Query:
faculty: "FEB" and publication year: "2007"
| Authors | H. Oosterbeek, R. Sloof, J.H. Sonnemans | | Title | Promotion rules and skill acquisition: an experimental study |
| Journal | Economica |
| Volume | 74 |
| Year | 2007 |
| Pages | 259-297 |
| ISSN | 00130427 |
| Faculty | Faculty of Economics and Business |
| Institute/dept. | FEB: Research Institute in Economics and Econometrics Amsterdam (RESAM) |
| Abstract | Standard economic theory identifies a trade-off between up-or-stay and up-or-out promotion rules. Up-or-stay never wastes the skills of those not promoted but may provide insufficient incentives to invest in skills. Up-or-out can always induce investment in skill acquisition but may waste the skills of those not promoted. The paper reports an experiment designed to study this trade-off. Under up-or-out, parties behave almost exactly as theory predicts. But under up-or-stay (and stay-or-stay), results differ markedly from theoretical predictions. In that case workers invest rather frequently, although the prediction is that they would not. These deviations can be explained by various reciprocity mechanisms. |
| Document type | Article |
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