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Zoekresultaten

Zoekopdracht: faculteit: "FNWI" en publicatiejaar: "2006"

AuteursM. van Hees, O. Roy
TitelIntentions and Plans in Decision and Game Theory
Boek/bron titelBruno Verbeek (ed.), Reasons and Intentions, Ashgate Publishers
Jaar2006
FaculteitFaculteit der Natuurwetenschappen, Wiskunde en Informatica
Instituut/afd.FNWI/FGw: Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)
TrefwoordenIntentions; Games; Decision Theory; Simplification; Focal Points
SerieILLC Prepublications / ILLC ; PP-2006-54
SamenvattingGiven the important role that intentions play in the way we make
decisions, we would expect intentions to occupy a substantial place
in any theory of action. Surprisingly enough, in what is perhaps the
most influential theory of action, rational choice theory, explicit
reference is made to actions, strategies, information, outcomes and
preferences but not to intentions. This is not to say that no
attention has been paid to the relation between rational choice and
intentions. On the contrary, a rich philosophical literature has
developed on the relation between rationality and intentions (see
for example (Mele, 1997)). However, to our knowledge, there
has been no real attempt to model the role of intentions in decision
making within a rational choice framework.

In this paper we argue that such modelling is a worthwhile
enterprise. Starting from a very simplistic rational choice model,
we show that enriching it with tools to represent intentions helps
to account for known phenomena such as focal points, and gives rise
to new questions about intention-based strategic interactions. We
build our representation of intention on the philosophical
foundations laid down in (Bratman, 1987). Our contribution is
twofold. We first show that intentions can account for focal points
in decisions and games. We then show how agents can use their
intentions to simplify decision problems. In neither part do we go
into the question whether intentions can be defined in terms of
strategies, preferences, beliefs, or in any other ingredient of the existing models; we simply
introduce intentions as an extra parameter and then examine some
conditions that might be imposed on them.
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