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Query: faculty: "FEB" and publication year: "2007"

AuthorsF. Englmaier, P. Guillen, L. Llorente, S. Onderstal, R. Sausgruber
TitleThe Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auction
PublisherFaculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde
PlaceAmsterdam
Year2007
Pages35
Title seriesCESIFO WORKING PAPER
Series number1782
FacultyFaculty of Economics and Business
Institute/dept.FEB: Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Keywordschopstick auction; exposure problem; laboratory experiment; second-price sealedbid auction
AbstractMulti-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by the so-called exposure problem. In this paper, we analyze a simple game called the ‘chopstick auction’ in which bidders are confronted with the exposure problem. We analyze the chopstick auction with incomplete information both in theory and in a laboratory experiment. In theory, the chopstick auction has an efficient equilibrium and is revenue equivalent with the second-price sealed-bid auction in which the exposure problem is not present. In the experiment, however, we find that the chopstick auction is slightly less efficient but yields far more revenue than the second-price sealed-bid auction and that it yields more [the same] revenue if bidders are inexperienced [experienced].
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