an atmosphere of friendship and good understanding in the framework of the Olympic Games’ (IOC archive:x).

Most socialist NOC's follow the Soviets quickly, leading to fourteen NOC's not participating in Los Angeles. The Assembly of Captive European Nations, representing nine Soviet satellite states<sup>37</sup> in the free world, stated that those states were ‘subjugated by the Soviet Union and the decision to boycott the 1984 Olympic was imposed upon them’. They therefore asked the IOC ‘to disregard their decision and to admit to the Olympic Games those athletes of the captive nations who are now in the free world, or to express its disapproval in another meaningful way, such as playing

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<sup>37</sup> Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania.

national anthems of these nations to mark their symbolic presence at the opening and at the closing of the 1984 Olympic Games' (IOC archive:y).

**GOAL AND TIMING OF BOYCOTT**

The stated goal of the boycott is a concrete and specified request of the Soviet NOC including the permission to dock a Soviet ship in the Los Angeles Harbour to house their athletes and staff, to gain entry in the States on a Olympic Identity card, to permit Aeroflot landing rights in Los Angeles and to have guarantees to be safe from aggressive protests. These represent modest and specified goals. Since these requests have been made first in the beginning of April these request were made in time for the target state to fulfil them or at least show that they were working on improvement.

**PRIOR RELATIONS & REGIME TYPE TARGET STATE**

The target state USA represents a democracy on the Polity IV index, with a maximum score of 10 (Los Angeles:a).

The USA and the Soviet Union still have full diplomatic relations. The content of their political relation has altered since the invasion in Afghanistan, the Olympic boycott and the other sanction applied by the USA and the restraints then applied are still in force. The relation between the two states is not cordial (Los Angeles:b).

**Table 9- Los Angeles- state size**

	USA	Soviet Union
<b>GNP</b>	<b>2.958</b>	<b>1.587</b>
(Ranking)	(--)	(--)
<b>Olympic medals</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>125</b>
(ranking) <sup>38</sup>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(1)</b>

(Grey column=target; white column = sender.  
N.B. GNP billion \$) (Los Angeles:c)

<sup>38</sup> the Olympic score is that of 1976 since that were the last Olympics both NOC participated and therefore can be compared

The GNP size difference is significant with still almost a 1:2 ratio. The Soviet Union is smaller than the USA. Like the Moscow case I score the Soviet Union to be significantly smaller than the USA despite their higher score on the Olympic ranking (see page 87).

On 24 May 1980 there is a meeting of the sports ministers and NOC's of 11 Socialist countries in Prague. IOC president Samaranch attends the meeting and asks the NOC's to consider participating in the Los Angeles Olympics despite the Soviet withdrawal. Romania states that they will attend the Games, but all other Soviet bloc states support Moscow and withdraw from the Games. The coalition is established quite soon after the final decision and only a fortnight later the public decision of the Soviet allies is made. The coalition establishes along clear lines of Moscow allies. However Moscow uses incentives, for example with Poland, offering them a delay to repay its trade deficit until 1990 (Wilson 1993:77). Romania is the only East European socialist state going to the Olympics thereby defying Moscow influence. 'The Czechoslovaks complain to the Rumanians that their decision to participate will make it more difficult to explain Czechoslovak non-participation to their own people' (ibid:109). On the other side the Romanians are praised for their action by the Americans and the IOC. The LAOOC pays travel expenses and picks up other bills for the Romanians. The US government recommends a year's extension to Romania's Most Favoured Nations Status and extends their bilateral commercial agreement for an additional three years, according to promises of Reagan to Romania's leader Ceausescu before 24 May 1984. The US ambassador to Romania, Funderburk, thinks this is ill-advised, since it was rewarding Ceausescu for doing something he was going to do anyway. Ceausescu indeed had promised Samaranch already on 5 May that Romania would participate, regardless the Soviet decision (Wilson 1993:89-92). Ceausescu is awarded the Olympic Order by Samaranch. This decision becomes contested later on but Samaranch states 'the Olympic Order [...] had nothing to do with any recognition of his domestic governing of the country, but (with) the important action of breaking the boycott by the communist countries' (Samaranch quoted in Miller 1992:90).

The Peoples Republic of China also participates at the Los Angeles Olympics, a re-entry after fifty years of absence. This is even more special since all sports exchanges between China and the USA are cancelled in April 1983 after the US government granted asylum to the Chinese tennis player Hu Na. She defected while taking part in a Californian tennis tournament in 1982. The Chinese do not attend the pre-Olympic events, but the criticism of the LAOOC on the Hu asylum decision helps to make the Chinese participation possible (Toohey 1984:167).

Most African NOC's compete at the Los Angeles Olympics, much to the relieve of the IOC. The Soviet Union has many allies in Africa. Prior to the Olympics, the Rugby team of England toured South Africa, leading to fears of a repetition of the Montreal boycott. Furthermore, the English Olympic team includes the South African runner Zola Budd who obtained the English nationality due to preferential treatment. The Organisation of African Unity and the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa leave the decision to boycott or not up to each country. Only Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso, KEO) withdraws for this reason. The one Libyan athlete and two officials go home after three Libyan journalists are refused visa to the USA for security reasons (Toohey 1984:166).

Two weeks before the opening of the Games more pressure is added when the NOC's of Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Malaysia, China and Singapore receive racist hate leaflets. 'There are no signatures [on them], except a cartoon insignia of a white-robed horseman over the caption 'Ku-Klux-Klan'. The US State Department states the letters are probably 'not written by a native English speaker' and suggest that the Soviet Union is behind the campaign (Toohey 1984:167).

Considering all this, the fact that 'only' fourteen NOC's boycott the Los Angeles Olympics is regarded as a success for Samaranch who is presiding his first Olympics. He can next turn his attention to the coming Olympics in Seoul, where again political pressure is expected.

#### **DOMESTIC COSTS SENDER STATE(S)**

The costs are born by the athletes who could not compete at the Olympics. There were no other measures and the Soviets clearly stated that they did not prohibit normal trade and business between the Soviet Union and the United States. There is no mention of an alternative ceremony or decoration of athletes by the Soviet Government or NOC.

#### **OTHER MEASURES**

There are no other measures taken against the USA by the Soviet Union at the time of the Olympic boycott, nor are other measures taken by other boycotting states. The Olympic boycott therefore is a standalone weapon, and the goal is not disruption of military adventures.

There is no dispute involving the Russian demands like the landing rights or docking rights pending at the International Court of Justice nor at the Permanent Arbitration Court (Los Angeles:d).

**Table 10- Los Angeles- total case score**

	YES	NO
1. Goal is modest	X	
2. Boycott announced in time with clarity on obligations target	X	
3. Target is non-autocratic	X	
4. There is prior cordial relation between sender and target		X
5. Target is smaller than sender		X
6. Coalition is established quick and decisive	X	
7. Domestic costs are matched and not imposed on particular group		X
8. Boycott dispute is not pending at tribunal or court	X	
9. When standalone weapon goal is not disruption of military adventures.	X	

**REACTION IOC**

After the boycott decision Samaranch plans a special IOC session in Lausanne in December 1984 to discuss whether participation of the Olympics should be made compulsory for member NOC's, whether there should be punishments for non-competing NOC's and if so, which ones. All NOC's are asked to provide the IOC with their proposals. The LAOOC president Ueberroth states that he 'remains opposed to any efforts to punish athletes for political purposes. History has proven that the use and abuse of athletes for political purposes, only hurts young individuals rather than achieving any political gain' (Toohey 1984:163). After long debate on the IOC session in December 1984 the IOC decides on the 'problem of political intrusion of the Olympic Games [...] the solution does not consist if imposing further punishment affecting the athletes for whom the Olympic Games exist' (IOC Session 1984:192). Samaranch, who at first is promoting the suspension of boycotting NOC's and wants participation to be compulsory, revises his opinion at the special IOC session. The IOC changes the way NOC's are invited, from now on the invitations are sent out by the IOC and no longer by the Organising Committee (Miller 2004:250).

**REVIEW ON THE LOS ANGELES OLYMPICS**

Some of the Olympic contests are heavily affected by the boycott. The absent NOC's represent 58% of the medals won at the Montreal Olympics in 1976. Luckily the professional footballers make their debut at the Olympics providing an exciting new contest which is highly appreciated

by the public. In absence of the Soviet Union and East Germany the Americans win the most medals.

