The UvA-LINKER will give you a range of other options to find the full text of a publication (including a direct link to the full-text if it is located on another database on the internet).
De UvA-LINKER biedt mogelijkheden om een publicatie elders te vinden (inclusief een directe link naar de publicatie online als deze beschikbaar is in een database op het internet).
faculty: "FEB" and publication year: "2004"
| Authors||E.C. Perotti, E.-L. von Thadden|
|Title||The political economy of bank- and market dominance|
|Title series||Discussion paper|
|Series number||TI 2004-012/2|
|Faculty||Faculty of Economics and Business|
|Institute/dept.||FEB: Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)|
|Keywords||corporate governance; banks versus markets; politics|
|Abstract||Legislation affects corporate governance and the protection of stakeholders versus investor claims. We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the governance structure and the extent of stakeholder claims. In a society where median voters have relatively more at stake in the form of human capital rather than financial wealth, they prefer a less risky environment even when this reduces profits, as stakeholder rents are exposed to undiversifiable firm-specific risk. In general, stakeholders and lenders prefer less corporate risk, since their claims are a concave function of firm profitability. This congruence of interests will lead the political majority in such a society to support bank over equity dominance. As shareholdings by the median voters increase, the dominance structure will switch towards favoring equity markets with riskier corporate strategies and higher profits.|
Use this url to link to this page: http://dare.uva.nl/en/record/119689
Contact us about this recordNotify a colleague
Add to bookbag