Zoekopdracht:
faculteit: "FEB" en publicatiejaar: "2011"
| Auteurs | C. Angelucci, M.A. Han | | Titel | Monitoring managers through corporate compliance programs |
| Uitgever | Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics |
| Plaats | Amsterdam |
| Jaar | 2011 |
| Pagina's | 48 |
| Serietitel | Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics working paper |
| Serienummer | 2010-14 |
| Faculteit | Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde |
| Instituut/afd. | FEB: Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI) |
| Samenvatting | Compliance programs entail monitoring of employees' behavior with the claimed objective of fighting corporate crime. (Competition) Authorities promote such intra-firm monitoring. In a three-tier hierarchy model, authority-shareholder-manager, we study the impact of monitoring through a compliance program on contracting within the firm and the authority's optimal sanctions and leniency policy. We find that compliance programs are beneficial in the fight against corporate crime if and only if the managerial sanction is low. Moreover, when the shareholder blows the whistle, the authority optimally grants partial corporate leniency, while not granting individual leniency to the involved employees. Conversely, when the employee blows the whistle, the authority grants individual leniency if and only if the expected managerial sanction is either particularly high or particularly low. Finally, we find that the authority does not apply a discount on the corporate sanction for the mere fact of having adopted a compliance program. We discuss our results in the light of the US and EU Corporate Leniency Program, US Individual Leniency Program and US Sentencing Guidelines. |
| Soort document | Rapport |
| Download bestand | |
| Document finder | 
|
Gebruik dit adres om naar deze pagina te linken: http://dare.uva.nl/record/432977
Vraag/opmerking over dit recordMail aan een collega
Toevoegen aan bewaarset
|
vorige
