The UvA-LINKER will give you a range of other options to find the full text of a publication (including a direct link to the full-text if it is located on another database on the internet).
De UvA-LINKER biedt mogelijkheden om een publicatie elders te vinden (inclusief een directe link naar de publicatie online als deze beschikbaar is in een database op het internet).
faculty: "FEB" and publication year: "2008"
| Authors||S. Arping, K.M. Diaw|
|Title||Sunk costs, entry deterrence, and financial constraints|
|Journal||International Journal of Industrial Organization|
|Faculty||Faculty of Economics and Business|
|Institute/dept.||FEB: Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)|
|Abstract||This paper studies how sunk costs affect a financially constrained incumbent's ability to deter entry into its market. Sunk costs make it less attractive to the incumbent to accommodate entry by liquidating assets in place and exiting the market. This may render entry by a prospective rival unprofitable, and thereby facilitate entry deterrence. However, sunk costs also make it harder for the incumbent to pledge valuable collateral to outside investors. To make up for the poor collateral value, the incumbent will have to give stronger liquidation rights to its lenders. Consequently, a larger fraction of the incumbent's assets will be liquidated in the event of a liquidity default. This potentially creates room for profitable entry. The overall effect of sunk costs on the incumbent's ability to deter entry into its market is thus ambiguous.|
Use this url to link to this page: http://dare.uva.nl/en/record/300861
Contact us about this recordNotify a colleague
Add to bookbag