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Query: faculty: "FEB" and publication year: "2000"

AuthorsR.M.W.J. Beetsma, H. Peters, E. Rebers
TitleWhen to fire bad managers: The role of collusion between managment and board of directors.
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
FacultyFaculty of Economics and Business
Institute/dept.FEB: Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
KeywordsShareholder influence; Firing costs; Incentives
AbstractWe develop a model in which a shareholder hires a director to monitor a manager who faces stochastic firing costs. We study the optimal incentive scheme for the director, allowing for the possibility that the manager bribes the director in order to change his firing intentions. Such collusion may be in the interest of the shareholder, because it avoids the need to (ex ante) compensate the manager for very high realisations of his firing costs (these are precisely the cases in which collusion occurs).
Document typeArticle
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