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Zoekresultaten

Zoekopdracht: faculteit: "FNWI" en publicatiejaar: "2007"

AuteurLena Kurzen
TitelLogics for Cooperation, Actions and Preferences
Jaar2007
FaculteitFaculteit der Natuurwetenschappen, Wiskunde en Informatica
Instituut/afd.FNWI/FGw: Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)
SerieILLC Master of Logic Theses / ILLC ; MoL-2007-18
SamenvattingLogics for Cooperation, Actions and Preference
Lena Kurtzen

Abstract:
In this thesis, a logic for reasoning about cooperative ability,
actions and preferences is developed. It is an extention of a
cooperation logic with actions, developed by Sauro et al., which is a
modular modal logic consisting of an environment module for reasoning
about actions and their effects and an agents module for reasoning
about the cooperative ability of agents to perform actions. In this
thesis, that logic is combined with a preference logic with unary
preference modalities. In the resulting logic, we can reason about the
abilities of groups to enforce some state of affairs in an explicit
way: It is explicitly represented how exactly a group can achieve some
state of affairs and how this achievement relates to the preferences
of single agents. It is shown that the developed cooperation logic
with actions and preferences is sound and complete with respect to the
class of multi-agent systems with preferences, which are setlabelled
transition systems with a preference relation over the set of states
and an attached model in which it is specified which actions groups of
agents can perform.
The cooperative ability of agents in this framework is investigated in
detail. It is shown what is the relation between the actions single
agents can perform and the role the agents play within a group when
the group is trying to enforce some state of affairs.
Moreover, it is shown that the semantic structures of the logic
provide a formal framework for mechanism design. Apart from standard
game theoretic results, we obtain results that show the relationship
between the distribution of action abilities among agents and the
properties of implementable choice rules.
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