The UvA-LINKER will give you a range of other options to find the full text of a publication (including a direct link to the full-text if it is located on another database on the internet).
De UvA-LINKER biedt mogelijkheden om een publicatie elders te vinden (inclusief een directe link naar de publicatie online als deze beschikbaar is in een database op het internet).
faculty: "FEB" and publication year: "2011"
| Authors||G. Dari-Mattiacci, B. Lovat, F. Parisi|
|Title||Loss sharing between non-negligent parties|
|Publisher||Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics, University of Amsterdam|
|Title series||Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics working paper|
|Faculty||Faculty of Economics and Business|
|Institute/dept.||FEB: Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)|
|Abstract||In this paper, we study the effects and desirability of legal rules that allow the sharing of an accident loss between a non-negligent injurer and his non-negligent victim. In order to identify the virtues and limits of loss-sharing rules, we begin by considering the effect of a loss-sharing regime on parties' incentives. We address an unresolved issue in the literature, exploring whether loss-sharing in equilibrium undermines the parties' primary care incentives. We establish the conditions under which loss-sharing may be desirable and characterize the regime providing the best overall incentives to minimize the social cost of accidents. Our results indicate that loss-sharing may indeed be desirable in a vast range of situations. The results are later extended to consider the effect of parties' uncertainty in a loss-sharing regime and reveal that loss-sharing may at the same time be desirable and unnecessary in real-life accident law.|
|Note||Also: Minnesota Legal Studies research paper No. 11-24 and Amsterdam Law School legal studies research paper No. 2011-07. - May 23, 2011.|
Use this url to link to this page: http://dare.uva.nl/en/record/422695
Contact us about this recordNotify a colleague
Add to bookbag