After the withdrawal of the Soviet NOC the LAOOC president Ueberroth suggests that no judges and referees of the boycotting states should be allowed. 'How can they operate calmly and effectively if it is unsafe for them to be present on American soil?' (Miller 1992:92). His suggestion is not applied since the International Federations regard this too disruptive (*idem*). So there are Soviets present at the Los Angeles Games. Despite the fears of the Ban the Soviet Coalition, there is no mention of a (terrorist) attack by a Soviet citizen or KGB agent. The Los Angeles bomb squad however has to act just ten minutes before the opening ceremony, on what appears to be a false alarm. During the Games they are called in on average twice a day. The day after the closing ceremonies, when most athletes are transported to the airport, a real bomb is discovered, planted on the bus of the Turkish athletes. A Los Angeles policeman heroically dismantles the bomb for which he is publicly praised. The bomb is not from Soviet descent but was planted there by the Los Angeles policeman who dismantled it (Ecker 1996:131).

## CASE 6: SEOUL (1988)

### INTRODUCTION TO THE SEOUL OLYMPICS

The IOC Session chooses Seoul to host the 1988 Olympics in 1981. The only other candidate is Nagoya in Japan, who is bidding for the third time. Melbourne and Athens withdraw before the election by the IOC Session. The South Korean political situation is far from stable at the time of the election. In October 1979 Major-General Park Chung Lee is assassinated and a period of chaos after that lasts two years. In February 1981 the new state leader, Major-General Chun Doo-Hwan becomes president. He shows little sign of ending the tradition of authoritarian rule. South Korea has no diplomatic relations with any of the socialist countries in the world, which would increase the possibility of another boycott, when Seoul is host city. Moreover the situation between North and South Korea is tense and there is fear of the outbreak of war between the two. So Nagoya clearly seems to have the better cards (Hill 1996:162). But after almost two hours of voting Seoul comes up winning the honour of hosting the 1988 Olympics. The Seoul delegation gives away first class roundtrip tickets to IOC members, which can be redeemed for cash. The Japanese IOC member alienates many IOC members from the Asian-Arab bloc, by vigorously criticising Seoul. According the LAOOC President Ueberroth these are the main reasons for the victory of Seoul (ibid: 168).

Soon after the election the first threat of a boycott is made by the Soviet Union. Their concerns are the same as in the case of the LA Olympics. The safety of the Soviet athletes, the docking of a Soviet ship in Korean waters, landing rights for Aeroflot, the fear of inducing Soviet citizens to defection. Another similarity to the LA Olympics is that the Seoul Olympic Committee (SLOOC) has to deal with these issues without governmental help. Not because of a tactical choice, like in the US case, but because the government simply does not have a diplomatic relation with the Soviet Union, nor any other socialist country. Another interest of the Soviets is the position of North Korea. The latter asks the IOC in the summer of 1985 to co-host the Olympics. The Soviet Union then state that 'some movement by Seoul towards sharing [with North Korea, KEO] would help the Soviet bloc to participate' (Hill 1996:172). While Seoul is not keen on the idea, Samaranch arranges several meetings with the two Korea's. In October 1985 North Korea wants a fifty-fifty division of the events and a separate opening and closing ceremony in both Seoul and Pyongyang. A second meeting is held in January 1986. South Korea offers four Olympic events to be held in North Korea, but they want at least eight events. In June 1986 the North

Koreans are offered to host archery and table tennis. Furthermore they can share cycle and soccer events, but the North Koreans hold on to their demand of organising eight events. In October 1986, Samaranch sets the deadline on 17 September 1987, the day on which the invitations to the 1988 Olympics will go out (Senn 1999:221,222).

In 1987 more problems appear on the Olympic horizon. The president of South Korea, Chun Doo Hwan had promised he would leave office by March 1988. However on 13 April 1987 he announces that the government will suspend political reform until after the Olympics. The South Korean government state that it wants to uphold the political and social stability of that moment. The opposition argues that Chun Doo Hwan was using the image of the Olympics to bolster its prestige at home and abroad and they compare the Seoul Olympics to those of Berlin 1936 (Senn 1999:223). The postponement of the democratic reforms, leads to many (student) protest demonstrations which are terminated with force by the army. Dissidents are detained and jailed 'prompted largely by the government's fear that domestic unrest would cause it to lose the Games and, more importantly, the opportunity to enhance Seoul's image in the world business and diplomatic communities (Jefferson Lenskyj 2000:112). On 10 June 1987 Major-General Chun Doo Hwan appoints his successor, the chairman of the reigning Democratic Justice Party, Roh Tae Woo. This announcement leads to even more demonstrations and now middle class businessmen join the students in action. Mass demonstrations are dealt with by the army using tear gas. On 19 June the president of the USOC states that 'the Americans had not been given any information that will lead us to believe we should be considering alternative places or do other things' but also says

'they don't want to participate in any athletic event where tear gas is popping off outside the stadium' (Senn:1999:224).

On 29 June Roh Tae Woo announces that he will support direct presidential elections, among other reforms, or he will resign. It makes him a national hero and leaves the opposition in disarray (Hill 1996:163).

In November 1987 another flashback to the previous Olympics and its political problems appears. A South Korean aircraft is destroyed while flying over Burma, killing all 115 passengers aboard. The plane flying from Baghdad to Seoul is planted with a bomb, allegedly by North Korean secret agents (Hill 1996:173, Miller 2004:251).

In July 1987 Seoul is ready to offer six events and starts the negotiations by offering five to the North Koreans. North Korea will not settle for less than eight sports however (Hill 1996:172).

The North Koreans declare the postponed elections in the South a reason to suspend further negotiations. They 'request the IOC to suspend all discussions until the results become known, given that it would be easier to come to an agreement with the new authorities'. The talks already have been difficult, according to North Korea, as a result of the 'systematic opposition and the very serious insults of the South Koreans to them' (IOC archive:z).

In South Korea the promised elections take place in December 1987. President Roh Tae Woo wins the election and now is the chosen leader (Senn 1999:226-227).

The IOC's Olympic Solidarity fund offers a financial incentive to all NOC's that will participate, amongst which a stay in the Olympic village for 20 day's for 8 persons, 8 air tickets, and \$ 8.000 per NOC for equipment. The IOC offers NOC's a subsidy of \$ 500 per competing athlete. The NOC's that decide not to participate will not benefit from revenues derived from the Games, including all Olympic Solidarity aid for the next four years (IOC archive:aa).

In January 1988 the Soviet NOC accepts the invitation to the Seoul Games. Gramov, now minister of sport states about the Seoul Olympics

'there should be as many nations as possible, the Olympic philosophy is to promote cooperation. Now is the time when all countries, irrespective of social systems, believe it is better to find way of closer understanding. I can tell you firmly that we shall participate' (Gramov quoted in Miller 2004:255,256).

After this statement other socialist states soon followed the Soviets in accepting the invitation. On 17 January 1988, the deadline for the invitation acceptance, 161 NOC's have declared their participation at the Olympics. North Korea states it would not participate claiming

'they had left no stone unturned so that the co-hosting problem can be solved. [...] Unfortunately this efforts ended in vain owing to the unjust position of the south.[...] We will not participate in the Olympic Games, in case this be held single-handedly and forcibly in Seoul, going against our nation's aspiration for the reunification' (IOC archive:ab).

In the end 'only' Cuba and Ethiopia join the boycott of North Korea. Albania, Nicaragua and the Seychelles do not accept the invitation either but it is unclear on which grounds. Senn (1999:226) states it is for other reasons, whereas the Reuters Press Agency specifically states that they join North Korea (IOC archive:aa).

Then yet another flashback, an international rugby tour is planned to be played in South Africa. The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa states that fifty NOC's might boycott if this tour goes ahead. The IOC immediately reacts that rugby is (still) not an Olympic sport and the tour therefore has nothing to do with the IOC. Also the first appearance of tennis in the Olympic programme means that athletes will be present who have competed in South Africa, before tennis was an Olympic sport (Miller 2004:251). The threat of an African boycott does not crystallize and all African NOC's, except Ethiopia, participate in the Seoul Olympics. (Senn 1999:228).

### **GOAL AND TIMING BOYCOTT**

The Seoul boycott is different from other Olympic boycotts. There is a political goal, namely the reunification of the two Korea's, but the demand of the boycott is the co-hosting of the Olympic Games, thereby stating that co-hosting is showing a real intent to reunification. Although this demand offers quite an organisational challenge, comparing to disrupting military adventures, this constitutes as a modest and specified goal. The question is asked in time as well to make the co-hosting possible. Perhaps the most surprising of these boycott demands is the fact that the IOC not only facilitates the negotiations, but also takes part in them. If successful it would have been the first Olympic Games awarded to a nation, while the Olympic Charter states 'that the organisation of the Games is entrusted by the IOC to a city' (IOC 2007:71). Senn (1999) and Miller (2004) both argue that Samaranch was very keen on avoiding a North Korean boycott, since all socialist state were allies of North Korea and had no diplomatic relations with South Korea (Senn:220, Miller:250).

