The UvA-LINKER will give you a range of other options to find the full text of a publication (including a direct link to the full-text if it is located on another database on the internet).
De UvA-LINKER biedt mogelijkheden om een publicatie elders te vinden (inclusief een directe link naar de publicatie online als deze beschikbaar is in een database op het internet).


Zoekopdracht: faculteit: "FEB" en publicatiejaar: "2008"

AuteurA. Bucciol
TitelSocial security, dynamic efficiency and self-control problems
UitgeverQuantative Society for Pensions and Saving, Jon M. Huntsman School of Business, Utah State University
PlaatsLogon, UT
SerietitelQSPS discussion paper
FaculteitFaculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde
Instituut/afd.FEB: Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
SamenvattingWe develop an OLG model with uncertainty on labor income and death age to study the welfare implications of unfunded Social Security programs in an economy where agents are affected by temptation à la Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, Econometrica 69, 1403). Tempted agents give additional value to the pre-commitment mechanism implicit in Social Security. Simulation studies calibrated on the US economy show that, in contrast to previous findings, Social Security may improve welfare even when it reduces aggregate consumption in a dynamically efficient economy. A reasonably small degree of temptation is enough to obtain this result. Our simulations, nevertheless, suggest that a payroll tax of 10 percent is possibly too large.
Soort documentRapport
Document finderUvA-Linker