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Zoekopdracht: faculteit: "FEB" en publicatiejaar: "2004"

AuteursE.C. Perotti, E.-L. von Thadden
TitelThe political economy of bank- and market dominance
UitgeverTinbergen Institute
SerietitelDiscussion paper
SerienummerTI 2004-012/2
FaculteitFaculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde
Instituut/afd.FEB: Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)
Trefwoordencorporate governance; banks versus markets; politics
SamenvattingLegislation affects corporate governance and the protection of stakeholders versus investor claims. We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the governance structure and the extent of stakeholder claims. In a society where median voters have relatively more at stake in the form of human capital rather than financial wealth, they prefer a less risky environment even when this reduces profits, as stakeholder rents are exposed to undiversifiable firm-specific risk. In general, stakeholders and lenders prefer less corporate risk, since their claims are a concave function of firm profitability. This congruence of interests will lead the political majority in such a society to support bank over equity dominance. As shareholdings by the median voters increase, the dominance structure will switch towards favoring equity markets with riskier corporate strategies and higher profits.
Soort documentRapport
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