### **PRIOR RELATIONS & REGIME TYPE TARGET STATE**

The target state South Korea constituted an anocratic regime with a score of -5 on the Polity IV Index in 1988 (Seoul:a).

In 1953 an armistice agreement is signed by North and South Korea, however the Korean War officially has not ended yet. In the beginning of the ninety-eighties the hostile inter Korean relation become a little less tense after the North sends relief goods to the South after a typhoon in 1984. This is followed by exchanging family visits between the North and the South in 1985. However the relation stays tense, especially after in 1985 four South Korean cabinet members are assassinated in Rangoon, allegedly by North Korea. The bombing of the South Korean flight in 1987 also is attributed to North Korea, whereby civilians are killed (Seoul:b). The hostile relations

also exist in the sport arena. At least in the 1974 Asian Games where North and South Korea refused to compete with each other. They made an exception for the volleyball competition since then parties are separated by a net (Espy 1979:160).

**Table 11- Seoul- state size**

	South Korea	North Korea	Coalition total
<b>GPD</b>	140	28	55.5
(ranking)	(18)	(--)	(--)
<b>Olympic medals</b>	6	2	15
(ranking)	(19)	(21)	(--)

(Grey column=target; white column = sender. GDP= billion \$, NB score North Korea of year 1989) (Seoul:c).

South Korea clearly outweighs North Korea economically. The Olympic score is of the 1976 Montreal Olympics, since that is the previous year that both NOC compete. South Korea joins the boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980 while North Korea does boycott the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984. The whole coalition outweighs South Korea on the Olympic medal scale, since Cuba won 13 medals at the 1976 Montreal Olympics. Ethiopia boycotts these Olympic but on a general note win a maximum of 4 medals (none in 1972, 4 in 1980 and 3 in 1992). The total GDP of the three boycotting states however show such a significant size difference, that the small Olympic size difference does not change the fact that South Korea scores significantly higher on the economic scale. The difference is even higher than presented here, since the data of the boycotting states is hardly available before 1988 I used the estimates of 1989 of the CIA world factbook (Ethiopia 6.6 billion \$, Cuba 20.9 billion \$). South Korea shows an explosive growth and its GDP in 1989 is 230,47 billion \$ even widening the gap.

The coalition is not established quick and decisive. On the contrary, most socialist allies of North Korea do compete at Seoul. The initiative of participation of the socialist allies is taken by the Soviet Union. The Soviets clearly aim for more cooperation in the Olympic Movement, in line with the more cooperative and open approach of the Soviet government in other fields, under the reign of Michael Gorbachev. Cuban president Fidel Castro disapproves of the communist bloc nations competing. 'It is very ugly that other socialist nations have gone to Seoul. Fraternal friends do not abandon each other' (IOC archive:aa).

**DOMESTIC COSTS SENDER STATE(S)**

The costs are born by the athletes, probably most by the Cubans since they have some strong contenders in baseball, women's volleyball, boxing and some track and field events. The 173 Cuban Olympic athletes are decorated with the Cuban Golden Order for 'the dignified attitude it took to support North-Korea' (IOC archive:aa). Furthermore the Cubans are awarded with a medal, a book and a watch by North Korean minister Kim Chang Ju (idem). Whether the North-Korean athletes or other non-competing allies receive the same compensation is unclear. However, besides this compensation of the costs, there are no other measures taken by North Korea and its boycotting allies. The absence of sanctions means that the costs were born only by the athletes and not by other groups of society.

**OTHER MEASURES**

There are no other measures taken against South Korea by North-Korea and its allies. On the contrary: Cuba and Ethiopia were themselves target of sanctions of the United States at the time.

There is no dispute involving the Korean reunification pending at the International Court of Justice nor at the Permanent Arbitration Court (Seoul:d).

**Table 12-Seoul- total case score**

	YES	NO
1. Goal is modest	X	
2. Boycott announced in time with clarity on obligations target	X	
3. Target is non-autocratic	X	
4. There is prior cordial relation between sender and target		X
5. Target is smaller than sender		X
6. Coalition is established quick and decisive		X
7. Domestic costs are matched and not imposed on particular group		X
8. Boycott dispute is not pending at tribunal or court	X	
9. When standalone weapon goal is not disruption of military adventures.	X	

## **REACTION IOC**

The IOC considers the Games very successful. Three NOC's do boycott and Samaranch's efforts to make both Korea's co-host are not fulfilled. However, there was fear of all socialist states boycotting so the participation of 159 NOC's after the big boycotts of 1980 and 1984, is reason for celebration as well as hope that the boycott era is over.

## **REVIEW ON THE SEOUL OLYMPICS**

The Seoul Olympics make a profit of 497 million US dollar. A major part of the profit is provided by the sales of apartments of the Olympic village after the Games. This also leads to criticism. The city had promised to include subsidized housing in the post-Games Olympic village but in the end most of the apartments are sold on the open market creating an upper-middle-class residential city (Jefferson Lenskyj 2000:115).

The Seoul Olympics are a great success for the Olympic Movement. Despite threats and recent history, the boycott era seems ended. The Olympics had a positive influence on the democratization process of the Republic of Korea, according to Samaranch. South Korea enforces his claim by releasing fifty-two political prisoners just after the Olympics ended. Not everybody is that easily convinced however. The Pope, visiting China a few days later says 'he is keeping an eye on the injustice and human rights record of the South Korean government' (Hill 1996:179). The Olympics do have a significant and lasting effect on the position of South Korea in the international community. The lack of diplomatic relations meant that the Seoul Olympic Committee (SLOOC) had to work through Olympic channels, establishing consular relations on a temporary basis, which in the case of Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Mongolia and the USSR precluded full diplomatic relations (Hill 1996:170).

In the end the Seoul Olympics are not remembered for the political problems in the lead up to the Games. The one thing that springs most people to mind is the positive doping test of the gold medallist of the 100 meter sprint, Ben Johnson who had to hand over his gold medal to Carl Lewis.

## 7- NON-BOYCOTTS

### INTRODUCTION

As stated in the general introduction (chapter 1) there are a couple of cases in which you might expect an Olympic boycott to occur, because circumstances were similar to those leading to a boycott. I will discuss the four most remarkable cases. The course of actions in the non-boycotts also offer arguments for the conclusion. Two of the cases, the 1936 Berlin Olympics and the 2008 Beijing Olympics, are not boycotted, although a boycott has been suggested. In the other two instances, the 1968 Mexico City Olympics and the 1970 Munich Olympics there is a clear boycott threat. On both occasions the demands of the boycott threat are met, so therefore the actual boycott did not take place.

### BERLIN 1936

The Olympic Games of 1936 are awarded to Berlin in 1931. The only other candidate is Barcelona. The IOC session is held in Barcelona at a time that the Spanish Civil War is 'already moving into the streets' (Senn 1999:50). With only a third of the members present, the Spanish IOC-members could not even make it to Barcelona, the vote is extended with a postal vote of the absent members. IOC president Baillet-Latour announces later that Berlin is chosen by forty-three votes to sixteen (idem). In February 1933 Adolf Hitler comes to power and starts to employ his fascist regime. By the end of March 1933 a national boycott on Jewish business is proclaimed and Jews are purged from public functions. Also in March 1933 the German Boxing Federation is the first sport organisation to ban all Jewish athletes and referees from competing in German championship contests, other sport organisations soon follow (Hart-Davis 1986:59). By summer 1933 Chancellor Hitler has withdrawn Germany from the League of Nations. The President of the Berlin Olympic Organizing Committee, Mr. Lewald, is replaced since his grandmother is born Jewish. After the IOC objects and states that the Olympics 'are to be entirely nonpolitical in character', he is reinstated. The Americans initiate the boycott debate under the lead of the athletes and their unions. In 1935 the national convention of the American Athlete Union votes by fifty-eight to fifty-six to participate in the Berlin Olympics (Ecker 1996:56). In Europe 'committees for the defence of the Olympic idea' are formed, aimed to promote a boycott of the Berlin Games, or the change of site by the IOC. The IOC however, has Germany's promise that Jews can enter the German Olympic team, that foreign Jews will not be in danger when visiting Germany and that all

