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faculty: "FEB" and publication year: "2001"
| Authors||E.C. Perotti, J. Suarez|
|Title||Last bank standing: what do I gain if you fail?|
|Publisher||Centre for Economic Policy Research|
|Title series||CEPR Discussion paper series|
|Faculty||Faculty of Economics and Business|
|Institute/dept.||FEB: Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)|
|Keywords||banking crises; bank mergers; charter value; market structure dynamics; prudential regulation|
|Classification||JEL classification codes: G21 , G28 , L10|
|Abstract||Banks are highly leveraged institutions, potentially attracted to speculative lending even without deposit insurance. A counterbalancing incentive to lend prudently is the risk of loss of charter value, which depends on future rents. We show in a dynamic model that current concentration does not reduce speculative lending, and may in fact increase it. In contrast, a policy of temporary increases in market concentration after a bank failure, by promoting a takeover of failed banks by a solvent institution, is very effective. By making speculative lending decisions strategic substitutes, it grants bankers an incentive to remain solvent. Subsequent entry policy fine-tunes the trade-off between the social costs of reduced competition and the gain in stability.|
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