The UvA-LINKER will give you a range of other options to find the full text of a publication (including a direct link to the full-text if it is located on another database on the internet).
De UvA-LINKER biedt mogelijkheden om een publicatie elders te vinden (inclusief een directe link naar de publicatie online als deze beschikbaar is in een database op het internet).


Zoekopdracht: faculteit: "FEB" en publicatiejaar: "2009"

AuteursM. Alvisi, E. Carbonara, G. Dari-Mattiacci, F. Parisi
TitelComplementing substitutes: bundling, compability, and entry
UitgeverACLE, Universiteit van Amsterdam
Pagina's43, [7]
SerietitelAmsterdam Center for Law & Economics working paper
FaculteitFaculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde
Instituut/afd.FEB: Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)
SamenvattingIn this paper we study price competition, equilibrium market configurations and entry when firms compete in vertically-di¤erentiated markets producing complementary goods. We consider two complements and start from a configuration where the market for one complement is a duopoly, whereas the other is a monopoly. In such framework, when products are highly di¤erentiated, the low-quality duopolist is always pushed out. We then allow for competition between complements on both sides of the market: one of the duopolists starts to produce also the other complement and decides whether to offer its two products as a bundle or to allow consumers to combine them with complements from other producers. We prove that this strategy always allows the low-quality duopolist to stay in the market, no matter if the duopolist producing both complements is the high or the low-quality one. Moreover, this strategy always increases consumer surplus, even when the duopolist sells the two complements only as a bundle.
Soort documentRapport
Document finderUvA-Linker