Olympic rules will be obeyed (Senn 1999:56,57). In France the government decides, after a long debate, that the decision whether to compete or not, is up to the NOC. The government argues that a state-led boycott will end any hope of an agreement between France and Germany. A boycott is not useful when there are no other countries boycotting (Hart-Davis 1986:121). In the United Kingdom the government leaves the decision to the NOC since they operate totally independent. There it is the general public and the academic world that lead the debates. The public protests against a football match in the UK between their national team and the German one in December 1935. The match is played, although heavily secured and stripped of the planned German march to the stadium through a Jewish neighbourhood (Hart-Davis 1986:83-90). The Oxford University refuses the invitation to the 550th anniversary of Heidelberg University, which the latter regards as extremely disrespectful (ibid:106-107). In September 1935 the Maccabi World Union of Jewish Sport Organisations convenes and adopts a resolution in which they ask all Olympic Committees to allow Jewish athletes to abstain from participating in Berlin considering the Jewish situation in Germany' (IOC archive: ac). All NOCs receive a factbook on the treatment of Jews by the German government<sup>39</sup>. Examples of expelling Jews from sporting organisations were regarded by the IOC as 'not of Olympic concern' and 'national politics' in their reaction to this factbook which was also sent to all NOCs (IOC archive ad). At the Olympics the black American athlete Jesse Owens becomes the symbol to prove Hitler wrong on his theory that the Aryan race is superior, by winning four gold medals. There is a persistent story that Hitler refuses to congratulate Owens. Owens himself states that Hitler just was not present at the time. All the boycott talk does not bother Owens that much, after all, he is not allowed to sport professionally in the USA because of his skin colour. In an interview in 1974 he states

'I wasn't invited up to shake hands with Hitler, but I wasn't invited to the White House to shake hands with the President, either' (Owens quoted in Ecker 1996:60).

In the end all NOCs participate, only a few individual athletes do not compete. With hindsight it seems that a coalition boycott could well have been possible. Hart-Davis (1986) asks what the effect of that might have been. It might have damaged Hitler's position and prestige but it might as well have accelerated his 'progress on a route which he was determined to take anyway' (:229). It seems that all countries and NOCs are too busy with their own policies and standings on the

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<sup>39</sup> In the IOC archive the author of the factbook is unknown (not mentioned on the factbook itself). The IOC says in their answer to the factbook of November 21, 1935 that they 'are without exception neither athletes nor even sporting officials, but either Jews or Aryan communists and socialists, who have emigrated from Germany (IOC Archive ad).

economic crisis, on what to think of Hitler and how to react to his policies, that such a coalition just does not come about.

### **MEXICO CITY 1968**

The 1968 Olympics are awarded to Mexico City in 1963, thereby defeating Detroit, Lyon and Buenos Aires, and becoming the first Latin-American city to host the Olympics. The only criticism on this election at the time of election, is the fear that the high altitude of Mexico City will hinder the athletes in their performance.

In October 1967 a couple of black student American athletes form the 'Olympic Committee for Human Rights' to protest the racial injustice in America. A specific part of it, called the Olympic Project for Human Rights (OPHR), is aimed to organise a boycott of the Mexico City Olympics. The OPHR states in november 1967 that the black athletes will boycott the Olympics. Initially the call for the boycott does not get much support, but things change when on 15 February 1967 the IOC votes, with a thirty-six to twenty-five majority, that the South African NOC can compete again, since they promised to send a mixed racial team (Espy 1979:102). That decision leads to the threat of a boycott of 40, most African, states in cooperation with the Soviet Union and some Eastern European states. The Organisation of African Unity calls for the boycott on 25 February and two days later the Supreme Council on Sports in Africa (SCSA) answers that call with a boycott threat. The Mexico City OCOG does not send out an invitation to the South African NOC, despite Brundage urging to do so. The Mexico City OCOG states that they cannot guarantee the safety of the South African athletes (Manning 1968). The IOC tries to get the South African NOC to withdraw voluntarily by stating 'that in view of all the information on the international climate [...] it is unanimously of the opinion that it would be most unwise for a South African team to participate' (IOC archive:ae). It does not have the intended result and in May 1968 it is the Executive Board of the IOC that advised the IOC Session that 'despite the Grenoble decision, South Africa should not be present in Mexico' leaving the final decision to the IOC members. By postal vote they now vote forty-seven to sixteen (eight abstentions) to withdraw South Africa's invitation (Miller 2004:175). Brundage is astonished according to a letter he writes on 8 April, saying 'how can any organisation function if after a decision is taken, the loser can call for another hearing? [...] People will think we are mad' (IOC archive:af). The boycott is off and in September 1968 the OPHR also withdraws their boycott threat. It is not the end of political upheaval however.

On 21 August 1968, the Russian Army enters the Czechoslovakian capital Prague to end the 'Prague Spring', a non-violent revolution aiming at a more free form of socialism than Russia's Stalin is promoting. Comparable to the situation in 1956 one would expect a boycott threat against the Soviets. Some of the Scandinavian countries indeed call for a boycott supported by the Czech athlete Emil Zatopek, but the call does not receive any substantial support and all Scandinavian NOC's compete at the Olympics (Espy 1979:121). The OCOG alter some arrangements in the housing of the athletes, since the Czechs were to share a dining room with the Soviets, among others. The public gives its opinion at the opening ceremony when it cheers the Czech delegation with loud sympathetic cries of 'czech-o, czech-o' while the Soviet delegation only receives a polite applause. Initially they are booed but since they hold small Mexican flags beside their Soviet flags, they get applauded after all (Ecker 1996:102, Daniels 1996:4).

On 2 October 1968, ten days before the opening ceremony, thousands of Mexican students gather on Tlatelolco Plaza to protest the government's lavish Olympic spending and demand the freeing of political prisoners, freedom of speech and association and democratization (Jefferson Lenskyj 2000:109). About three hundred protesters are killed by the army, others are arrested, tortured and jailed. The IOC calls an emergency meeting to see whether the Olympics must be canceled for safety reasons but decide that the Olympics can proceed as scheduled (idem). There is however no call for a boycott to cancel the Games because the Mexican government does not uphold human rights. The lack of news about the Tlatelolco Massacre can be a reason for this. The first newspaper articles report on twenty five to forty casualties. The Daily Telegraph for example reports on 4 October that there are 40 death guerrillas, not students (ibid:110). It is not until the Games already began that more realistic figures are mentioned, but by then all attention is focused on the Olympics. The Sunday Times states on 13 October:

'It is now estimated that over 200 perished in the massacre of Mexico City's Plaza de las Tres Culturas but the impact on the Olympic village and its camp followers has been as negligible as that of a pin dropped into the Pacific' (The Sunday Times 1968).

## **MUNICH 1972**

In 1965 South Rhodesia declares itself independent from British rule. The Rhodesian government employs a racial apartheid policy. In 1968 the UN Security Council adopts a Resolution in which member states are asked not to recognize Rhodesian passports. However the Federal Republic of

Germany (FRG, West Germany KEO) is not a UN-member by then, and therefore not bound by the UN resolution (Epsy 1979:129). The UN Security Council Sanctions committee asks West Germany to

‘inform the IOC that the Resolution applies to individuals and private organisations as well’ (ibid:130).

Like in 1968, at the Mexico Olympics, the IOC arranges for the Rhodesian athletes to travel and enter Germany on an Olympic Identity Card (Senn 1999:148). IOC president Brundage is convinced that there is no such extreme discrimination in Rhodesian sports as there is in South Africa. The Rhodesian NOC functions without governmental influence and their Olympic team of forty-seven includes seven black athletes. Additional arrangements are made about the flag and name to be used for the team. Six days before the opening ceremony, the chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (AOU) king Hassan II of Morocco states that 41 African nations will withdraw from the Munich Olympics unless the Rhodesian team is expelled (Miller 2004:190). Although this statement is made by a political organisation, all African athletes and eighteen black American athletes show their support of the boycott threat by refusing to compete at a pre-Olympic practice meet where nine Rhodesian athletes compete also. The IOC convenes and votes to withdraw the invitation of the Rhodesian team, later declaring their passports were not in order. The vote is narrow, thirty-six for withdrawal, thirty-one against and three abstentions (Senn 1999:149). The Rhodesians go home and the other Africans and the American participate. Brundage was so frustrated over this ‘political blackmail’ that he made an eronous statement on the memorial service held for the killing of the Israeli athletes.

‘Sadly, in this imperfect world, the greater and the more important the Olympic Games become, the more they are open to commercial, political and now criminal pressure. The Games of the XX Olympiad have been subject to two savages attacks’ (Brundage quoted in Senn 1999:152).

The fact that he links the pressure to exclude Rhodesia with the hostage taking and murder of Israeli athletes leads to many protests, especially of African states. ‘It was not what he said that was objectionable in itself, but the occasion on which he said it’, Killanin later stated in retrospect (ibid:153).

The IOC did fulfil the demand of the boycott threat and send the Rhodesian team packing. Although the initial boycott threat is made by a political organisation, the athletes of the NOC’s in question, show their support of the boycott threat. Beside not only the West German government

pressures the IOC but also the UN does. The existence of the UN Resolution can well have been a decisive factor for the IOC members when it came to the vote.

