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Query: faculty: "FEB" and publication year: "2001"

AuthorsR.M.W.J. Beetsma, A.L. Bovenberg
TitleThe optimality of a monetary union without a fiscal union
JournalJournal of Money, Credit, and Banking
Volume33
Year2001
Issue2
Pages179-204
ISSN0022-2879
FacultyFaculty of Economics and Business
Institute/dept.FEB: Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
KeywordsMonetary union; Fiscal union
AbstractThe paper explores the case for monetary and fiscal unification. Monetary policy suffers from an inflation bias because the monetary authorities are not able to commit. With international risk-sharing, fiscal discipline suffers from moral hazard. An inflation target alleviates the inflation bias but weakens fiscal discipline. In a monetary union, however, this adverse effect on fiscal discipline is weaker. This advantage of monetary unification may outweigh the disadvantage of not being able to employ monetary policy to stabilise country-specific shocks. While monetary unification may thus be optimal, international risk-sharing may be undesirable because it weakens fiscal discipline
Document typeArticle
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