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Query: faculty: "FEB" and publication year: "2004"

AuthorsH. Oosterbeek, R. Sloof, J. Sonnemans
TitleSpecific investments, holdup, and the outside option principle
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume48
Year2004
Pages1399-1410
ISSN0014-2921
FacultyFaculty of Economics and Business
Institute/dept.FEB: Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
KeywordsHoldup problem; Contractual solutions; Outside option principle; Experiments
ClassificationJ41; J31; C91
AbstractAccording to the outside option principle the holdup problem can be solved when the non-investor has a binding outside option. The investor then becomes residual claimant, creating efficient investment incentives. This paper reports about an experiment designed to test this. We find that when the outside option is binding investment levels fall short of the efficient level, but holdup is less of a problem than predicted when the outside option is non-binding.
Document typeArticle
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