## **BEIJING 2008**

Beijing is elected to host the 2008 Olympics at the IOC Session in Moscow in 2001. It is the first time since 1980 (Moscow) that the Games are organised in a nation with a totalitarian regime. Criticism to the choosing of Beijing follows and gets real momentum when the Games approach. The first subject of protest is the warm relation between the Chinese government and that of Sudan, while the latter is condoning the large scale murder of refugees in Darfur. In March 2007 actress Mia Farrow starts a campaign called 'the Genocide Olympics' (Yale Law School:2007). People are asked to send petitions to sponsoring companies. Director Steven Spielberg is an artistic adviser for the Chinese but withdraws from this position after Farrow publicly asks 'whether he wants to be the next Leni Riefenstahl?'<sup>40</sup> (idem). Athletes join the campaign and form the 'Team Darfur' initiated by the American speedskater Joey Cheek. Team Darfur calls on Olympic athletes to highlight the Darfur issue during the Games by for example wearing a 'Team Darfur' sweatband (Team Darfur 2008). Asked about the Olympic rule that no political demonstration or propaganda is allowed at the Olympics, British badminton player Vaughan says 'Darfur is a humanitarian issue, not really a political one' (BBC News 2008:b).

The Free Tibet campaign also grabs the Olympic spotlight, to support the Tibetans and their exiled leader the Dalai Lama, in their struggle for Tibetan independence. They already are present at the IOC session in 2001, opposing the possible election of Beijing. At the 2006 Turin Winter Games the 73-year old Buddhist Monk, Palden Gyatso, who had been imprisoned by the Chinese for twentyfive years, stages a hungerstrike which he ends after talking to IOC officials. In March and April 2008 the Chinese government acts with force against protest of Tibetans and close down budhist monastries. About 400 Tibetans are killed, according to reports and then thousand jailed and detained without a fair trial (Reuters 2008:b). The Free Tibet Campaign uses the torch run to demonstate against the Chinese occupation of Tibet. At more than one occasion the torch run is interrupted (Free Tibet 2008).

The Reporters without borders, an INGO of journalists, call for a boycott of the Beijing Olympics. They do not argue for a total boycott, but that heads of state and other high profile

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<sup>40</sup> Referring to the movie made by Riefenstahl about the 1936 Berlin Olympics. The movie is contested for its content is not atheleticism but it praises fascism and the superiority of the Aryan athlete and race.

officials should stay away from the opening ceremony. They endorse the issues mentioned above and focus on the human rights situation in China itself, particularly that of journalists (Reporter Sans Frontiers 2008). Indeed the question whether heads of state should boycott the ceremonies becomes a heavily debated issue in international politics. Several European politicians state that they consider to not attend the opening ceremony. Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama and John McCain, all in the running for the presidential elections of the USA, state that they would not attend when they would have been the president by then, and urge George W. Bush to stay at home as well. Bush does attend however and so do most European leaders, despite earlier reports of boycotts and the call for one by the president of the European Parliament Hans Pottering (The Guardian 2008:c). French president Sarkozy, German Chancellor Merkel and British prime-minister Brown all publicly doubt their attendance prior to the Games but do not boycott the ceremony.<sup>41</sup> Most heads of state choose the dialogue at Beijing rather than staying away whilst publicly stating their support for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan cause. Besides politicians question 'whether attendance of the opening ceremony equals and endorsing of the Chinese government' (Nordlinger 2008:42). The French president Sarkozy, then also presiding the European Union, receives the Dalai Lama officially, much to the dismay of China (The New York Times 2008).

The build up to the Beijing Olympics differs substantially from all previous boycott actions. Historically Olympic boycotts were mostly initiated by politicians who influenced the NOC's and athletes. This time it is the other way around with private persons, pressure groups, athletes and INGO's pressuring the politicians to boycott the opening ceremony.

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<sup>41</sup> Merkel and Brown are absent, but not for boycotting reasons (CNN 2008).

## 8- CONCLUSIONS

Is it possible, from a political point of view, that an Olympic boycott is an appropriate tool to use? It can be when political actors apply the Olympic boycott in a way that respects the requirements of international law and of effectiveness. In this final chapter I will weigh up the scores of all the cases and argue whether or not the Olympic boycotts are, or can be, appropriate as a political tool.

**Table 13- Overview all cases (the 'yes' scores of the cases per condition)**

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Goal is modest	NS		X		X	X
2. Boycott announced in time with clarity on obligations target				X	X	X
3. Target is non-autocratic		X	X		X	X
4. There is prior cordial relation between sender and target			X			
5. Target is smaller than sender			X	X		
6. Coalition is established quick and decisive			X		X	
7. Domestic costs matched & not imposed on particular group				X		
8. Boycott dispute is not pending at tribunal or court	X	X	X	X	X	X
9. When standalone weapon goal is not disruption of military adventures.	NS		X		X	X
<b>TOTAL 'yes' scores</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Appropriateness boycott ('yes' score ≥ 5)</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Y</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Y</b>	<b>Y</b>

(1=Melbourne 1 (1956), 2= Melbourne 2 (1956), 3=Montreal (1976), 4=Moscow (1980), 5= Los Angeles (1984), 6= Seoul (1988), NS=no score) (Y=yes, N=no)

Based on the score table the Olympic boycotts of Montreal 1976, Los Angeles 1984 and Seoul 1988 are deemed appropriate as they score positive on five or more of the requirements for appropriateness. Thereby they sufficiently meet the standards of sanctions, set by international law and effectiveness studies of sanctions.

The case of Montreal scores the highest on my appropriateness scale, with seven points. However this case must be dismissed as an appropriate sanction. The reason of the boycott is that New Zealand is wrong to play rugby with South Africa. The rugby tour in question, already had taken place, by the time the Organisation of African Unity makes their boycott demand. So the boycott is not aimed to alter the behaviour of New Zealand, but to punish it for its actions. The International Law of the United Nations is clear on the fact that

‘the purpose of sanctions is to modify the behaviour of a party that is threatening international peace and security, and not to punish or otherwise exact retribution’ (UN 1995:par. 66).

Therefore the boycott of Montreal 1976 does not meet the standards for sanctions, required by international law. The use of the Olympic Games as a sanction by the Organisation of African Unity thus is not an appropriate political tool.

After reviewing the cases I find three of the nine conditions to be of greater importance in their contribution to the appropriateness, than the others. These three conditions are: modesty of the goal, the timing of the boycott and the cost matching and spreading.

### **MODESTY OF THE GOAL**

It is clear that a modest goal improves the chance of an Olympic boycott to be successful, and thereby improves its chance of appropriateness as well. This corresponds perfectly with the findings of Hufbauer e.a (2007) on economic sanctions. When the stated boycott demand is the relocation or postponement of the entire Olympics, there is hardly any chance that the boycott will be successful, whatever the underlying, political demand is. History shows that only during the two World Wars the Olympics were cancelled. At that time this was ‘just’ a logic step to take for the IOC, boycott threats were not needed for this decision. The only two successful boycotts threats, in the sense that the stated demand is met, are Mexico City and Munich. In both cases the stated boycott demand is modest, namely the withdrawal of one NOC, while the underlying demand is not modest, namely a regime change. Although these underlying goal are not modest, they are largely unrefuted and in line with the Olympic Charter. The demanded expulsion of South Africa and Rhodesia is based on the apartheid policies of both countries, which are applied by the NOC’s as well in the composing of the Olympic teams (though not that clear in the Rhodesian case at the time of the Munich Olympics in 1972). Segregation by race is quite easy to recognise. An Olympic team consist of only white athletes or not. Furthermore, the selection of athletes by race by an NOC is clearly a breach of the fundamental principles of the Olympic Movement laid down in the Olympic Charter:

‘Any form of discrimination with regard to a country or person on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise, is incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement’ (IOC 2007:11).

