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Query: faculty: "FEB" and publication year: "2007"

AuthorS. Onderstal
TitleThe optimality of ignoring lobbyists
PublisherUniversity of Amsterdam, School of Economics
PlaceAmsterdam
Year2007
Pages6
FacultyFaculty of Economics and Business
Institute/dept.FEB: Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
AbstractFor situations where interest groups compete in an all-pay auction for a political prize, we derive conditions under which the government optimally balances the costs and the benefits of lobbying by ignoring all lobbying activities and by always assigning the prize to the interest group with the highest ex ante value for it.
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