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faculty: "FEB" and publication year: "2003"
| Authors||E.C. Perotti, E.-L. von Thadden|
|Title||The political economy of bank and equity dominance|
|Publisher||Centre for Economic Policy Research|
|Title series||CEPR discussion paper|
|Faculty||Faculty of Economics and Business|
|Institute/dept.||FEB: Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)|
|Keywords||bank centred system; corporate governance; corporate investment; median voter; political economy and social insurance|
|Classification||JEL Classification: G28, G31, G32 and G34|
|Abstract||Legislation affects corporate governance and the return to human and financial capital. We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the governance structure and the extent of labour rents. In a society where median voters have relatively more at stake in the form of human capital rather than financial wealth, they prefer a less risky environment even when this reduces profits, as labour rents are exposed to undiversifiable firm-specific risk. In general, labour and lenders prefer less corporate risk, since their claims are a concave function of firm profitability. This congruence of interests can lead the political majority to support bank over equity dominance. As share-holdings by the median voters increase, the dominance structure will move towards favouring equity markets with riskier corporate strategies and higher profits.|
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