It is no coincidence that the only two mandatory sanctions of the UN Security Council<sup>42</sup> are against those two nations, for exactly the same reasons. The breach of both international norms and laws (and the Olympic ones) is extremely obvious. Moreover segregation of people based on the colour of their skin is probably one of the moral norms and convictions, that are international and intercultural commonly shared. So for both the UN and the IOC it means that you can take action without taking too much risk. It is much harder to get the majority of the IOC Session or the whole of the Security Council to take a stand on more contested, that is less universal, human rights abuse. Human rights issues like the ones in the Beijing boycott campaign, are more debatable. Is Tibet a sovereign state that is occupied or is it a rebellious region of China? Is censorship of the press a reason to intervene or is it within the ‘freedom of a nation to design its own political, economic, social and cultural system?’<sup>43</sup> A collective point of view on issues like this is much harder to obtain. And even when there is agreement on the fact that human rights are breached, it is a lot harder to decide whether that should lead to intervention. Even on the perhaps more obvious case of South Africa the IOC vote is far from unanimous. While everybody might agree on the wrongness of the apartheid system the question whether to use sport to sanction is a separate one. ‘It does not hurt those who administer apartheid, and it deprives the young athletes of many young nations of a meeting with the rest of the world’ the London Telegraph points out in 1968 (IOC archive:ad). Besides the South Africa related boycott, the only Olympic boycotts that score positive on the appropriateness scale have a modest goal, and they are the only ones that score positive on this particular condition as well.

### **TIMING OF THE BOYCOTT**

The notion that the target should get the time to meet the demands seems obvious, however in half the cases the boycott threat is first made a week or even a few days before the opening ceremony of the Olympics concerned. Especially in the case of a total Olympic boycott, as opposed to boycotting the ceremony by high-profile politicians for example, the timing condition should

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<sup>42</sup> In the timeframe of the Olympic boycotts that is until 1988.

<sup>43</sup> UN 1965

be considered pondourant. Not only to the target, but also to other parties involved, not in the least place to the athletes. In the case of Melbourne 1 and Montreal for example, athletes are already present in the Olympic Village, doing their last training. While the disappointment certainly will be no less for, for example the American athletes in 1980, who knew upfront that the chance they would be able to compete was very slim, it is the least courtesy to give athletes the opportunity to focus themselves and their training towards another goal. History shows that the timing of informing and involving the athletes, the main stakeholders, was usually not done with great sensitivity and clarity. A 1992 study among Canadian Olympic athletes who could not compete at the 1980 Moscow Olympics shows that 63% of the athletes were informed about the boycott by the media, to 23% by their coach and only 4% by a head official with the Sport federation (Crossman&Lappage 1992:363).

#### **COSTS TO SENDER AND TARGET**

Only the American athletes in 1980 and the Cuban ones in 1988 receive some way of compensation for the costs they bear. However, one can imagine that any athlete would trade dinner at the White House or a reception by Castro for an Olympic medal any time. It is clear that the athletes pay the highest price in Olympic boycotts and in most cases they are the only domestic group of the sender state that pay that price. It is hard to imagine any way of compensating an athlete in a way that would indeed compensate the loss of participation and/or even more so a medal at the Olympic Games. I argue that there is no such compensation possible. I agree with Buckley jr. who argues that you can only ask this burden from athletes if you ask this burden from farmers, businessmen and soldiers as well (1980:245). Furthermore one must realize that in the case of boycott, athletes are used as a tool to make a political point. The athletes themselves have no actual leverage to change the behaviour of the regime of a foreign state. If they have any leverage at all, it is the contact with other athletes during competitions and especially in the Olympic village. Participation of athletes of for example closed countries might mean that athletes at least get a glimpse of the world outside theirs. The Dutch are concerned enough with the Hungarian civilians that they boycott the Olympics in 1956. They could have said 'we are not coming to the Olympics unless the Dutch and Hungarians share a site in the Olympic Village'. Then they would be able to talk to and perhaps help their Hungarian colleagues. It still is using the Olympics for political purposes, albeit in a more friendly and cooperative way.

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Clearly athletes are in the Olympic village to train and prepare for their contests and the IOC could dismiss this demand on political grounds as easily as any other boycott demand.

Some of the boycotts are against the state hosting the Olympics, like the 1980 Moscow, the 1984 Los Angeles and the 1988 Seoul boycott. With others, including the case of Mexico City and Munich, the organising state has no more leverage to the boycott demand, than the sender state has. The costs for the organising state however are tremendously higher, especially when multiple NOC's boycott the Olympics. This does not only go against common sense but it is against international law as well. International law requires quite clearly that a sanction is only prohibited against 'a state which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act' or 'is a threat to the international security' (International Law Commission 2001:126-135&UN 1995:par.66). Moreover, international law requires that

'the costs of the sanction should be borne equitably by all member states and not exclusively by the few who have the misfortune to be neighbours or major economic partners of the target country. The Security Council will assist states that suffer collateral damage, unless they support the target state' (UN 1995:par. 72-75).

If I translate this to the Olympic boycotts it would mean that a boycotting state, whose boycott goals considers another state than that hosting the Olympics, should compensate the costs of the boycott to the organising state. So, the Organisation of African Unity and/or the African NOC's should have compensated Canada for the costs of their boycott in 1976. It is remarkable that the Australians are punished for a Soviet action in Hungary and an Israeli, French, British action in Egypt, Palestine and the Suez Canal. Just as remarkable as Canada is punished for a rugby tour between New Zealand and South Africa in 1976. The latter case is probably even worse, considering the higher costs to Canada due to the larger number of boycotting states. I find it astonishing that it are exactly those cases where the boycott threat is made a few days or a week before the opening ceremony. So not only do the organising states have no leverage to the boycott demand, any more than any other, including the sender state; on top of that there is no time to negotiate or mediate with the sender state(s). In the case of Mexico and Munich, also aimed at another state than the hosting state, there is at least some leverage for the hosting states. The organising states are the ones handling the invitations (now done by the IOC). In view of the fact that both these boycotts are aimed at one state, Mexico and Germany could have withdrawn the invitation of one NOC to prevent the non-participation of many. In the case of Mexico there is

also time for further negotiations. In the Melbourne case however, even if the boycott would have been announced earlier, that would not have led to more leverage of the Australians to get the Russians out of Hungary, the Israelis out of the Gaza strip. I argue that when a boycott is used for reasons not linked to the host state, the stakes for the proper design and execution of the sanction are much higher. The history of Olympic boycotts shows the opposite.

### **THE OTHER CONDITIONS**

Most Olympic boycotts are, at the time of the boycott, a 'single weapon' and not accompanied by other sanctions. The underlying goals of the boycotts can be divided in long lasting conflicts and singular events. The hostilities between the Soviet Union and the USA as well as between North and South Korea are long lasting conflicts. The invasion by the Soviet Union of Hungary and the rugby tour between South Africa and New Zealand are more specific events that happen to occur just prior to an Olympic Games celebration. The one condition that receives a positive score at all cases is the one that requires that the underlying conflict is not pending at an international court. A case is only then referred to an international court or tribunal if other ways to solve the dispute, like negotiation, diplomacy and sanctions, failed to work. In the singular event cases, like Melbourne 1 and 2 and Montreal, that point could not have been reached yet. The events occurred just prior to the Olympics and other means of conflict resolution did not even have a chance to prove themselves. It seems in these cases that when the 'event' happened, the Olympic podium just was available and therefore used. The seemingly sudden decision to use the Olympic therefore impresses as not well thought out. The invasion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan also is a specific event. However, in view of the fact that President Carter, before the invasion, already is adamant to boycott the Moscow Games, and that there is enough time for other means of conflict resolution, I argue that this case should be seen in the light of the long-term hostile relation between the Soviet Union and the USA. The Olympic boycotts in these cases can prelude other sanctions or are applied on top of already applied other sanctions. These other sanctions do not necessarily concern the same subject. While the relations between the Soviet Union and the USA already was subject to many means of coercion and pressure, the Olympic boycott was the first action taken in reaction of the invasion of Afghanistan. The Olympic boycotts applied to long lasting conflicts do not show a well thought out plan of how an Olympic boycott can enhance the effect of other measures already applied. In these cases it also seems to be the availability of the Olympic podium that spurs the decision for an Olympic boycott. Olympic boycotts are decided

more on the availability of the opportunity than on the well thought out leverage possibilities of sport in international politics, so it seems. The Olympic podium (of the Summer Games) is available 'only' once in four years. The Olympics time frequency and span, a peak every four years with a build up in the year before, is a very relevant notion to the appropriateness of Olympic boycotts.

#### OLYMPIC TIME FREQUENCY AND SPAN

The Olympics Games are celebrated every four years within sixteen days. It makes the leverage of using the Olympics bound by time. Threatening to boycott the Olympic Games six months before they start has a stronger influence than threatening with it three years in advance. However, the leverage of the Olympics is a short one. As soon as the Olympic are over, the leverage is gone. The target can no longer be influenced with an Olympic boycott that already occurred. In economic sanctions the leverage 'is the incremental application of force, combined with the threat to inflict more pain in the future' (Cortright&Lopez 1995:203). With an Olympic boycott there is no such future, it is the moment of the Olympic with a limited timeframe up front, but as soon as the Olympic flame is extinguished the leverage is gone as well. While the Olympics provided a leverage to use against the Chinese government in July 2008, by September the same year, it had no power left whatsoever. The timeframe of the Olympics makes it a very limited mean for political pressure.

