The UvA-LINKER will give you a range of other options to find the full text of a publication (including a direct link to the full-text if it is located on another database on the internet).
De UvA-LINKER biedt mogelijkheden om een publicatie elders te vinden (inclusief een directe link naar de publicatie online als deze beschikbaar is in een database op het internet).
faculty: "FEB" and publication year: "2004"
| Authors||E.C. Perotti, P. Volpin|
|Title||Lobbying on entry|
|Title series||Discussion paper|
|Series number||TI 2004-088/2|
|Faculty||Faculty of Economics and Business|
|Institute/dept.||FEB: Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)|
|Keywords||entrepreneurship; entry; financial development; growth; income|
|Classification||JEL Classification: G21, G28, G32|
|Abstract||We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequality and political accountability undermine entry and financial development. Incumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potential entrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can promise larger political contributions than the entrants due to the higher rents earned with less competition. Entry and investor protection improve when wealth distribution becomes less unequal, and the political system becomes more accountable. Consistent with these predictions, in a cross-section of 38 countries we find that greater accountability is associated with higher entry in sectors that are more dependent on external capital and have greater growth opportunities. Also, higher accountability and lower income inequality are associated with more effective legal enforcement, even after controlling for legal origin and per-capita income.|
Use this url to link to this page: http://dare.uva.nl/en/record/126924
Contact us about this recordNotify a colleague
Add to bookbag