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Query: faculty: "FEB" and publication year: "1992"

AuthorE.C. Perotti
TitleCross-ownership as a hostage exchange to support collaboration
JournalManagerial and Decision Economics
Volume13
Year1992
Issue1
Pages45-54
FacultyFaculty of Economics and Business
Institute/dept.FEB: Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)
Keywordsfirms; ownership rights; reallocation
AbstractThe impossibility of writing complete contracts causes loss of profitable transactions among firms, since their managers cannot ex ante bind themselves to future actions. The author shows how a reallocation of ownership rights into a network of mutual shareholdings among a coalition of firms produces an efficient enforcement mechanism. Cooperation is achieved by exchanging control rights until a mutual threat of capture of control is established. By making control over their firms vulnerable to a takeover by the other members of the coalition, each firm is able to make a credible commitment to future efficient actions. In equilibrium no punishment is administered, so that the arrangement achieves the outcome under complete contracts. More generally, it is proved that a mutual hostage exchange may dominate the threat of loss of reputation as an enforcement mechanism.
Document typeArticle
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