The negative effect of an Olympic boycott on the athletes of the sender state will have a more long-lasting effect. In some cases even an indefinite effect when the Olympics boycotted are the only one for an athlete to compete in. Pound argues that 'the permanent damage is suffered by the boycotters themselves and their citizens [anyway...]. For example, South Korea was not affected by the Cuban boycott of its Games as much as Cuba and the Cuban athletes' (1994:337).

This substantial limit of time has a negative effect on the possible impact of the sanction to the behaviour of the target state. This limit applies to total boycotts but to ceremonial boycotts such as the non-attendance of politicians at an opening ceremony and associated meetings, as well. In that case, as soon as the Olympic ceremony is started, the leverage a politician may have had the day before is gone completely. And also there the cost for the sender can have a more long-lasting effect. The fact that you were, so to speak a 'party-pooper', might be better and longer remembered than the speeches you held on the boycott subject.

It is partly due to this fact, the only four year leverage opportunity, that an Olympic boycott, or other political inference for that matter, is arbitrarily selective. It is not a case of whether the conflict is serious enough; the question seems 'are the Olympics near enough? Moreover, as the research of Hafner-Burton on naming and shaming shows, the choice of a target is arbitrary and not always 'evidence-based' in non-Olympic instances as well. IOC member and Prince of Hanover puts this into words on the South African question on 18 March 1968:

'I voted against the invitation of the South-African athletes for purely practical reasons as I was afraid that an affirmative vote would create difficulties for the Olympic Idea and the Games in Mexico City. It seems to me that moral indignation concerning the invitation of the South-Africans is groundless considering how many athletes from countries governed by dictatorial regimes with unlimited power over the individual attend the Olympic Games. In this connection I would also like to draw your attention to Nigeria, where the central government wages a more or less genocid civil-war against the Ibo people' (IOC archive:ad).

This is just one example of the undoubtedly many there will be available. Now I do not want to argue that sanctions can not be employed because of the arbitrary nature of the target picking. There is no reason for the international community not to act on a breach of international peace and security, solely for the reason that they failed to act in another case. However a sanction goal, especially in the case of a sports boycott, in which athletes suffer more than politicians, should be as uncontested as possible. I find the arbitrary nature of Olympic boycotts, due to their limited time span, a substantial negative influence on the appropriateness of the sanction. IOC President Samaranch acknowledges this point when he says that 'if the political situation in the world at the time of the Games is calm, we will have good Games, and if it is bad, the Games can be adversely affected' (Samaranch quoted in Pound 1994:337).

When boycotts occur against the hosting state the IOC will be criticized for choosing this state to host the Olympics in the first place. As stated, the IOC is a sports organisation in the first place. There are not always many candidates to chose from. One could wonder how the IOC came to chose Seoul as the host, while that state was not fully integrated in the international world at that time. On that occasion though, there were 'only' two states to choose between. Furthermore, once the Olympics in question are over, there will be hardly any politician actively and publicly lobbying for a change in the IOC's customs and regulations. It will only then come up when a

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boycott is debated or when the host state is contested for political reasons. This adds proof to the premise that politicians use the Olympic podium when it is available, but have no substantial and tenacious interest in reforming the IOC after that momentum has gone. Only NGO's and pressure groups that are founded for that reason will keep interested and active on this subject, like for example the Bread and Circuses movement.

I find the three conditions: 'modesty of the goal', 'timing of the boycott' and 'cost spreading and matching', the most relevant when searching for appropriateness of Olympic boycotts. The other conditions are more general requirements of possible effectiveness and are therefore meaningful as well, but these three conditions specifically handle the content of the Olympic boycotts and the parties involved. Certainly a quick and decisive coalition forming improves the possible effectiveness of an Olympic boycott, but an Olympic boycott in which the goal is demanding, the costs are not matched and spread and the boycott is not announced in time, the coalition condition will not make the boycott appropriate. While in economic sanctions the size difference is very relevant for the possible success, I argue that it is less relevant in the Olympic cases. It is relevant in the sense that the withdrawal of the USA, the Soviet Union or China has a larger effect (seen the amount of athletes and medals) than when for example New Zealand, Uganda or Liechtenstein withdraws. However, in the Olympic Movement every NOC is equal, and for any state, how small it might be, the Olympic parade has the same relevance. Especially for small countries, or just emerging countries, the Olympic Games are a way to show themselves to the world. So on that account, it does not matter how big or small the delegation, how many or few the medals won at the previous Games, the presence at the Olympics is equally important to any country. The Brunei people were very upset that their two athletes could not compete in Beijing, as they reveal on the BruneiNews Forum (Brunei News Net 2008). Not because they expected to win a lot of medals, but for the pride of their small delegation walking among the rest of the nations of the world.

When I weigh up the importance of the conditions I find that for an Olympic boycott to be appropriate it should at least score positive on these three conditions: modest goal, acceptable timing and cost spreading and matching. Table 14 show that none of the boycotts then pass the appropriateness test.

**Table 14- appropriateness test 3 mandatory conditions**

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Goal is modest	NS		X		X	X
2. Boycott announced in time with clarity on obligations target				X	X	X
3. Domestic costs matched & not imposed on particular group				X		
<b>Total score appropriateness (3 positive scores required)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

(1=Melbourne 1 (1956), 2= Melbourne 2 (1956), 3=Montreal (1976), 4=Moscow (1980), 5= Los Angeles (1984), 6= Seoul (1988), NS=no score) (Y=yes, N=No).

My overall conclusion must therefore be that from a political point of view all historical Olympic boycotts have been inappropriate as a political tool, as a sanction method. The politicians are not bound by the Olympic Charter but the employed sanction does not meet the standards for 'regular' sanctions, to which they are bound, either. They do not sufficiently meet the standards, let alone convincingly. Despite the fact that historical cases prove to be inappropriate, can an Olympic boycott be appropriate from a political viewpoint? Based on the conditions set and my findings it could be when at least the following conditions are met:

- ❖ The goal is modest.
- ❖ The boycott is announced in time with clarity on the obligations target.
- ❖ The price of the boycott is not paid only by the athletes (officials and businesses related to the Olympics, and they are compensated for their costs as much as possible.
- ❖ When the boycott is aimed at a state other than the organising state, the costs of the boycott are compensated to the organising state.

Those are the compulsory conditions which should be added with at least two of the following conditions:

- ❖ The target state is not an autocratic regime.
- ❖ The relation before the boycott is cordial.
- ❖ The boycott issue is not pending at an international tribunal.
- ❖ The target state is significantly smaller than the sender state.
- ❖ The coalition of the willing is established quick and decisive.
- ❖ When the boycott is a stand alone weapon the goal is not the disruption of military adventures.

It is hard to imagine any future case of an Olympic boycott which will meet these requirements. All historical cases show that Olympic boycotts do not, nor did any of the historical boycotts achieve the underlying goals. As Richard Pound (1994:51) points out:

‘Did the departure of the African countries on the eve of the Montreal Games in 1976 prevent New Zealand from competing, or its rugby teams from continuing contact with South Africa? Did the Soviet Union leave either Hungary or Afghanistan because of Olympic boycotts? Did the Olympic boycott in 1980 send a message any stronger about the world’s revulsion with the intervention in Afghanistan than had already been delivered through the diplomatic structures, especially when it was clear that no military action was contemplated by any of the countries that opposed the intervention?’

Due to the time span of Olympic Games the leverage will always be very limited, while the cost of the domestic group of Olympic athletes will always be very high. The cause of an eventual future boycott must be very ponderous to justify the decision to indeed threaten with or apply an Olympic boycott. The cause must be so ponderous that it justifies the enormous cost laid on the athletes. The cause must be grave enough to justify the fact that a state, which itself is not bound by the Olympic Charter, forces its athletes to violate the charter that they are bound by. And there is the bottle neck for any Olympic boycott. To justify those costs the cause must be grave, but for an Olympic boycott to have a chance to be effective and therefore appropriate, the goal must be modest. Therefore an Olympic boycott can not be deemed an appropriate political sanction. It is unable to meet the requirements of lawfulness and possible effectiveness of sanctions and at the same time justify the costs for a domestic group (athletes) which have no leverage in the political matter. It never has done in the history of Olympic boycotts. In my opinion, in the case of deciding whether an Olympic boycott can be an appropriate political tool, past result do guarantee future results. The words of Brundage, albeit from a very different, but also political context, still apply: ‘the Games must go on’.

