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Query: faculty: "FEB" and publication year: "2010"

AuthorM.I. Ochea
TitleEssays on nonlinear evolutionary game dynamics
PromotorC.H. Hommes
Date19-01-2010
PublisherThela Thesis
PlaceAmsterdam
Year2010
Pagesxv, 201
ISBN978 90 5170 688 8
FacultyFaculty of Economics and Business
Institute/dept.FEB: Tinbergen Institute
Keywordsevolutionary game dynamics ; Logit choice ; bifurcations
AbstractEvolutionary game theory has been viewed as an evolutionary “repair” of rational actor game theory in the hope that a population of boundedly rational players may attain convergence to classic “rational” solutions, such as the Nash Equilibrium, via some learning or evolutionary process. In this thesis the model of boundedly rational players is a perturbed version of the best-reply choice, the so-called Logit rule. With the strategic context varying from models of cyclical competition (Rock-Paper-Scissors), through industrial organization (Cournot) and to collective-action choice (Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma), we show that the Logit evolutionary selection among boundedly rational strategies does not necessarily guarantee convergence to equilibrium and a richer dynamical behavior - e.g. cycles, chaos - may be the rule rather than the exception.
LanguageEnglish
NoteTinbergen Institute research series no. 468
Document typeDissertation
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