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Zoekopdracht: faculteit: "FEB" en publicatiejaar: "2008"

AuteursA. Hu, L. Zou
TitelSelecting less corruptible bureaucrats: A quasi-auction approach
Jaar2008
Pagina's43
FaculteitFaculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde
Instituut/afd.FEB: Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
SamenvattingA government official's propensity to corruption, or corruptibility, can be affected by his intertemporal preference over job benefits. Through a dynamic model of rent-seeking behavior, this paper examines how endogenously determined corruptibility changes with monitoring intensity, salary growth, and discount factor for expected future income. The paper illustrates credible circumstances in which the less an official values his job, the more he seeks rents. This negative relation suggests a simple quasi-auction mechanism for selecting less corruptible public servants. While straightforward to implement, the quasi-auction also tends to circumvent the corrupt influence that is often associated with standard auction of jobs.
Soort documentRapport
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