## **IOC REACTIONS**

The IOC chooses the sites for Olympic Games seven years in advance. While the IOC wants to contribute to world peace, first and foremost they are an international sports organisation. When choosing a host city the main focus is on how well a city can organise the Olympic Games as a

sport contest. Furthermore the IOC wishes to celebrate the Olympics throughout the world, which has led to the custom to choose a city from a different continent than the last chosen. These interests of the IOC make that the host city can be in a state reigned by any political system, not necessarily a liberal democracy. This leads to criticism and/or Olympic boycotts. The IOC wants to separate sport from politics but finds itself in the midst of political debate on more than one occasion, as is shown by the historical boycott cases. The IOC has a leverage to punish NOC's that boycott or use the Games for political objectives. The IOC has debated whether and how to punish NOC's after every major boycott. But they find themselves facing the consequence that makes them condemn the boycotts. When the IOC punishes an NOC that has been boycotting, it thereby punishes the same athletes and officials that have been punished by the boycott. It would mean that an athlete that could not compete since the NOC he is accredited to boycotted the Olympics would be unable to compete at the following Olympics as well, since his NOC would then be boycotted by the IOC. Besides the Rhodesian and South African NOC's the IOC never suspended NOC's. It did change the way of inviting NOC's to the Olympics. The invitation is, since 1984, no longer send by the Organising committee, but by the IOC itself. NOC's must reply to this invitation at least six months before the opening of the Olympics. The IOC could choose to avoid boycotting states as hosts of an IOC Session or Congress for a certain period of time. Thereby it takes a stance and an action but does not punish athletes or officials. Another option for the IOC could be to grant athletes from a boycotting state the opportunity to compete as an individual Olympic athlete. Thereby it can diminish the effect of the boycott since the number of athletes would not drop that drastically thereby saving media coverage, advertising and sponsoring revenues. The IOC refused this opportunity to American athletes in 1980. However it gave the opportunity, for other reasons, to athletes of East Timor at the 2000 Sydney Olympics and to the athletes of former Yugoslavia at the 1992 Barcelona Olympics. The history of the Olympic Games shows that the different IOC presidents had very different approaches to political turmoil. De Coubertin had very strict ideas about the separation between sport and politics. In 1924 Germany, Austria, Hungary and the new Soviet Union would not be invited to the Paris Games. 'With his ingrained idealism/blindness, de Coubertin campaigned for the inclusion of the German team for Paris, but was unable to persuade his unsurprisingly embittered colleagues' (Miller 2004:73). While Killanin had a more awaiting approach when politics interfered with the Olympics, Samaranch took a very active role. Perhaps due to his prior diplomatic career he immediately started to negotiate himself when boycott threats came about. The current IOC president Rogge

seems to employ a silent diplomacy method while being publicly clear on what can be expected of the IOC and what the IOC expects of athletes. Let's hope he is right when he states, in the lead up to the Beijing Games,

'boycotts are a thing of the past, not the present nor the future' (China Daily 2008).

#### THE OLYMPICS AS WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

When the Olympics are held in a state that is contested for its regime or handling of (inter)national affairs like China, one might use the possibilities of the Olympic time-frame for change. Lord Moynihan, quoted in the introduction as well, stretches this point when he says, 'ironically, the greatest challenge may come when the flame is extinguished on August 24. Many human rights campaigners will wish that the Olympic Games were an annual event; and that the permanent site was Beijing' (Moynihan 2008). Nordlinger asks Chinese dissidents their opinion. 'The Games should probably never have been granted to this state to begin with. But now that they have —take advantage of them. There is a window of opportunity, not to be missed. [...] If we do nothing, this will definitely strengthen the hands of the Communists. They will be emboldened, knowing that they can get away with whatever they want. If, on the other hand, America and others press the Communists for reform, the Games may prove a help, even a boon' (Nordlinger 2008:43). The Dalai Lama never endorsed an Olympic boycott. He calls for an investigation to the Lhasa killings and accuses the Chinese Government of cultural genocide, he says in March 2008. On the Olympic Games however he says that 'China deserves to be a host of the Olympics' and 'the Chinese people need to feel proud about it' (Timesonline 2008). While a negative use, by a boycott, of the limited time span has little long-lasting effects, the positive use of the same limited time span, might have longer lasting effects. The Dutch journalist and former Olympic Champion in table-tennis, Bettine Vriesekoop lives in and reports from China. She states in a Dutch TV interview that the Chinese political system has not changed. What has changed however, is the level of openness among the Chinese, which has grown. The Olympics brought many citizens in contact with the world outside China on a scale never seen before the Olympics (VARA 2008).

### **POSSIBLE FUTURE BOYCOTTS**

The boycott discussion of the 2008 Beijing discussion is started by citizens pressuring governments, instead of the other way around like at the previous Olympic boycotts. Olympic boycotts thereby follow international trends. Civil society, whereby actors not belonging to the government or the (economical) market act and influence those two, are more and more active on many fields, for example in foreign aid (LSE 2004). The Beijing boycott debate was not initiated by politicians or governments but by pressure groups of citizens, some already existing, some founded for this particular reason like the athletes 'team Darfur'. The future Games that already are awarded are the winter Games of 2010 in Vancouver (Canada) and the summer Games of 2012 in London (United Kingdom). The winter Games of 2016 are in Sochi, a southern Russian city near by the border with Georgia, more specifically with the rebellious region Abkhazia which is supported by the Russians. Although the ingredients seem to be available for political inference, usually the winter Games are less liable to major political actions due to the fact that the podium is much smaller than that of the summer Olympics. There are fewer athletes from fewer NOC's competing. On the other hand, the Georgian president Saakashvili already urged the world to boycott the Sochi Games in 2008 (see page 2). The Summer Games of 2018 are not decided yet but the final four candidates are known. They are Chicago (USA), Madrid (Spain), Tokyo (Japan) and Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). None of those cities and states currently poses any possible threat to be boycotted. So a major boycott is not likely to appear at least until 2020. By then the landscape of political actors, civil society, and globalisation might well have changed so much that when political interference of Olympic Games will occur, it will be in yet another way and fashion. In view of the development of sanctions in general, the growth of interdependence between most nations states and the fact that the last boycott against another competing state not being the host state was in 1976, I do not expect such a boycott to occur in the future. When a boycott will occur it will be most likely against the hosting state.

### **AUDIENCE REACTION**

If one wants to use the Olympic Games to make a statement about the politics of another state, any politician could well leave that up to the public. History shows that the audience at the Olympic Opening ceremonies quite clearly show their approval or disapproval of the nations entering the stadium. In Melbourne the Russian delegation is booed, in Mexico City they are as well (initially) after their invasion in respectively Budapest and Prague (Schaller&Hennaux (eds.)

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2004:128 (my translation from Dutch KEO/ Ecker 1996:102). At the Barcelona Games the athletes of the former Yugoslavia and those of South Africa (re-entering the Olympics) are cheered while the Iraqi ones are boo-ed over their invasion of Kuwait (Hargreaves 2000:115), while at the Beijing Games the North Koreans probably receive their warmest welcome ever at the Olympics (The Huffington Post 2008). And after the Games are opened the focus, of the same public, will be focused on the sport results and achievements.

All historical cases of Olympic Boycotts have proven to be inappropriate measures from a political point of view. They do not meet the standard for appropriateness sufficiently, let alone convincingly. The leverage on Olympic Games is very limited due to its specific time span. It is impossible for an Olympic boycott to meet the requirements of lawfulness and possible effectiveness of sanctions and at the same time justify the costs for a domestic group (athletes). A general sanction can only be lawful when it is aimed to change the behaviour of the target regime, it may not be aimed at the winning from the target on other political grounds. So for the Olympic Games as well as (Olympic) politics the creed of de Coubertin still is valid:

**The most important thing [...] is not to win but to take part!** <sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Toohey&Veal 2007:64

## 9-ANNEX

### CASE 1: MELBOURNE 1

- a: Score retrieved on 14 April 2009 from: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/rus2.htm>
- b: \* Diplomatic relation Soviet Union and the Netherlands: website Dutch embassy in Moscow. Retrieved on 1 April 2009 from: <http://www.netherlands-embassy.ru/>  
\* Diplomatic and trade relation Spain and Soviet Union: nations encyclopedia based on the Country Studies Series by Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. Retrieved on 1 April 2009 from: <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-13081.html>  
\* Trade relation Soviet Union and the Netherlands. Website Ministry Foreign Affairs Netherlands. Retrieved on 1 April 2009 from: <http://www.mfa.nl:8000/ddi-onderzoek2/148279.pdf>
- c: \* GDP Netherlands and Spain retrieved on 1 April 2009 from: [http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco\\_gdp-economy-gdp&date=1960](http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gdp-economy-gdp&date=1960)  
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