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Query: faculty: "FEB" and publication year: "2004"

AuthorsE.C. Perotti, E.-L. von Thadden
TitleThe political economy of bank- and market dominance
PublisherTinbergen Institute
PlaceAmsterdam
Year2004
Title seriesDiscussion paper
Series numberTI 2004-012/2
FacultyFaculty of Economics and Business
Institute/dept.FEB: Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)
Keywordscorporate governance; banks versus markets; politics
AbstractLegislation affects corporate governance and the protection of stakeholders versus investor claims. We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the governance structure and the extent of stakeholder claims. In a society where median voters have relatively more at stake in the form of human capital rather than financial wealth, they prefer a less risky environment even when this reduces profits, as stakeholder rents are exposed to undiversifiable firm-specific risk. In general, stakeholders and lenders prefer less corporate risk, since their claims are a concave function of firm profitability. This congruence of interests will lead the political majority in such a society to support bank over equity dominance. As shareholdings by the median voters increase, the dominance structure will switch towards favoring equity markets with riskier corporate strategies and higher profits.
Document typeReport
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