The UvA-LINKER will give you a range of other options to find the full text of a publication (including a direct link to the full-text if it is located on another database on the internet).
De UvA-LINKER biedt mogelijkheden om een publicatie elders te vinden (inclusief een directe link naar de publicatie online als deze beschikbaar is in een database op het internet).

Search results

Query: faculty: "FEB" and publication year: "1994"

AuthorsE. Berglof, E.C. Perotti
TitleThe governance structure of the Japanese financial keiretsu
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
FacultyFaculty of Economics and Business
Institute/dept.FEB: Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)
KeywordsCorporate governance; Financial keiretsu; Corporate control
ClassificationJEL classification codes: G32; L14
AbstractThe authors rationalize the cross-holdings of debt and equity within the Japanese keiretsu as a contingent governance mechanism through which internal discipline is sustained over time. The reciprocal allocation of control rights supports cooperation and mutual monitoring among managers through a coalition-enforced threat of removal from control. In financial distress this threat is less effective, and the governance mode shifts to hierarchical enforcement under main bank leadership. The model is consistent with the capital structure, the distribution of claims, the extent of intragroup trading, and patterns of investor intervention within the groups.
Document typeArticle
Document finderUvA-Linker